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ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session
Paris, sth{th June 1990
TUESDAY,5th JUNE
Morning
Meetings of political groups.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
1. Opening of the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session by the Provisional'Pre-
sident.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Re-enrolment on the agenda of reports of committees.
7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session.
8. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens, former President of the Assembly.
Debate.
9. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
10. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance:
report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
WEDNESDAY,6th JUNE
t 
"-" 
r. j*jrrs.by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, chairman-in-office of the
2. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance:
Resumed debate.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. WEU in the Atlantic Alliance:
Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union:
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Newall on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
ll
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THURSDAY,7th JUNE
Morning l0 a.m.
l. Address by Mr. CoEme, Minister of Defence of Belgium.
2. Address by Mr. Jeszenszky, Minister for Foreign Alfairs of Hungary.
3. Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. Observation satellites 
- 
a European means of verifying disarmament 
- 
guidelines drawn from
the symposium:
p_resenration of the report tabled by Mr. l*nzer on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace
Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. Address by Mr. Atwood, Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States.
2. The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union:
presenErtion of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aero-
space Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
' 3. WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and
European defence:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stegagnini on behalf of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Votes on the draft recommendation and draft order.
4. The new r6le of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir John Hunt on behalf of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft resolution.
FRIDAY,8th JUNE
Moruing l0 e.m.
l. The future of low flying:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
t2
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2. Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I):
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace
Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial
years 1989 (revised) and 1990:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lord on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION
l3
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INFORMATION LETTER
from Mr. van Eelwlen, Secraary-General of WEII,
on the activities of the intergovernmental otgans
(I6th November 1989 
- 
|lth March 1990)
London, 15th March 1990
Dear President,
My previous information letter to you in November 1989 coincided with the first signs that a
truly revolutionary challenge to the old order in Eastern Europe was gaining momentum in the wake of
the opening of the Berlin wall. The fall of the Ceausescu rdgime with so much bloodshed on 25th
December marked the end both of the first stage of a general upheaval and of an era: almost fifty years
of Leninist socialism in subjection to the Soviet Union are now a matter for the judgrnent of history.
Simultaneously with the proclamation of independence from Moscow by the Lithuanian Communist
Party on 23rd December, perestroika came up against the urgent need for larye-scale institutional
reforms to meet the challenge of ethnic and religious demands on the western and southern fringes of
the Soviet empire.
The USSR as we know it is, to say the least, in the throes of wholesale changes; Stalin's empire is
falling apart but Russia is still alive and will always assert itself as a great power on the continent of
Europe, particularly if it succeeds in adopting a political r6gime conducive to its development. Moscow
must be encouraged to allow the peoples of the Soviet Union the fundamental right freely to choose
their type of economic and social organisation, which presupposes a guarantee of political freedoms.
President Gorbachev recognised this right for the nations of Eastern Europe in his speech to the United
Nations on 7th December 1988. Events are showing us that such recognition is inescapable. If it is
given quickly, there will be less violence. In this respect, the landslide victory of the Sajudis movement
in the Lithuanian elections on 24th February 1990, followed by the declaration of independence on
I lth March 1990, has triggered an irreversible process.
In these circumstances, the Western European countries linked in the European Community and
WEU must exert their full political influence, in view of Gorbachev's wish to attract western capital
and technology to the USSR on a large scale. In all matters concerning the application of the funda-
mental principles embodied in the Helsinki final act, West Europeans must take a bold political line
and not be held back by the unfounded criticism that they are threatening Russia's vital interests. They
are not. If a document issued by the Novosti press agency early this month is to be believed, elimi-
nation of the threat of war is the first priority of the armed forces of the Soviet Union whose foreign
policy is based on the renunciation of the anns race and power politics. Following the example of all
the other European countries committed to the CSCE process, the USSR declares that it has no terri-
torial claims, that it does not consider any state or people to be an enemy and consequently that it will
never start hostilities or even less be the first to use nuclear weapons. In this context, the rights of
peoples are an integral part ofthe political dialogue and can no longer be regarded as a subject ofcon-
frontation. Iooking only at the western fringes of the Soviet Union, it is no longer appropriate for the
WEU countries to stay silent, considering the extent of the demonstrations in Moldavia and the success
of the candidates seeking independence at the elections in the Ukraine. Caution is essential in military
matters, but a bold and open approach in support of the values which the peoples have brought to
triumph in the East is essential in the political dialogue with the Soviet power. Here the Assembly has
taken positive initiatives which should be carried further.
Eastern Europe's re-entry into history, which we are watching closely and with enthusiasm, is
marked by the powerful re-emergence of national, ethnic, religious and cultural identities. National
feeling and religious faith have been the driving forces in the escape from communist domination.
Everything must now be done to prevent any drift towards aggressive attitudes. Consolidation of the
new democratic r6gimes must be accompanied by the emergence of original forms of regional
Mr. Charles GOERENS,
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union
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co-operation capable of stifling any resurgence of the local conflicts which have remained below the
surface since the forties and any inclination to dispute frontiers with the risk of the chain reaction
which such foolish ideas would trigger. Where there are minority problems, frontiers should be relaxed
and opened 
-to allow the free movement of people by way of bilateral or multilateral agreements. But
why not go further and consider the establishment of real European rights for minorities to be imple-
mented thrgrugh the CSCE? The WEU Assembly could usefully open the debate on this subject from
the standpoint of European security. In this area, the Council of Europe could no doubt add fruitfully
to its remarkable contribution in the matter of human rights. It is time to take action in that direction
so that certain problems in the Balkans for example do not one day become European security
problems.
The complete regeneration of the East European economies will demand heavy sacrifices from
the peoples. A market economy is not a panacea; its introduction will be an arduous process and there
will be no quick results. A completely new European strategy is needed in order to mitigate the adverse
political and social repercussions of the unavoidably enoflnous cost of what amounts to economic
reconstruction. This strategy must be global and, therefore, political as well as financial and industrial.
To encourage the assertion of the right to self-determination is not to deny obvious economic interde-
pendence, but rather to give it a new basis and create a climate favourable to reconstruction by cross-
investment. The opening of the USSR to the outside world is as much a condition for its recovery as
for the strengthening of peace and security for all Europeans.
The European Community will gain in cohesion in the search for new balances if it follows such
a strategy with determination and without slowing the progress towards its,economic and monetary
union. The one lesson to be learned from the current debates on the future structure of Europe is that
the answers to the challenges to be faced 
- 
German unity, monetary union of the Community,
organisation of European security and economic recovery of Eastern Europe 
- 
are all expressed in
terms of unity and cohesion: strengthening of European union, affrrmation of new solidarities in con-
firmation of existing ones and enlargement of the scope of possible and necessary co-operation. The
European Community must be able to forge ahead and assert itself as the inspiration and even the
main architect of the continent's new order.
Any withdrawal into over-sensitive nationalism and any return to the pleasures of the power
game on the basis of outworn ideas about European equilibrium will lead nowhere and could well end
up by giving substance to some of the fears played upon in some quarters about certain frontiers or
national minorities.
German unity has always been recognised as the common aim of the western allies. It has been
made possible by the collapse of the GDR, since which the wishes of the people have been made quite
clear in the streets. Can there be any doubt about the result of the elections? The WEU countries and
the members of the Community are at Germany's side and support it in a process which will start with
the elections of l Sth March. The speedy completion of this process will be to Europe's advantage
because united Germany will be firmly established in the community of pluralist democracies and free
peoples to which the East Germans show daily they wish to belong. Are not thousands of them still
taking the painful decision to leave?
Germany will not turn its back on its allies because it knows that its unity is being achieved
through the solidarity maintained within the Atlantic Alliance which resisted Moscow's political
blackmail throughout the years of the cold war. As a dynamic partner in the European Community,
Germany has made a notable contribution to economic changes in the West and South of our con-
tinent: it is only fair that, in return, our countries are joining with Germany to prepare for the essential
changes in the GDR. It is, however, to the whole of Eastern Europe that the European Community is
turning, as German unity is unavoidably a stage on the way to establishing closer links with the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe.
WEU's basic task is to analyse by regular consultation how the current changes will affect the
security of member states. The extent of the changes is so great that WEU cannot stop there. Future
prospects are therefore being discussed jointly in the search for new solutions and in preparation for
future decisions concerning the implementation of agreements for the reduction of armaments and the
restructuring and redeployment of forces. The protection which the Atlantic Alliance affords us will
not spread across the map to the East, even though several of the new democracies have already shown
interest in the West's ideas about collective security. The CSCE, which has competence in this field,
has no means of acquiring authority and practical capacity to take action. The creation of institutions
for its security dimension is no more than a remote possibility at the moment. As it is unlikely that the
Warsaw Pact can be reformed to restore a minimum of credibility for it, two possible ways of filling
this gap, already considered by the experts, deserve to be explored and debated by the WEU parliamen-
tarians: the first would be to equip the CSCE to play an operational r6le in the establishment of a just
l5
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and lasting peace over the continent of Europe as a whole. This would involve a substantial North
American contribution. The second possibility would amount to going beyond the Single European Act
and giving wider security powers to the European institutions.
A third scenario would be the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance, represented by
WEU, by giving it an operational rOle in the deployment of European forces in accordance with the
undertakings given in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and the Hague platform regarding the
response toarmed attack and the defence of frontiers. The legitimacy of European forces stationed on
the territory of member states of the union would be enhanced by their organisation into multinational
units which might be deployed on both sides of frontiers. The stationing of these forces further to the
East would add a military guarantee to the political guarantees regarding the inviolability of frontiers,
by demonstrating in practical terms that force of arms can never again be used on European soil exclu-
sively to serve national interests.
The future of the Atlantic Alliance is in no way in question. Has it not just given dazzling proof
of its success in defending peace and promoting the values on which the active solidarity of its
members is founded? When the time comes, the future organisation of the continent's security will
benefit greatly from the experience gained by the alliance in the continuous strengthening ofthe col-
lective securiiy of sixteen nations resolved to co-operate profitably with each other. Neither the disinte-
gration of the Warsaw Pact nor the bilaterally-negotiated withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern
Europe could justify the disappearance of NATO or of American forces from Western Europe. Changes
to the alliance's defence posture will follow from the future CFE treaty and the timetable for its imple-
mentation. It would be irresponsible to anticipate developments which are at their earliest stage and to
create dangerous vulnerability at a time of uncertainty when the emergence of new threats cannot be
ruled out. Europeans must say clearly to the Americans what they expect from the continued presence
in Europe of forces which they are agreed must be genuinely effective in military terms. Talks must be
held with the United States and Canada to explain their deterrence r6le and operational missions. This
must be done in order to avoid any ambiguity in relations between the two pillars of the alliance and to
give them a new equilibrium on the basis of the increased security responsibilities Europeans are
having to take on.
rl
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In December, the Permanent Council and its working goups began planning their programmes
for the implementation of the decisions taken at the Ministerial Council on l4th November 1989. The
Permanent Council has met eight times: on 22nd and 29th November and l3th December 1989, on
l Tth and 30th January 1990, when the Council was enlarged to include the political directors of foreign
ministries and representatives of chiefs-of-staff, and on 7th and 2lst February and l4th March.
The enlarged Council of 30th January 1990 discussed the likely consequences for member states
of the upheavals which had taken place since the ministerial meeting in Central and Eastern Europe
and in the USSR. Some effects of these events have been signs of interest in WEU from some of the
new democracies, the emergence of pan-European ideas echoing Gorbachev's * European home " and
keener discussions of the new European 'architecture " likely in the future. This turmoil calls for
clearer statements from the existing European institutions and in particular from WEU regarding the
likely development of the security dimension of European construction now that the Warsaw Pact is
breaking up and the range of options open to the Soviet Union is narrowing. The Council recognised
that a signal should be given in practical and concrete terms by WEU at the ministerial meeting on
23rd April.
The enlarged Council agreed that the " post-CFE " political and military environment should be
the subject of on-going studies on which the working goups would report regularly to the Ministerial
Council and would use as the basis for suggesting future discussions by ministers on more specific sub-jects such as the co-ordination of reductions, the future of stationed Soviet and American forces or the
political expediency of considering the formation of multinational European units.
At the 75lst meeting of the Permanent Council on l4th March, the Ambassador of the Portu-
guese Republic to the Court of St. James's announced that, on 13th March, the Portuguese Parliament
had passed a law authorising ratification of the protocol of accession of Spain and Portugal to the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty done in London on l4th November 1988, thus completing the process of ratifi-
cation by the nine pember states. The instruments of ratification had been deposited in Brussels by the
United Kingdom on l8th April, the Netherlands on l2th June, Luxemboury on27th July and Spain on
9th August 1989, by Belgium on 8th January, France on 28th January and Italy on 23rd February
1990.
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The Special Working Group (SWG) met jointly with the Defence Representatives Group (DRG) on
l2th December 1989 and separately on 22nd January,22nd February and l3th March. The SWG dis-
cussed the following subjects:
- 
an analysis of recent developments in East-West relations with specific reference to the pro
posal for a meeting before the end of 1990 of a 'pan-European summit' in the framework of the
CSCE process when the CFE treaty would probably be signed;
- 
preparation of the security agenda of that summit;
- 
consideration of the implications for European security of the proposals for free overflight of
territory and arrangements for an " open-skies " r6gime which were on the agenda for the Ottawa con-
ference and study of the need for co-operation on this subject in WEU;
- 
acceptance by the Soviet Union of the American proposal for setting ceilings for their forces
stationed in Europe and its consequences for the deployment of the forces of WEU member countries;
- 
repercussions of the German unification process on the CFE negotiations and on WEU;
- the idea of multinational European forces from the standpoint of the balance between North
America and Europe within the Atlantic Alliance and of public reactions in member states.
At the same time, the SWG continued its work on the European security environment
1991-1995 and on the conditions necessary for the maintenance of an undiminished level of security
during the transitional period pending full implementation of the future CFE treaty. Against this
prospect, the SWG tried to identify the problems posed by continuation of the CFE process, as the pace
of developments in Central and Eastern Europe was so great that any pause in the arms control negoti-
ations in Europe would scarcely be appropriate. The CFE treaty will no doubt have to be supplemented
on several points and the possibility of creating institutions for the security dimension of the CSCE
should be examined in depth by the WEU countries.
The political subjects under consideration by the members of the SWG are:
- 
the strategic aims of the Soviet Union and the impact of its institutional reforms and of devel-
opments in its republics on how it perceived its vital interests;
- 
the consequences for European security of the emeryence of new democracies in the Central
and Eastern European countries;
- 
the new prospects for East-West co-operation, particularly through the CSCE;
- 
changes in the Atlantic Alliance and transatlantic relations, particularly as regards the sta-
tioning of American forces in Europe;
- 
the extra-European dimension of European security.
The WEU countries will have to be in a position fairly quickly to define the minimum require-
ments for security and the level of deterrence which they consider to be suflicient and credible given
the force reductions which will follow the implementation of the CFE treaty. They must also consider
the prospects which the new strategic environment will create for their co-operation in security
matters.
At its meetings on l6th January, l5th February and 6th March 1990, the Defence Representa-
tives Group concentrated on the military aspects of the report on the European security environment
199l-1995, the practical aspects of co.operation between member states for the verification of the
future CFE treaty and the introduction of an " open-skies " rdgime. Under the heading of topical
defence questions, the group analysed the CSCE seminar on military doctrines. This seminar revealed
a total lack of cohesion between the Warsaw Pact countries. The USSR had expressed concern at the
naval superiority of the Atlantic Alliance. The group also exchanged information on the agreements
concluded with the USSR on the prevention of accidents at sea and bilateral contacts with the Soviet
armed forces. As regards co-operation on verification, a questionnaire had been sent to WEU member
governments to provide information for a document summarising the different ways in which verifi-
cation is organised at national level, proposals for multinational teams and the idea of bilateral trial
inspections.
On l3th February, experts on the shared data-processing for verification met to study a Nether-
lands proposal for a common information system and to hear a report on the French data base system.
This meeting was followed by two more on 26th and 27th February to draft a report which was adopted
by the DRG on 6th March.
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The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space met on l5th January and l4th February 1990, with instructions
from the Ministerial Council to carry out the necessary preliminary technical studies for the prepa-
ration of a possible ministerial decision on the development by WEU member states of a European sat-
ellite observation programme. These studies will be directed in the first place at identifying and evalu-
ating national and European operational requirements which could be covered by satellite observation
and also the corresponding technical resources as regards sensors, satellite platforms and ground facil-
ities. At the same time, the usable data already provided by scientific, commercial and military satel-
lites now in service will be listed. The sub-group will assess the quality of these data and their adequacy
for verification purposes and will evaluate the way in which they are processed. For some of these
studies, the group will have to call on experts who will meet as and when required. No conclusions con-
cerning either the use of existing satellite systems or the technical and financial feasibility of devel-
oping a European satellite observation system can be drawn until all the parameters of the verification
arrangements under the CFE treaty now being negotiated in Vienna are known.
The Mediterranean Sub-Group met on 12th January and lst March 1990. The first meeting of
the year was largely devoted to the implications for European security of the proliferation of ballistic
missiles which, in view of the range of this type of weapon now being deployed in the Near and Middle
East, constitute a greater potential threat not only to the WEU countries bordering the Mediterranean.
The sub-group also discussed the renewed military activity in the Sahara conflict and the implications
of events in Eastern Europe for the Mediterranean/Balkans area, where the uncertain situation in
Yugoslavia and the future of the Albanian rdgime threaten to undermine stability. Finally, the sub-
group exchanged information on prospects for the development of co-operation in the Western Medi-
terranean, the unknown factors in the construction of the Arab Maghreb Union and the progress of the
Greco-Turkish dialogue in Cyprus.
The Institutional Working Group held two meetings late in 1989 (22nd November and l4th
December) and three meetings early this year (23rd January, 19th and 28th February), when it dealt
mainly with practical measures for implementing the ministerial decision to wind up the Paris minis-
terial organs and to set up the WEU Institute for Security Studies.
The group paid special attention to the position of staff of the Paris ministerial organs. The
requests for complementary indemnification submitted by the Staff Committee were studied with the
greatest care and all the relevant legal, statutory, financial and individual details were forwarded to
national authorities to enable them to reach a decision in full knowledge of the facts. I spared no effort
in pressing for a solution which was indeed on the lines that you and the Presidential Committee pre-
ferred. After prolonged discussions, a consensus emerged in favour of applying the terms of the Staff
Rules. As a result, the Permanent Council decided on l4th March not to pay complementary indemni-
fication to members of staff not re-employed by the WEU Institute for Security Studies. It was the
unanimous view of national authorities that the allowances provided for under the rules were generous
enough. Moreover, recognising its responsibilities towards the co'ordinated organisations, the Per-
manent Council did not wish unilaterally to set a precedent. I-astly, the budgetary situation of member
states and their wages policy preclude payment of complementary indemnification.
*
**
As to direct relations between the Council and the Assembly, I would simply recall, Mr. Pres-
ident, that we had the opportunity last December freely to take stock, together with representatives of
the presidency and our immediate collaborators, of a number of problems. We agreed to hold consulta-
tions as often as neoessary. It is indeed vital to avoid any hasty conclusions being drawn as a result of a
misunderstanding of the Council's working methods and which might lead to unfounded criticisms
being made. We are all aware of the inevitable gap which will always exist between the information the
Assembly would like to receive and that which the Permanent Council is able to provide under the con-
sensus rule. To some extent, the Secretariat-General can remedy this situation and I believe this is one
of its essential tasks vis-i-vii the WEU parliamentary Assembly-and its Oflice of the Clerk. That is why
I should like to reiterate here and now, as preparations are made for the first part of the thirty-sixth
ordinary session of the Assembly, that I am always at the disposal of any rapporteurs, their committees
or national delegations who might consider it useful to hear the Secretary-General's views on any given
aspect of the Council's activities. At the end of January, I did in fact have the pleasure of a visit to
London by Lord Newall, Sir William Shelton and Mr. Cameron with whom I had useful talks.
In keeping with tradition, the meeting between the Presidential Committee and the Belgian pres-
idency in Brussels on 7th March provided an opportunity for a wide-ranging discussion which was
especially useful coming as it did just two weeks before the extraordinary session of your Assembly.
These exchanges of view could perhaps be more structured as far as their political content is concerned
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so as to bring a greater degree of convergence between the work of the Assembly's committees and that
of the Council's working groups. This is vital if WEU is, in the coming months, to develop the concept
of a European defence identity and give operational expression to that identity. Only in this way will
WEU establish itself on the European scene as one of the reference points for future decisions on the
European security architecture and as one ofthe key players in building a new security system on the
continent.
rt
**
On l Sth January in Rome, I had a series of talks on the future of WEU with Mr. de Michelis,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Martinazzoli, Minister of Defence, and Mr. Vitalone, Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
On lst February, I paid an oflicial visit to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg duting which I had
talks with His Highness, the Grand Duke, the Prime Minister, Mr. Santer, Mr. Poos, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, President of the Chamber of Deputies.
On Thursday, lst March, I was received by Mr. Douglas Hurd, United Kingdom Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
. . 
Finally, on Wednesday,Tth March,I met Mr. Jacques Delors, President of the European Com-
mlsslon.
In the field of public relations and information on the rOle and activities of WEU, the
Secretariat-General was represented either by myself or by my colleagues at the following events:
- on l6th November 1989, I addressed the Politischer Club in Berlin as part of a conference
organised by the USIS and the German Marshall Fund;
- 
on 18th and l9th November, I took part in the international symposium of the Hans Seidel
Stiftung;
- 
on 20th November, I took part in a seminar organised by the Danish Institute for Interna-
tional Studies and gave an address on * The European pillar'. The following day, I was received by the
Danish Commission for Security and Disarmament;
- 
on 23rd November, I gave a speech entitled 'Transformation of East-West relations: from
confrontation to collaboration' to the Europa Dispuut Circle in Groningen;
- 
on 27th November, I had a visit at the secretariat from Sir Geoffrey Johnson-Smith, Head of
the United Kingdom Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly;
- 
on 28th November, I gave a talk at All Souls College, Oxford, on'WE(J, NATO and the arms
control process ";
- 
on 30th November, I took part in the CEPS annual conference in Brussels on * Governing
Europe';
- on lst December, I delivered the closing address to the Second European Session of Advanced
Defence Studies;
- 
on 2fth December, I spoke to students at the Institut royal sup6rieur de ddfense in Brussels;
- 
from 2nd to l4th January, I took part in the third Dolder conference in Zurich on " East-West
relations and the prospects of the arms control dialogue ";
- 
on 15th January, I addressed a symposium of the Fondation du Futur in Paris;
- 
on l9th January, I took part in a meeting of the European Strategy Group (ESG) in Rome;
- 
on 3lst January at the secretariat, I received a group ofFrench executives on a study visit to
London and spoke to them about WEU and the problems of European defence;
- 
from 2nd to 4th February, I took part in the 27th international Wehrkunde conference;
- 
on 9th February, I addressed the high-level seminar organised by the German Atlantic Associ-
ation in Bonn on the future of defence policies;
- on l2th February, I took part in a conference organised by the Royal Naval College at
Greenwich on * Britain's wider interests post-CFE ";
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- 
on l4th February, I took part in a conference at Wilton Park on * Re-balancing the alliance?:
development of common foreign security and procurement policies in the European pillar of NATO';
- 
on l6th and lTth February, I was in Berlin for a conference of the Politischer Club;
- 
on the same dates, Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, attended a colloquy in
Paris organised by the Cercle des Libertds Republicaines on the subject of German unity and Europe;
- 
on22nd February, I gave a talk on WEU to students from the Nonvegian Defence College who :
were visiting the United Kingdom;
- 
on 23rd February, Mr. Richard Tibbels spoke on the * ROle of WEU in the verification of con-
ventional arms control agreements'at a seminaion conventional arms control verification organised 
,by the Netherlands Institute for International Relations, Clingendael, The Hague;
- 
on 26th February, I spoke at a European defence seminar organised by Unisys. My theme was
European problems affecting defence policies in the 1990s;
- 
on lst March, I received the President and Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Assembly, :
Mr. Patrick DufB, and Mr. Peter Corterier;
- 
on 5th March, I addressed the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva; i
- on 8th March, I spoke to members of the NAVG.KRING in Louvain;
- 
from 9th to llth March, I took part in the Ebenhausen conference on *Future tasks of the
alliance'. :
I have, finally, endeavoured to increase the number of direct contacts with both the press and tel- i
evision so that their comments on European security give WEU the importance it deserves.
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Dmft Recommendation
on tlu budgas of ilE mini$qil organs of Wqten Europan lJaioa
for tle fiuacial ycan 1989 (rcvised) and 1990
,,
The Assembly, 
;1(!) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union ifor 1989 (revised) and 1990, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the
Charter;(it) Considering that:
l(a) t\e budget of the Secretariat-General for the financial year 1.990 may be considered nryyi- 
lsional insofar as the proposals to create seven new posts, withdrawn at the request -of tne
WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, will be considered subsequently on the basis of a r
management survey to be conducted by a specialised body;
(b) in doing this, the Budget and Organisation Committee has relinquished responsibility for
organisation, which is part of its attributions;
(c) the " liquidation' version of the 1990 budget of the Paris agencies is based on a wholly theo-
retical assumption and is therefore liable to be changed significantly;
(d) the operating budget of the WEU Institute for Security Studies has not yet been drawn up;
(e) the Assembly is consequently unable to express an opinion on the abovementioned budgets;(iit) Regretting that: 
rl
(a) !\rgCoyncil has decided not to pay additional indemnities to officials not recruited by theWEU Institute for Security StuAiei;
(b) t\e participation of representatives of the staffof the co-ordinated organisations in negotia-
tions on procedure for adjusting salaries does not appear to correspond to their legitimate l
expectations;
(c) theyg is no agreement between the secretaries-general of the coordinated organisations to
facilitate the movement of staff from one organisation to another, which would have been
very useful on the occasion of the winding up of the Paris agencies,
RrcoutrlrNos rHAT rHs CouNclL
l. Reconsider the composition and mandate of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee, in
particular its responsibility for organisational matters;
2. S.unnort the action taken by the staff associations of the co-ordinated organisations with a view
to playing a more effective part in negotiations on staff employment conditions;
3. Ask that the,question of the movement of staff from one organisation to another be included in
the agenda of a forthcoming meeting of the Committee of Secretaries-General of Co,ordinated
Organisations in order to work out means of fostering and facilitating such movement.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Lord, Rappoaeur)
I. General
l. According to Article VIII (c) of the
Charter of the Assembly, " the Assembly shall
express its views in the form of an opinion or
recommendation on the annual budget of
Western European Union as soon as it has been
communicated ".
2. The present report has been prepared in
application of this provision and relates to the
revised budgets of the ministerial organs of
WEU for the financial year 1989 and the
ordinary budget for the financial year 1990. It is
placed in the framework of the reply to the
Council's annual report on its activities; in point
of fact, to the study of its activities made by the
Defence Committee, the Political Committee
and the Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee has to be added the assessment of the
financial implications of these activities, which
is the responsibility of the Committee on Budg-
etary Affairs and Administration.
3. The first part of the thirty-fifth annual
report of the Council to the Assembly (lst
January 1989 to 30th June 1989) refers to
increasingly intense activity by the Council and
the Secretariat-General due to the enlargement
of WEU and political developments in which
the r6le and aims of WEU are arousing growing
interest. In addition, there are the activities of
the working groups (Special Working Group,
Defence Representatives Group, Mediterranean
Sub-Group, ad hoc Sub-Group on Space).
4. Conversely, the activities of the Paris
agencies seem to have consisted merely of
analysing the problem of their abolition and
replacement by an Institute for Security Studies,
decided upon by the Council on l3th November
1989. The second part of the Council's report
will perhaps contain further details allowing a
better assessment to be made of the activities of
the WEU ministerial organs, particularly the
Paris agencies, but at the time of writing the
Council's report for the second half of the year
has not yet reached the Assembly.
5. In any event, the intensif,rcation and
expansion of the duties of the Secretariat-
General seem to justify the increase in the
number of its staff proposed in the draft budget
for 1990, i.e. the creation of three new grade A
posts and four new grade B posts, this being a
minimum solution. In the explanatory memo-
randum to the abovementioned budget, it is
specified that: " There may well be scope for a
larger increase in personnel, but it seems pref-
erable for the time being to proceed step-by-step,
taking a 213 year view, and to allow for ample
discussion based upon experience gained and
flexible use of all members of the secretariat. "
6. However, the WEU Budget and
Organisation Committee concluded as
moreover it did for similar proposals made by
the Assembly - * that a management review on
the staffrng situation should be carried out first
before any proposals for additional staff could
be considered " and asked that this review be
conducted by experts in organisation.
7. By doing this, your Rapporteur considers
that the Budget and Organisation Committee
has relinquished one of the duties attributed to
it, i.e. organisation which, with good reason,
forms part of its title. In the past, it carried out
this duty and assumed all its responsibilities.
The fact that it is now referring to its lack of
competence in regard to organisation creates a
precedent which can but have unfavourable
iepercussions on the operation of the institu-
tions. Henceforth, indeed, the latter will no
longer be able to adapt their organograms
quickly enough as their needs evolve ifeach pro-
posal for a change in staff has in principle to be
accompanied by an assessment by an expert in
organisation.
8. In this connection, your Rapporteur
wonders how valid such a review really is if it is
conducted by experts having only very limited
knowledge of international organisations of a
political nature to which it is certainly not pos-
sible to apply the criteria and assessment para-
meters used in industry, where the essential
aims of keeping production costs down and
optimising results are never forgotten.
9. Furthermore, the Secretariat-General
employs only fifty-two staff (including switch-
board operators, chauffeurs and security
guards), who are assigned to the- four tranches
of tne organisation: Political Affairs Division,
Press and Information Service, Translation
Service and Administration Division (see
Appendix I). In these circumstances, your
Rapporteur wonders whether the management
review requested by the Budget and Organis-
ation Committee was really necessary.
10. There will certainly be an opportunity to
return to this matter when the conclusions of the
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review are known; but it seems timely here and
now to consider the mandate assigned by the
Council to the Budget and Oryanisation Com-
mittee and the membership of that committee.
I l. The sums requested for the creation of the
abovementioned seven new posts having been
withdrawn from the budget of the Secretariat-
General for 1990, this budget, except for the
strengthening of communication equipment, is
essentially 
- 
as will be shown in Chapter III 
- 
a
renewal and is not particularly affected by the
accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU.-
12. In regard to the budget of the Paris
agencies for 1990, the initial draft submitted to
the Budget and Organisation Committee under
reference BA (89) 16 was recast following the
Council's decision to abolish the agencies as
from 3fth June 1990 and to set up an Institutefor Security Studies in their place. Conse-
quently, the new draft budget was reduced to
half the previous one and approved by the
Council subject to the preparation of a " liqui-
dation budget " including expenditure involved
in the context of the abolition of the agencies
and the dismissal of the staff, plus a separate
budget for the Institute for Security Studies,
which is to start work on lst July 1989.
13. This liquidation budget was in fact drawn
up as a * provisional supplementary budget for
1990 of the Paris ministerial organs ", under ref-
erence B (90) l. It shows the maximum budg-
etary implications of winding up the agencies,
calculated on the basis of the 'legal' effects of
applying current rules in respect of thirty-nine
officials. As indicated in the explanatory notes,
* this provisional supplementary budget will
have to be revised in due course to incorporate
amendments resulting from practical circum-
stances and further Council decisions regarding
the staff".
14. Some of these thirty-nine officials may be
re-employed by the WEU Institute for Security
Studies as from lst July 1990. Consequently, nir
payments will have to be made in 1990 to staff
taken on by the institute (be it the indemnity for
loss ofjob, the leaving allowance provided for inthe Pension Scheme Rules or even the
pension).
15. The precarious nature of the agencies'
liquidation budget and the fact that the insti-
tute's operating budget has not yet been drawn
up make it quite pointless to analyse the various
budget heads in detail. However, it must be
noted that this situation, in which the cost of
abolishing the agencies and organising a new
subsidiary organ the institute is still
uncertain, is due to the Council not having
taken decisions in this connection until
November 1989, although the problem of
restructuring the Paris ministerial organs had
been dragging on for years and the fate of the
staff affected by this abolition is still uncertain.
Brief consideration should therefore be given to
the impact of these decisions and an assessment
made of their implications for the staff, particu-
larly as the latter have informed the Assembly of
their concerns and confusion.
II. The abolition of thc Paris agencies
16. The abolition of the Paris agencies,
decided upon by the Council on l3th November
1989, was preceded by a restructuring of the
former ministerial organs (Agency for the
Control of Armaments and secretariat of the
Standing Armaments Committee) on lst
January 1986, which involved the creation of
three security agencies each having an hors
cadre director. One of these agencies incorpo
rated what remained of the ACA, staff assigned
to it wearing both hats. Henceforth, with a few
exceptions, posts falling vacant as their holders
retired remained unfilled, so that the number of
staff fell from seventy+ight in 1985 to seventy
in 1986.
17. At its meeting in The Hague on l6th
October 1987, the Council of Ministers then
decided to merge the three agencies for security
questions in a single agency under the authority
of the Secretary-General. As a result, the posts of
the three directors of the former agencies were
abolished, thus, with vacancies that had
occurred in the meantime in the natural course
of events, bringing the number of staff down to
fifty-two at the end of 1988.
18. In June 1989, with a view to the estab-
lishment of a WEU Institute for Security
Studies, the Council terminated grade A con-
tracts of fixed duration and provisionally
authorised the half-yearly renewal of contracts
of the same type for grade B and C staff. At this
point, the Staff Committee, which had hitherto
been kept out of the matter 
- 
in spite of the
stafPs legitimate interest in its fate 
- 
took the
initiative of proposing that, recognising the
changes that had taken place in the former
employment relationships, the Council take
steps to facilitate voluntary departures. The
Council agreed to this proposal but limited its
application to grades B and C. Seven offrcials
having taken advantage of this meiasure, towards
the end of 1989 the number of staff in the Paris
ministerial organs fell to thirty nine, plus
another oflicial assigned to the Agency for the
Control of Armaments who is responsible for
the only remaining control of the non-
production of A, B and C weapons.
19. The decision of l3th November 1989 on
the abolition ofthe Paris agencies therefore con-
cerns thirty-nine oflicials whose fate is still
uncertain. In confusion, they informed the
24
DOCUMENT I2I8
WEU parliamentarians at the December 1989
session of their anxiety about the conditions in
which the Council was preparing to terminate
their contracts. Only on l3th December 1989
was the Staff Committee invited to submit the
staffs proposals to the Council, which may be
summed up as granting an indemnity in
addition to the indemnity for loss of job on the
basis of existing precedents, particularly in the
EEC and other co-ordinated organisations.
20. On l9th December 1989, the Council
wrote to these thirty-nine oflicials terminating
their contracts, thus bringing into application
the provisions of the Staff Rules (indemnity for
loss ofjob) and the Pension Scheme Rules. In its
letter, it asserted that it would pay all due
attention to the proposals for additional mea-
sures submitted by the StaffCommittee and said
" it would be possible for the staff to apply for
posts in the organogram of the institute in
accordance with the procedure agreed upon ".
21. At the request of the Presidential Com-
mittee, the President of the Assembly wrote to
the Secretary-General on l9th January 1990 * to
ensure that the question raised by the departure
ofpart ofthe staffofthe agencies is solved in a
manner that takes due account of the social and
humanitarian aspects, established rights and the
duties of an organisation towards persons who
have served it for what has, in some cases, been
a very long period ".
22. Furthermore, on 22nd January 1990 the
Standing Committee of the StaffAssociations of
the Co-ordinated Organisations wrote to the
Secretary-General of WEU asking him to draw
the Council's attention to the need to ensure
that every step is taken to find a satisfactory
solution for all the staff as soon as possible. It
said it endorsed any action the WEU StaffCom-
mittee might have to take to defend the staffs
interests and hoped the Council would take
the necessary measures to facilitate the
re-employment by the new institute of staffnow
in the process of being dismissed.
23. In a letter of 25th January 1990 answering
the President of the Assembly, the Secretary-
General reviewed the situation. He gave an
assurance that he would 'continue to do every-
thing possible to ensure that this matter is
handled with the utmost respect for its essential
social and human aspects'. At the presentjuncture, the thirty-nine members of the staff
of the former agencies whose contracts have
been terminated have only one hope: that the
Director of the institute will give priority to con-
sidering their possible applications for posts in
the new organisation, or that the Council will
decide on indemnities additional to those
already provided for in the Staff Rules.
24. Your Rapporteur thought it necessary to
describe the background to this problem because
for many years the staff of the Paris agencies
were unaware of the future the Council's new
guidelines held in store, although they affected
their jobs and thus concerned their future. It is
regrettable that, until December 1989, the
Council did not consider the human aspects of
this serious problem and did not allow represen-
tatives of the staff 
- 
in accordance with Rule 60
of the Staff Rules 
- 
to give their opinions and
co-operate in the search for a solution to the
crisis, so distressing for the staff. This is particu-
larly striking since, already, in 1984, the former
Director of the ACA drew the Secretary-General's
attention to the grave consequences the restruc-
turing then being considered would have for the
staff and proposed appropriate measures. The
Assembly itself had an opportunity (see the
report presented by Mrs. Pack on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration, Document ll84) to note "that the
practice of renewing contracts every six months,
from lack of a decision on restructuring, is a
practice which is detrimental to the morale and
dignity of the staff concerned ".
25. The recent letter from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Assembly indi-
cates that the matter will finally be the subject of
an in-depth study. However, as no solutions
have yet been found, the Assembly trusts the
Council will adopt the most reasonable deci-
sions, so as to reduce as far as possible the dis-
tressing consequences that the staff will have to
suffer. following the winding-up of the Paris
agencles.
III. The budgas of thc Secrctafiat-Geneml
26. The trend of the budget of the Secretariat-
General (see Appendices V and VI) compared
with the initial budget for 1989 (which was
studied in the previous report, Document I184)
may be summed up as follows:
- 
a difference of f.4l 867 in respect of
sums brought over from the financial
year 1988 that had been committed but
not paid before 31st March 1989;
- 
the provisional transfer of f93 500
from Head I * Staff" to Head III, i.e.
f6 500 for covering the cost of running
the WEUCOM network and, under
Head A.I.A., Sub-Head 3, f87 000 for
leaving allowances paid to two senior
staff members who left the organ-
isation;
- 
a supplementary sum of [107 140 to
restore to Head I the provisional
deduction of f93 500 and increase the
pensions budget by fl3 640.
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27. With the abovementioned changes, the
final budget for 1989 has a net total (expend-
iture less receipts) of f I 835 096 excluding pen-
sions and f2 229 797 including pensions, i.e. an
increase of 2.75o/o and 7.16% respectively com-
pared with the initial budget.
28. Regarding the budget for 1990, your
Rapporteur has no other comments to add to
those set out in Chapter I above. There is a'|.9o/o
increase in the net total operating budget and
6.08% in the overall net total, including pen-
sions compared with the revised budget for
1989.
IY, The budgus
of the Paris ministerial organs
29. As shown in Appendices X and XI, the
initial budget of the Paris ministerial organs for
1989 was revised as follows:
- 
a difference of F 48 126 in respect of
sums brought over from the financial
year 1988 that had been committed but
not paid before 31st March 1989;
- 
a reduction ofF I 720000 in operating
expenditure to offset a fall in receipts,
cover expenditure relating to the
departure of ten officials and pay an
invalidity pension to a grade C
offrcial.
30. With the abovementioned changes, the
flrnal budget for 1989 has a net total (expend-
iture less receipts) of F 20 357 476 excluding
pensions and F 27 317 876 including pensions,
i.e. a reduction of 3.ll7o and an increase of
0.18% respectively compared with the initial
budget.
31. In regard to the budget for 1990, the esti-
mates in the agencies' liquidation budget are
based on the assumption that the contracts of all
staff (twenty-nine contracts of indefinite
duration and ten non-renewed contracts offixed
duration) will be terminated on 30th June 1990.
Estimates therefore take into account the
payment of the indemnities provided for in the
StaffRules and the Pension Scheme Rules. They
are consequently a maximum which may be
lower if present oflicials are taken on by the
Institute for Security Studies. Conversely, the
possible payment of an additional indemnity in
accordance with the Stalf Committee's pro-
posals was not taken into account and, ifappro-
priate, will be the subject of a subsequent
revision of the liquidation budget.
32. Compared with the 1989 budget, there is
a decrease of 5.580/o in the net total of the provi-
sional liquidation budget for 1990 excluding
pensions and an increase of 16.480/o including
pensions and leaving allowances.
Y. Cottclusions
33. From the foregoing, it seems clear that the
budgets of the WEU ministerial organs reflect a
provisional position pending a revision of the
organogram of the Secretariat-General and the
organisation of the new Institute for Security
Studies. Only at the end of this process will the
Assembly be able to give its opinion on the ade-
quacy of the means made available to these
organs in relation to the tasks set for them.
YI. Action taken on Recommendation 46E
34. In adopting Recommendation 468, the
Assembly drew the Council's attention to the
need:
(a) to set up an Institute for Security
Studies and fix its methods of work
bearing in mind that the Assembly can
be made responsible for common ser-
vices;
(b) to make the necessary amendments to
the Financial Regulations to adapt it
to the requirements of budgetary man-
agement;
(c) to afford its backing to the staffassoci-
ations in their action to defend their
right to take part in negotiations in the
framework of co-ordination on the
conditions for the employment of
staff;
(d) to make a study to determine how to
facilitate the movement of staff
between the co-ordinated organisations
in order to improve career possib-
imities.
35. Your Rapporteur can but be gratified that
the Council of Ministers decided to set up the
Institute for Security Studies in accordance with
the Assembly's recommendation and asked the
Permanent Council " to take appropriate deci-
sions, after consulting the Assembly, on the
organisational aspects of setting up the institute
in the organisation's building'. Consultations
have not yet been held. Your Rapporteur wishes
there to be the closest cooperation between the
Offrce of the Clerk of the Assembly and the
institute, inter alia in the organisation of the
common services and the management of the
premises.
36. In its reply to the abovementioned recom-
mendation, the Council said the Budget and
Organisation Committee would examine the
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question of amending the Financial Regulations
and would give its views on the matter once
restructuring was completed. The Assembly will
therefore have an opportunity to return to this
matter.
37. In regard to the more effective partici-
pation of staff associations in negotiations on
salary reviews, the Council's reply refers to the
importance of the contribution made by repre-
sentatives of the staff in these negotiations.
However, the latter do not express the same
feelings. In a communiqud issued after the nego-
tiations on salary adjustments held on lst July
1989 and the establishment of procedure for
annual reviews covering the next three years,
they said: * CPAPOC does not feel bound by a
text which is not the result of tripartite negotia-
tions and which contains elements which it had
previously denounced as being unacceptable to
the staff... At the close of these long dealings,
which marked a serious setback in the tripartite
system, CPAPOC can but note the absence of a
negotiated solution and invite the staff of the
co-ordinated organisations to embark here and
now upon a long-term struggle with a view to
1992." Only then will further negotiations be
held for updating salary scales. The Assembly
trusts the WEU Council will bear in mind the
legitimate aspirations of the staff to play an
active part in these negotiations.
38. On this last point, the Council, referringto the possibility of oflicials from one
co-ordinated organisation being recruited by
another, adopts no precise position. The fact is
that transfers from one organisation to another
are in practice possible only if specific agree-
ments are reached between the secretaries-
general of the organisations concerned. Your
Rapporteur can but note with regret that, if
agreements existed, the winding up of the Paris
agencies might be less painful for the staff and
less costly for WEU from the moment some offi-
cials could be taken on by other co-ordinated
organisations. The importance of this problem
therefore goes beyond the framework of mea-
sures allowing prospects of a career, as
envisaged in Recommendation 468. It is
desirable that the problem be included in
the agenda of a forthcoming meeting of the
secretaries-general of the co-ordinated organ-
isations.
Addendum to the *planatory memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Itrd, Rapprteur)
16th March 1990
In his information letter to the WEU
Assembly of l5th March 1990 (No. 9), the Secre-
tary-General said:
" The Institutional Working Group held
two meetings late in 1989 (22nd
November and l4th December) and three
meetings early this year (23rd January,
l9th and 28th February), when it dealt
mainly with practical measures for imple-
menting the ministerial decision to wind
up the Paris ministerial organs and to set
up the WEU Institute for Security Studies.
The group paid special attention to the
position of staff of the Paris ministerial
organs. The requests for complementary
indemnification submitted by the Staff
Committee were studied with the greatest
care and all the relevant legal, statutory,
financial and individual details were for-
warded to national authorities to enable
them to reach a decision in full knowledge
ofthe facts. I spared no effort in pressing
for a solution which was indeed on the
lines that you and the Presidential Com-
mittee preferred. After prolonged dis-
cussion, a consensus emerged in favour of
applying the terms of the StaffRules. As a
result, the Permanent Council decided on
l4th March not to pay complementary
indemnification to members of staff not
re-employed by the WEU Agency for
Security Studies. It was the unanimous
view of national authorities that the
allowances provided for under the rules
were generous enough. Moreover,
recognising its responsibilities towards the
co-ordinated organisations, the Per-
manent Council did not wish unilaterally
to set a precedent. Lastly, the budgetary
situation of member states and their
wages policy preclude payment of comple-
mentary indemnification. "
One can but note this decision with regret.
It is contrary to the staffs expectations and the
Assembly's recommendations.
The draft recommendation therefore has
to be amended accordingly.
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APPENDIX I
Table of utablishment 
- 
Secruafiat-Generull
(ercluding proposed additional stalf)
No. Grade Function No. Grade Function
l.
2.
3.
4.
5. A.6
6. B.3
H.G.
H.G.
B.4
B.4
7. 4.4t5
8. A.2t3
9. A.2t3
10.
I l.
A.3t4
A.zt3
4.412.
13. LT.5
14. LT.4
15. LT.3
16. LT.3
t7. LT.z
18. A.5
19. B.3
8.420.
Secretary-General
Deputy Secretary-General
Personal Assistant to Secretary-
General
Personal Assistant to Deputy
Secretary-General
Polilical Alfairs Division
Head of Division
Secretary to Head of Division
S ec t ion- C ounc i I S ecretariat
Head of Section (A.5)
Committee Secretary (A.3)
Committee Secretary (A.3)
Section Policy and planning
Head of Section (A.4)
Planning Secretary (A.3)
Press and Information
Head of Section (A.4)
Translation Semice
Head (Reviser E/F)
Translator/Reviser F/E
Translator E/F
Translator E/F
Translator F/E
Administration Division
Head of Division
Secretary to Head of Division
(B.2)
Administrative Assistant
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.8.4
29. B.2t3t4
30. B.2t3t4
31. B.2t3t4
32. B.2t3t4
33. B.2l3l4
34. B.2t3t4
35. B.2t3t4
36. B.2t3t4
37. B.2t3t4
38. B.2t3t4
39. B.2t3t4
2t. A.3t4
22. A.2
23.8.4
A.2
B.4
8.2
8.2
40. B.l
41. B.l
42. C.3
43. C.2
44. C3
45. C.3
46. C.4
47. C.3
48. C.3
49. C.3
50. c.3
51. c.3
52. C3
Section-Finance and budget
Controller (A.4)
Accountant
Financial Assistant (B.3)
Section-Registry and communica-
tions
Head of Section
Senior Clerk
ClerUrepro
Clerk/repro
S ec t io n- Seue tar ial as s is tance
Head of Section
Assistant (B.3)
Assistant (B.4)
Shorthand Typist (B.2)
Shorthand Typist (B.3)
Shorthand Typist (B.3)
Shorthand Typist (B.l)
Shorthand Typist (B.3)
Shorthand Typist (B.2)
Shorthand Typist (B.2)
Shorthand Typist (B.2)
Shorthand Typist (B.3)
Section-General sen ices
Telephonist
Telephonist
Messen gerlstorekeeper
Messenger (C.3)
Chauffeur
Chauffeur
Head Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard (C-B (89) l)
r. c-B (89) 28.
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APPENDIX II
Tablo of estoblishmeat - Ministedal organs in Paris I
Unit No. I
Post No. Grade(s) of post Function
ASI- IASI. 2ASI. 3ASI- 4
AS I. 5i
AS I. 6*ASI- 7
AS I - 8*ASI. 9
AS I - l0+
AS I. II
H.G.
A.5/6
4.4t5
A.zt3t4
A.4t5
8.4
8.4
s.E
8.2
Director tt
Expert
Expert
Suppressed a/o lst July 1988
Expert
Expe6 ***
Personal assistant to the Director
Assistant
Suppressed a/o lst July 1988
Shorthand typist
Shorthand typist
Unit No.2
Post No. Grade(s) of post Function
ASII-1
AS II .2
ASII .3
AS II - 4*
ASII .5
AS II .6+
ASII .7
ASII-8
AS II .9*
Previously H.G.
A.5t6
A.4t5
A.zt3t4
A.2t3t4
8.4
B.4
8.3
B.3
Post not provided for in the budget
Expert
Expert
Expert
Expert
Personal assistant to the Director
Assistant
Shorthand typist
Shorthand typist
Unit No.3
Post No. Grade(s) of post Function
ASIII- I
AS III - 2*
ASIII . 3
AS III - 4*ASIII- 5
ASIII . 6
ASIII . 7
AS III - 8i
ASIII . 9
AS III . IO
Previously H.G.
A.st6
A.4t5
A.2l314
A.zt314
B.4
8.4
B.3
B.3
8.2
Post not provided for in the budget
Expert
Expert
Expert
Expert
Personal assistant to the Director
Assistant
Shorthand typist
Shorthand typist
Shorthand typist
l. c-B (8e) 28.
+ In post on 1.1.1990.
+* Sole post of Director provided for in the draft estimates for 1989.
.** Dual function: Expert of Unit No. I and Deputy Director of the ACA.
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APPENDIX II :
toint senices
Post No. Grad(s) of post Function
(a) Administration and Legal Affairs
Division
SCAdm- I
SC Adm - 2*
SCAdm- 3*t
Finance and Administration Section
SC Adm - 4*
SCAdm- 5*
SCAdm- 6*
SC Adm - 7*
SCAdm- 8*
SCAdm- 9*
SC Adm - l0*
SC Adm - ll
SC Adm - 12
SCAdm- 13*
SC Adm - 14*
SC Adm - 15
SC Adm - 16*
(b) Lingaist Service
scL-l7
scL-18*
scL-19*
scL-20*
(c) Docamentation Ollice
SC Doc - 2l
SC Doc - 22
SCDoc-23t
SCDoc-24t
SC Doc - 25
(d) Secarity/Archives Olfice
SC Sec/ar.- 26 I
SC Sec/ar.- 27 *
SC Sec/ar.- 28
SC Sec/ar.- 29
SC Sec/ar.- 30 t
SC Sec/ar.- 3l *
SC Sec/ar.- 32 *
SC Sec/ar.- 33 *
SC Sec/ar.- 34
SC Sec/ar.- 35 *
SC Sec/ar.- 36
SC Sec/ar.- 37 *
SC Sec/ar.- 38 *
SC Sec/ar.- 39 *
SC Sec/ar.- 40 *
SC Sec/ar.- 4l *
A.6
B.3
A.3t4
A.4t5
A.314
B.4
B.4
B.4
8.4
B.4
c.4
B.3
B.3
c.5
c.4
B.4
B.3
B.3
L.4
L.3
L.3
L.3
A3t4
A.3t4
8.4
B.3
B.3
c.4
c.3
c.3
c.3
c.3
c.3
c.3
c.3
c.3
c.3
c.3
c.3
Head of Division, Legal Adviser WEU
Chairman of Budget Committee
Secretary of Budget Committee
Assistant Legal Adviser
Head of Section
Deputy Head of Section, Head of Finance and
Accounts Oflice
Assistant for the Building and General Services
Accountant
Accountant
Administrative Assistant and Secretary of the
Section
Administrative Assistant and Shorthand typist
Suppressed a/o lst July 1988
Under Assistant for General Services Storekeeper
Telephonist
Telephonist
Chief roneo operator
Roneo operator
Translator-Reviser
I nterpreter-Translator
I nterpreter-Translator
Translator-Verbatim writer
Head of Offrce
Suppressed a/o lst July t988
Assistant Documentalist
Clerk-Shorthand typist
Documentation Clerk-Typist
Head of Offrce
Assistant for Archives and Registry
Clerk responsible for Security
Clerk-Shorthand typist
Head Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Service vehicles
AS-YS - 42 r
AS-VS - 43
c.4
c.4
Chauffeur-mechanic
Chauffeur-mechanic
t In post on 1.1.1990.
+* Post provided for in the 1990 budget estimates of the Secretariat General.
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APPENDIX III
Srcrrou A
WEU first supplcmentary budget for 19E9 |
I
Personnel costs
Travel
B (89) 9
Credits
b/f from
l 988
c-B (89) l
l 989
approved
budget
B (8e) l0
1989
Transfers
Proposed
Supplementary
Budget
Revised
Estimates
(f)
^ 
ait.oo
20 000.00
(f)
2 241 061.00
59 s00.00
250 455.00
36 300.00
l6 995.00
(f)
(e3 s00.00)
6 500.00
(f)
93 s00.00
(f)
224106t.00
59 500.00
278 822.00
36 300.00
36 995.00
Other operating costs
Prrreheses
Buildings
Total expenditure ..
WEU tax
Other receipts .. . . .
Total income ......
Net ordinary budget
Netpensions......
Net total budget ...
4l 867.00 2 604 311.00 (87 000.00) 93 500.00 2 652 678.00
805 582.00
l2 000.00
80s 582.00
l2 000.00
817 582.00 817 582.00
4l 867.00 t 786729.@
294 061.00
(87 000.00)
87 000.00
93 500.000
l3 640.000
I 835 096.00
394 70t.00
4l 867.00 2 080 790.00 107 140.00 2 229 797.00
National contributions
6Ofths t.
Belgium
Franee
59
120
120
120
2
59
120
l0 535.00
21428.00
2t 428.00
21428.00
358.00
l0 53s.00
21428.00
G
Italy .
Luxembourg ...
Netherlands ....
United Kingdom
600 107 140.00
l. c-B (89) 14.
3l
DOCUMENT 12I8 APPENDIX IV
APPENDIX IV
Srcrrox A
Summary of estimated erpenditurc and income for 19% - Secrctariat-Gencral I
Expenditure
I. Personnel costs
II. Travel
III. Other operating costs .,
IV. Purchases ...
V. Buildings ....
Total: Gross operating costs
Income
VI. WEU tax ..
VII. Other receipts
Total: Operating income ...
Nrr rornl oPERATTNc cosrs . .
Nrt peNsrox cosrs .
Torar
Expenditure/
income
1988
Credits
revised
for 1989
Credits
proposed
for 1990
Difference
between 1990
and 1989
(f)
t 995 869 (a)
55 382
213 027 (b)
t6 982
(c)
(r)
2241 061
59 500
278 822
36 300
36 995
(f)
2 489 188
70 9s0
318 400
22 t50
750
(f)
248 t27ll 450
39 578
- 
14 150
- 
36 245
(Yo)
I1.07
t9.24
14.19
- 
38.98
- 
97.97
2281260 2 652 678 290t 438 248 760 9.38
705 243
42 t42
805 582
l2 000
909 788ll 500 to4 206
- 
500
t2.94
- 
4.17
747 385 817 582 92t 288 103 706 t2.68
l s33 875 l 835 096 l 980 150 145 054 7.90
333 054 394 70t 38s 230
-9 471 -2.40
t 866 929 2229 797 2 36s 380 135 583 6.08
Footnotes
fa) inituoa an item p.m. in respect of education allowance. 'l(D/ Includes an item p.m. in respect of Appeals Board and amounts brought fomard from 1988.(c/ Includes amounts brought forward from 1988.
.
l. c-B (89) 28.
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APPENDIX V
Trend of budgas of the Seuetariat-General of WEU between 1989 and 1990
Approved
budget
for 1989
cB (89) l
a
Brought
fonvard
from 1988
cB (89) 9
b
I 989
Transfers
B (8e) l0
c ad
l 989
supplementarybudget %CB(89)14 d-a
de
l 990
ordinarybudget VoCB(89)28 e-d
A. Operating budget
I Sfaff
(f)
2241 061
s9 s00
250 455
36 300
l6 995
(r)
2 241 061
59 500
272322
36 300
36 995
(f)
2 147 56t
s9 s00
278 822
36 300
36 995
(r)
224t 061
s9 500
278 822
36 300
36 99s
(f)
2 489 188
70 9s0
318 400
22 150
750
II.
III. operating
Travel
Other
eosfs
IV. Purchase of furn-
iture and equipment
V. Buildings ........
Total expenditure ....
Receipts
Nrr rorru
B. Pensions budget
Pensions and allow-
2 604 3tt
817 582
2 646 178
817 s82
2 559 t78
817 582
2652678 r.86
817 582
2 901 438 9.38
92t 288
t 786 729 I 828 596 t 741 596 l 835 096 2.71 I 980 150 7.90
371 080
77 0r9
371 080
77 019
458 080
77 019
47 t 720
77 019
470 430
8s 200Pensions receipts
Nrr rorel
Nrr cneNn rorAl(A+B)
294 061 294 06t 381 061 394 70t 34.22 385 230 - 2.40
2 080 790 2 122 657 2 122 657 2229 797 7.16 2 365 380 6.08
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APPENDIX VI
Yafiations in the hudgets of tlu Secretariat-Gercral of WEU in 1989
l 989
approved
budget
c-B (89) l
a
Brought
forward
from 1988
B (8e) e
b
l 989
Transfers
B (89) l0
c
Supple-
mentary
budget
c-B (89) 14
d
I 990
ordinary
budget
c-B (89) 28
e
A. Operating budget
I Staff
(t)
2 24t 061
59 500
250 455
36 300
t6 995
(f)
2t 867
20 000
(f)
- 
93 500
6 500
(f)
93 500
(f)
248 t27ll 450
39 578
- 
14 150
- 
36 245
II Travel
III. Other operating costs ..... .
IV. Purchase of furniture and
equipment
V. Buildings
Total expenditure
Receints
2 604 3tt
8t7 582
4t 867
- 
87 000 93 500 248 760
103 706
Nrr rornl
B. Pensions budget
Pensions and allowances
Pensions receipts
Nrr rnral
t 786 729 4t 867
- 
87 000 93 500 145 054
371 080
77 0t9
87 000 l3 640
-t2908l8l
29406t 87 000 t3 640
-9 471
Nrr cneNn rorAL(A+B) 2 080 790 4t 867 r07 140 135 583
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APPENDIX vII
SrctroN B
Ministerial orga.ns in Pafis 
- 
Revised estimates for 1989 |
Summary
Credits
approved
for 1989
(F)
Amendments
proposed
(F)
Revised
estimates
(F)
o/o
Expenditure
B. I. Personnel costs
B II Travel
28 92t 950
400 000
2046900
30 000
3l 398 850
10007 100
195 000
l0 202 100
2t t96750
6 073 000
27 269 750
- 
l 532 500
- 
150 000
- 
38 100
- 
I 720 600
- 
1 158 300
l4s 100
- 
l 013 200
-707 400
707 400
2',t 389 450
2s0 000
2 008 800
30 000
29 678 250
8 848 800
340 100
9 188 900
20 489 350
6 780 400
27 269 750
- 
5.30
- 
37.50
-'j8u
- 
5.48
- 
l1.57
74.4t
- 
9.93
- 
3.34
l L65
B. III. Other operating costs
R fV Prrrnhocec
B V Brrildi
T,
Income
R VI WFIT ta
B.VII. Other receipts
Tnrar
N
Pensions
N
l. C-B (89) 22 (Part tl.
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APPENDIX VIII
SEcuoN B
Summary of estimated upenditure and income for 1990 - Minisurial otgans in Paris I
Current expenditure
B. I. Personnel costs ..B. II. Travel
B. III. Other operating
costs .
Capital expenditure
B. IV. Purchases .......B. V. Buildings .......
Gross operating costs . . .
Income
B. VI. WEU tax .... ...
B. VII. Other receipts ...
Operating income
Net total operating costs
Pensions
B.I.A. Costs .
B.VI[. Receipts
Net pension costs .
Net total costs .
Expenditure/
lncome
I 988
Revised
credits
for 1989
Credits
proposed
for 1990
Difference
between 1990
and 1989
(F)
30 476120.54
270 000.00
t 707 569.28
(F)
27 389 450
250 000
2 0s6 926 I
ll
(F)
410 650
100 000
r4t 250
(F)
- 
15 978 800
- 
150 000
- 
915 676
e/o)
- 
58.34
- 
60.00
- 
44.52
29_839.20
10 
000
- 
30 000
- 
109.00
32 483 529.02 29 726 376 l2 651 900 - t7 074 476 - 57.44
l0 537 669.40
42t 359.47
I 848 800
340 100
3 680 000
80 000
- 
5 168 800
- 
260 100
- 
58.41
- 
76.48
l0 959 028.87 9 188 900 3 760 000 - 5 428 900 - s9.08
2t 524 500.15 20 537 476 8 891 900 - tt 645 576 - 56.70
8195 42t.06
960 826.78
7 623 600
843 200
8 243 000
3s0 000
619 400
- 
493 200
8.12
- 
58.49
7 234 594.28 6 780 400 7 893 000 1 112600 t6.41
28 759 094.43 27 317 876 l6 784 900 - t0 532976 - 38.56
l. c-B (89) 28.
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APPENDIX IX
SrcrroN B
Ministurtd otgans in Parts - Provisionol supplementary estimata for 1990
Summary
Expenditure
B. [. Personnel costs
B II. Travel
Credits
approved
for 1990
Amendments
proposed
Revised
estimates Vo
l1
(F)
410 650
100 000
t4t 250I
(F)
l0 500 000 2t
(F)
910 650
100 000
r4t 250I
92.02
B. III. Other operating costs
R [V Prrreheces
B V Buildinos
Tor l2 651 900 l0 500 000 23 l5l 900 82.99
Income
EI \/I WFII f 3 680 000
80 000
3 680 000
80 000B.VII. Other receipts.
Tnr 3 760 000 3 760 000
N 8 891 900 l0 500 000 19 391 900 118.08
Sessions 7 893 000
l6 784 900
4 s36 200
l 5 036 200
t2 429 200
31 821 100
57.47
89.58Nrr cpaun rorar
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A. Operating budget
I Sreff
1989
apprcved
credits
c-B (89) 22
a
l 988
tmnsfers
B (89) 6
h
r 989
revrsed
budqel %:
c-B (8!) 22 a
c
1990
ordinary
budget ( I )
c-B (89) 28
%:i
1990
pror rsronal
suppl. budget
B (90) l
I
(F)
28 921 950.00
400 000.00
2 045 900.00
30 000.00
(F)
28 921 950.00
400 000.00
2095 026.00
30 000.00
(F)
27 389 450.00
250 000.00
2 056 926.00
30 000.00
I
(F)
410 650.00
100 000.00
r4l 250.00
u 2l 9r0 650.00
100 000.00
l l4r 250.00
II. Travel
III. Other operating
costs ..
IY. Purchase of furn-
iture and equip-
V. Building
Total expenditure.
Rmeints
3l 398 850.00
l0 202 100.00
3t 446976.00
l0 202 100.00
29 726 376.00 
- 
5.33
9 188 900.00
12 651 900.00
3 760 000.00
23 15l 900.00 
-22.t2
3 760 000.00
Net totel 2r t96750.00 2t 244 876.00 20 537 476.N 
- 
3.1I 8 891 900.00 19 391 900.00 
- 5.58
B. Pensions budget
Pensions and allowances
Pensions receipts ......
6 965 000.00
892 000.00
6 965 000.00
892 000.00
7 623 600.00
843 200.00
8 243 000.00
350 000.00
l3 3r5 000.00
885 800.00
Ner rorel 6 073 00.00 6 073 000.00 6 780 400.00 I 1.65 7 893 000.00 124292m.N 83.31
Net cneNo toteL(A+B) 27 269 750.00 27 3t7 876.00 27 3t7 876.00 0.18 16 784 900.00 31 821 100.00 16.48
APPENDIX X
Trend of budgas of thc ministerial otgans of WEU in Paris bctween 1989 ot d 1990
(French 
.francs)
l. This budget relates only to the lirst halfof 1990.
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APPENDIX XI
Yadations in the budge* of the ministertd organs in Paris between 19E9 and 1990
(French francs)
1989
approved
credits
c-B (8e) 22
a
Brought
forward
from 1988
B (8e) 6
b
1989
revised
budget
c-B (89) 22
c
1990
ordinary
budget
e
l 990
provisional
suppl. budget
B (90) lf
A. Operating budget
I Stalf 28 921950.00
400 000.00
2 046 900.00
30 000.00
48 126.00
- 
t 532 500.00
150 000.00
- 
38 100.00
- 
ls 978 800.00
150 000.00
915 676.00
30 000.00
l0 500 000.00
II Trevel
III.
IV.
Other operating costs
Purchase of furniture and
V. Buildings
Total expenditure
D aaainrc
3l 398 850.00
t0202100.00
48 126.00
- 
t 720 600.00
- 
I 013 200.00
t7 074 476.N
5 428 900.00
l0 500 000.00
Np.T Toral 2t 196 750.00 48 126.00 707 400.00 - 11 645 576.00 l0 500 000.00
B. Pensions budget
Pensions and allowances .
Pensions receipts
6 96s 000.00
892 000.00
658 600.00
- 
48 800.00
619 400.00
- 
493 200.00
5 072 000.00
s35 800.00
Nnr rour 6 073 000.00 707 400.00 l l 12 600.00 4 536 200.00
Nrr cnnno rorAl
/A+R\ 27 269 750.00 48 126.00
- 
l0 532 976.00 ls 036 200.00
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APPENDIX XII
RECOMMENDATION 46t'
on the badgas of tln ministerial organs of |fatern Eumpeon Union
for the financial yearc 198E (revised) otd 19E92
The Assembly,
(t) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1988 (revised) and
1989, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;(i, Considering that:
(a) no decision has yetbeen taken by the Council on the restructuring of the ministerial organs;
(b) the budgets of these organs are still based on former organograms;
(c/ consequenfly these budgets are not a valid estimate of requirements in relation tb pro-
grammed work;
(d/ consequenfly the Assembly is not in a position to give an opinion on the budgets in question
on the basis of a cost&fficiency ratio;
(e) inthe framework of budgetary management, a new practice seems to be introduced (which is
to transfer from one financial year to the next unused credits within the limits of the total con-
tributions of member states), which does not correspond to Article l0 (c/ of the Financial Reg-
ulations of WEU which is referred to as justification;(ii, Regretting that
(a) the staff of the Paris agencies is still uncertain about its future;
@/ furthermore, in the framework of * co-ordination " there is a tendency to limit the partici-pation of staff representatives in the negotiations on determining conditions of
employment,
Rrcourrmos rHAT Tr{E CouNqr
l. Follow up without delay Recommendation 467 adopted by the President'al Committee on l6th
March 1989;
2. Make the necessary amendments to the Financial Regulations to regularise the procedure for
transferring credits from one financial year to another outside the provisions of Article l0 (c/ of the Reg-
ulations;
3. Afford its backing to the staff associations in their action to defend the right of their representa-
tives to take part in negotiations in the framework of 'co-ordination' on the conditions for the
employment of staff;
4. Make a study to determine how to facilitate the transfer of staffberween the co-ordinated organ-
isations in order to improve career possibilities.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (2nd sitting).
l. Ex.plan{ory memoran4ym: see the report tabled by Mrs. Pack on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-istration (Document I 184).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 468
1. Recommendation 467, proposing substantial organisation and management changes, is still
being considered. The Council will, in due coursie, inform the Assembly of progress.
2. The Council has considered the recommendation of the Assembly concerning the transfer of
budgetary credits from one financial year to the next. It recognises that the system ofbudgetary control
has to have some flexibility in practice to meet special circumstances, providing modifications to
agreed budgets are made with the authority of the Council on the recommendation of the Budget Com-
mittee. The Council notes that, in the instances referred to, the secretariat sought and obtained the
appropriate authority.
The Council is fully aware of the exceptional nature of the circumstances in which the secretariat
has to operate at present. It does not consider that a new criterion has been set in adopting a practical
response to meet the unusual situation.
Whilst it may be somewhat premature to modifu permanently the Financial Regulations to meet
what is in effect a transient phase, this matter will be examined by the Budget and Organisation Com-
mittee to consider whether a change would be advisable in the long term.
3. The r6le of the staff associations to take part in the negotiations in the framework of 'co-
ordination " is recognised. Considerable progress has been made in the past ten years to establish and
develop this participation and the process continues to be refined and improved. The positive attitude
of the staff, as well as their contributions during the discussions and negotiations, are much appre-
ciated.
The framework of 'co-ordination'is, however, complex and often time-bound, and sometimes
one or other of the three parties involved may feel that it should have had more influence or that the
outcome of the negotiating process should have resulted in a more favourable compromise.
The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, within its sphere of competence,
endeavours to give each side its proper due and arrive at a common consensus as much as possible
before submitting its recommendations to the councils.
4. The movement of staff between co-ordinated organisations ought not to be considered
" transfers', but rather the leaving of one autonomous organisation (resignation, expiry of contract,
etc.) and the entering of another autonomous organisation (recruitment).
Staff mobility between co-ordinated organisations is enhanced by the more or less automatic
transfer of pension entitlements under the common pension scheme, and in that generally in
recruitment, preference will be given to appropriate staff members from other co-ordinated
organisations, maintaining, wherever possible, acquired grade and seniority, whilst recognising also
opportunities for career advancement.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l2th September 1989 and received at the Offrce of the Clerk on l2th September 1989.
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ANNExS
Secoad part of the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council
to the Assembly of WEU
(lst luly 
- 
3lst Decembr 1989)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Activities of the Council
III. Activities of the Special Working Group
IV. Activities of the Defence Representatives Group
V. Activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group
VI. Activities of the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space
YII. Activities of the Institutional Working Group
VIII. Relations with the press and information
IX. Relations with the Asssembly
X. Activities of the Paris ministerial organs (1989)
XI. Public Administration Committee (1989)
XII. Budgetary and administrative questions (1989)
I. Ministerial decision taken on l3th November 1989 in Brussels con-
cerning the setting-up of a * WEU Institute for Security Studies'
II. Co-ordinated organisations (1989)
IlL Application of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty on
forces bf Western European Union (1989)
IV. Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (1989)
17th April 1990
In the face of this extremely promising
situation, they unanimously stressed the
absolute need to support the development of the
reforms under way. They also recalled that the
Harmel doctrine, which provided for the estab-
lishment of a peaceful and secure order in
Europe, was still valid. They were pleased to see
that the ideas they had originally put forward
now had a genuine prospect of becoming reality.
Their aim was to achieve successive stages of
disarmament in an atmosphere of reciprocal
balance, control and stability.
They stressed the need to pursue and
implement the Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE
prooess and respect for human rights, insisting
that a pluralist democracy be established fol-
lowing free elections.
They stressed their commitment to the
pursuit of European integration, and in par-
ticular to the implementation of the Single
European Act.
3. Ministers' discussions ranged over the
main issues affecting European security.
I. Introduction
l. The second half of 1989 saw Europe
embark upon a new phase in its history. The
fundamental principles set out in the Helsinki
Final Act laid the groundwork for the break-up
of totalitarianism and the overcoming of the
division of Europe. Today, we are seeing that
division disintegrate.
The remarkable thing about this is its
peaceful nature. However, we must not be blind
to certain latent risks or to the extremely high
social cost ofthe necessarily slow transition ofa
closed and interventionist economic system to
an open market economy. For the USSR, the
uncertainties are even greater, given the chal-
lenges of all kinds facing President Gorbachev's
reform policy.
2. At their meeting on l3th and l4th
November 1989 in Brussels, Ministers had a
detailed exchange of views on the latest develoF
ments in Eastern Europe, particularly in the
German Democratic Republic.
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In this field, they stressed the need to
maintain a system of deterrence within the
framework of the Atlantic Alliance, having
regard to the changing climate of the arms
control negotiations.
Ministers hoped that developments in the
security field would take place in a climate of
stability. They added that it was not in their
interest unilaterally to make capital out of the
current changes taking place in Eastern
Europe.
4. Ministers exchanged views on the Euro-
pean security environment in the period 1991-
1995.
Whilst emphasising the undeniable ben-
efits of a CEE agreement, they noted that the
residual capacity of the Soviet Union following
the reductions would continue to pose a
potential military threat.
They concluded that, against the back-
ground of rapid political change, the reforms in
the East had to be supported in any event.
Following this initial discussion, they con-
cluded that an assessment of the likely security
environment of Western Europe in the period
l99l-1995 would be an important topic for dis-
cussion at future meetings.
5. Ministers examined an interim report pre-
pared by the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space on the
potential for security-related co-operation
between WEU member states in the field of
space technology, a field in which, in contrast to
ambitious civil programmes, the potential at
their disposal had not been exploited.
They agreed that satellite observation was
of interest to Europe mainly in the field of veri-
fication of arms control agtreements, and for
monitoring crises with security implications and
also environmental hazards. It could offer
greater security for member states and the
alliance as a whole, an increase in Europe's con-
tribution to, and expertise in, the verification of
arms control agreements and an enhancement of
European industrial and technological capabil-
ities.
6. Ministers decided to set up a * WEU
Institute for Security Studies ". Essentially, the
r6le of the institute would be to promote a
European security identity and to assist the
organisation in implementing the provisions of
The Hague platform.
Accordingly, its main tasks would be:
(a) to carry out research, principally for
the Council, calling on national
experts if necessary and in consul-
tation with the Secretariat-General;
this research would be carried out
independently and objectively;
(b) to encourage and help the existing
institutes in the member states to
promote a greater awareness of
European security issues and, specifi-
cally, to organise courses and seminars
to that end;
(c) in collaboration with existing insti-
tutes, to organise meetings with insti-
tutes in countries not belonging to
Western Europe, particularly those in
the Warsaw Pact countries;
(d) toestablish and keep up-to-date a data
bank for the purposes of research into
the defence efforts of the WEU
member countries and for studies
relating to European security. The
institute would submit a proposal to
the Council concerning the practical
arrangements for this measure;
(e) to contribute to academic work on
these topics.
7. The Ministers representing the Belgian
Presidency, Mr. Mark Eyskens and Mr. Guy
Co6me, briefed Assembly representatives on the
outcome of last year's ministerial meeting on
l3th and l4th November 1989.
II. Auivitics of the Council
1. During the period under review, the Per-
manent Council, both at its regular meetings
and at * enlarged " sessions, continued to follow
all the activities of the WEU intergovernmental
bodies and discussed a number of topical ques-
tions relating to the developments in Eastern
Europe.
2. The Council paid close attention to insti-
tutional questions and oversaw the work of the
Institutional Working Group which it had estab-
lished following the mandate given by Ministers
in April to the Permanent Council to study the
question of setting up an institute. After the
Council of Ministers'meeting on l3th and l4th
November, the Council set in motion the nec-
essary procedures for implementing the minis-
terial decision, the most important aspect of
which was the appointment of a Director. A
selection board was created to assist the Council
in making its decision and met once in the
period under review. In accordance with the
ministerial decision, a Director had to be
appointed by lst February 1990 so that he could
take up his duties as soon as possible, and no
later than lst June. It was expected that the
institute would therefore be fully operational
during the second half of 1990.
3. Following the ministerial meeting, the
Permanent Council also examined how to
implement the Ministers'decision to abolish the
Agencies for Security Questions (except for the
ACA) and the Standing Armaments Committee.
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It asked the Defence Representatives Group for
an opinion on the work done by the remaining
SAC working groups.
4. In accordance with the consultation pro-
cedure aggeed between the Council and, respec-
tively, Greece and Turkey (cf. Document 1200,
page 2), highJevel contacts took place between
representatives of the Council presidency and
the Greek and Turkish authorities following the
ministerial Council on l3th and l4th November
1989 in Brussels:
- 
on 20th November 1989, a meeting
between the Belgian Deputy Director-
General for politico-military affairs and
the Greek Ambassador to Brussels;
- 
on 3fth November, a meeting between
the Belgian Deputy Director-General
for politico-military affairs and a dele-
gation of seven senior Turkish offi-
cials;
- 
on 15th December, talks between the
Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Eyskens,
and his Turkish counterpart, Mr.
Yllma4 in the margins of the North
Atlantic meeting in Brussels.
5. The Council followed progxess in the
national ratification procedures of the protocol
of accession of Portugal and Spain signed on
l3th November 1988. By 3lst December 1989,
five member states had ratified the protocol.
6. The Council had further preliminary
exchanges on the review of the modified
Brussels Treaty and its protocols and examined
the question of the Agency for the Control of
Armaments in the light of the ministerial deci-
sions taken in November 1989.
7. The Council closely followed matters
relating to Assembly requirements directly
ensuing from enlargement and agreed upon a
supplementary budget to finance the necessary
alterations to the Assembly's seat which should
be completed prior to the Assembly's June 1990
sessron.
III. Auivities of the Special Working Group
1. The SWG's discussions of topical
politico-military questions during the period
under review have focused on two areas:
- 
the implications for Europe of the
results of the Atlantic Alliance summit
meeting in May 1989;
- 
the implications for the WEU member
countries of the dramatic changes
which took place in Central and Eastern
Europe in the second half of 1989.
These discussions have contributed
towards the emergence of a shared European
appreciation of these developments and to an
increase of European influence within the
alliance, thus helping to strengthen the alliance's
r6le in the arms control negotiations. Very
fruitful discussions took place on how best spe-
cific European security interests could be
reflected in the western position at the CFE
negotiations in Vienna. This broad consensus
was reflected at the ministerial meeting in
November 1989.
2. An important part of the SWG's con-
ceptual work during the period covered by this
report was devoted to evaluating what Europe's
security environment might be during the period
l99l-1995. On the basis of the discussions in the
SWG, the Belgian presidency introduced this
topic at the ministerial meeting in November
1989. Ministers invited the SWG and DRG to
conduct a comprehensive and in-depth study
and to prepare a report for the April ministerial
meeting. This report should include some
aspects more specifically related to maintaining
an undiminished level of security during the
transition period pending the full implemen-
tation of a CFE treaty.
3. The decisions at the May 1989 alliance
summit to accelerate the timetable for con-
cluding a CFE treaty highlighted the necessity
for consultation on how in practice European
countries could implement a CFE treaty, partic-
ularly as regards its extensive verification provi-
sions. Discussions in the SWG and DRG
emphasised the fact that, while verification
would be a national responsibility, a consid-
erable amount of co-operation and co-ordin-
ation would be required. Such co-operation
within WEU would have the double benefit of
demonstrating that Europe had a security
identity while at the same time contributing to
(and not duplicating) the work being done in the
alliance. It was for these reasons that Ministers,
at their November meeting, mandated the SWG
and DRG to present joint proposals on the prac-
tical arrangements for co-operation between
member countries with regard to the procedures
for verifying a CFE treaty.
4. The SWG has also discussed member
states' security interests regarding the proposal
put forward by President Bush at the alliance
summit in May 1989 to establish an 'open
skies " r6gime. In this area too, the potential for
practical co-operation between WEU member
countries is being examined by the SWG and
DRG.
5. In the context of the extra-European
dimension to WEU's activities, the SWG has
conducted an exchange of information on
member states' security-related programmes of
assistance to third world countries.
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6. The defence implications of a single
European market by 1992 is also a subject which
remains on the SWG's agenda.
IY. Activities
of the Defence Repruentatives Group
The Defence Representatives Group held
four meetings in its own right during this period,
as well as three joint meetings with the Special
Working Group. The majority of its activities
were devoted to the preparation of a report for
the November Ministerial Council on the
subject of training.
As requested by Ministers at their April
1989 meeting, this report considered how best to
promote further cooperation with a view to
maintaining effective and realistic training while
keeping the associated inconvenience to a
minimum. It recognised that proper training was
essential for the credibility of the armed forces
and that there was no substitute for exercises in
open terrain. It assessed, however, that there
was scope for changing the present mix of
studies currently under way, and by increasing
the use of simulators. The report also contained
detailed information on member states' training
facilities and exchange programmes in order to
assidt bi- and multilateral co-operation in these
flrelds.
The DRG was also actively involved in
discussions on the question of practical
co-operation on verification, in conjunction
with the SWG (see above). This subject was of
particular interest to the DRG since the minis-
tries of defence are likely to have to provide the
majority of the resources for verification activ-
ities. Various topics discussed included the size
and shape of national verification organisations,
the possibility of including inspectors of other
member states in inspection teams, the training
of inspectors and bilateral trial inspections.
Other activities of the DRG during this
period included discussion of topical defence
questions such as agreements with the Soviet
Union on avoiding military incidents and
military-to-military contacts with the Soviet
Union. It also began its initial discussions on the
military aspects of the report which is being pre-
pared on European security requirements in the
period 1991-1995.
Y. Activities
of the Mediterranean Sub-Group
At its meeting on 20th October 1989, the
sub-group continued its exchange of information
on developments in the Balkans, the Maghreb
and Cyprus.
The sub-group also studied a report on
naval deployments in the Mediterranean, which
showed that the European countries must con-
tinue to shoulder their responsibilities in that
area with adequate forces capable of playing an
active peacetime rOle in preventing local
cnses.
In view of the unending conflicts on its
eastern perimeter and the major development
problems facing countries on its southern
shores, the Meditelranean was very clearly of
considerable importance for Europe's security.
The sub-group recognised that its
mandate remained geographically limited to the
Mediterranean, but felt that it should not ignore
outside areas where political and military chal-
lenges affected the security of European states.
More attention should be given to the North/
South dimension of European security.
It was therefore decided to make a
detailed study of problems relating to the prolif-
eration of ballistic missiles with special ref-
erence to the disputes in the Middle East and the
Gulf and to capacities for manufacturing
chemical weapons.
The group would continue its analysis of
regional situations and its exchanges of infor-
mation on bilateral relations. As and when nec-
essary, it would propose subjects for discussion
by Ministers concerning developments which
represented major challenges for Europe's
security.
YI. Activities of the Sub-Group on Spoce
In essence, the mandate agtreed jointly on
lTth May 1989 by the Special Working Group
and the Defence Representatives Group for a
study of space, questions concerned the identifi-
cation, by collecting details of technical means
already available or to be established, of those
areas where co-ordination of member states'
activities was both necessary and beneficial.
After four meetings, between 5th July and
29th September 1989, the ad hoc Sub-Group on
Space of the Special Working Group produced
an interim report and unanimously approved its
final chapter. The Enlaryed Council adopted
this report and its summary. These texts were
submitted to the Ministerial Council which took
due note. Ministers discussed in depth the value
for Europe's security of member states' space
programmes currently in progress or planned.
They considered the possible uses of space tech-
nology in three areas: the verification of arms
control agreements and the monitoring of
ecological hazards. On that basis, Ministers
requested the ad hoc sub-group to continue its
work and to undertake the technical studies
required for the preparation of a possible minis-
terial decision on the development by member
states of a European satellite observation pro-
gramme.
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These pre-feasibility studies would have
to cover both the use of satellite systems already
in existence or being developed and also the
technical and financial feasibility of developing
a European satellite observation system. They
would involve the definition and analysis of the
various national and European operational
requirements which satellite observation might
meet and of the corresponding technical means
as regards sensors, satellite platforms and
ground facilities. The inventory of usable data
from scientific, commercial and military satel-
lites and the study of how such data are to be
processed and assessed for quality will have to
be conducted in parallel. Finally, consideration
will be given to the definition of an appropriate
institutional framework for the effective man-
agement of the programmes involved.
These different subjects will therefore be
on the agenda ofthe ad hoc Sub-Group on Space
during 1990.
YII. Activitiu
of the Institutional Working Group
l. Following the decision taken by the Min-
isterial Council in London on 3rd April 1989 to
instruct the Permanent Council 'to review the
question of an institute for strategic studies and
the related question of the WEU agency with a
view to a further discussion at its next
meeting', the Institutional Working Group(IWG) was convened and, after four meetings,
produced a draft ministerial decision.
2. This draft was submitted to the Minis-
terial Council in Brussels on l3th November
and adopted. Under the terms of this decision,
a * WEU Institute for Security Studies' was
set up for the purpose of strengthening
the organisation's impact on the identification
of European security by giving it a study
capacity.
The institute was set up in accordance
with Article VIII (2) of the modified Brussels
Treaty and with the conclusions on institutional
questions reached by Ministers in The Hague on
27th October 1987 and l9th April 1988.
3. In addition to the Director, it will have
four permanent experts and a Head of Adminis-
tration. Funds will be earmarked for enlisting
expertise to carry out specific and in-depth
studies.
The Director and the experts will carry
out their tasks independently and objectively.
The Director will report to the Council on the
execution of the tasks assigned to him and
on how the budget has been used. For 1990,
the budget will be F I I 380 000, includingF I 730 000 for functional expenditure. Min-
isters instructed that the Director should be
appointed by the Council by lst February 1990
at the latest.
4. The Council of Ministers also decided to
wind up the Paris-based Agencies for Security
Questions' and the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee. The Permanent Council was instructed
to terminate the contracts of the staff of those
bodies in accordance with the legal provisions in
force.
Ministers also asked the Permanent
Council to take appropriate decisions, after con-
sulting the Assembly, on the organisational
aspects of setting up the institute in the
organisation's building.
YIII. Relations with the press
and iaformation
l. The ministerial bodies have continued to
be very active in this field. Action taken by the
Secretary-General and his participation,
together with members of his staff, at various
events concerned with the challenging issues and
problems of European security were reported in
detail in two information letters sent to the
Assembly during the second half of 1989. Con-
tinuing to work in the same direction and in the
same ways, the ministerial bodies again sought
to foster public relations with the press and with
the many institutions involved in the debate on
the changing state of member countries' security
policies. This continuity is largely attributable to
the basically unchanged political and budgetary
constraints to which an intergovernmental
organisation is subject.
The most noteworthy event of late 1989
was the second European session of advanced
defence studies held at the Palais d'Egmont in
Brussels from 26th November to lst December.
In the very short time available, and against the
background of headlong developments in
European history, this session succeeded in
identifying all the basic political and military
questions now facing Europeans and in looking
at them in a new lieht; it also suggested possible
ways of responding, providing food for thought.
The credit for this remarkable success goes to
the outstanding team from the Belgian Centre
for Defence Studies, which formulated terms of
reference 
- 
shown to be highly relevant by the
day-to'day events 
- 
and succeeded in attracting
an array of most talented speakers.
IX. Relations with the Assembly
l. During the second part of the thirty-fifth
ordinary session of the Assembly (4th-7th
December 1989), the Foreign Affairs and
Defence Ministers of the Belgian presidency,
l. This does not apply to the Agency for the Control of
Armaments.
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Mr. Eyskens and Mr. Co€me, the French
Defence Minister, Mr. Chevdnement, the Min-
ister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal
Republic of Germany, Mr. Schlifer, and the
Italian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Vitalone, all spoke and answered questions from
the parliamentarians (see Volume IV of the Pro-
ceedings of the thirty-fifth ordinary session of
the Assembly).
2. The now official meetings between the
Ministers of the Belgian Presidency, the Secre-
tary-General and the Presidential Committee of
the Assembly took place before and after each
Ministerial Council on:
- 
l Tth October, and
- 
l4th November in Brussels between the
Ministers of the Belgian Presidency, the
Secretary-General and the Presidential
Committee of the Assembly.
These meetings are extremely valuable as
the occasion for face-to-face, informal talks and
the exchange of up-to-date information. They
also provide an opportunity for presenting new
ideas on the political and military activities of
each ofthe organs and for questions about insti-
tutions.
3. Other forms of dialogue such as the
Secretary-General's information letter to the
President of the Assembly and the organisation
of special meetings have been devised with the
constant aim of improving relations between the
Council and the Assembly:(i) On 12th September and 22nd November
1989, the Secretary-General, Mr. Willem van
Eekelen, wrote to Mr. Charles Goerens, Pres-
ident of the Assembly, briefing him on the activ-
ities of the intergovernmental organs.
The texts of these letters were distributed
to all members of the Assembly.(it) On lst November 1989, the Secretary-
General, Mr. Willem van Eekelen, received
members of the United Kingdom Delegation to
the Assembly, with whom he discussed the main
questions before the Council.
(iii) 
. 
When he visited Paris on 6th November
1989, the Secretary-General had talks with Mr.
Jean-Pierre Fourr6, Chairman of the French
Delegation to the WEU Assembly.(iv) Speaking at the second part of the thirty-
fifth ordinary session of the Assembly on 4th
December 1989, Mr. Willem van Eekelen
expressed his willingness to be consulted as and
when necessary by the Assembly committees or
national delegations.
X. Activities
of the Paris ministerial organs (1989)
1. The year in question has witnessed a
gradual run-down in the staffrng and output of
the Paris ministerial organs, following the
streamlining in 1988 of the principal activities
entrusted to the Agencies for Security Questions
by Ministers in April 1985.
The agencies have however contributed
usefully to the work of the Council working
groups; in particular for the:
- 
Special Working Group on:
- 
anns control verification
- 
space
- 
chemical weapons
- 
1992 single market
- 
Defence Representatives Group on:
- 
military aspects of arms control veri-
fication
- 
training
- 
demogsaphy
2. Under the general heading of European
armaments co-operation, the three remaining
working goups of the Standing Armaments
Committee continued their work on test proce-
dures for wheeled vehicles and on operational
research. A seminar on artificial intelligence was
organised in June at the Paris oflices. Contacts
and exchanges of information with FINABEL
were maintained.
3. In addition, experts of the agencies
attended specialist conferences and symposia,
contributed articles on defence issues to profes-
sional publications and advised the Secretary-
General on specific military matters as
required.
4. In its decision of 13th November 1989,
the Council of Ministers set up a WEU Institute
for Security Studies, whose essential r6le will be
to promote a European security identity and to
assist the organisation in pursuing the objectives
laid down in the platform. It was also decided
that the Agencies for Security Questions (but not
the ACA) and the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee should be abolished, with staff contracts
being terminated with effect from 30th June
1990.
In view of this decision, the Council
agreed that its Defence Representatives Group
should examine the future of the work of the
remaining working gtroups of the SAC, and
report its findings to the Council in due course.
The Paris ministerial organs have contributed a
report for consideration by the Defence Repre-
sentatives Group.
5. The Agency for the Control of Armaments
continued its residual tasks in respect of atomic,
biological and chemical weapons control, at the
levels existing at the time of the Rome Decla-
ration of 1984 and in accordance with the proce-
dures agteed up to that time 2.
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For this thirty-fourth ACA control year,
the juridical sources used to justify control levels
and procedures remained unchanged in 1989.
The ACA continued to follow the work of
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and
expecially the work on negotiations on a con-
vention prohibiting chemical weapons. It also
took part in the Special Working Group's
meeting on chemical weapons.
)il. Public Administration Committee (1989)
The Public Administration Committee
held its two six-monthly meetings at Bad
Mergentheim on 25th and 26th April and at
Caen from l8th to 20th September.
The reports on these meetings will be for-
warded to the Office of the Clerk of the
Assembly where they will be available for
members' inspection.
A new feature of the past year was the
attendance for the first time of representatives
of the Spanish and Portuguese Directors-
General of Public Administration.
The thirty+ighth seminar for government
offrcials took place from l5th to 21st October
1989 in Bruges, Belgium, on the subject of
'Informatics, individual liberties and public
security'.
XII. Budgetary
and administrative questions (1989)
l. At its meeting in November 1989, the
Ministerial Council decided:
- 
to abolish the Agencies for Security
Questions as from 30th June 1990;
- 
to maintain the Agency for the Control
of Armaments (ACA) in its present
form until further decisions were
taken;
- 
to establish a * WEU Institute for
Security Studies" as from lst July
I 990.
2. As a result of the abolition of the Agencies
for Security Questions, all A, L, B and C grade
staff were sent letters before 3lst December
1989, giving notice of the termination of their
contracts with effect from 3fth June 1990, in
accordance with the provisions of Annex VI to
the Staff Rules, leading, in appropriate cases, to
the payment of a loss of job indemnity.
It is hoped that some members of staff
will find a post in the new WEU institute; the
small number seconded by their governments
will return to their national departments; efforts
will be made to help find posts for the remaining
staff in other WEU bodies or international
organisations.
3. Stafffor the new WEU institute, recruited
from the Agencies for Security Questions or else-
where, will be offered renewable, three-year
limited-term contracts.
On l3th December, a selection board,
made up of the permanent representatives, held
its first meeting in the presence of the Secretary-
General to appoint a Director for the
institute.
4. Following the accession of Spain and Por-
tugal, the Assembly's new office and conference
material requirements have called for reap-
praisal of the premises in terms of the available
space and the purchase of equipment. At the
same time, the abolition of the agencies and the
establishment of the institute have resulted in a
net reduction in staff numbers.
The institute will occupy the third floor of
the WEU premises in Paris. Arrangements for
co-operation between the Assembly and the
institute are now being worked out.
5. As a result ofthe unexpected departure of
the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-
General, a supplementary budget has had to be
submitted as the cost of the leaving allowances
could not be covered from savings elsewhere in
the budget.
6. On the recommendation of the Budget
and Organisation Committee, the Council
decided in November 1989 that a management
survey of the Secretariat-General and the Oflice
of the Clerk of the Assembly must be conducted
before any posts could be added to the estab-
lishment table.
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ANNEX I
Ministerial decision concerning thc saning-up
of a " WEU Institute for Security Sludies "
Brussels, I3th Nowmbcr 1989
The Ministerial Council:
Convinced that, as stated in the platform on European security interests adopted in The Hague
on 27th October 1987, the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it
does not include security and defence and that WEU makes an important contribution to the broader
process of European unification;
Determined to increase the effectiveness of the organisation and to contribute to an overall
solution to its institutional problems;
Stressing the importance of having within WEU a capacity to study, and provide documentation
on, questions concerning European security;
Recalling that the Assembly, in Recommendation 467, has expressed interest in the estab-
lishment of such a capacity,
Hns oectoeo AS FoLLows:
l. A * WEU Institute for Security Studies " shall be set up. Essentially, the r6le of this institute shall
be to promote a European security identity and to assist the organisation in pursuing the objectives laid
down in the platform. Accordingly, its main tasks shall be:
(a) to carry out research, principally for the Council, calling on national experts ifaecessary and
in coniultation with the Secretariat-General; this research will be carried out independently
and objectively;
(b) to encourage and help the existing institutes in the member states to promote a.greater
awareness of European security issues and, specifically, to organise courses and seminars to
that end;
(c) in collaboration with existing institutes, to organise meetings with institutes in countries not
belonging to Western Europe, particularly those in the Warsaw Pact countries;
(d/ establish and keep up-to-date a data bank for the purposes of research into the defence. 
efforts of the WEU member countries and for studies relating to European security - the
relevant practical arrangements will be the subject of an institute proposal to the Council;
(e/ contribute to academic work on the same topics.
2. It is decided that the Agencies for Security Questions 3 and the Standing Armaments Committee
shall be abolished.
3. The institute shall be placed under the authority of the Council which shall appoint the Director
for a period of three years. The Director shall be responsible to the Council for the management of the
institute.
4. The institute shall be located in Paris in the premises of WEU. The question of its location shall
be reviewed in the light of the conclusions of the Ministerial Councils of 27th October 1987 and l9th
April 1988 regarding the collocation of WEU institutions, necessary in the context of the European
construction process.
5. The Assembly may, with the Council's approval, assign to the institute studies relating tqJhg
Assembly's own activitie-s. fne Assembly shall have access to the results of the institute's unclassified
work.
6. The Director of the institute shall be appointed by lst February 1990 at the latest. He shall take
up his duties as soon as possible, at the latest by lst June 1990.
3. This does not apply to the Agency for the Control of Armaments.
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ANNEX II
Co-ordinated organisotions ( I 989)
L The Co-ordinating Committee held eight meetings in 1989. In addition, there were ten meetings
of the Committee of Heads of Administration, and nine joint meetings of the Standing Committee of
Secretaries-General with the Standing Committee of Staff Associations.
2. The main subjects dealt with in the framework of co-ordination, some of which are still under
review, were as follows:
- 
a review of the adjustment procedure for salaries and appropriate allowances, resulting in an
approved new adjustment procedure taking effect with the annual review of lst July 1989;
- 
an evaluation of the cost of the pension scheme;
- 
effects on the pension scheme of the introduction of part-time work in the OECD;
- 
the periodic adjustment of salaries and allowances.
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ANNEX III
Application of Protocol No. II of the modifwd Brussels Treaty
on forces of Western Euroyrcan Union (1989)
l. The Council has continued with its customary controls on levels of forces of member states, con-
sistent however with the political declaration adopted by the Council of Ministers on l4th November
1988 concerning a review of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols.
For 1989, as for preceding years, the Council received information concerning the levels of
forces of WEU member states under NATO command, in accordance with Article IV of Protocol No.
II. This information was transmitted, as previously, to the Council by a high-ranking offrcer designated
by SACEUR to that end. This annual presentation to the Council once again gave permanent represen-
tatives an opportunity to hold a substantive exchange of views with the SHAPE representatives on a
wide range of topical European defence issues.
The Council keeps its procedure for forces control under annual review, so that it may continue
to implement the essential control measures set out in Protocol No. II.
2 t. The Government of the United Kingdom has informed the Council that the average number of
British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1989 in accordance with the commitment in
Article VI of Protocol No.II was 52 127. The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern
Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of
duty there. In 1989 there were on average 747 personnel deployed in this way to Northern lreland. In
addition, an average of 523 personnel were deployed to meet commitments in Cyprus. These units
would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.
So far as the strength of the United Kingdom's contribution to the Second Allied Tactical Air
Force in 1989 is concerned, there is one minor change from the 1988 table, in that the Reconnaissance
Squadron, previously shown as Jaguar/Tornado, is now solely Tornado.
The revised table is shown below:
RAb Airuaft/equipment Squadrons
Strike/attack Tornado
Harrier
Tornado
Phantom
Rapier surface-to-air missiles
Puma
Chinook
RAF regiment
7
2
1
2
4
I
I
1
Offensive support
Reconnaissence
Air defence
Air
Grorrnd defence
l. The text hereafter was communicated to the Assembly on 23rd May 1990.
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ANNEX IV
4aivities of the Agency for the C.ontrul of Armaments (19E9)
l. Atomic weapons
The ACA does not exercise any control of these weapons.
2. Biological weapons
All member states agreed to carry forward for 1989 the list of biological weapons subject to
control in use in 1988. The Council took note.
However, as for previous years, the ACA exercises no control of these weapons.
3. Chemical weapons
All member states notified the agency that they agreed to carry fonrard, during 1989, the list of
chemical equipment products (chemical weapons) subject to control which was in force in 1988. The
Council took note.
Following the usual procedure, the agency asked the member states whether any effective pro
duction of chemical weapons was being carried out on their mainland territory. All member states
replied in the negative.
No country reported holding chemical weapons on the mainland of Europe.
Also following the usual procedure, four 'agreed non-production control measures' were
carried out at chemical production plants. In executing these controls, the ACA observed nothing con-
trary to the undertakings not to manufacture chemical weapons.
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l. As usual, in the first half of 1990 there
were two aspects to the Presidential Commit-
tee's action: administrative and political.
I. Administratbe oction
2. In regard to administration, the Presi-
dential Committee examined the consequences
of the enlargement of WEU and the restruc-
turing of the administrative organs. The former
concerned it directly since the increase in the
number of members of the Assembly and its
committees, and the additiorr of two further lan-
guages to the organisation's five oflicial lan-
guages, compelled the Assembly to transform its
premises and increase the size of its meeting
rooms. The abolition of the WEU security
agencies involved human factors to which the
Presidential Committee felt it could not remain
indifferent.
(i) Reorgaaisatioa ofthc seat
3. In the first part of 1990, the Presidential
Committee had to ensure that the first session of
the Assembly of enlarged Western European
Union was held in conditions which respected
the Rules of Procedure and the dignity of its
debates.
4. The reorganisation of the WEU building
was thus one of the Presidential Committee's
constant concerns. It is common knowledge
that, because of the Council's delay in giving its
agreement, work included in the Assembly's
extraordinary budget started late. One of the
firms awarded a tender having gone bankrupt, it
had to be replaced forthwith and the time lost
18th May 1990
due to this incident had to be made good. In
short, every effort has been made to ensure that
the premises are ready by the time the session is
opened in spite of the hazards involved in this
kind of work.
5. Not only, therefore, shall we be able to
welcome the Portuguese and Spanish Delega-
tions, henceforth sitting as full members, it is
also to be hoped that there will be a significant
improvement in the Assembly's working condi-
tions.
6. The new committee rooms replace rooms
that were badly ventilated and which had too
few seats for the former number of members of
the Assembly.
7. Furthermore, in addition to English and
French, as provided for in the Rules of Pro-
cedure, it will be possible to have interpretation
into the language of any other member country
if the delegations concerned so wish and recruit
interpreters at their own expense.
8. Offices assigned to delegations are now
slightly larger than the previous ones. Their fur-
nishing and equipment will be improved. The
Presidential Committee is nevertheless aware
that the situation is not yet satisfactory. It
regrets that the Council agreed only to expen-
diture relating to work directly connected with
the enlargement of WEU.
(ii) Stalfofthc sccurity agcncics
9. 1990 is also the year for the application of
the twofold decision to set up a WEU Institute
for Security Studies and to abolish the security
agencres.
Action by the Presidential Committee
+EPORT
suhmitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee
by Mr. Gurens, President of the Assembly
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Administrative action
(y' Reorganisation of the seat
(iri Staff of the security agencies
II. Political action
(r/ New forms of dialogue with certain Warsaw Pact countries
(iil Yisit by the Presidential Committee to Moscow
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10. Mr. Roper, appointed Director of the ins-
titute, is a former member of our Assembly and
a former Chairman of the Defence Committee. I
have wished him every success in a task which
involves close co-operation with the Assembly
that he knows well.
11. The institute comes into operation on lst
July. In order to leave its Director absolutely
free to choose his staff, the Council decided to
terminate the contracts of all officials of the
Paris ministerial organs. However, the condi-
tions in which this was done aroused keen
concern of which the Staff Committee of the
agencies informed the President of the
Assembly. The Staff Committee regretted the
absence of a negotiated agreement on the condi-
tions in which staff recruited to work for the
future WEU Institute for Security Studies would
stay on and on the financial compensation that
would be paid to those who would have to leave
the organisation following what amounted to
collective dismissal.
12. The Presidential Committee decided to
examine this problem and started a dialogue
with the Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen,
who assured it that he fully shared its concerns
and had asked the Director of the institute, Mr.
Roper, to give priority to the candidatures of
staff of the Paris ministerial organs.
13. Finally, the Council refused to grant the
staffof the agencies who had been dismissed any
indemnity other than that provided for in the
Staff Rules. At the joint meeting with the
Council, the Presidential Committee was
informed that this matter had now been settled
once and for all.
14. To my $eat regret, this is the situation
that I have to report to the Assembly.
***
II. Political action
15. Politically speaking, the beginning of
1990 was marked by the upheavals in Central
and Eastern Europe at the end of last year.
These were the subject ofdebates at the extraor-
dinary session held by the Assembly in Luxem-
bourg on 2lst and22nd March. The Presidential
Committee for its part has endeavoured to
establish new forms of dialogue with certain
Warsaw Pact countries and, by visiting Moscow,
to strengthen links with the Supreme Soviet, ini-
tially established in 1987.
(i) New forms of dialoge
with cerlain ll/anaw Paot couatries
16. To facilitate the examination, at the extra-
ordinary session in Luxembourg, of events in
Central and Eastern Europe, the Presidential
Committee decided, for the first time, to invite
members of the Polish and Soviet Govern-
ments.
17. Instead of Mr. Shevardnadze, Soviet
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was unable to
attend, it was Mr. Falin, Director of the Interna-
tional Department of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and
Member of the Committee of the Supreme
Soviet responsible for international affairs, who
addressed the Assembly in Luxembourg.
18. The Polish Minister for Foreign Alfairs,
Mr. Skubiszewski, was able to accept the invi-
tation and he attended almost all our debates
and spoke twice. The Assembly listened with the
utmost attention to his reasoned comments on
his country's foreign policy in his first address
and was then gratified to hear him speak again
after Mr. Genscher's address. The Assembly was
privileged to promote a fruitful dialogue
between those responsible for foreign policy in
two neighbouring countries reconciled after the
drama of recent history than*s to the recog-
nition, just repeated by Mr. Genscher on behalf
of the Federal Republic of Germany, of the
intangibility of the Oder-Neisse frontier.
19. It should be added that Mr. Falin
regretted not being able to conduct a similar dia-
logue because Mr. Genscher had had to leave,
but his address and well-documented answers to
questions allowed a better assessment to be
made of areas of agreement and the extent of the
differences that still have to be overcome.
20. The Presidential Committee also decided
to invite the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
future Hungarian Government to attend the
June session. At the time of writing this report,
it is to be hoped that we shall be able to hear one
of the very earliest foreign policy statements by
the first Hungarian Government to emerge from
free elections.
21. Finally, parliamentary observers from
countries with special guest status in the Council
of Europe have, for the first time this year, been
invited to the Assembly's sessions.
22. Only Hungarian and Yugoslav parliamen-
tarians were able to attend the Luxembourg
session but we hope that parliamentarians from
Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union and Yugo-
slavia will be able to attend the June session,
together with others from the German Demo-
cratic Republic, in order to enrich our debates
with their remarks.
(ii) Yisil by the Presidential Commiuee to Moscott
23. The Presidential Committee's visit to
Moscow from 2nd to 6th April 1990 was made
in the framework of the regular relations estab-
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lished by common agreement between the
Supreme Soviet and our Assembly.
24. I congratulated those we met on the ini-
tiative taken by the Supreme Soviet of inviting a
delegation from the WEU Assembly to Moscow
in April 1987. Last year, the Assembly in turn
invited a delegation from the new Soviet Par-
liament following the spring elections. It has
been agreed that these visits will henceforth be
organised on an annual basis, alternately in
Paris and Moscow.
25. I told the Soviet authorities that the dia-
logue now under way encouraged mutual
understanding and a spirit of co-operation
favourable to the search for solutions to our
common problems. We all hope that a just,
peaceful and secure order will be established in
Europe. The WEU Assembly for its part had
been reflecting on this subject, the first stage
being marked by the adoption, at the extraor-
dinary session held in Luxembourg on 22nd and
23rd March, of the recommendation to the
Council submitted by Senator Pontillon on
behalf of the Political Committee.
26. In the same spirit, the Presidential Com-
mittee, aware of the magnitude of the problems
facing the Soviet Union, did not want it to be
weakened but, on the contrary, hoped peres-
troika would be successful since we did not
endorse the cold-war reasoning that whatever
harmed one side served the interests of the
other, but advocated co-operation implying that
we need each other.
27. Mr. Zagladin, Mr. Gorbachev's advisor
and a member of his Security Council, presented
the present situation in a similar light. He
believed international relations now revealed
the coexistence of two dissimilar approaches:
that of the past, when diplomacy was viewed
solely as the defence of national interests, and
that of the future, which sought to build an
international community in which each one
considered the rights of all the others.
28. He personally concluded that the future of
the different security systems should now be
envisaged in the framework of all-Europeanjoint security. He added that the Soviet Union
would never resort to force, even if the situation
turned against it.
29. The Soviet authorities, in particular
Mr. Dzasokhov, Chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet, while
stressing the need for the unification of
Germany to be co-ordinated with that of
Europe, stressed the frequent similarity of views
expressed by each side, especially on the intangi-
bility of frontiers.
30. However, major differences emerged as
soon as the question of German unification was
tackled. From a Soviet standpoint unified Ger-
many's membership of NATO would upset the
balance of forces in every area, particularly at
military level. What would the West say, one of
them pointed out, if unified Germany joined the
Warsaw Pact?
31. Without calling attention to the lack of
realism of this retort, we answered that, legally,
the German people must remain free to choose
its alliances and, politically, all the alliances had
an important r6le to play in promoting the
consolidation of an order that ensured security
in Europe. Unified Germany's membership of
the Atlantic Alliance should not be considered
as a threat. On the contrary, the alliances would
have a major r6le to play in the context of the
new European order.
32. In this connection, our German colleagues
stressed that Germany could not be subject to
special conditions for ever. Whatever the
concerns for balance or bad memories of the
past, the people of the new Germany would have
to choose their destiny like other peoples. The
need for Germany to be free to express its poli-
tical choices was confirmed by the other
members of the Presidential Committee.
33. The members of the Presidential Com-
mittee nevertheless showed that they were aware
of the security concerns of the Soviet Union by
indicating their agreement to the alliances, in
the future, being assigned a political r6le which
might progressively take over from their
military r6le. In the meantime, there would have
to be substantial balanced and adequately-
controlled disarmament.
34. We were told at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs that the Vienna negotiations would have
to be concluded in the framework of the present
mandate. A new mandate would then have to be
adopted to allow further reductions in conven-
tional forces and new measures in the
framework of a collective security system.
35. On the Soviet side, the wish was expressed
that the nuclear disarmament talks would allow
a substantial reduction in such weapons and the
abolition of tactical nuclear weapons, but they
admitted that the West should retain nuclear
weapons * as a guarantee against the machina-
tions of irresponsible political leaders ". Thus,
there seemed to be the first signs of some recog-
nition of the need for minimum deterrence.
36. Emphasis was also laid on the growing
importance of co-operation between the two
alliances to meet the dangers of nuclear and che-
mical proliferation and the growth in imports of
advanced technology military equipment in
various parts of the world.
37. The frankness of the talks allowed the Pre-
sidential Committee to express its concern at
events in Lithuania. Were we not witnessing on
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this occasion the existence of a limit to peres-
troika?
38. The Soviet authorities voiced their
concern for stability and balance. Events in the
Baltic region raised economic and also moral
problems. Each ethnic group should show
respect for the other groups. Furthermore, the
problem raised was not confined to Lithuania
but concerned all the nations in the region.
Everything that had been achieved in recent
decades was being called in question. It was
therefore legitimate to call for a referendum to
be organised.
39. Some pointed out that attribution of the
city of Vilnius to Lithuania was a consequence
of the pact between Stalin and Ribbentrop. The
treaty question was therefore more complex
than was thought. Above all, the Soviet Union
wanted time to find a way out.
40. Generally speaking emphasis was laid on
the importance for the Soviet Union of the
present transitional period. The move from an
inward-looking to an outward-looking policy
was painful, but success was necessary not only
to ensure the salvation of the Soviet Union but
to place European security on sound founda-
tions.
41. Mr.7a$adin was particularly optimistic
about the future of perestroika, which would
move more quickly this year. Steps would be
taken to ensure significant effects before the end
of the year.
42. In conclusion, we all agreed on the
interest of the talks just held and the value we
attached to the pursuit, in a particularly
changing context, of the dialogue on the condi-
tions of European security.
*
t*
43. I wish to express a few personal thoughts
on the Presidential Committee's visit to
Moscow.
44. While remaining one of the world's two
great military powerc, the Soviet Union is
passing through a period of change which is
disorganising its economy and upsetting the
foundations of its social cohesion and national
identity. This combination of strength and
weakness implies, on our patl, a new organi-
sation of European security.
45. We must first take account of the fact
that, for the first time, East and West are
referring to the same principles. Although there
is still an economic gap between the two parts of
Europe, the ideological struggle has come to an
end with the eastern countries' endorsement of
the principles that guide the West.
46. Already in April 1987, when receiving the
Bureau of the Assembly in Moscow for the first
time, the Soviet authorities were no longer pre-
senting their system of social organisation as a
model. While underlining their loyalty to
socialist ideals, they recognised not only eco-
nomic failure due to * the time lost in the
Brezhnev era' but above all the need for
sweeping democratisation of society and institu-
tions.
47. Although less rapid than in other
European countries, this democratisation seems
to be making steady progress. However, only in
the Soviet Union is it endangering the very unity
of the state.
48. The introduction of democracy, through
perestroika, in the immense heterogeneous
empire assembled by the tsars is more of a revo-
lution than a reform. Only the slowness of the
process had concealed its extent, which is now
glaringly apparent. The upheavals that it is
causing are linked with the emergence in an
authoritarian, set society of the two factors of
mobility implied by democracy: freedom of
expression and pluralism.
49. The frst offers the peoples of which the
Soviet Union is composed the possibility of
demonstrating their personalities in a_n often
unoompromising manner at a time when the
Western and Central European countries, where
there were national movements a century and a
half ago, are stressing their solidarity. The plu-
rality of opinions that may now be expressed in
the Soviet Union is weakening the party as the
instrument of power and calling in question the
factor of cohesion represented by a dominating
ideology. Finally, in the other Warsaw Pact
countries, the emergence of democracy has led
to the dismantling of the ramparts that the
Soviet Union considered to be an essential part
of its security.
50. Nevertheless, the military power built up
by the Soviet Union during the period of tension
is still intact, declarations of intent concerning
its reduction not yet having had any significant
effect. We know the factor of inertia that applies
to disarmament. It is not easy to implement
quickly even the most sincerely proposed reduc-
tions.
51. The danger inherent in the present
situation is represented by the fact that, now the
Soviet Union is pursuing a policy of rappro-
chement with the West, the army has become its
most stable institution and, whatever happens,
will remain the basis of its strength for a long
time to come.
52. To such a new problem, the West cannot
merely give the military answer prepared in res-
ponse to threats expressed by the Berlin blo
ckade, the Korean war or the Prague coup d'6tat.
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A new international order must be established in
agreement with the Soviet Union and the
eastern countries. As in 1815, at the Congress of
Vienna, we are in agreement on the principles to
be applied. But the legitimate principle today is
the right of peoples to self-determination.
53. At the Vienna Congress, the principle of
monarchical legitimacy was applied, taking into
account concerns relating to balance considered
as a factor of security. Today, it is the Soviet
Union which is asking that respect for the will of
the peoples be linked with the need to maintain
the balance of forces. This request is fanning the
flames of controversy over the unification of
Germany since respect for the clearly-expressed
will of the German people implies strengthening
the western camp.
54. This strengthening certainly involves no
risk for the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, ebch
side fears the potentialities of the other. Only
the establishment of an all-European security
order will therefore allow peace in Europe to be
made lasting and give a stable basis to intra-
European co-operation. This means combining
conventional arms reductions, a ban on the pro
duction of chemical and biological weapons and
the existence of minimum deterrence to counter
threats from any direction. Moreover, we must
show imagination in ensuring that the imple-
mentation of democratic principles is a factor of
mutual confidence rather than the start of new
crises. With the fear of clashes between peoples
and ethnic Etroups more attached to affrrming
their personalities than to respecting that of
others, Europeans must find ways of making
their own diversity a factor of richness rather
than disorder.
55. We must not forget that the governments
used WEU to settle the Saar problem in 1955
and that WEU has allowed Federal Germany to
be rearmed in an atmosphere of mutual confi-
dence. Today, the purpose is to found a new
European order guaranteeing the security of all.
In such circumstances, can WEU, the forum for
Europeans to give thought to their own interests,
remain silent? We urge the Council to assume in
full the important responsibilities incumbent
upon it.
56. The Assembly for its part acts with the
means it has. The recommendation it adopted at
the close of its extraordinary session in Luxem-
bourg is a first set of proposals aimed at giving
WEU a major rOle in organising the new
European order. It has established a dialogue
with the Supreme Soviet which will be extended
to include other Central and Eastern European
countries. In so doing, it is endeavouring to
promote a $eat Europe in which confidence is
the basis of fruitful co-operation and a smaller
European union that is destined to assume
greater responsibility for its own security to
make a safer world.
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Activities of the IEPG
I*tter from Mr. van Eeleclen, Secretary-Gencral of WEU,
to Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly
llth April 1990
Dear President,
In view of the interest which has been expressed by members of the Assembly in the activities of
lhq IEPG, most recently at the meeting on 7th March 1990 between the Presideniial Committee, the
Pgl4un presidency and myself, I have pleasure in attaching an information letter which it prepared in
1989 on its activities. I would be grateful if you would arrange for it to be circulated to membeis of the
Assembly.
I am currently. inv-estigating whether it might be possible to establish a more regular exchange of
information of this kind.
Yours sincerely,
Willem van ErxurN
Mr. Charles GornEus,
President of the Assembly of WEU
d.
**
IEPG information letter to the IAEII Assembly
Introduction
l. The Indepe^ndent European Programme Group (IEPG) was founded in 1976 to provide aEuropean forum for discussion of defence equipment matters in which France could parti6ipate. All
Europ-ean members of NATO, except lceland, are in the IEPG. In 1984, the group met for the first time
at Defence Minister level. It-was recognised at that meeting that ad hoc.methlodsior generating collabo-
rative programmes were no longer suitable and this, coupEd with the call in the Nuin amend'ment for
Europeans to do more for their own defence, led to lr,tiniiters seeking to inject more dynamism into the
IEPG and to promote more systematic collaboration.
2. Through its comprehensive membership, the IEPG remains the natural vehicle for defence
equipment collaboration among European members of the NATO Alliance. When Ministers met in
1984, it was agleed that the a-im for the group should be to promote European collaboration in order topermit qore effective use of funds for research and development, to increase standardisation and inter-
operability of equipment, to maintain a healthy defence industrial base in Europe, and to facilitate a
rea.listic-two-way street between Europe and Norttr America. In an attempt to imiroue furopian Capa-
bilities,_Ministers commissioned the European Defence Industry Study (^rplS). rnis tual piurist io i"late 1986 and recommended_vqlilus steps to be taken to achi6ve thd joals iet by Minislers at iteit
1.984 meeting. In particular, the EDIS report advoc-ated_lhe pursuit of a tiansnationll open and iompe-titive market, and a stronger European research effort. ttre iepG subsequently drew up un 
"iiion 
plan
to implement the main recommendations of the report.
Structure of the IEPG
3. The IEPG functions throqgh_q!rye qanels which report to six-monthly meetings of National
Armaments Directors (NADs). The NADs, in turn, report tb Defence Ministeis who m6et three times
ev_ery two years. The Chairmanship of the IEPG rotates every two years between member states. TheUK, the current Chair nation, will relinquish its responsibjfities'at the end ol1990. fni ouUini
structure of the IEPG is at Annex A.
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Current activities
Panel I
4. Panel I, under Norwegian chairmanship, is responsible for operational requirements and
equipment programmes. In 1989, the panel completed its 5th annual review of a document called the
equibment ieplacement schedule (ERS) in order to identify, on a systematic basis, those areas which
offei scope for European collaboration. In addition, the Chairman of Panel I is analysing in detail how
to develop a mechanism for looking at long-term military requirements (15-20 years) with a view to
improving the identification of co-operative programme opportunities. As a first step, a trial involving
concept papers is taking place in the 1990 ERS programme. Finally, Panel I oversees several project
goups which range from the exploratory to those approaching full development. These groups are at
Annex B.
Panel II
5. Panel II, chaired by France, is responsible for research and technology. In the past, there has
been too much duplication of effort in European research. Since 1985, there has been work on co-
operative technology areas, but this has been limited in its impact. A major new initiative has now
been taken to devise a European technology programme. Work is under way to agree the management
structure and funding for the programme, and IEPG Ministers agreed in Estoril in June this year that
details of the plan 
- 
to be known as Euclid (European co-operation for the long term in defence) -
should be released to industry and other centres of research as soon as possible so that they could come
forward with proposals to meet European research priority needs. The work of Panel II will become
more widely known in 1990.
Panel III
6. Panel III, under German chairmanship, oversees economic matters, including implementation-
of proposals in the action plan, such as the establishment of national focal points, the publi_cation of
contracts bulletins, agreement on criteria for contract award, devising a recording system for cross-
border defence procurement, and improvements in technology transfer.
7. The action plan represents the IEPG's resolve to break with past practice and open up the-
European defence marketlo contractors from other nations. If we are to make the best possible use of
defence resources, it is important to accept greater competition in principle and in practice. In a period
of static or declining defence budgets it is vital to achieve the best value for money, thereby permitting
the wider use of funds for research, development and procurement.
8. To achieve greater competition, it is important to have increased visibility of bidding opportu-
nities and to be able to enter ntw markets. To this end, earlier in 1989, IEPG nations nominated focal
points at which companies wishing to enter new markets could register an interest, receive advice on
national procuremenl procedures and make an important initial contact with national defence minis-
tries. As i result, potential bidders will have a source of knowledge to support their bids, and ministries
will have a wider supplier base. IEPG nations have also agreed to publish, in the near future, bulletins
of contract opportunities similar to those already produced by the UK and France. The focal points
and bulletins are central to opening up the European defence equipment market.
9. However, there remains much to be done. IEPG nations are currently examining the possibility
of introducing on a transitional basis a flexible and pragmatic system for operating juste retour which
will not undermine the philosophy of an open market. Initial figures on the balance of defence trade
between nations are being collecied and will need to be carefully analysed before further action is
taken. Work is also continuing on technology transfer to ensure that intellectual property rights are
adequately protected. It is alsoimportant for the IEPG to ensure that all members follow similar pr999-
dures wh6n awarding contracts. As a result, the IEPG has drafted criteria for contract award which
Defence Ministers will be asked to endorse early next year.
1992 Study Group
10. Naturally, the IEPG remains aware of parallel activities in the EC directed towards opening the
civil market. A study group has been established, under Belgian Chairmanship, to report on the impli-
cations of 1992 for defence procurement.
Secretariat
I l. Earlier this year the IEPG established a permanent secretariat in Lisbon. The precise nature and
r6le of the secretariat can be expected to evolve in time. In the short term, the function will be one of
co-ordination and administrative assistance to the Chair nation. The secretariat will offer increased
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continuity for the organisation and can be expected to play a progressively more valuable part in
support of panel activities.
Deve loping defence industries
I.2. A long-standing issue within the IEPG has been that of assistance to the developing defence
industries (DDIs) 
- 
Greece, Portugal and Turkey 
- 
to develop their defence industries. A working
group has been tasked to look at ways to enable DDIs to play a full part in European defence procu-
rement. Proposals have included price-preference on bids, subsidies, opening markets without seeking
immediate reciprocity and free technology transfer. The challenge is to identify practical means o-f
assistance whilst preserving the adyantages of the open market. Indeed, the open market will benefit
DDI nations by allowing them to exploit areas where they already have expertise. Several countries
have offered to make places available on project management training courses and in research
establishment for DDI oflicials and scientists in an attempt to help the DDI nations.
Atlantic dimension
13. It has sometimes been overlooked that the revitalisation of the IEPG in 1984 was intended, in
part, as a means of improving the European contribution to the alliance. The IEPG has no wish to
damage or underming the alliance, and members are ooncerned to avoid any measures which might be
construed as protectionist on either side of the Atlantic.
ANNEX A
Structurc of the IEPG
MINISTERS
STATE SECRETARIES
Panel I
(Operational
requirements
and programmes)
Ad Hoc
Working
Grouo I(Competition)
Ad Hoc
Working
Grouo II
(Juste retour)
Ad Hoc
Working
Group III
(Technology
transfer)
Panel III
(Economic
Affairs)
Sub-Grouo 7(DDrS)
Panel II
(Research and
Technology)
Sub-Grouo 6
(Research)
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ANNEX B
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APPENDIX I
Ministerial rcsolution for Euclid
lane 1989
At our meeting in June we resolved to institute a European research and technology programme
to be called Euclid. Although some areas of uncertainty remain, building on our previous proposals we
have agreed that Euclid will take the following form:
l. The Euclid will consist of several Common European Priority Areas (CEPAs) in each of which
there will be a number of Research and Technology Projects (RTPs).
2. The general conditions for the Euclid will be defined in the Programme MOU (PMOU). Indi-
vidual RTPs will be covered by implementing arrangements to the PMOU.
3. These conditions will be interpreted in such a way as to encourage and support the participation
of DDI nations in the programme.
4. Each RTP will be undertaken by international contributors represented by a single legal
contractor, chosen by competition wherever practicable. The single legal contractor will be responsible
for placing subcontracts with other participating contractors.
5. Each RTP will be managed by a lead nation on behalf of participating nations. The lead nation
will deal with the single legal Contractor representing national industries and laboratories of all coun-
tries whose governments have decided to participate in the RTP.
6. The lead nation will use its own contract rules and regulations, amended to ensure the rights of
other participating nations, in accordance with the PMOU.
7. It is intended that the participation of nations in an RTP will be on the basis of an equal
government share of the anticipated costs, unless the governments participating in a specifiq RTP
decide another breakdown, especially to facilitate the participation of DDI nations. Nations will pay
for their own workshares, making funds available to the lead nations for that purpose so that money
will not cross national boundaries.
8. The participating industries will be expected to contribute, using their own funds.
9. Intellectual property will be owned by those generating it but will be made available for the use
of participating nations for their own defence purposes subject to conditions to be defined in the
PMOU.
10. The programme will be conducted in full consultation with EDIG using the structures formu-
lated for this purpose.
I l. The list of priority areas which will be studied initially is attached.
Attachment
Preliminary area lrum which Euclid prujects wi[ be dmwn
- 
Modern radar technology (airborne radars)
- 
Si-microelectronics
- 
Composite structures
- 
Modular avionics
- 
Electric gun
- 
Artificial intelligence
- 
Signature manipulation
- 
Opto-electronic devices
- 
Satellite surveillance technology (including verification aspects)
- 
Underwater acoustics
- 
Human factors, including technology for training and simulators.
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APPENDIX II
Glcneagles communiqud
21st February 1990
The defence ministers of the thirteen IEPG nations met in Gleneagles on 2lst February 1990.
Against the background of recent events in Eastern Europe and the accelerating pace of arms reduc-
tions, they stressed that, whatever the outcome of these developments, there would be a continuing
need_for F,uropean co-operation in research, development and production of defence equipment. They
reaffirmed the r6le of the IEPG as the main forum for achieving this and for strengthening the
European contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance. Ministers reviewed the progress made so far on
a number of important IEPG initiatives, including the implementation of the action plan for a step-
by-step opening of the European defence equipment market, and the establishment of the Euclid
European research and technology programme. They underlined their view that these developments
will ensure the most effective use of resources and will maintain and strengthen the industrial and tech-
nological base of all IEPG countries.
Opening the European defence equipment market
Directing that work should continue on the timely implementation of the action plan, ministers
welcomed the progress already made, with the publication of bulletins announcing defence contract
opportunities, and the establishment of a network of IEPG national focal points within each defence
ministry to provide a point of first contact for industry.
Most IEPG countries have now started the regular publication of bulletins of defence contract
opportunities for companies. Ministers reaffirmed the importance of these bulletins for promoting
awareness of contract opportunities and for encouraging competition at all levels. They noted with
satisfactign the progress of work on the important issues of the qualification of companies for bidding,
criteria for contract award and technology transfer. They noted that the armaments directors will
prepare a policy document drawing together the principles of operation of the open defence equipment
market, technology transfer and juste retour.
Ministers gave their support to the study of the incidence of cross-border contracts. They noted
that work would continue on improving and implementing a pragmatic and flexible system of juste
retour through concrete, transitional measures.
Ministers noted with approval that a study group on 1992 issues has been set up to consider the
consequences for the European defence equipment market of wider developments in Europe.
Publicity
Ministers welcomed the r6le of the permanent secretariat in exchanging information within the
IEPG and in co-ordinating IEPG publicity. They noted with approval the work of the secretariat to
produce a brochure to disseminate information about IEPG activities.
European session for armaments managers
Ministers noted the value of regular meetings of this forum. Two meetings are to be held this
year, in France and in Spain.
Next meeting
To ensure that present levels of progress are maintained, ministers agreed to meet again before
the end of the year.
Future chairmanship
Belgium accepted ministers' invitation to take the chair of the IEPG from January l99l for a
two-year period.
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Thc fuuru of bw Ilyins
REPORT 
'
submittcd on behalf of the Defence Committee2
by Mn KleidzinsW, Rapprteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Reppontgun's Pnerncr
Dnnrr RecouueNonttoN
on the future of low flying
Expr-eNnronv MrnaonnNou n,l
submitted by Mr. Klejdzinski, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. The present situation with particular reference to WEU's alliance
interests within NATO
III. The security policy background
IV. Analysis of the threat to the territory of the Western European countries
V. The importance of air forces
VI. The range of tasks for tactical air forces
(i) Air reconnaissance(ii) Atr defence(iii) Aft attack(ivl Summary
VII. Operational justification of tacticd low-altitude training
VIII. Low-altitude training in the Federal Republic of Germany
(il Structure/use of airspace(ii) Low-altitude training in the German Air Force(iiil Low-altitude training by the allies over Federal territory (1988)(rvl Airspace structure and the disturbance caused by low-altitude flying
IX. Effects of low-altitude flying
(r/ Low-altitude flying as a souroe of noise
(dr/ Research projects 
- 
findings so far(iiil Pollution(lv/ Aspects of air safety/danger due to low-altitude flying(v/ Exposure of aircrews to mental and physical stress(vfl Strain on military equipment(viil Cost of low-altitude operations
X. Measures taken to reducrc noise
(y' Current situation(itl Objective(iirl Measures so far taken to reduce noise(rvl Measures to reduce noise due to low-flying aircraft taken in
coordination with the allied air forces(v) Longer-term measures to reduce noise
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Sziri (Chairman); Mr. Fourr€, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (Alternate: Stoffelen) (Yice-
Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Cariglia, Chevalier (Alternate: Kempinaire), Cox, De Decker (Alternate: P€criaux), Ewing,
Fiandrotti, Fillon, Fioret, Irmer (Alternate: Klejdzinski), Jung, Kittelmann, Mrs. I-entz-Cornette, MM. Maris (Alternate:
Verbeek), Nijpels, Pecchioli, Scheer (Alternate: Ahrens), Sinesio, Speed, Steiner, Sir John Slokes, MM. Uyttendaele, Zierer.
N.B. Tlre names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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XI. Iow-altitude flying and the development of alternative approaches
XII. Low-altitude flying and public opinion '
XIII. Low-altitude flying and arms control
XIV. Recommendations to the WEU countries
APPENDICES
I. Definitions
II. Central European weather environment (Western Europe)
III. Attrition model results over moderate terrain (FRG)
IV. Probability of ground kill (Fully trained pilot)
V. Mission survival
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Raplnrteur's Preface
In preparation for this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows:
In October 1989 in Bonn and subsequently:
Mr. W. Wiirmer, Parliamentary Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence;
Lieutenant-General H. Jungkurth, Inspector of the Luftwaffe, Ministry of Defence;
Lieutenant-General J. Schnell, Deputy Inspector of the Luftwaffe, Ministry of Defence;
Colonel M. Menge, commanding the 36th Fighter-Bomber squadron;
Mr. W. Kolbow, Vice-Chairman of the Bundestag Defence Committee and Chairman of the sub-
committee on military aircraft noise.
30th October 1989 
- 
Ministry of Defence, London
Air Commodore Tim Garden, Director Air Force Staff Duties;
Group Captain Bogg, Air Force Staff;
Wing Commander Cable, Air Force Staff;
Mr. Jim Anderson, Operational Requirements.
31st October 1989 
- 
Headquarters RAF Strike Command, High Wycombe
Air Vice Marshal Richard Johns, RAF, Senior Air Staff Officer;
Wing Commander Bill Nevison, Headquarters Staff.
8th January 1990 
- 
Ministry of Defence, The Hague
Mr. A.L. Ter Beek, Minister of Defence;
Mr. H.P.M. Kreemers, Policy Directorate, Defence Staff;
Commodore B. Droste, Deputy Chief Operations, Air Force Staff;
Lt. Col. M.H.J.Q. Holland, Staff Oflicer Military Strategic Affairs;
Lt. Col. G.F.A. Macco, Air Force Staff, Operational Training Branch.
9th January 1990 
- 
Twenthe Air Force Base, the Netherlands
Colonel Kronenbourg, Wing Commander Flying;
Squadron Leader Tiggelman, Commanding Officer 315 Squadron;
Squadron Leader Victor, Headquarters Branch;
Captain Komin, 315 Squadron RNLAF.
l2th March 1990 
- 
Ministry of Defence, Lisbon
General Gongalves Ribeiro, Director, National Defence Policy;
General Conceigao Silva, Chief-of-staff of the Portuguese Air Force.
13th March 1990 
- 
Montijo Air Force Base, Portugal
Colonel Nico, Commandant, Montijo Air Force Base;
Lt. Col. Ramalho, Air Operational Command.
14th March 1990 
- 
Madrid
Lt. Gen. Francisco Veguillas Elices, Director General of Defence Policy, Ministry of
Defence;
Commander Rafael Barbudo Escobar, Head of External Relations, Ministry of Defence;
Major Rafael Barbudo Gironza, Defence Policy Directorate, Ministry of Defence;
Lt. Col. Arturo Rubi de Cevallos, Air Force Headquarters;
Major Jos6 Porta Carracedo, Air Force Headquarters.
The committee as a whole was addressed by the ltalian Minister of Defence, Mr. Martinazzoli, in
Rome on 15th February 1990.
The committee and the Rapporteur extend their thanks to those ministers, oflicials and senior
oflicers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions.
The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the com-
mittee.
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Druft Recommendation
oa the fature of low llying
The Assembly,
O Recalling the motion for a resolution on the banning of low-altitude military training flights,
tabled by Mr. Biichner and others'on 5th December 1988 (Document 1169);
(iil Aware that the effects of low-altitude flying are suffered in all member states of WEU, as well as
in most other European countries, including those of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation;
(iit) Considering the easing of tension between East and West;
(iv) In view of the prospect of agreement in Vienna to make substantial reductions in certain cate-
gories of conventional weapons including combat aircraft;
(v) Convinced that it should be possible to make greater use of simulation in preparing pilots for
low-altitude flieht;
(vt) Stressing that there should be greater consultation and agreement between member states to
share the burden of low-altitude flight training;
(viil Recalling that in the past the Council has fonrarded certain recommendations of the Assembly
to the NATO authorities,
RrcouueNos rHAT rHs Couxcrr-
l. Include the subject of low-altitude flying and attendant problems in its own agenda and urge the
NATO authorities to do likewise, with the aim of making an urgent study of the ways in which the uni-
versal European problem of low-altitude flying may be attenuated in the future, including research into
public knowledge of and attitudes to the problem;
2. Ensure that the general and specific points made in the present report are taken into account
and, in particular, fully examine the following suggestions with a view to their adoption by NATO and
national governments as norns for the future:
(a) h peacetime, minimum heights for low-altitude flights over urban areas to be not less than
300 metres;
(b) intergeption exercises and formation flying at low altitude to be banned in the vicinity of
heavily populated areas;
(c) aircraft speed to be limited to 420 knots maximum, so that noise is reduced;
(d) very low-altitude flights (i.e. those at less than 75 metres) to be authorised only over training
areas ofsuflicient size and consideration to be given to suppressing the use ofall such areas
in peacetime, to be reactivated only in time of tension;
(e) all low-altitude flying to be banned after 10 p.m. (even in training areas) and generally on
Sundays and bank holidays;
A the authorisation of night low-flying routes to be subject to agreement by national author-
ities;
@) all necessary training for flights at low and very low altitude in * real " conditions to take
place in areas where geography allows such flights without causing considerable disturbance
to the population;
(ft/ although the current state of simulation techniques cannot completely replace actual low-
altitude flying, consideration to be given to further research and development with the aim
of improving low-altitude flying simulation (the high financial cost would be more than jus-
tified);
(/ consider, in addition, ways in which the unsocial aspects for aircrews of training in areas
overseas or remote from home bases might be alleviated;
l. MM. Biefnot, Holtz, Eicher, P6criaux, Stoffelen, Schmidt, Mrs. Luuk, Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Scheer.
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(j) rhe standard of the equipment of various types of aircraft should not be the only factor for
determining low-altitude training techniques and conditions;
(k/ whereas, formerly, low-altitude training flights in potential zones of action were desirable for
making use of geographical data and for tactical reasons, the greater perfection of naviga-
tional aids has virtually removed the need for visual contact, thus allowing such training to
be carried out in other more sparsely populated areas;
(f units of the air forces of WEU member countries must be able to conduct low-altitude
training with realistic advance warning after an analysis of the actual threat, which at the
present time does not justify exercises based on the hypothesis of a few hours'warning time.
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Expla.rutory Memorundum
(submidd by Mr. Kleidziaski, Rapportcar)
I. Introduction
l. This report on " The future of low flying'
owes its origin to the Motion for a Resolution(Document 1169), entitled 'Banning of low-
altitude military training flights', tabled by Mr.
Biichner and others' on 5th December 1988
during the second part of the thirty-fourth
ordinary session of the Assembly and in the
wake of the tragic flying accident at Ramstein in
the Federal Republic of Germany. The text of
the motion reads:
* The Assembly,
Cnlu oN rHE covERNMENTs or Meunen
Srnres to ban all low-altitude military
flights and air-combat exercises over
heavily built-up areas and also flights
towards targets such as nuclear plants,
hospitals, schools, places of worship,
public buildings and factories, etc.'.
2. Rather than succumb to the obviously
heightened emotions of the moment, the
Assembly decided to refer the motion and the
whole subject of low flying and its future to the
Defence Committee for examination. Your
Rapporteur was appointed because of his double
experience: he is both a sufferer from the effects
of low flying (like virtually every other citizen of
the WEU member countries), living beneath one
of the busiest low flying exercise areas in the
Federal Republic of Germany, and he is also a
former perpetrator of low flying, having served
for a number of years as a fighter pilot. He hopes
therefore that his colleagues will find the present
report totally objective from all points of view.
Although the reader will find that the orien-
tation conoerns particularly the problems of low
flying on the Central Front and therefore in the
Federal Republic of Germany, most of the
points made in the report also apply to the
majority of WEU member countries and in par-
ticular to the United Kingdom, where on
average there are some 40 000 more low flying
sorties per year than in the FRG!
II. The present situation with particular
ruference to WE(ls ollionce
interests within NATO
3. Western Europe's close association with
the United States and Canada is very important
for the maintenance and shaping of peace in the
European continent. If there is to be solidarity
within the alliance, Western Europe must make
l. MM. Biefnot, Holtz, Eicher, Pdcriaux, Stoffelen, Schmidt,
Mrs. Luuk, Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Scheer.
and increase its contribution to joint defence
and, co-operating as a partner, lend weight to
the influence it has on the policy of the leading
power in the Atlantic Alliance. Security
co-operation in Europe is being stepped up to
this end.
4. Closer European co-operation within
Western European Union (WEU) is to make an
effective contribution to the maintenance of
appropriate military streng[h and political soli-
darity within the western alliance and, on this
basis, to promote co-operation between East and
West. This calls for operational and effective
training even in peacetime. At present, low-
altitude flying is needed if we are to maintain
our defence capability. In every country such
training flights are a particular burden on the
population concerned.
5. Striking an acceptable balance between
the public's legitimate claim to a reasonable
quality of life, and security requirements, is
therefore a goal constantly to be pursued. While
it is essential for air forces to be able to fulfil
their mandate, the utmost importance must be
attached to maintaining the highest possible
level of air safety. The risk both to the public
and to aircrews must not be allowed to increase.
Although major efforts have already been made
in the past to ease the burden on the public
while maintaining high training and safety stan-
dards, there is growing unwillingness on the part
of the public to accept low-altitude training
flights without criticism.
III. The suurity pol@ backstourrd
6. With their political strategy - set out in
the Harmel report in 1967 - of combining a
guaranteed defence capability with the offer of a
wide-ranging East-West dialogue, the western
alliance partners have long been urying the
Warsaw Pact countries to co-operate.
7. Western hopes of reducing East-West con-
frontation remained unfulfilled until the mid-
1980s because of the ambivalence of the Soviet
Union's policy of coexistence, its expansive mil-
itary policy and its policy of arming itself to the
teeth, which it now admits was inappropriate. It
is only since General Secretary Gorbachev put
forward his idea of a modern, economically
more effrcient Soviet Union as the precondition
for a credible world power policy that priorities
have changed and resources have been diverted,
and this is having a clear and positive impact on
East-West relations. The Warsaw Pact countries
are following a similar line.
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8. The question is what implications this has
for western defence policy.
9. For NATO, and especially for the WEU
countries, the maintenance of a guaranteed
defence capability has not lost any of its impor-
tance even though conditions have changed.
Many take the view that it was the West's guar-
anteed defence capability which paved the way
for stability in Europe and made the 'new
thinking " in the East possible: the East's will-
ingness to negotiate is a visible result. One thing
is certain: stability in the security sphere can be
achieved in the long run only with unequivo-
cally defensive military doctrines and strategies,
balanced military capabilities and, therefore,
comparable military options. As far as can be
seen politically, the Soviet military doctrine for
Europe is developing into a doctrine of pre-
venting war. In terms of the deployment of
armed forces, equipment and training its
military-technical component'is, however, still
geared to an offensive concept, although state-
ments by senior military personnel indicate the
possibility of change.
10. Of prime importance for an assessment of
the situation are current military potential and
resulting military capabilities. The Soviet Union
certainly has no aggressive intentions at present.If its political objectives should change,
however, its military capabilities will still enableit to take offensive action towards Western
Europe in the future. The unilateral reductions
announced by Gorbachev, the political and psy-
chological effects ofwhich are to be enhanced by
similar and, quite obviously, co-ordinated mea-
sures by other Warsaw Pact countries, hold out
the prospect of an East-West relationship fea-
turing more dialogue and co-operative coexis-
tence.
I l. However, what may lie behind these
reductions needs to be properly analysed from
every angle. The announcements may well be
intended:
- 
to permit a reduction of the SovietUnion's superior conventional
potential without loss of face so that it
may proceed to the conventional arms
control (CFE) talks anticipating the
outcome and in a stronger starting
position;
- to gain western confidence in the
Warsaw Pact's ability to revise its
security and military policies, and also
to eliminate western ideas about the
military threat posed by the Warsaw
Pact;
- 
to make it seem that the new principle
of defence suffrciency is already a
reality or about to become one;
- 
to alleviate the personnel problems
arising from the unfavourable demo.
graphic trend in the Soviet Union and
the German Democratic Republic;
- 
to help reduce budget deficits and con-
centrate attention on the solution of
economic problems.
12. In any force comparison it should be
remembered that the Warsaw Pact forces still
have twice as many tanks and more than twice
as much artillery. Additional reductions by
other Warsaw Pact countries will do little to
change this situation. This being so, the West
must press for further reductions in the Warsaw
Pact forces deployed throughout the Soviet bloc
and for the adoption of a defensive posture by
the armed forces. The NATO countries want the
CFE talks to result in reductions to identical
ceilings on both sides. Only then can there be
stability in respect of military forces in Europe.
The western governments take the view that it is
more conducive to European security for them
to maintain their own defence capability so as to
provide an incentive for negotiations on iden-
tical, verifiable ceilings and then to disarm to
agreed lower levels. Prior unilateral concessions
are rejected. Table I gives an overview of the
relative strength of the two sides.
IY. Arwlysis of the thruat to the teniary
of the Western Eumlrcan countries
13. This analysis of the threat is based on
present circumstances and options and will need
to be revised when clearly deflrnitive defence
strirctures and strategies, which have been
announced, are implemented. This description
underlines the need for a substantial reduction
in the air attack component.
14. The Warsaw Pact's tacticaUoperational
air forces are crucial to the achievement of the
objective of its military strategy in the CentraU
Western European theatre by means of air oper-
ations, i.e. destroying the most important and
strongest gxoups of NATO's armed forces. As a
result of the greatly improved performance and
penetration capability of the Warsaw Pact's air
forces (increased range, electronic warfare and
mid-air refuelling), they are able to attack vital
NATO facilities throughout the Central
European sector after a brief period of prepa-
ration.
15. Encouraged by the initiative seized and
the offensive launched in the early stages, the
Warsaw Pact can prepare its many tactical air-
craft for a wide range of tasks:
- 
first, drastically reduce NATO's air
defence and air attack capability;
- 
establish superiority in the air;
- 
disrupt the deployment of troops;
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- 
prevent the introduction of reinforce-
ments;
- 
eliminate NATO's nuclear potential.
16. Features of Warsaw Pact air operations
will be initial mass air attacks and their concen-
tration on specific parts of the theatre of war.
Intruding fighter bombers, helicopters, recon-
naissance aircraft, bombers, fighters and support
forces will fly at different altitudes and attempt
to split or saturate NATO defences at specific
points. Besides efficient aircraft, modern
weaponry (anti-radar, range capability, pre-
cision, blanket fire capability) and conventional
ground-to-ground missiles will be the principal
means used to break down NATO's resistance.
As aircraft can be moved over great distances
very quickly, it is also important for airflreld
infrastructure in border areas to be considered
during disarmament negotiations if there is to
be effective monitoring of reductions. As coun-
terattacks on the Warsaw Pact's airfields will be
a crucial means of eliminating the offensive
potential of its air forces and disrupting the
co-ordination needed for offensive operations,
Soviet air defence troops (in the German Demo-
cratic Republic, for example) have orders to
carry out air defence operations in co-operation
with the other national forces at the Soviet
Union's western outposts.
17. A feature of Warsaw Pact air defence
operations is the combination of land-based and
airborne forces, with an extensive early-warning
system designed to provide a major response
period for the weapons systems used. For this
purpose, the Warsaw Pact has developed a
dense, partly overlapping, vertically and hori-
zontally tiered defence system, which is con-
stantly and quickly modernised with a view to
closing any gaps in cover or combat capability
that may be identified. Active and passive
sensors located near borders, backed by the
Soviet airborne early-warning and guidance
system (Mainstay), are designed to give the
appropriate command posts information on the
situation in the air early enough to permit eco-
nomical defensive action against the various
weapons systems.
18. The air defence system of the Warsaw
Pact's land forces, which is highly mobile and
active well beyond the spearheads, and in the
future mobile anti-aircraft missile systems of the
land-based air defences (SA-10), a line of SA-5
anti-aircraft missiles capable of reaching targets
some 150 km inside the territory of the Federal
Republic of Germany, protection over a wide
area and the latest fighter aircraft (e.9. Fulcrum/
Flanker) are designed to limit the combat
strength of NATO's air forces and threaten their
ability to survive, especially in the flrrst few
critical hours and days of a war, when attacks on
enemy airfields to repel the offensive will be
most important.
19. The Warsaw Pact air defence operation
will include offensive elements (e.g. escorts for
fighter bombers, raids on enemy territory by
interceptors), one oftheir tasks being to engage
enemy air forces as early as possible, i.e. while
they are still on the ground. For an assessment
of the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact's
potential for aerial warfare it is therefore
essential to know the options open to the main
combat units responsible for air operations and
air defence operations.
20. Where the threat to the WEU countries is
concerned, the Warsaw Pact's aerial warfare
potential, especially in the initial phase of a con-
flict, is significant, since its operational flexi-bility makes it a particularly effective
instrument at all levels of warfare (tacticaU
operational, strategic). Although current
political developments in the Warsaw Pact
countries allow the assumption that thepe is no
threat to the WEU countries, a proper analysis
calls for a response to existing capabilities, the
requirements of military strategy and options.
Thus, although capabilities must be substan-
tially reduced, until disarmament has occurred
all options must be taken into account in the
assumed threat.
Y. The importance of air forces
21. The possession of instruments of aerial
warfare on a scale and of a quality appropriate
to the tasks they are required to perform enables
an alliance or a nation to exercise air power. Air
power represents an instrument of military
power which denies enemy instruments of aerial
warfare sole use of airspace. In principle, the
capabilities inherent in instruments of aerial
warfare make it impossible for an adversary to
escape their effect. The threat they wield can be
countered only with similar instruments. The
only answer therefore is to meet air power with
arr power.
22. Air power enables combat strength to be
extended over considerable distances relatively
quickly. Although air power cannot replace land
power, especially over a longer period, it can
correct the balance of power and so compensate
for local disparities of land and naval forces. Air
power thus moves the frontiers of space and
time. If used correctly, it opens up new dimen-
sions for the reciprocal relationship between
space, time and forces. Air power thus:
- 
removes the boundaries of the battle
atea;
- 
prevents an aggxessor from restricting
acts of war to areas of his choice;
- 
subjects the enemy's hinterland to air
attacks;
- 
makes it impossible for him to
maintain sanctuaries.
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Air power (especially when it includes offensive
operations) counteracts offensive strategies if
the assumption is that an agg;ressor will always
endeavour to carry the fight into enemy territory
in order to protect his own. The more he is
denied this opportunity or the less likely he is to
succeed, the greater the risk he takes in the event
of an attack. In these circumstances, credible air
power based on efficient air forces assumes
special imporiance for strategic defence which
sees itself committed to a defensive strategy
concept.
23. In peacetime air forces make a major con-
tribution to preventing a surprise attack through
their presence and their reconnaissance capa-
bility. They force the aggressor to spend a great
deal of time and money on preparation, which is
again identified by the air forces'instruments of
reconnaissance, giving the political leaders a
warning period to decide what action they
should take to strengthen their own defence
capability. To deter a potential aggressor from
attacking he must have no doubt about our
capabilities.
24. Whether immediately mobilised or not,
which is a requirement for improvement in
available combat strength, air forces which are
in place can be raised to their combat readiness
status without delay. In view of their ability to
react and their limited threat profile, air forcesthus constitute a particularly suitable
instrument for political crisis management and
crisis resolution. Raising the responsiveness of
defensive instruments of aerial warfare to the
highest level of readiness does not reprcsent any
kind of political or military threat. It is solely
intended to increase significantly the risk a pos"
sible aggressor takes in launching an attack.
25. Although air forces may attack targets in
the enemy's territory at any time and at any
place and threaten to destroy them, they do not
have the ability to launch an invasion and take
possession of land for any length of time. They
thus jeopardise the enemy's military options
without seriously threatening his viability.
26. The air forces of some WEU countries
have already been integrated into the NATO
command structure in peacetime. This is con-
ducive to a united rcsponse from the alliance
and risk-sharing The potential advenary does
not therefore face any national enemy air forces
or have the option ofrestricting his activities to
a country of his choice. Any idea of launching an
attack means confrontation with the alliance as
a whole and its air forces. At times of crisis air
forces thus make a major contribution to sta-
bility. In wartime air forces can regain the initi-
ative and create and maintain the favourable sit-
uation in the air which is imperative for
successful defence. After an offensive initiative
favoured by the military strategy adopted has
been successfully repelled with defensive instru-
ments of aerial warfare 
- 
the subsequent battle
must take the form of a balanced combination of
offensive and defensive air operations.
27. Continued persistent attacks on the
enemy's aerial warfare capability weaken his
offensive strength and ability to take the initi-
ative. They prevent him from concentrating
solely on attack and give the attacker's own
forces new room for manoeuvre. They thus pave
the way for successful fonvard defence, help to
prevent the early use ofnuclear weapons and, by
undermining his potential to launch an
invasion, make it impossible for the enemy to
achieve his strategic objectives. These funda-
mental considerations remain valid even if
troop reductions should bring parity between
the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.
YI. TIE ruage of tosks fu trctical air forces
28. The main task of the air forces in
defensive warfare is to strike at the enemy's
aerial warfare capability. They also have the task
of attacking land forces deep inside the enemy's
territory to prevent him from bringing up
further troops to strengthen his own offensive
forces. In addition, the air forces' airborne
weapons systems have the task of making recon-
naissance flights to obtain intelligence on the
enemy's intentions (primary reconnaissance)
and, in the case of defence, information on
targets to be attacked (secondary reconnais.
sance).
29. The following tasks of the air forces are
thus relevant in the context of the debate on
low-altitude flights:
- 
air reconnaissance;
- 
air defence;
- air attack.
(i) Air reconnaissance
30. Comprehensiveand reli{le intelligence is
a major requirement for eflicient decision-
making. Air reconnaissance in peacetime and at
times of crisis is intended as a means of identi-
fying signs of an attack in good time. In wartime
suc@ss depends on the availability of correct
and upto-date information on the enemy.
31. Tactical reconnaissance aircraft play their
part in this. They are equipped with optical and
infra-red sensors and with high-resolution side-
looking radar. If upto-date and reliable data are
to be obtained as a basis for determining the
targets of air attack operations, these aircraft
need to penetrate into the enemy's airspace after
he has attacked.
(ii) Air defence
32. NATO's air defence is geared to com-
bating offensive air operations by the Warsaw
Pact. Its goal is to ensure that NATO's forces are
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able to operate freely, to preserve its defence
capability and to protect the public and eco-
nomic resources. It is capable of safeguarding
the deployment of NATO land forces and pro
tecting them against enemy air attacks during
the initial phase.
33. NATO assumes that attacks by third- and
fourth-generation combat aircraft combined
with tactical conventional air-to-ground and
ground-to-ground missiles will have to be
repelled.
34. Land-based air defence systems are inade-
quate for this purpose. Fighter aircraft are
designed to strengthen and complement the pro-
tection afforded by land-based air defence
systems. Fighters are essential for the rapid con-
centration of forces. Their task is to protect
flanks and to cover any weak points and gaps
that emerge in the land-based air defence
system. They alone are able to engage enemy air-
craft even when mass air attacks are saturating
land-based air defences or, by flyin7 under the
enemy's radar at high speed, to paralyse the
offensive capabilities of his land-based air
defences by electronic means. Fighters can be
used actively as an instrument of crisis man-
agement in the event of Warsaw Pact provoc-
ative incursions into NATO airspace.
(iii) Air attack
35. Given the relative strengths of the two
. sides at present, air defence forces alone cannot
undertake sustained defensive operations with
sufficient chance of succeeding. Air attack com-
plements air defence. It is an essential means of
combating the enemy's offensive potential. Air
attack is directed against the enemy's defensive
and offensive aerial warfare capability. This is
the only way to ensure that NATO will achieve
its objectives and that the enemy is denied the
use of his combat aircraft.
36. To this end, fighter bombers must, in case
of war, penetrate the enemy's territory to attack
his weapons systems and impede his offensive.
Only by operating deep inside enemy territory
can they also disrupt the introduction of further
Warsaw Pact land forces so persistently that the
latter suffer increased losses or are delayed, thus
making it impossible for them to achieve their
strategic operational objectives.
37. As the most important targets lie rela-
tively deep in the enemy's hinterland, the
combat aircraft must avoid the Warsaw Pact's
dense systems of air defence missiles and
overcome defences at the taryet. The reliability
of the ability of these weapons systems to reach
these targets is therefore extremely important.
They must be able to fly at low altitudes and
high speeds and to take advantage ofthe terrain
since, by so doing, they reduce the time they
spen9 in areas covered by enemy air defence
systems. In addition, action needs to be taken
specifically to reduce the options which are still
open to the Warsaw Pact's air defences at low-
altitudes.
(iv) Summary
38. The strategy of the NATO alliance is
explicitly geared to repelling a possible attack in
the context of forward defence and to restoring
territorial integrity. It is essential for defensive
operations to succeed and for the initiative to be
gained if military operations are to continue
with the aim of bringing the conflict to an early
end at the lowest possible level of military
response. Action must be taken against the land
and air forces of an aggressor at his point of
departure with a view to weakening him and
hampering the development of his operations to
such an extent that NATO remains capable of
cohesive defence and loses as little territory as
possible.
39. The air forces have a particularly
important rOle to play in this context because of
their inherent combination of such properties as
range, speed and combat streng[h. They are
capable of preventing surprises, reacting to
enemy concentrations quickly and over wide
areas, denying an aggxessor the opportunity to
create sanctuaries and eliminating imbalances of
forces. This flexibility exists only if manned air-
craft are used, land-based missiles being a sub-
stitute or complement only in certain sectors
and for very limited periods (single use).
Y I I. Opc rutio nal i u st iftcatio n
of toctical low-altitude lraining
40. Knowing how quickly the West's air
forces are able to react, the Warsaw Pact uses a
complex, multi-layered and deeply tiered system
ofland-based air defence to protect those of its
forces capable of launching an invasion. This
system has gaps below about 100 metres, and
the closer a target flies to the ground, the larger
these gaps become. In addition, fighters are used
to attack aircraft at medium and high altitudes.
However, their effectiveness against aircraft
flying at extremely low altitudes is very limited.
This is also true of fighters capable of " look
down/shoot down'.
41. Discussions with experts in the WEU
countries indicate that low-altitude flying is an
essential tactical measure if manned weapons
systems are to perform the function required of
them in wartime even when effective electronic
countermeasures are taken and if losses of air-
craft to the enemy's air defence system are to be
reduced to an acceptable level.
42. These weapons systems must be able to fly
very fast and low so that they minimise the time
the enemy's air defences have to react and,
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where possible, avoid detection and/or attack.
Thus the reaction time of radar-controlled, land-
based anti-aircraft systems is reduced by 750/0,
i.e. from about four minutes to about one, if an
aircraft approaching at a speed of about I 000
km and an altitude of 150 metres reduces its
altitude to 30 metres 
- 
the altitude at which the
lowest-level training flights are carried out in
Canada.
43. Effective and credible fonvard defence
requires of NATO's air forces not only a high
degree of presence but above all optimum
combat capability of aircrews, especially during
low-altitude flight. In other words, crews must
be in a position not only to navigate their air-
craft at 30 metres but also to use them as
weapons systems in the intended manner.
NATO therefore takes the view that aircrews
must above all be familiar with weather condi-
tions, the topographical features and the
structure of airspace in Central Europe. At
present, this capability is achieved and main-
tained through tactical unit training at altitudes
of 150 and 75 metres at home and very low-
altitude training at 30 metres at Goose Bay in
Canada, for example. There is now very little
public acceptance of low-altitude flying, espe-
cially in the areas where it is carried out at
75 metres.
44. A second focal area of training for air
force units is the use of weapons. In addition to
the training undertaken for this purpose at air-
to-ground ranges at home and aboad, aircrews
are required to practise simulated tactical
attacks. The success of these tactical operations
entirely depends on all participating aircraft
being co-ordinated with pinpoint accuracy.
These operations are therefore highly training-
intensive. To meet this need for flying following
the contour of the land at the lowest possible
altitudes (terrain-following), which is particu-
larly vital during the attack phase, it is con-
sidered necessary for there to be continuous
training flights at an altitude of 75 metres in
appropriate areas at home.
45. It is true to say that neither attack proce-
dures nor flying at ground level can be properly
practised at higher altitudes. The usefulness of
training at higher altitudes is insignificant.
46. To ensure that weapons are sufliciently
effective whatever the target and that aircraft
can overcome enemy air defences by means of
saturation and possibly direct attack, a wide
range of weapons systems often needs to be
used. Such operations involving a combination
of aircraft and air forces are not feasible without
intensive training. Tactical flying in large forma-
tions at low altitudes is therefore the third focal
area of training for flying units.
47. Low-altitude training flights must also
continue to be guided by the reality of the
defence scenario. The ability of the armed forces
to fulfil their mission and air safety must not be
affected. The air forces of the WEU countries
therefore would wish tactical low-altitude
training over the territory of the Western
European countries to continue in the future. An
aircrew is required to view low-altitude flying as
an essential part of its training. Removing it
from the training programme of the overall
defence system would, it is claimed, result in
shortcomings in training and thus lower the
standard of all the other components. To escape
detection by land-based or airborne radar, air-
craft must approach and attack their targets at a
very low altitude, i.e. 30 metres, at maximum
speed using features ofthe terrain and on-board
electronic defence systems releasing chaff and
flares.
YI I I. Low-altitude ttainiag
in the Fe4eml Republic of Germany
(i) Structure/use of airspace
48. The situation has changed radically, to the
disadvantage of military air traffrc, since the era
of the propeller aircraft, when the civil air traffrc
control authority was required to make its ser-
vices available only up to an altitude of 6 000
metres and civil air traflic made very limited
demands on airspace.
49. The structure of airspace was simple in
the 1960s. At that time, unlike today, we had a
'fair-weather air force'. In other words,
although aircraft could be flown blind, visual
contact had to be made with targets on the
ground and in the air before they could be
attacked. The air forces had 8090 ofall airspace
available to carry out visual flights with their jet
aircraft. A diagram of the airspace structure at
that time is shown in Table 2. The far more
complex situation today is depicted in Table 3.
50. With the introduction of jet aircraft, the
civil air transport sector began to make growing
demands on airspace. The airways, which had at
first extended to an altitude of 6 000 metres,
were raised to 7 500 metres, then to I I 500
metres and ultimately to 15000 metres. The
routes of the airways follow the main flows of
civil traffic as closely as possible. As air speeds
increased, so did the speeds at which aircraft
approach each other in the air. This resulted in
the basic principle in visual flying 
- 
* see, be
seen and take prompt evasive action " 
- 
failing
with growing frequency.
51. The number of near-misses between air-
craft flown visually and aircraft flown on instru-
ments rose. This led to the banning of visual
flying above 3 000 metres in 1976. The air
forces * lost' 66.3V0 of the airspace they had
previously been able to use without restriction
in good weather. Although some compensation
was achieved through the establishment of
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* temporarily reserved airspace " (TRA), most
of the airspace concerned had already been
available for flights in and out of the airfields.
This airspace for training flights and aerial
combat is situated between the airways and
accounts for 13.3o/o of the total. In effect, then,
5390 of the airspace of the Federal Republic of
Germany is no longer open to visual flying, and
the use of the 13.30/o just mentioned is subject to
restrictions (see the diagram in Table 3).
52. While military visual flying was once pos-
sible in 800/o of total airspace, only 80/o is now
available for this purpose (below 3 000 metres,
outside control zones around airports and pro-
hibited areas). All civil air traflic flying by visual
flight rules, which has increased sharply in the
meantime, also depends on this airspace. This
means that 750 000 military and 300 000 civil
visual flights have to make do with 890 of the
country's airspace, whereas almost 8070 is used
for some I 150 000 flights by instrument flight
rules.
53. The trend in the volume of traflic that has
to be monitored by the civil and military air
traflic control authorities is shown in Tables 4
and 5. It is clear that civil instrument flying is
rising sharply, whereas military traflic remains
almost constant.
54. The division of responsibility for the
control of short- and long-haul air traffrc in the
lower airspace is shown in Table 6. Although
most military training areas are also used for
short-haul military flights, these areas are
opened to civil transit flights on request
wherever the German Air Force controls this air
space and when the volume of traffic allows.
Recent statistics on transit flights are to be
found in Table 7.
55. The Eifel and Ramstein areas are con-
trolled by the United States Air Force, the Lahr
area by the Canadian Air Force. No figures on
transit flights through these areas are available.
The attitude towards closing airspace for
manoeuvres is also extremely conservative.
During the largest NATO exercise, Central
Enterprise, a mere 0.80/o of German airspace was
closed for two hours on each of flrve days. The
German Air Force does not claim any more air-
space than necessary. This statement is under-
lined by the fact that almost all civil requests for
transit flights through training areas can be met
and all military airspace is made available to the
civil air traflic control authority once military
flying operations cease.
56. At weekends and on public holidays this
airspace is in any case always available to the
civil air traffic control authority. However, the
same delays occur as on weekdays. While it is
true that civil air traflic is in principle required
to fly round military training/short-haul areas,
military aircraft have to make even g;reater
detours in some cases because the airspace
structure has been optimised for civil purposes
and because of the heavy volume of civil
short-haul traffic.
57. It is thus clear that the military use of air-
space is not the cause of delays in civil air
transport. The opposite is the case: the German
Air Force is more willing to co-operate with the
civil air traflic authority than its counterpart in
any comparable country. This is the only expla-
nation for the safety of flight operations in the
Federal Republic of Germany despite the
extremely high density of air traflic.
(ii) Low-altitude training in the German Air
Force
58. Air forces which are in place and always
ready for action make a major contribution to a
credible deterrent. The operational capability of
the air forces depends on crews which are highly
trained and whose standard of performance is
high. This standard of performance can be
achieved only if each crew makes sufficient
training flights each year. Throughout the
alliance the scale of flight training is based on
decades ofexperience. The annual training pro-
gramme specifies the nature and number of indi-
vidual training flights needed and the standard
to be achieved and maintained.
59. NATO has therefore very deliberately set
the target for the air forces of all member coun-
tries at 240 flying hours per aircrew and year.This requirement, which has remained
unchanged for years, is not met by the German
Air Force. Instead, it relies on a concentrated,
concise form of training to bring German air-
crews up to the optimum standard to meet
expected operational requirements in Central
Europe. To achieve and maintain an adequate
level of combat capability with the 180 hours
considered to be the minimum necessary, the
German Air Force trains its aircrews on the
basis of programmes which are tailored strictly
and in detail to the respective operational
pattern and complemented by appropriate simu-
lator training.
60. Within this short time-frame the fol-
lowing focal areas of training:
- 
mastery of flight operational patterns
over the whole range of technical and
aerodynamic performance;
- 
tactical low-altitude training geared to
the threat;
- training in the use of weapons;
- 
training in tactical flying in large forma-
tions at low altitudes,
together with such other necessary operational
training as instrument flying, flying in formation
and aerial combat, determine the scale and
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content of the tactical training programmes. As
a statistical averuLge, low-altitude training
(excluding training in the use of air-to'ground
weapons) accounts for about one third of the
overall tactical training programme.
61. In the 1980s the German and allied air
forces substantially reduced their low-altitude
operations over the Federal Republic of
Germany. From a total of some 100 000 hours
of low-altitude flying a year in the 1970s the
figure had fallen to around 68 000 hours by
1988. Of the total of 42 000 hours of low-
altitude flying undertaken by the German Air
Force in 1989, some 23 000 took place over the
territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. A
further reduction was achieved when the
Federal Minister of Defence withdrew the order
to the German Air Force to train German
fighter units to play the secondary rdle of fighter
bombers and the fighter bombers' additional
task of joining the reconnaissance squadrons
was dropped.
62. In recent years the German Air Force has
transferred an average of some 19 000 hours of
low-altitude flying to other countries:
- 
neighbouring
countries
- 
Portugal
- 
Italy
- 
Canada
8 000 hours p.a.
3 500 hours p.a.
3 0@ hours p.a.
4 500 hours p.a.
This means that the German Air Force has
already transferred about 46% of tactical low-
altitude training and two thirds of its air-to-
ground weapons training, a particularly noise-
intensive part of tactical training, to other
countries with a view to achieving, among other
things, fairer burden-sharing in the alliance.
63. When the tactical training programme is
established, the nature and mix of the already
limited amount of low-altitude flying is
optimised to suit specific weapons systems. On
average, German crews spend about 52 hours
p.a. in low-altitude training (about 28 hours p.a.
of this at home), the standard of performance
and experience of the crews being generally
taken into account when the number of flying
hours required of each is determined.
64. If more low-altitude flying is transferred
abroad, however, it must also be remembered
that weapons systems have to be used in tactical
combination with the command structure and
other forces. This is not possible abroad. The
abovementioned reduction in 1989 could be
achieved only by sacrificing certain functions
and thus operational flexibility.
(iii) Low-altitude training by the allies over
Federal tenitory (1988)
65. The 23 000 hours of low-altitude flying by
the German Air Force compare with 45 000
hours by the allies, i.e. the German Air Force
accounts for less than 35% of the total. Of the
allied air forces, the USAFE and RAFG in par-
ticular make use of German airspace (about 2096
each). The ratio of the German Air Force's low-
altitude hours to the allies' roughly corresponds
to the relative strengttrs of the air forces in
NATO's European sector.
(iv) Airspace structure and the disturbance caused
by low-altitude Jlying
66. The airspace over the Federal Republic of
Germany is already among the world's busiest.
A further increase in the volume of traffic is
likely in the future.
67. In April 1985 a Eurocontrol working
party consisting of experts from its member
countries submitted an interim report on the
draft description of a future air traffrc control
concept, which it had taken five years to
compile. According to this report, the volume of
general air traflic is likely to be 36% higher in
the year 2000 than it was in 1980.
68. The experts estimate that there will be no
numerical increase in military air traffic as a
whole. Thus there will continue to be 800 000 to
900 000 military flights in the Federal Republic
of Germany each year, the vast majority gov-
erned by the visual flying rules, i.e. not subject
to air traflic control. Low-altitude flying by jet-
propelled combat aircraft within the overall
altitude band set aside for this purpose will
account for only about one tenth of this volume
of traffic.
69. A particular problem is posed by the fact
that many sectors of the Federal Republic's air-
space are in principle completely or occasionally
closed to general use. These are danger areas,
areas where flight restrictions apply, control
zones, CVFR areas, temporarily reserved air-
space (TRA), the flight inspection zone (ADIZ),
etc. This hampers the choice of routing in many
cases. The crews of combat aircraft are also
aware of this when they are forced to fly round
certain areas and so have to put up with long
detours. The fact is that these areas are not used
continuously and often for only limited
periods.
70. Clearly, there is considerable economic
importance to be attached to throwing open free
airspace and allowing it to be used flexibly and
rationally for civil purposes. From the military
angle, the uneven spread of the disturbance
caused by the noise of air traflic is a factor that
is gaining in importance.
71. Commercial and other civil aircraft and
operational aircraft flown by military pilots thus
make different, sometimes conflicting demands
on the airspace structure and ground services.
Commercial aviation, for instance, sees airspace
primarily as a necessary medium in which safe
and the shortest possible routes should be pro-
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vided between airports and so views it from the
transport route angle. Given their military
mission, the armed forces use it principally as an
operational area, in which sovereign territory
within the alliance is to be defended. Amateur
pilots set store by being as unrestricted as pos-
sible in their freedom to use airspace. For them
it is virtually a leisure area.
72. All users' claims to airspace are valid,
though in varying ways. However, it is not pos-
sible or advisable to allow all demands on air-
space to exist side by side unco-ordinated and
completely unrestricted. Commercial, private
and leisure interests take second place to certain
priority arrangements arising from the defence
mission and allied rights. This is true, for
example, of air defence flights and the arrange-
ments for the area east of the Federal Republic
of Germany. In practice, however, the resulting
military priorities, which are applied restric-
tively by the armed forces, do not represent an
unsunnountable obstacle to civil aviation. Even
such special sectors of airspace as danger and
restricted areas can in principle be penetrated by
scheduled civil flights today once there has been
appropriate co-ordination.
73. Restrictions which have had to be
imposed for general reasons of flight safety are a
different matter, i.e. more stringent, for all cate-
gories of traflic. In the past decade airspace was
increasingly withdrawn from unrestricted use,
especially under visual flying conditions. As a
result of the establishment of a wide variety of
rigid and no longer penetrable airspace struc-
tures and the introduction of highly complex air-
space rules, section I of the Air Transport Act
(" The use of the airspace shall be free " ) is
becoming less and less applicable in our airspace
as the total volume of (civil) air traffrc grows.
These restrictions are especially true of military
and general aviation.
74. Some years ago steps were taken to
enlarge the area in which low-altitude flying is
permitted through the comprehensive removal
of unjustified restrictions, thus generally
reducing the frequency of overflights. This
marked a reversal of the trend in the 1960s and
early 1970s, when airspace not available for low-
altitude flying had been increased by 5070. The
larger the area available for low-altitude
training, however, the fewer the number of
flights over a given place.
75. It remains essential in this context that
compromises at the expense of safety should not
be accepted in the future. There are conse-
quently a number of natural limits to further
deregulation. Thus there must be no withdrawal
of the ban on low-altitude flying over airfields
and the danger areas surrounding them, cities
and conurbations and the areas near the
southern and eastern borders of the Federal
Republic of Germany as they now stand. Addi-
tional protected zones or even prohibited areas
needed for certain regional installations have
therefore always had to be assessed from this
angle, with likely future requirements also borne
in mind.
76. In 1980 an independent society carried
out a survey of low-altitude flying for the
Federal Ministry of Defence and in the process
calculated the scale and the distribution over
time and geographically of low-altitude flying byjet aircraft in the airspace of the Federal
Republic of Germany, with a breakdown by
countries. As the data presented in the 1980
survey seemed out of date, particularly in the
ligbt of the effects of arrangements made and
other measures taken in the meantime (self-
imposed restrictions such as the midday break
in low-altitude flying and the 50-minute rule), a
fresh survey was carried out in late 1986/early
1987. The study confirmed the claims by the
Federal Ministry of Defence that the volume of
low-altitude flying and thus the disturbance
caused by aircraft noise have declined consid-
erably since the 1980 survey. In all, there are
fewer than 70 000 hours of low-altitude flying
over the territory of the Federal Republic of
Germany each year, with the Federal armed
forces accounting for about 23 000 hours (1988).
This is almost 20 000 hours fewer than in 1980.
77. In Northern Germany the areas over
which flights may be made are heavily, though
uniformly, affected. The opening up of new
areas for low-altitude flying and better use of the
area near the eastern border could ease the situ-
ation here. As the British, Belgian and Dutch air
forces make particular use of the northern area
of the Federal Republic of Germany, these coun-
tries' participation in a future NATO tactical
fighter centre would have a particularly
favourable impact.
78. In the south of Germany the volume of
low-altitude flying and the resulting noise nui-
sance are not evenly distributed. One of the
main areas of concentration extends from the
Palatinate in the direction of Western Middle
Franconia. Less badly affected by low-altitude
flying are the central and southern Black Forest
and the north and north-east of Bavaria. The
area over which low-altitude flying is permittedin the south of Bavaria has been greatly
increased, mainly because parts of the line
beyond which such flying is prohibited have
been moved southwards and the size of the mil-
itary control zones has been reduced. In general,
opportunities for better distribution can still be
identified in the southern half of the Federal
Republic of Germany.
79. All in all, the study has shown that there
are still areas subject to particular disturbance.
Where opportunities for changing this situation
are available, they are to be seized with the help
of modern technology. To this end, the work on
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the early introduction of the computer-assisted
collection and evaluation of flight plans con-
tinues apace. When completed, the computer
project known as TMS (Tiefllug ManagementSystem Iow-altitude Flight Management
System) will also permit a suitable, specific and
early response to particularly disturbing situa-
tions.
80. In an overall evaluation of the disturbance
caused by the noise of air traffrc in a given area,
the disturbance due to low-altitude flying at 75 or
150 metres is only one factor to be considered. A
contributory, ild in some regions the deter-
mining, factor is the disturbance experienced by
those who live near military airfields and air-to
ground ranges or under one of the temporarily
reserved airspaces already referred to.
IX. Efiuts of low-altitudc flying
(i) Low-altitude flying as a source of noise
81. The noise emitted by aircraft consists of
broadband sounds, i.e. it ranges from the infra-
sonic through the human range of audibility to
the ultrasonic.
82. The primary cause of serious disturbanceto the public is the noise of successive
approaches and departures or of low-altitude
and supersonic flights of military aircraft, which
diminishes with distance. The disturbance is all
the greater where such flights occur at otherwise
quiet times of day or night.
83. Besides individual lowJevel overflights,
interception operations at low altitudes over
land (500 to 5 000 feet above ground level) are
particularly disturbing, even though operational
restrictions have already helped to reduce noise
in this case. In addition to the high flying speeds
needed for tactical reasons during interception
operations, the following factors help to create a
particular noise problem:
- 
at least two flight movements are
always involved (target-hunter);
- 
flight manoeuvres are carried out at
high engine speeds;
- 
the fli8ht path is restricted to a rela-
tively small geographical area, espe-
cially in the case of combat air patrols
(CAPs);
- 
repeated overflights, espcially in the
case of CAPs;
- 
sudden and unexpected overflights at
high speed.
The medical question that arises here for the
public as for aircrews is whether the scale of this
noise may impair health or even cause oryanic
damage.
84. The degree of noise nuisance is, by com-
parison, far less important since it reflects sub-jective impressions and cannot therefore be
measured by objective standards. Studies have
thus confirmed the significance of motivation
for the subjective evaluation of aircraft noise.
85. Above all, the limits at which permanent
auditory damage is caused by continuous and/or
repeated exposure to intensive noise have been
determined. In many countries these findings
are used as the basis for appropriate legislation.In the Federal Republic of Germany, for
example, they have been taken into account in
the law on protection against aircraft noise in
the vicinity of airfields in the calculation of the
equivalent continuous sound level, which is used
in the definition of the noise protection area and
its division into protection zones. There is insuf-
ficient evidence, however, to deny that there is
in principle a link between aircraft noise and
auditory damage.
86. The claim that * noise makes you ill'has
not been refuted.
87. I-eaving aside the effect of aircraft noise
on the auditory system, research findings pub-
lished so far show that, although it may influence
vegetatively-controlled functions, such as
breathing, circulation and sleep patterns, there is
as yet no scientific evidence of a cawal link
between the elfect of noise and certain diseases.
Nor has it yet been possible to describe any syn-
drome that can be unequivocally attributed to
aircraft noise.
88. Where secondary fficts on health and
functional capacity are concerned, reactions to
being startled are probably the subjectively most
unpleasant effect aircraft noise has on the
public.
(ii) Research projects 
- Jindings so far
89. Although the findings of the preliminary
study carried out in 1985 in the Federal
Republic of Germany by the Federal Health
Agency's interdisciplinary working group on the
effects of noise, which focused on the clariflr-
cation of methodological questions, led to thejustified assumption that the possibility of the
noise of low-altitude flying in 75-metre low-
altitude flying areas having long-term effects on
the auditory and cardiovascular systems could
not be ruled out, no conclusive evidence was
produced.
90. The object of the Federal Health Agency's
preliminary study was to determine whether
methods hitherto used in medical research into
the effects of noise were suitable for research
into the noise of low-altitude flying and to put
the hypotheses on the possible implications of
the noise of low-altitude flying for health in a
more precise form. A distinction was made
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between effects occurring immediately after
overflights (acute effects) and effects mani-
festing themselves only after a fairly long period
of exposure to the noise of low-flying aircraft(long-term effects). For financial reasons the
study was confined to children and elderly
people, who must be regarded, according to pre-
liminary surveys, as population groups particu-
larly affected by such noise. The Iield surveys
were carried out in a * low-altitude flying atea"
(area 7). Adjacent areas were used for the pur-
poses of comparison.
91. The findings of the examinations of
school and pre-school children for long-term
effects showed that reduced auditory acuity,
increased blood pressure in girls and disturbed
sleep as after-effects of the noise of low-flying
aircraft during the day and, in very rare cases,
psychiatrically-relevant symptoms, cannot be
ruled out.
92. The work for the main study was initiated
as part of the 1987 environmental research plan.In view of the complexity of the research
methods, representative findings cannot be
expected before 1990. The Rapporteur is
unaware of studies in other WEU countries.
93. Such scientists as Professor Jansen take
the view that the noise of low-altitude flying
constitutes a genuine hardship for the public
and that something must be done about it for
health reasons.
94. He believes that, when certain noise
levels, which have yet to be accurately defined,
are exceeded, many people suffer changes in
physical functions (vegetative overmodulation
reactions, etc.).
95. At the 98th meeting of the Bundestag's
Defence Committee on 23rd June 1986, Pro-
fessor Jansen then made the following
statement:
* We have not yet managed to prove that
noise causes an extra-aural disease, that is,
a disease outside the ear. Nor, as I am
Tornado
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sure my colleagues will agree, will we ever
be able, as far-as we can see, to define a
monocausal extra-aural disease that can
be ascribed only to noise, for the simple
reason that noise excites the whole
nervous system. It affects the weakest
point, which is usually the circulation.'
96. A study carried out in 1987 by the
Institute for Psychology and Biocybernetics of
the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg on
'Damage to the auditory system possibly
caused by the noise of low-flying aircraft', on
whose research report the Federal Environment
Agency has meanwhile submitted an opinion to
the Federal Defence Ministry, concludes that
low-altitude flying is unlikely to result in chronic
damage. Experiments on animals led to the
development of a criterion for daily human
noise exposure above which slight acute damage
to the auditory system cannot be ruled out. The
criterion is the noise level. The Federal Envi-
ronment Agency's opinion states that the
assumptions made in the study are wholly plau-
sible and scientifically defensible.
97 . The findings of the Erlangen study can be
summarised as follows:
- 
where a noise level of 125 dB(A) is
exceeded in one instance, the possi-
bility of the risk limit being exceeded
cannot be ruled out;
- 
instances in which noise levels of
between I l5 and 125 dB(A) are reached
are tolerable no more than once or
twice a day;
- 
where more frequent overflights occur
on any one day, none should expose
members of the public to noise levels
higher than ll5 dB(A);
- 
where multiple overflights occur in
rapid succession and where the number
of overflights per day averages about
40, none should exceed a noise level of
10s dB(A).
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(iii) Pollution
98. There have been many studies on the
emission and immission problems posed by avi-
ation.
99. The Technical Supervisory Board (TUV)
investigated exhaust gas emitted by air traffrc
over the Federal Republic of Germany in 1988.
The principal findings of this study can be
summarised as follows.
100. In any comparison of emissions from civil
and military aircraft the difference in the nature
of flying must be borne in mind. Thus the
majority of military flight movements take place
at low altitudes and at higher speeds than is the
case in civil air transport. In addition, some jet
aircraft are equipped with after-burners, which
are used principally to increase thrust during
take-off. As they have more engine power than
civil aircraft, military aircraft spend much of
their time, about 70 to 85%, flying in the lower
partial load range, while civil aircraft fly in the
medium or upper load range.
l0l. Tables 9 to 12 show total emissions of
CO, HC, NO. and SO, for the whole range of
altitudes at which civil lnd military aircraft flew
in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984.
98.0
101.6
l10.6
tt4.7
l18.3
109.2
tl1.8
t16.7
l19.0
105.7
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108.3
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102. The areas around Frankfurt, Munich and
Diisseldorf in particular account for an above-
average proportion of total emissions due to air
tralfic.
103. To illustrate the civil and military contri-
butions to total emissions from air traflic, the
exhaust gas emissions of the two categories at
altitudes above and below 10000 feet are
summarised in Table 13.
104. It can be seen that, in relation to fuel con-
sumption, military air traffrc accounts for a
larger proportion of CO and HC emissions than
civil air traffic. Particularly at altitudes below
l0 000 feet military tralfic accounts for 5090 of
CO emissions and 54% of HC emissions. This is
partly due to the very small proportion of flight
movements by military aircraft above l0 000
feet. The high CO and HC emissions can also be
ascribed to frequent flying in the partial load
range of the engine and the use of the after-
burner.
105. Emissions at altitudes above l0 000 feet
are largely due to civil air traffic.
106. Most military flights are made at altitudes
such that pollutants are quickly returned to
earth by the weather (clouds, rain). For the pur-
360 knots
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450 knots
480 knots
540 knots
420 knots
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poses of comparison, they must be related to the
pollutants emitted by power stations, industry,
domestic heating systems and road traflic. It
then becomes clear that, at less than 0.3% of the
total, pollutant emissions by military air traffrc
are very low. Fuel consumption by aircraft totals
2.8 million tonnes (1988), with civil aviation
accounting for 1.6 million tonnes (the Federal
Armed Forces 0.4 million tonnes, the allies
0.6 million tonnes).
107. Fuel consumption by motor vehicles is
many times higher in the Federal Republic of
Germany.
108. About l% of total pollutant emissions is
thus due to civil and military air traffic.
109. As air traffic accounts for a very small
proportion of pollutant emissions, it must be
considered unlikely to have any effect on the
dying of the forests. There is no evidence to the
contrary; even under airways, local effects on an
appreciable scale are unlikely since the high dti-
tudes at which aircraft fly result in pollutants
being spread over a wide area. Studies by the
Defence Geophysics Agency of the Federal
Armed Forces have shown that even forest areas
under low-altitude flight paths and woodland
adjoining airports have not suffered any appre-
ciable additional damage (German Bundestag,
10th Legislative Period, Document l0l282l).
(iv) Aspects of air safety/danger due to low-
altitude flying
Situation/trend
I10. The aviation industry spends more on
staff and equipment for the maintenance and
improvement of safety than virtually any other
sector. The efforts that have been made over
many years have resulted in a high level of
safety. This is true in principle of all air forces.
The statistics shown in Table 14 (air accident
rates in the Federal Armed Forces, 1958-1988)
confirm the positive trend towards further
stabilisation at a low level. The results achieved
in 1988 (air accident rates: 0.35 in the Federal
Armed Forces, 0.37 in the Federal Air Force and
0.47 in the case of jet aircraft) were bettered
only in 1983 and 1987.
I I l. The trend towards lower absolute figures
persists. If this positive trend is to continue,
current efforts must be consistently maintained
and aircrews must have adequate training
opportunities and flying hours, as bitter expe-
rience in the past has shown.
ll2. To summarise, the air accident rate (acci-
dents per l0 000 flying hours) fell from 3.6 in
1958 to 0.35 in 1988, and the number ofjet air-
craft crashing per 100 000 hours fell from over
twelve in l97l to under three in 1988.
Air safety risk
ll3. Since 1958, 956 people have lost their
lives as a result of military aircraft crashing in
the Federal Republic of Germany, including 133
people on the ground not involved in flying
operations (at 6th June 1989/31.5 years).
Risk inherent in low-altitude flying
ll4. Only about 4090 of crashes involving mil-
itary jet aircraft occur during low-altitude opera-
tions.
Air safety and training
l15. Air safety largely depends on the quality
of the personnel, i.e. on their personal and
physical aptitude, training and experience.
I 16. Selection procedures and the further
training of aircrews must ensure that those
selected meet the aptitude requirements. The
training programmes have been optimised on
the basis of the many years of experience gained
by the Federal Armed Forces and other air
forces. Ifthe required high level oftraining is to
be achieved and maintained, however, suffrcient
opportunities for training and exercises are
essential. If minimum requirements are not met,
air safety will suffer.
Effects of military flying operations on buildings/
parts of buildings
ll7. Since 1966, land, loaal and church
authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany
have blamed overflights by military aircraft for
I I cases of damage to buildings of cultural, his-
torical or other value.
118. To this must be added less well-known or
widespread cases of damage to other buildings(e.g. the partid collapse of a farmhouse in
Saarland).
l19. These flights resulted in cracks in plaster,
the detachment of plaster, damage to wall
paintings and cracks in roof structures.
l2O. In every case, however, the investigating
authorities felt that wear due to age could not be
ruled out as the cause of the damage.
lzl. In no case were flying operations regarded
as the cause, although the possibility of their
having triggered the damage was taken into con-
sideration.
122. No information on other WEU countries
is available.
ScientiJic studies on the eflect ofacoustic pressure
waves on buildings
123. The effect of acoustic pressure waves has
been the subject of several scientific studies in
the past, examples being the studies carried out
by the Curt Risch Institute at the Technical Uni-
versity of Hanover, the Technical University of
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Stuttgart and the Institute for Solid Con-
struction and Building Materials Technology of
the Technical University of Karlsruhe.
124. According to the report by Professor Koch
of the Curt Risch Institute of the Technical Uni-
versity of Hanover, buildings suffer damage
when pressure shocks involving sudden changes
of pressure of at least 50 kp/m2 occur at ground
level. In the case of supersonic flights at I I 000
metres, pressure shocks at ground level do not as
a rule exceed I kp/m2.
125. In exceptional cases, i.e. when aircraft are
accelerating or tuning and under certain meteor-
ological conditions, pressure shocks of between
5 and l0 kp/m2 can reach the ground even when
aircraft are flying at supersonic speed at or
above 1l 000 metres.
126. Aircraft flying at a speed of 450 knots(830 kph) and an altitude of 150 metres(500 feet) cause pressure shocks well below
I kp/m2.
127. These lindings are confirmed by research
carried out at the Technical Universities of
Stuttgart and Karlsruhe in 1987, which showed
that the acoustic pressures during overflights
within the prescribed parameters are too low to
cause damage to buildings.
Flight operation rules
128. The flight operation regulations appli-
cable to the Federal Republic of Germany,
which are binding on both the Federal Armed
Forces and the allies, also take account of the
findings of the studies on the effect of acoustic
pressure waves on buildings.
129. With a view to reducing noise and also
preventing damage to buildings the following
stipulations were made:
supersonic flights over land: minimum
altitude I I 000 metres (36 000 feet);
- 
maximum speed below l0 000 feet(EDR-9 ceiling): Mach 0.9 (and thus
well below the speed of sound./Mach l).
Current knowledge indicates that, if these regu-
lations are heeded, military flight operations will
not do any damage to properly constructed and
maintained buildings. The strength of the
pressure waves occurring at ground level is thus
insignificant.
Assessment of damage/settlement of claims
130. The area of potential damage caused by a
supersonic flight at low altitude (along the flight
path) extends over several kilometres longitudi-
nally and laterally.
l3l. All damage caused by pressure waves
during overflights has occurred where the flight
operation rules have been infringed (maximum
speed exceeded, supersonic flights below the
minimum altitude).
(v) Exposure of airuews to mental and physical
StTCSS
132. The introduction of modern, complex,
third-generation flying weapons systems has
generally increased the demands on aircrews.
Flights at low altitude and high speed require
special skills and high mental and physical tol-
erance.
133. Several conditions help to ensure that this
tolerance exists: rigorous selection, intensive
and constant training, continuous flight training
in formation, the help of automatic and semi-
automatic pilot and control systems and, not
least, the support of a weapons systems oflicer
(F-4F, RF-4E and Tornado).
134. In medical circles it is claimed that during
low-altitude training flights the pilots of jet-
propelled combat aircraft are not only exposed
to considerable physical stress but are almost
constantly forced to operate at or beyond the
limits of their functional capacity in the mental-
neutral performance range. From this they infer
that pilot error during low-altitude flying is
almost inevitable and that disastrous crashes are
therefore bound to occur. Essentially, the fol-
lowing 'arguments " are advanced:
- 
in military technical systems, safety
aspects take second place to operational
criteria in development and day-to-day
flight training;
- 
the pilot who can be distracted can no
longer meet the complex requirements
arising in intricate flying situations and
through his * human failings " reduces
the reliability of the overall system;
- 
during low-altitude flying aircrews of
combat aircraft are exposed to extreme
shock loads and accelerative forces (up
to l0 times gravitational acceleration),
which may reduce vigilance seriously
and even lead to unconsciousness;
- 
the strong physiological activation of
the human organism during low-
altitude flying is normally accompanied
by distinct losses of mental capacity;
- 
the danger of exceeding the limits of the
aircraft's capabilities exposes the pilot
to constant emotional stress;
- 
when combined with the special opera-
tional conditions obtaining during low-
altitude flying, the numerous actions
required of a pilot when flying a
combat aircraft leave him " a minimum
of time' to take decisions and action;
- 
the pilot's visual and vestibular percep-
tivity is so impaired by the high flying
speeds over ground and the G-forces
that he often becomes spatially disori-
ented;
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- 
the demands on concentration due to
the wide range of factors to be con-
sidered in flight are so high that fatal
lapses of concentration cannot always
be avoided;
- 
ergonomic improvements in cockpit
design are as unlikely to help reduce
risks substantially as optimisation of
pilot selection and increased training in
behaviour in the aircraft that complies
with the safety regulations;
- as a general rule, excessive * struc-
tural' demands are thus made on the
pilots of low-flying combat aircraft.
135. Studies carried out for the Federal Air
Force show that low-altitude flights account for
a surprisinely small proportion of the total
number of accidents when the scale of such
flights is considered: since 1975 the accident
rate for jet aircraft at low altitudes where crews
have been involved in or caused accidents has
been just under 2lo/o of all flying accidents.
There is thus less risk of an accident in low-
altitude flying than in other types of military
flying. This statement is confirmed by absolute
flrgures: in the five years from 1984 to 1988
combat aircraft of the Federal Air Force
involved in low-altitude training over the ter-
ritory of the Federal Republic of Germany
caused l0 accidents, two of them at sea. In all,
aircraft of the Federal Armed Forces were
involved in 78 accidents. The proportion of
accidents occurring during low-altitude flying
(1390) has thus continued to fall in recent years.
Comparisons of numbers of flying accidents
involving civil and military aircraft show that
military training flights, and specifically low-
altitude flights, are no more hazardous than civil
aviation, where standards are allegedly geared
more closely to the optimisation of safety.
136. No specific research findings on the air
forces of other WEU countries are available, but
the situation described above has been con-
firmed in personal discussions.
137. As regards the argument that excessive
structural demands are made on pilots during
low-altitude flying, it must be admitted that they
are acting under quite specific external and
internal conditions which take them close to the
limits of their capabilities.
138. The very high G-forces of up to 10 times
body weight said by critics to occur duing low-
altitude flying and the resulting losses of mental
capacity, even extending to unconsciousness, are
relevant to the crews ofjet aircraft on this scale
only for brief, though very frequent periods. In
principle, therefore, interception training at low
altitudes over populated areas should be pro-
hibited.
139. The abovementioned danger of disorien-
tation during low-altitude flying is sufficiently
alleviated by the aircraft's instruments (artificial
horizon, radar altimeter). Where a pilot is dis-
tracted or suffers a lapse of concentration, for
example, limits may, of course, be temporarily
exceeded.
140. Of interest in this context is the con-
clusion drawn from the analysis of the human
factor during research into the causes of flying
accidents that attitudinal, motivational and
social problems are far more frequent determi-
nants of pilot error than excessive physical or
mental demands.
(vi) Strain on military equipment
l4l. The jet aircraft of the Federal Armed
Forces are not currently equipped with a system
that records the stresses to which the cell struc-
tures are exposed during each mission. It is not
therefore possible to determine a change in the
degrees of damage to aircraft structures related
to low-altitude operations (more literally: a
change in the degrees of damage to aircraft
structures related to low-altitude operations is
not therefore possible).
(vii) Cost of low-altitude operations
142. The Federal Air Force does not have any
data on the cost of maintaining aircraft or of the
fuel consumed on a mission-by-mission basis.
The basic guide parameter used in air force
logistics is the flying hour, to which the cost of
maintenance work and consumption units is
related. Flight profiles are of secondary impor-
tance in logistic reflections of this nature. Data
logging and the submission and evaluation of
reports are geared to this objective.
143. The following 2 figures give some idea of
the average quantity of fuel consumed by air-
craft per hour:
Tornado 4.6 )
Phantom F-4F 6.15 [ m3 of F-34
Alpha Jet 1.6 ( per flying hour*
Phantom RF-4E 5.6 I
* Price of F-34 on lst May 1989: DM 323tm3.
The cost of maintenance in 1988 was:
Tornado 7.48 IPhantom 6.06 | thousand DMI per
Alpha Jet 4.61 I flying hour
Phantom RF-4E 6.21 ,
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X. Measures tden to re.duce noise
(i) Current situation
144. The military training flights that take
place over the Federal Republic of Germany are
a particular burden on the public in the areas
concerned and undoubtedly cause them consid-
erable hardship. Restricting such flights to an
unavoidable minimum is therefore an obvious
and constant requirement and objective. The
aim must be to find an acceptable compromise
between the legitimate claims of our fellow cit-
izens to a reasonable quality of life and our
country's security requirements in the western
alliance. Maintaining air safety (particularly
during low-altitude training) is of prime impor-
tance in this context. The risk to crews and the
public must not be increased.
145. Although major efforts have been made in
recent years to ease the burden on the public
while maintaining high training and safety stan-
dards, those directly affected are subject to par-
ticular hardship:
- 
the Federal Air Force's low-altitude
training over the Federal Republic of
Germany was almost halved between
1980 and 1986;
- 
dl flight training of potential jet pilots,
46% of low-altitude training and two
thirds of the noise-intensive weapons
training of the Federal Air Force's air-
crews have been transferred abroad;
- 
a wide variety of restrictions has been
imposed on air traffic, although they
are not considered adequate.
(ii) Objective
146. Every conceivable effort should be made
to ease the burden on the public as far as pos-
sible, and the financial implications must not be
a determining factor in this.
147. low-altitude training flights should be
geared to actual defence at various threat
levels.
148. No reduction should detract from the
ability of the armed forces to play their desig-
nated r6le, air safety and thus responsibility for
the lives and health of pilots and the public. It
should be ensured in this context that the social
situation of pilots and technicians, who are
already forced to spend up to three months of
the year away from their families, is not made
any worse.
149. There cannot therefore be any radical
solutions. Solutions consist only in a justifiable
compromise between the imperative require-
ments of the military defence of the country and
the understandable expectations of the public.
(iii) Measures so far taken to reduce noise
150. German aircrews undergo most of their
training on jet aircraft outside the Federal
Republic of Germany 
- 
in the United States, the
United Kingdom and Portugal. This accounts
for some 40 000 flying hours a year.
l5l. The air forces of eight countries train in
the Federal Republic of Germany. One
requirement is that these air forces know their
operational area, its geographical and meteoro-
logical peculiarities. They must train as an
integral part of the existing operational
organisation, together with ground-based air
defences and the land forces, whose troops 
- 
as
in the allied context 
- 
have their stand-by and
operational areas on German soil3. This density
of forces and thus of training activities imposes
a major burden. One of the main tasks for the
German Air Force and the allies has therefore
long been to take steps to reduce aircraft
nolse.
152. Efforts to achieve a wider spread of low-
altitude flying by greatly increasing the area in
which it is permitted, thus generally reducing
the frequency of overflights, began many years
ago.
153. This marked a reversal of a trend in the
1960s and early 1970s, when the area in which
low-altitude flying was not permitted was sub-
stantially increased. The larger the area
available for low-altitude training, however, the
lower the frequency of flights over a given place,
even if it is assumed that the volume of flying
remains constant. Specifically:
- 
so-called high-density air traffic areas
were abandoned;
- 
control zones were reduced in size;
- 
the boundary beyond which low-
altitude flying was not permitted was
moved southwards;
- 
protection zones were abandoned or
reduced in size;
- 
parachute-dropping areas were used
only when needed.
154. Additional protected zones or even pro-
hibited areas requested for hospitals, health
resorts and nature conservancy areas, to name
but a few, were not approved for fear of setting a
precedent for many similar claims.
155. This is an indication of the dense popu-
lation of the Federal Republic of Germany.
156. Extending the training areas to include
areas of the WEU countries with comparable
populations would produce similar results.
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157. In the Federal Republic of Germany there
are 68 cities, 23 000 towns and municipalities
with 3 300 hospitals, 40 000 schools and 20 000
homes for the elderly. The area available for
low-altitude flying is therefore very small.
158. Even more careful preparation, stricter
planning and more consistent flight operations
have made it possible to limit the time aircraft
spend at low altitudes. Thus instructions were
issued at the beginning of 1985 to restrict the
low-altitude part of any operation to a
maximum of 50 minutes. Although these
instructions were originally binding only on the
Federal Air Force's operations, the allies later
followed suit. The remainder of any operational
flight is made at medium and high altitudes.
Studies carried out in the meantime prove that
it has been possible to reduce to 42 minutes the
average time any aircraft actually spends in the
low-altitude band during training. Despite the
intensification of low-altitude training, the total
number of hours has consequently been reduced
to about 68 000 (1988) since 1980, i.e. by about
a quarter.
159. Besides reducing the duration of noise, the
Federal Air Force and the allies have imposed a
number of restrictions on themselves to reduce
the intensity of noise:
- 
a ban on the use ofafter-burners below
3 @0 feeU
- 
restriction of supersonic flights to alti-
tudes above 36 000 feet over land.
160. The times at which low-altitude flying is
permitted have also been limited: it is allowed
only between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. from Mondays
to Fridays, and from May to October it is
banned between 12.30 and 1.30 p.m.
16l. Areas ofpopulation are not used as navi-
gation points and, above all, the minimum
altitude is in principle 500 feet (150 metres).
Flying at an altitude of 250 feet (75 metres) is
permitted only in certain areas at certain times
and on a limited scale. German crews fly only
short distances at this altitude.
162. No training flights are made by jet aircraft
below 250 feet in the Federal Republic of
Germany. This important form of low-altitude
training is carried out exclusively in the
extremely thinly populated district of Labrador
in Canada.
163. The measures taken to reduce aircraft
noise until mid-1989 are again listed below (in
brackets the year in which the measure was first
ordered, revised, amended or tightened up):
(a) Flight operations (general)
- 
transfer of flight training facilities for
basic training; advanced training; and
training on combat aircraft; much of
the low-altitude and weapons training
of operational units to friendly NATO
countries (since 1957; since 1988 the
goal has been an increase in capacity at
Goose Bay/Canada by 1991); transfer
of high-$ade aerial combat training,
including the leasing of civil target
simulation equipment, to the ACMI/
Decimomannu;
- 
consistent work on the further devel-
opment of simulators (since 1988);
- 
reduction in low-altitude flying through
the abandonment of the fighter units'
second r6le (1988);
- 
utilisation of the airspace over the
North and Baltic Seas (since 1972,
increased in 1988 through the transfer
of about a quarter of the Federal Air
Force's aerial combat training to mar-
itime areas). Once all the measures take
effect, some 8096 of the Federal Air
Force's aerial combat training will take
place over the sea;
- 
general restriction on military flight
operations at weekends and on public
holidays (since 1972, revised in 1983,
tightened up in 1986);
- 
restriction of day-time low-altitude
flying to the period from 7 a.m. to
5 p.m. from Mondays to Fridays (since
1965);
- 
midday break in low-altitude opera-
tions by jet-propelled combat aircraft
from 12.30 to 1.30 p.m. from May to
October (1986);
- 
restriction of total duration in the low-
altitude band to a maximum of
50 minutes per operational flight
(1e85);
- 
restriction of military flight operations
at night (1970);
- 
general termination of night flying at
low altitudes at midnight (since 1970,
amended in 1983);
- 
fixing of minimum altitude for night
flying at predominantly I 000 feet(about 300 metres) above ground level
(since 1970, revised in 1983);
- 
ban on training flights at supersonic
speed at midday and at night;
restriction of operations to the periods
from 8 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. and 2 to
8 p.m. from Monday to Friday and
.from 8 a.m. to 12 noon on Saturdays(since 1970, revised in 1984);
- 
ban on supersonic flights below 36 000
feet (about I I 000 metres) over land
(1970, amended in 1983);
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- 
general low-altitude flying at altitudes
between 500 and I 500 feet (150 and450 metres), with the added
requirement that the upper part of this
altitude band be used whenever tacti-
cally feasible (revised in 1983);
- 
general ban on low-altitude flights by
operational units near their home air-
fields out of consideration for the com-
munities adjoining airfields and in sur-
rounding areas, which are the worst
affected (since 1983);
- 
time and spatial restrictions on the use
of the seven 250-foot (75-metre) low-
altitude flying areas (1986);
- 
general closure of the 250-foot (75-
metre) low-altitude connecting routes(since 1974);
- 
exclusion of specific towns from
25Gfoot low-altitude flying areas (since
1976, revised in 1983);
- 
restriction of the low-altitude reference
speed to 450 knots (about 835 kph)
(revised in 1983);
- 
general use of navigation and target
points outside populated areas (1983);
- 
ban on the use of after-burners at low
altitudes (except in emergencies) (since
1983);
- 
ban on military low-altitude flying over
urban centres with more than 100 000
inhabitants whenever possible (since
1960, revised in 1983);
- 
instructions to aircrews to avoid urban
areas with fewer than 100 000 inhabi-
tants whenever possible (introduced in
1982);
- 
ban on flying over nuclear power sta-
tions (introduced in 1975, revised in
1983, tightened up in 1988);
- 
establishment of protection zones
around airfields with a high volume of
air traflic (permanent monitoring);
- 
establishment of a Flight Operations
and Information Centre (FLIZ) at
Cologne/Porz (1985) to analyse and
respond to complaints about noise;
allocate the 250-foot (75-metre) low-
altitude flying areas to the allies; and
co.ordinate low-altitude training.
(b) Specific mec$ures at airJields and air-
toground ranges
- 
definition of approach and departure
paths with account taken of population
density (amended in 1984);
- 
establishment of noise protection areas
near military airlields predominantly
used by jet aircraft (Aircraft Noise Act
of 3fth March 1971, Federal Law
Gazette, page 282, permanent);
- 
establishment of noise protection areas
near air-to'ground ranges (since
1979);
- 
local arrangements at military airfields
to reduce noise (e.g. ban on flying over
inhabited areas, pennanent);
- 
communities near airfields kept
inforrred of special projects (per-
manent);
- 
establishment of noise protection com-
missions at all Federal Air Force and
Navy airfields at which jet aircraft are
based (since June 1989); the allies have
similar bodies;
- 
resettlement of communities near air-
fields exposed to extreme noise levels(te77).
(c) Structural measures at airJields (since
1e70)
- 
construction of noise-insulated hangars
for the ground-testing of jet engines
(second generation from 1975);
- 
installation of noise-insulating embank-
ments, woodland, plantations, screens,
etc. at military airfields (from 1980).
(d) Education and training
- 
teaching aircrews and staff and tech-
nical personnel to bear the problem in
mind;
- 
constant monitoring of the density of
low-altitude flights and of discipline
with Skyguard radar equipment (since
1985);
- 
informing the aircrews of all units of
the Federal Armed Forces and of the
allies who fly in the Federal Republic of
Germany of the burden imposed on the
public by aircraft noise and of ways of
using airspace that take account of the
problem (1985).
(e) Measures to increase knowledge and
understanding of unavoidable airuaft
noise
- 
prior announcement of major aerial
exercises (NATO and Federal Armed
Forces) through regional media (since
1974, revised in 1983);
- 
conferences on aircraft noise to inform
the public about the task to be per-
formed, how it is performed and what
environmental measures are taken
(stepped up since 1983);
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- 
periodic dissemination of information
to the national media (press, radio, tele-
vision, etc.) (since 1984);
- 
individual oral and written answers to
all questions,. com^plaints and petitions
concerning aircraft noise (since 1960,
revised in 1985);
- 
informing the public and operational
units about special problems connected
with aircraft noise throughFLIZ (since
1983);
- 
the progressive development of a Low-
altitude Flying Management System
(TMS) to support efforts to achieve an
effective reduction in the noise to
which the public is exposed.
164. The aim of all the arrangements listed
above is to reduce flying operations to a
minimum, which is assumed to be the level
essential for the maintenance of operational
readiness. It cannot be denied that aircraft noise
still causes hardship.
(iv) Measures to reduce noise due to low-flying
aircraft taken in coordination with the allied air
forces
165. To reduce the noise to which the public is
exposed, the following measures have been
ordered:
(a) A reduction in low-altilude flyiny
speed
The low-altitude flying speed for the navi-
gation phase of combat aircraft is reduced
from 450 knots (835 kph) to 420 knots(778 kph) throughout the low-altitude
flying area.
Where noise is concerned, this means:
- 
the lower engine speed greatly reduces
the noise emitted - by up to 25V0,
depending on the type ofaircraft. Peak
noise levels considered critical in
research on aircraft noise are not as a
rule reached at this speed. In the future
only about 50/o of flights will have to be
made at higher speeds for technical and
tactical reasons;
- 
owing to its lower speed, the aircraft's
appearance is less of a surprise. The
shock is greatly reduced, and the
auditory system is better able to adjust
to the volume of noise.
(b) A reduction in low-altilude interception
training
Low altitude interception training is
' carried out at altitudes of 150 to 450
metres. As several high-powered aircraft
are simultaneously present in a small area
for a fairly long time in this type of
training, the noise level and stress are par-
ticularly high because of the frequency of
overflights at low altitude. Under a new
training concept incorporating a new gen-
eration of radar equipment, known as
pulse Doppler radar, this training too is
now carried out at altitudes above 450
metres when weather conditions are
appropriate. A large proportion of allied
combat aircraft are already equipped with
radar of this type. Its installation in air-
craft of the Federal Air Force will begin in
1992.
This will immediately reduce such low-
altitude training by about a third. The
noise impression at ground level will be
approximately halved as a result of the
gtreater altitude at which aircraft equipped
with this radar will fly. Its installation in
aircraft of the Federal Air Force from
1992 will bring further reductions.
(c) A signilicant reduction in low-altitude
flyin9 @t 75 metres) in the special low-
altitude flying areas
The highest noise levels are caused by air-
craft flying at 75 metres. However, flying
at this altitude is still one of the most
important elements of the whole training
exercise, since it includes the phases of
penetration, (simulated) weapons use and
departure from the target. It is the most
important requirement if the transition to
training abroad at the necessary opera-
tional altitude (about 30 metres) at opera-
tional speed is to be made safely and
quickly. German and allied aircrews differ
widely in terms of the nature and opera-
tional r6le of their weapons systems, their
familiarity with geographical and climatic
conditions in Central Europe and the
opportunities they have to train at low
operational altitudes. The need for flying
at 75 metres therefore varies. Currently,
operational flights at this altitude still last
up to 28 minutes. After a lengthy debate,
the allied air forces, which account for the
largest proportion of such training, have
reappraised and modified their training
requirements.
In the future aircraft will spend only
about 15 minutes at this altitude. It can be
assumed that the average for all opera-
tions will be about 12 minutes.
This represents a reduction by about 450lo
over the special 75-metre low-altitude
flying area.
As most training flights at 75 metres will
also be made at reduced sPeed in the
future, the noise in the low-altitude flying
areas will be approximately halved. In
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addition, the number of towns in these
areas which may not be flown over at
75 metres has been significantly increased(from 25 to 6l).
(d) A reduction in low-altitude filyin7
hours
The tactical training of unit leaders of the
allied air forces is being transferred from
Central Europe to Belgium. The Federal
Navy is reducing its low-altitude flying
over land by 50% and stopping weapons
training at German air-to-ground ranges.
This will reduce low-altitude flying over
the Federal Republic of Germany by a
further 2 000 hours.
(e) Easing the burden on areas with a high
density of low-altitude flying
Areas over which the density of low-
altitude flying is increasing 
- 
owing to the
location of cities and airfields and to other
restrictions 
- 
are at a particular disad-
vantage. By the end of March 1990 pilot
projects in two areas will have been com-
pleted and evaluated. In these projects the
minimum altitude for overflights is raised
to 300 metres (weather permitting), and
simulated air-to-ground attacks and inter-
ception operations are forbidden. With
the reduction of speed to 420 knots, this
arrangement seems likely to bring a signif-
icant reduction in the high noise levels to
which the public in these areas are
expsed. If the pilot projects are suc-
cessful, these arrangements are to be
introduced in a number of other areas
similarly exposed to high noise levels.
fi Monitoring of low-altitude flying
Four Skyguard radar sets are being used
to monitor low-altitude flying at focal
points for airspace monitoring and also at
the request of politicians and local author-
ities. Even though culpable infringements
occur in only l% of aU flights recorded,
great care will be taken in the future to
ensure that the regulations are observed.
(g) A reduction in aerial combat training at
higher altitudes
Unlike low-altitude interception, aerial
combat training over land is always
carried out at high altitudes (above about
3 000 metres) in Temporarily Reserved
Airspace (TRA). In the future 86% of
Federal Air Force training of this kind
will be undertaken over the sea or abroad,
leaving only 14% over the Federal
Republic of Germany (current situation:
about two thirds over the sea or
abroad).
The allies are also considering how much
more of this training can be carried
out outside the Federal Republic of
Germany.
(h) Avoidance of excessive regional noise
levels
As a first development stage, the FederalAir Force has installed a computer-
assisted, central Low-altitude Flying Man-
agement System for the flight operations
of its units. A trial phase has begun. At
present this system is capable ofrecording
and depicting low-altitude movements
with the aid of the flight plan data input
by the German units. Concentrations both
on individual days and over longer
periods can be analysed and advice on
changes of routine provided.
As soon as the system is fully operational,it will be possible to adjust the low-
altitude flight plans of the units and so
achieve a more uniform and, therefore,
less onerous distribution of low-altitude
flying. Besides lowering the noise levels to
which individuals are exposed, a wider
spread of low-altitude flying will also
reduce the risk of collisions, thus further
improving air safety.
The allies have shown an interest in par-
ticipating in this system after a trial
phase.
(i) Summary
All the various measures will result in an
immediate and substantial reduction in
noise, especially in the areas which are
worst affected today.
- 
Speed restrictions, leading to a
reduction in noise by up to 25Vo;
- 
the reduction of low-altitude inter-
ception operations by a third; and
- 
the reduction of the time spent at 75
metres in the low-altitude flying areas
by 45olo,
will make the greatest impact. They take
account of the concern felt by the public
without unjustifiably affecting operational
readiness or safety.
(v) Longer+errn measures to reduce noise
166. Work on the achievement of the
longer-term objectives in this context con-
tinues:
(a) Elforts to transfer low-altitude training
abroad
- 
Under an agreement signed with the
Canadian Government in 1986, the
capacity of Goose Bay, the only
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location from which the air forces can
fly at an altitude of 30 metres, is to be '
increased to the agreed level by 1991.
- 
The negotiations on the renewal of the
agreements on the use of the Portuguese
air force base at Beja are being con-
ducted with a view to improving the
opportunities for the use of this
facility.
- 
It is hoped to improve the use of the
Decimomannu location for aerial
combat training.
- 
The decision on a NATO Tactical
Training Centre and on its possible site
- 
Konya in Turkey or Goose Bay in
Canada 
- 
needs to be given careful con-
sideration. The centre is intended for
particularly demanding training of a
type that is not possible in Europe. An
establishment of this kind could lead to
the transfer of further low-altitude
flying, although the Canadian Prime
Minister, Mr. Brian Mulroney, was
quoted recently as saying that NATO
might be forced to abandon the project
because of the current relaxation of
East-West tension. The subject is on
the agenda for the NATO Defence
Planning Committee meeting in May.
In passing, it is worth mentioning that
the prospect of Goose Bay being used
more extensively is meeting increasing
opposition from local inhabitants...
At present there are no other areas in
Europe to which low-altitude flying could
be transferred. The development of a new
facility remote from any population
centres abroad and its maintenance are
beyond the means of one country acting
on its own and would entail major risks.
It can only be a joint facility. The social
hardship for crews and technical staffalso
imposes serious constraints on the
transfer of further low-altitude flying.
The Spanish Government is reported as
having offered to take a future multi-
nation training centre for the European
Fighter Aircraft (similar to the tri-nation
Tornado Training Unit at RAF
Cottesmore in the United Kingdom).
Such an offer is to be welcomed as would
be any similar offer from Portugal and
Spain to take more allied low flying in the
Iberian Peninsular, where, in comparison
with other countries of the alliance, there
is rather less 'burden " being carried,(with, in consequence, rather fewer pro-
tests from the population).
(b) Trials with low-altitude llying simu-
lators
The German and many other armed
forces are becoming increasingly involved
in the development of methods to enable
military training to be transferred to sim-
ulators. The Federal Armed Forces were
the first to commission the development
of a low-altitude flight simulator, acting
on a decision of the Federal Government
and with the approval of the Bundestag.
The first step will be to consider whether
- 
and to what extent 
- 
low-altitude flying
can be replaced with simulated flying.
Until the prototype has undergone trials,
beginning in late 1990, it will not be pos-
sible to say whether series production isjustified. The first model being developed
is for the Federal Air Force's Tornado
combat aircraft.
This development could result in a further
reduction of low-altitude flying. It cannot,
however, completely replace low-altitude
training.
(c) Promotion of technological measures to
reduce noise
Although their power output has
remained the same or even increased, sub-jective and objective reductions in the
noise emitted by aircraft engines have
been achieved from one generation to the
next in the past. A Tornado, for example,
is about 4096 quieter than the older
Phantom. A study on the development of
even quieter engines has been commis-
sioned. It is unlikely, however, to have
practical implications in the foreseeable
future.
(d) The Federal Ministry of Defence has
requested NATO's Supreme Allied Head-
quarters in Europe to examine certain
requirements to be binding on all air
forces. NATO is currently considering
whether:
- 
training operations in the supersonic
range over land can be completely
abandoned; although these operations
are all carried out at altitudes above
I I 000 metres and are already very
limited in number, the sonic boom
makes them very noisy;
- 
an aircraft- and r6le-related reduction
can be achieved in the number of
annual flying hours considered nec-
essary for aircrews by present standards
and thus in the time they spend flying
at low altitudes.
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XI. Inw-altitude flying and the dcvelopment
of alteraative qprooches
167. No current developments indicate that
low-altitude operations can be completely aban-
doned in the near or even distant future, unless
r6les are reallocated.
168. Operational measures to reduce the noise
caused by low-altitude flying in the short term
may, however, be joined in the medium term by
a number of technical measures that can be
taken on equipment already in use. For the most
part they consist of modifications to the source
of noise itself, i.e. the aircraft or its engines.
169. Specifically, they may consist of changesin configuration, leading to reduced air
resistance and thus to reduced engine thrust
requirements, or changes to the engine itself,
ranging from the removal of the after-burner
through the use of sound absorbers to the devel-
opment of new jet designs.
170. The goal of these developments should be
to reduce the noise level by at least l0 dB and so
to halve the subjective noise impression.
l7l. The implementation of these measures
depends not only on solutions to technical
problems being found but also on such para-
meters as safety, reliability, flying performance,
their effects on operations and, not least, added
costs.
172. Studies of these aspects have begun.
Unequivocal statements cannot yet be made.
173. There are signs of technological develop-
ments in the long term which are likely to have
implications for tactical operational concepts
and overall strategy and so not least on the
nature and scale of low-altitude flying in the
future.
174. Current perceptions indicate that progress
in the following areas in particular will con-
tribute in this respect:
- 
navigation and pattern recognition
methods;
- 
stealth technology;
- 
engine construction;
- 
ammunition technology;
- 
EDP/automation.
Depending on the range of targets and the depth
of penetration, a variety of options capable of
performing at least some of the tasks of current
low-flying combat aircraft is conceivable.
175. The approaches that might be considered
include the following:
- 
high-flying aircraft operating at hyper-
sonic speeds;
- 
high-flying stealth aircraft which pene-
trate enemy airspace at supersonic
speeds;
- 
high-flying combat aircraft which are
equipped with intelligent long-range
weapons, operate at subsonic speeds
and do not penetrate enemy airspace;
- 
reusable and non-reusable, low-flying,
unmanned aircraft operating at sub-
sonic speeds;
- 
use of conventional missiles instead of
manned flying weapons systems.
These options are the subject of studies and
development work at national and international
level. Initial statements on the possibility of
some of these options becoming reality have
been made.
176. In other words, the development of
defence concepts that do not rely on low-altitude
flying depends on the availability of effective
alternative equipment. Given the present tech-
nological and financial environment, however, it
is likely to be some considerable time before
they are implemented.
XII. Low-altitude flyins ail public opinion
177. Despite the extensive measures taken by
the air forces which train in the Federal
Republic of Germany to reduce aircraft noise by
changing the airspace structure and the flight
operation rules, public opposition to military
low-altitude flying has grown appreciably. In
general, this is also true of a number of other
WEU countries. Increasingly, complaints are
made not only by individuals but also by politi-
cians and other holders of public office, local
authorities and citizens' action goups.
178. The armed forces have so far done a great
deal of public relations work. Explanations,
some going into detail, have been given in
answer to all written submissions. An attempt
has been made to engage in objective argument
and to focus on locaUregional problems at local
meetings and in the media or to disseminate
information on this complex subject. Despite
this, it has so far proved impossible to halt the
trend described above.
179. The most recent public relations exercises
include:
- 
a telephone hot-line at the local rate 
-
this hot-line has been installed atFLIZin the Federal Air Force Agency(Luftwaffenamt) and is open to any
member of the public;
- 
the establishment of aircraft noise com-
missions at all the Federal Air Force's
operational airfields.
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XIII. Inw-altitude flying and arms contol
180. At their meeting on 30th May 1989, the
NATO heads of state and government accepted
in principle (" Bush initiative ") the proposal
from the Warsaw Pact countries that the first
round of negotiations should cover not only
battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers,
but also combat aircraft and combat helicopters
as separate categories.
l8l. Given the wide range of unanswered ques-
tions concerning combat aircraft, particularly
with respect to deflrnition, criteria for counting
numbers and ceilings, it is impossible to say
when these negotiations will produce results.
The Warsaw Pact appears to have the political
will to come to an early agreement.
182. An agreement along the lines proposed by
the West 
- 
equality of armed forces at a lower
level 
- 
might change the need for training and
exercises. The arms control dialogue today is
based on a guaranteed defence capability and
will continue to be so in the future. If opera-
tional capability and combat strength are to be
maintained, low-altitude training for the NATO
air forces seems imperative.
183. The operational capability of the air
forces depends, however, on aircrews with a
high standard of training and performance. This
standard of performance can be achieved only if
each crew makes sufficient a number of low-
altitude training flights each year. Arms control
measures can thus affect only the number of
flying weapons systems available.
184. The logic of this assumption reflects the
view that a ban on low-altitude flying is not to
be recommended as a * confidence-building
measure ". Confidence-building measures are
intended to increase transparency and predicta-
bility, to reduce the danger of a surprise attack
and generally to improve our security.
185. Another aspect of arms control concerns
verification (a subject close to the Assembly's
heart). As well as considering the possibility of
overflying not only the CFE areas, but also all
the territory of the nations concerned (the
* Open Skies " proposals), the idea has surfaced
in Vienna of using light aircraft, flying low, for
verification purposes. It is to be hoped that this
proposal will be easier to sell to our populations
than low flying by fast jets...
XIY. Recommendations to the WEa countries
186. Efficient air forces in place are a crucial
element of our defensive strategy, which is
geared to preventing war and containing
political and military conflict. There can be little
doubt that the high standard of training of our
aircrews that is essential for this purpose can be
achieved and demonstrated convincingly only
through constant practice within the overall
defence system.
I 87. The air forces have, however, always been
subject to the requirement that they limit low-
altitude training to the minimum essential on
operational grounds. However, our populations
are increasingly making their voices heard and
consider, for instance, that noise levels in the
75 metre low-altitude flying areas are extremely
high and are now totally unacceptable.
188. Hence the recommendation of this report
that all the WEU and NATO partners who carry
out low-altitude exercises should take suitable
measures in the future to reduce the noise to
which the public is exposed to an unavoidable
level. The Defence Committee's recommenda-
tions are of an essentially practical nature,
avoiding, your Rapporteur hopes, all polemic.
The Council is urged therefore to take early
action in line with the ideas expressed in the
present report.
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Teslr 3
Airymce structarc of the Federal Republic of Gennany
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TesLn 6
Military Aruas of Conpaerce (Lower Ainpace)
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TnsI-e 7
TrwcittWts thmagh truiaing ateos (TM)
l. Air Tratfic Control Sector B, Bremen area 201/202
requested approved
January-June 1987 2374 2373
2. Air Traffic Contol Sector C, Diisseldorf area 203
requested approved
January-June 1987 438 438
3. Air Trallic Control Sector A, Maastricht area 301/302
Approved transit flights May-December l9E7 14 E68
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Aanual cmissba of salphur dioxide W all air tmfftc
at all oltitudcs in the Federal Republic of Gcrmany ia 1984
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Emissions of-CO, H_C, NO, and SO, by civil and mititary air traffic
in the Fedemlkcpublicbf'Gcrmany in I9B1'
o5
Source Altitudeft
Fuel co HC NO. SO:
Tonnes
p.a. %
Tonnes
p.a. %
Tonnes
p.a. %
Tonnes
p.a. %
Tonnes
p.a. %
Civil air traffrc(including visual flying .
< 10000
> 10000
all alts
591 889
t 004 67t
l s96 560
2t
36
57
t2990
l0 r70
23 t60
27
2t
48
3 016
t 064
4 080
33ll
44
7 318tt 4t2
l8 730
25
40
65
591
l 003
I 594
22
36
58
Military air traflic .
< 10000
> 10000
all alts
t 073 934
13l 945
t 205 879
38
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23 578
I 085
24 663
50
2
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4 937
139
s 076
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2
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9 036
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3l
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l 028
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37
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Total air trallic. all alts 2802 439 100 47 823 100 9 156 100 28 892 100 2 746 100
Source: Institute for Energy Technology and Environmental protection.
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APPENDIX I
Defiaitbns
CVFR area
A controlled airspace with fixed dimensions in which only IFR and CVFR flights are permis-
sible. (rcAo 
')
Restricted flying area (EDR)
An airspace with fixed dimensions over a country's territory or territorial waters in which flights
are restricted owing to certain conditions. 
GCAO, NATO)
Flight information area (FIR)
An airspace with fixed dimensions in which a flight information service and flight alarm service
are available. (rcAo)
Air tralfic control route
A fixed route intended for channelling the flow of traflic so that it satisfies the requirements of
the air traflic control services. (rcAo)
Low-altitude night-time interception area (LANIA)
An airspace with fixed dimensions, occasionally established to permit low-altitude night-time
interception training flights. (AFSBw 2)
Danger area (ED-D)
An airspace with fixed dimensions in which activities dangerous for aircraft may be undertaken
at set times. (ICAO, NATO)
Control area (CTA)
A controlled airspace extending upwards from a fixed line above the earth's surface.
N.B. A control area may consist of short-haul areas, air traflic control routes and other con-
trolled airspace, except control zones. (ICAO, BFS 3, NATO)
Control zone (CTR)
A controlled airspace extending upwards from the earth's surface to a fixed upper limit.(ICAO, BFS, NATO)
Air defence exercise area (ADEM)
An airspace with fixed dimensions which is temporarily established to permit training protection
flights and air defence training flights. (AFSBw)
Short-haul area (TMA)
A control area usually situated where air traffic control routes meet near one or more airports. 
_(ICAO, NATO)
l. International Civil Aviation Organisation.
2. Federal Armed Forces Air Traffic Control Oflice (Amt fiir Flugsicherung der Bundeswehr).
3. National Flight Co-ordination Authority (Bundesanstalt ftir Flugsicherung).
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Upper flight information area (UIR)
An airspace with flrxed dimensions above flight information areas, in which a flight information
service and flight alarm service are available to aircraft flying at high altitudes. (rcAo)
Upper control area (WA)
A controlled airspace in an upper flight information area.
Temporarily reseryed airspace (TM)
An airspace-with fixed dimensions temporarily established to permit uncontrolled VFR flights
by military aircraft.
(AFSBw)
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APPENDIX II
Ccnlml Earupun nalhct eavimnment
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This graph illustrates environmental factors which affect low-altitude flying in the Central Region. The weather often forces air-
craft to op€rate at low altitude below a ceiling Additionally, decreased hours of daylight at certain times of the year force
increased concentrations of low-altitude trallic during available daylight hours. The periods of night time also show the need for
the nighUall weather capability of the F-16 LANTIRN and F-15E.
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APPENDIX III
Attritioi model results over nodcrde tcnain (FRG)
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This graph demonstrates the relationship between combat attrition by enemy defences and aircraft altitude. Attrition, due to the
threat, increases dramatically as aircraft altitude increases. The shaded area on the chart shows the altitude below 5fi) feet is best
for reducing attrition due to enemy defences.
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APPENDIX IV
Ptotubil@ of gruund Hll (fally taind pilot)
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This graph illustrates the relationship between aircraft altitude and the probability of hitting the ground. The model assumes
moderate terrain features similar to those found in Germany. As altitude decreases below 150 feet, the probability of the pilot
hitting the ground rapidly increases. This probability becomes unacceptably high below I 00 feet (see shaded area of the chart).
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APPENDIX V
Mission sunital
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This chart combines'data from the previous two graphs to demonstrate how mission survivability in combat varies with aircraft
altitude. As altitude decreases, survivability from the threat increases until approximately 100 feet. Below this altitude, surviva-
bility rapidly decreases becausc of the greater probability of the pilot hitting the ground. The shaded area on the chart shows I (X)
to 3fi) feet is the best altitude to fly considering the combined attrition of enemy defences and ground impact. However, some
training benefit is realised while flying in the 3fi) to 5fi) feet altitude block.
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2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mr. Fourr6, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (Alternate: Stolfelen) (Yice-
Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Cariglia, Chevalier (Alternatq Kempinaire), Cox, De Decker (Alternate: PCcriaux), Ewing,
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Raplnrteur's Preface
In preparation for this report, the Rapporteur held discussions in London on 22nd and 23rd
January 1990 with:
Mr. Paul Irver, Head of Security Policy Department, Foreiglr and Commonwealth Oflice;
MM. David Chuterand Ian Manson, Defence Arms Control Unit (DACU), Ministry of Defence;
Mr. John Roper, Director of Studies, Royal Institute of International Affairs;
Mr. Willem van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
The Rapporteur also had interviews with the following permanent representatives to the CFE
and/or CSBM talks and their staff in Vienna on l9th and 20th March 1990:
H.E. Mr. M. Edes, Ambassador, Head of the United Kingdom Delegation;
H.E. Mr. J. Coene, Ambassador, Head of the Belgian Delegation;
H.E. Mr. G. Joetze, Ambassador, Head of the Federal German Delegation;
H.E. Mr. F. Plaisant, Ambassador, Head of the French Delegation;
H.E. Mr. P. Pucci di Benisichi, Ambassador, Head of the Italian Delegation;
H.E. Mr. R. Bloes, Ambassador, Head of the Luxembourg Delegation;
H.E. Mr. L.W. Veenendaal, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation;
H.E. Mr. M. Barreiros, Ambassador, Head of the Portuguese Delegation;
H.E. Mr. J.A. San Gil, Ambassador, Head of the Spanish Delegation;
H.E. Mr. Gleissner, Ambassador, Head of Arms Control Department, Austrian Ministry for
Foreign Affairs;
H.E. Mr. Peel, Ambassador, Head of the Canadian Delegation;
H.E. Mr. Meiszter, Ambassador, Head of the Hungarian Delegation;
Mr. P. Kaplan, Minister, United States Delegation;
Mr. Y. Evstafiev, Minister, Soviet Delegation,
and with General Sir Richard Vincent, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (Chief of the Defence Staff
Designate), in London on 4th April 1990.
The Rapporteur met the following at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, bn 25th April 1990:
H.E. Mr. Amedeo de Franchis, Ambassador, Deputy Secretary-General;
H.E. Sir Michael Alexander, KCMG, Ambassador, United Kingdom Permanent Represent-
ative;
H.E. Mr. William H. Taft, IV, Ambassador, United States Permanent Representative;
Dr. Jamie Shea, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General;
Mr. Harry Brown, Special Assistant, Strategic and Global Events, SHAPE;
Brigadier General T.G. Waanders, NLAR, Deputy Assistant Director, Plans and Policy
Division;
Colonel W. Meyer, GEAR, Arms Control and Disarmament Branch, Plans and Policy Division;
Mr. D. Beattie, CMG, United Kingdom Deputy Permanent Representative;
Air Commodore Mike Butler, COS, United Kingdom Mil. Rep.;
Mr. David Fisher, Defence Counsellor, United Kingdom Delegation;
Messrs. Jon Day, Ian McEwan and Geoff Magnus, United Kingdom Defence Staffl
Mr. Guillaume Parmentier, Assistant Director of External Relations;
Mr. P. Jenner, Information Directorate.
The committee asawhole was addressed by the Italian Minister of Defence, Mr. Martinazzoli,in
Rome on l5th February 1990; by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic
9f Germany, and Mr. Skubiszewski, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Luxembourg on- 22nd
\4aqch 1990, during the extraordinary session of the Assembly;and by Mr. Eyskens, Belgian Ministerfor Foreign Alfairs, and Mr. CoEme, Belgian Defence Minister, in Brussels -on 24th April 1990.
The committee and the Rapporteur extend their thanks to those ministers, ambassadors, officials
and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions.
The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the com-
mittee.
tt4
DOCUMENT 1223
Draft Recommendation
on Yienao, disarmanent and Westeflt Europeaa Union
The Assembly,
O Welcoming the recent developments in Europe which promise a dramatic reduction in
East-West tension;
(it) Considering, however, that the establishment of lasting security greatly depends on decisions
which have to be taken forthwith;
(iit) Aware that the democratic evolution in the countries of Central Europe faces growing problems
of internal argument and traditional nationalism;(iv) Convinced that progress in the Vienna talks, both on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) and
on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM), is an essential prerequisite for stability and
security in Europe;(v) Stressing the necessity to continue arns control negotiations immediately after the signing of the
first CFE treaty;
(vil Certain that further cuts in weapons and force levels in Europe are desirable but that they must
be agreed collectively and not decided unilaterally;
(vii) Noting the convergence of views on arms control between WEU member countries and a
glowing number of Warsaw Pact countries;
(vrifl Recognising that few nations, in the East or the West, continue to have the financial means to
maintain defence spending at former levels;(ix) Determined that there must be gtreater European co-operation in the field of defence and
security, especially over arms control in general and verification of agreements in particular;(x) Pleased that the NATO nations have tabled a series of measures in Vienna which are setting the
pace for the forthcoming CFE treaty;
(xil Saddened that the French Prime Minister's proposal of 7th September 1989 that WEU should
start a specific programme of immediate co-operation with regard to veriflrcation and disarmament has
not yet been taken up by the Council;
(xiil Encouraged, however, by the proposal on 23rd March 1990 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Federal Republic of Germany to create a centre for verification in Europe, which echoes pre-
vious French ideas on the necessity for transparency and reciprocal openness;
(xiii) Recalling that Recommendation 465 proposed the creation of a European observation satellite
agency to assist in the veriflrcation measures agreed by each member country;
(xiv) Welcoming the fact that the Council is studying a possible WEU contribution to the CFE verifi-
cation system based on the enhancement of European capabilities and the pooling of all member coun-
try's assets;
(xv) Convinced of the urgent need for a European verification centre and struck by the fact that the
ideal nucleus for such a body is WEU, plus those other states (signatories of the forthcoming CFE
treaty) desiring to take part;
(ni) Suggesting that the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, together with the Secretary-General,
should immediately begin consulting not only member states but other interested nations from both
East and West which meet the necessary requirements with a view to their participation in the work of
this centre,
Rrcouttlrros rHAT rHr CouNcrr
Take the action
which all states which
participate.
necessary to create, under WEU auspices, a European verification centre in
meet the necessary requirements, from both East and West, be invited to
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Explarutory Memorandum
(sabmined by Lord Newall Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. The aim of the present report on
'Vienna, disarmament and Western European
Union " is to ensure that the key issues
regarding the major arms control negotiations
are brought before the Assembly for debate, con-
tinuing the process of education emphasised in
the past year by two other Rapporteurs for the
Defence Committee, Mr. de Beer and Mr.
Steinerr.
2. As previously, there is a particular danger
that what is written today may be overtaken by
events tomorrow 
- 
which is why your present
Rapporteur intends to limit comment to the
essential facts necessary as a catalyst for
sparking the process of debate so vital in a par-
liamentary democracy. The recommendations
which have been formulated are directed at
translating the debate into effective action so
that the WEU member countries help initiate,
rather than merely follow, the arms control
process which has become the key issue for
European security and stability. The record thus
far is poor and pressure from the Assembly is
vital to emphasise the requirement for urgent
action by the Council.
3. Appended to this report will be found the
original mandate for the Vienna CFE talks,
which shows the scope of the discussions, as well
as a comprehensive glossary of terms and
acronyms.
II. European dcvelopments
4. Since Mr. Steiner's report for the Defence
Committee on'Force comparisons (NATO and
Warsaw Pact military potential)' in November
1989, events in Europe have moved at an ever-
increasing tempo. Large Soviet and Eastern
European unilateral force reductions have
begun, with all the inherent problems con-
cerning possibilities and./or requirements for
verification of their authenticity and their
enduring nature (many commentators are
unhappy that such reductions are not taking
place in the context of any treaty and are not
subject to continuing verification). The Warsaw
Pact organisation appears close to a de facto dis-
solution, with less and less * consultation' on
l. ' Current aspects of arms control: the Western European
Union position 
- 
reply to the annual report ofthe Council ",
Document I182, 25th April 1989, Rapporteur: Mr. de BeeC
* Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military
potential) 
- 
reply to the annual report ofthe Council ", Doc-
ument 1204, 6th November 1989, Rapporteur:
Mr. Steiner.
the arms control process, and indeed with one
member about to become united with a member
of the erstwhile * opposition ". Do such develop
ments mean that a possible treaty on conven-
tional forces in Europe (the CFE negotiations) is
in imminent danger of being overtaken by events?
5. Your Rapporteur would argue that, on the
contrary, the need for a CFE treaty is even more
pressing! At a time of increasingly rapid change
both in relations between East and West and,
perhaps even more importantly, between East
and East, the conclusion of a treaty to establish
defined parameters to constrain military forcesin the European theatre their numbers,
equipment, dispositions and utilisation 
- 
will
per se be a stabilising factor.
6. The CFE treaty will also help counter the
previously-cited problem of unilateral reduc-
tions and withdrawals by setting specific limits
to various force levels in particular European
zones.
7. In addition, by initiating an extensive
exchange of data on force structures and
equipment holdings and with an intrusive verifi-
cation r6gime, the treaty should considerably
increase East-West * openness' (the 'trans-
parency' to which the French Prime Minister,
Mr. Rocard, has frequently referred), and
thereby reduce risks of misunderstandings, as
well as instituting a safeguard against the pos-
sible aggressive use of military capabilities.
III. Progess to date
8. Given that the CFE negotiation is much
larger in scope than any other present or pre-
vious arms control forum, that there are 23 par-
ticipants, theoretically taking part on an indi-
vidual basis, but in reality, at least hitherto,
divided into the two alliances (16 on the western
side (NATO) and seven to the East (the Warsaw
Pact)), with an area of application covering
some six million square kilometres between the
Atlantic and the Urals, including as many as
4 000 garrisons and well in excess ofa quarter of
a million items of equipment to be treaty-
limited, in addition to several hundreds of thou-
sands of United States 
- 
and Soviet-stationed
personnel 
- 
with so many factors to be con-
sidered it is of considerable credit to the negoti-
ators in Vienna that any progress at all has been
possible!
(i) Categories
9. At the beginning of the negotiations, with
the negative legacy of the MBFR talks, there were
ll6
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major differences between the two sides. Since
then, agreement has been possible on the flrve cat-
egories of equipment to be treatyJimited:
- 
main battle tanks;
- 
armoured combat vehicles (with three
sub-categories: armoured personnel car-
riers, armoured infantry fighting
vehicles, and heavy armoured combat
vehicles;
- 
artillery;
- 
combat helicopters;
- 
combat aircraft.
(ii) Delinitions
10. An agreed definition has proved possiblefor artillery systems, and definitions are
imminent at the time of writing for battle tanks
and armoured combat vehicles. The western
side has modified its position on definitions for
combat helicopters, dropping the proposed
" look-alike, count-alike' rule which could have
involved transport and ambulance helicopters,
and it is hoped that an agreed deflrnition is close.
The one major sticking point is on combat air-
craft where the two sides remain some distance
apart.
(iii) Ceilings
11. As far as overall ceilings are concerned,
agreement has been forthcoming for battle tanks
and combat helicopters, is very close on
armoured combat vehicles and should soon
prove possible on artillery.
(iv) Troops on the ground
12. With reference to limitations on United
States- and Soviet-stationed forces in Europe, as
a result of President Bush's initiative and
intensive US-Soviet bilateral contacts, it seemed
at Ottawa during the Open Skies conference that
agreement had been reached on the numbers
involved:
- 
195 000 Soviet soldiers in Eastern
Europe, outside the territory of the
USSR;
- 
195 000 US troops in Central Europe(FRG, Benelux and Denmark), plus a
total maximum of 30 000 US soldiers
in the rest of Western Europe (United
Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Turkey);
- 
this would mean reductions of some
370 000 Soviets (from 565 000) and c.
80 000 Americans (from 305 000).
Since Ottawa, the Soviets and East Germans
have tried to suggest an overall troop ceiling for
each alliance of 700 000, but without any
noticeable enthusiasm either from the West or
indeed from other Warsaw Pact members.
(v) VeriJication proposals
13. Regarding verification of reductions, the
work is only now beginning in Vienna, with the
West submitting a draft protocol on inspection
and the proposed text of two articles of the
future treaty: verification and information
exchange.
14. The western allied proposals place an
accent on on-site inspections at declared and
undeclared sites. Each country would have to
accept a minimum required quota of three days
ofinspection a year, plus one day for every 100
aircraft and helicopters or 300 tanks, armoured
vehicles and artillery pieces. Furthermore, each
country would have to accept an additional day
of inspection for every 50 000 km2 of territory.
Declared sites would be sites where equipment
covered by a CFE treaty are regularly or periodi-
cally stored; undeclared sites would be places
which serve or could serve to break or cir-
cumvent the obligations specified in the treaty.
Each inspection team (no more than six people)
could spend no longer than two days at a single
site or l0 consecutive days on the territory ofa
country being inspected. The proposals also
foresee strict time limits for different phases:
notification, arrival, announcement of choice of
site, duration of presence. The measures are
modelled on inspections already permitted
under the framework of the CDE and the INF
treaty. They do not handle the problem of arma-
ments factories.
15. Much of the preparatory work for the
western proposals on verification has reportedly
taken place in the WEU working groups,
drawing on over 30 years'experience of running
a successful verification r6gime under the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty. In his information letter
last November, the Secretary-General made the
following comments:
'The Special Working Group and the
Defence Representatives Group are to
present joint proposals, for the next min-
isterial meeting, on the practical arrange-
ments for co'operation between the WEU
member countries in order to ensure their
optimum participation in the process of
verifying the implementation of a CFE
treaty. These proposals might, for
example, include the co-ordination of ver-
ification activities such as those of
inspection teams or even cGoperation in
the training of inspectors.'
Your Rapporteur hopes that this work will
intensify over the next few months and lead to
growing recognition and appreciation for
WEU's r6le by all concerned...
16. In addition to the above, drafting has also
begun on the treaty text itselfand especially on
the necessary articles concerning rules of pro
cedure, such as arrangements for review confer-
tt7
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ences. Fortunately both sides seem to be on the
same wave-length when both structure and
outline ofthe treaty and its related annexes and
protocols are discussed.
(vi) Zones and storage
17. Good progress has also been made
towards a common understanding on the very
diflicult issue of the zonal structure to be
applied in the treaty and the related question of
how to deal with equipment held outside active
units in monitored storage. Agreement has been
reached on a definition for monitored storage
and, although some details still have to be clar-
ified, on the associated rules governing the use
of such storage.
18. There is also a broad understanding that,
following the general lines of the initial western
proposal, there will be an inner Central
European area consisting of the Benelux coun-
tries, Denmark and the FRG 
- 
on the West 
-
and the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and
Hungary 
- 
on the East, within which there will
be sub-ceilings applying only to equipment in
active units. There will also be a wider Central
European zone including the above countries,
together with 
- 
on the West 
- 
the United
Kingdom, France and Italy, and on the East, the
Baltic, Byelorussian and Carpathian Military
Districts in the Soviet Union. Within that wider
area there would be an overall ceiling on
equipment in active units and in monitored
storage, and a sub-ceiling on equipment in
active units. Although this part of the zonal
structure is subject to broad agreement, the
thorny problem remains of the areas outside
Central Europe, and in particular, with the spe-
cific concerns of the flank countries which are
worried that stored equipment will be foisted
onto them.
(vii) Combat aircraft
19. As mentioned earlier, the two sides are
still far apart on combat aircraft. On the eve of
the Ottawa meeting, the West agreed to adopt
the eastern ceiling of 4 700 for combat aircraft,
but offered 
- 
first 
- 
to add to this an additional
entitlement of 500 air-defence interceptors and
- 
second 
- 
to exclude so-called primary trainers.In Moscow, during the US-Soviet bilateral
meetings before Ottawa, the Russians responded
by proposing that there should be a basic enti-
tlement of 4 700 combat aircraft, to which
should be added an entitlement for I 500 to
I 600 combat-capable trainers and a further
entitlement of I 500 air-defence interceptors.
The Russians confirmed specifically that they
were willing to include intermediate bombers,
such as the Tu-16, Tu-22 and Tv22M(Backfire). But they emphasised that they were
nol willing to include land-based naval aircraft
of these types or, indeed, any other land-based
naval aircraft. No mention has been made of
long-range heavy bombers, which the Russians
say are covered by the START talks between
themselves and the Americans.
20. The large numerical difference between
the two sides, with the Russians talking of a total
of 7 700 or 7 800 aircraft and the West of 4 700
plus 500 air-defence aircraft, constitutes a signif-
icant problem. The absurdity of a situation
where, if Russian proposals are accepted, the
West in theory would have to build and acquire
more aircraft to reach the ceilings involved must
be brought home to the Soviets.
Il/. The problem of veriftcation
21. In spite of the progress made in the
Stockholm agreement on confidence- and security-
building measures and in the INF agreement,
and the many positive references to verification
by Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Shevardnadze, old
attitudes towards verification in the Soviet
Union, particularly among the military, die
hard. There remains a very great reluctance to
accept the degree of openness with respect to
military matters which is already common
practice in the West, let alone the much more
intrusive procedures necessary in the arms
control context.
22. Inspections under the Stockholm
agreement are limited in number and are rela-
tively constrained. Verification of the INF
agxeement is tightly focused, with the enorrnous
advantage of a zero agreement, and both sides
rely heavily on national technical means. CFE
will entail, if western requirements are to be
met, a verification rdgime of a quite different
order, both in terms of the number of inspec-
tions and the range of facilities to be covered
without right of refusal;and in terms of its intru-
slveness.
23. However, the Soviet response is not
merely the legacy from old-style, pre-glasnost
paranoia and secrecy. There are also real con-
cerns which relate to the scale of the military
reorganisation now under way, and the size of
the reductions implicit in the CFE agreement.
The Soviet bureaucracy, in particular the mil-
itary, are 
- 
with some justification 
- 
very con-
scious of the sheer burden which their already
over-stretched administrative machine will have
to bear. It must not be forgotten that the
problems of rehousing and resettlement for
those demobilised in the USSR are enorrnous
and far greater than for any of the NATO allies.
The logistics and costs ofthis exercise alone are
causing great concern. As has already become
evident both in Vienna and, more recently
during the Open Skies negotiation in Ottawa,
the Russians will look very closely indeed at the
large verification bill now being presented by the
I l8
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West, and will probably seek to strike as many
items off it as they can.
24. Where our own WEU member countries
are concerned, we also want to avoid unnecessary
duplication of effort and excessive costs in
implementing a verification regime. A number
of nations have already announced the for-
mation of inspection teams, the start of
language-training courses, etc., etc., with a view
to being prepared to make a prompt beginning
once the CFE treaty is signed and ratified by
national parliaments. Belgium, the Federal
Republic, France, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom have all begun the necessary
processes (as has Hungary on the eastern side),
but there is a growing realisation that the costs
involved could prove prohibitive.
25. Hence the need for co-operation between
nations, beginning with the obvious advantages
of such co-operation in Western European
Union, where proposals for trial inspections on
a bi- or trilateral basis are being implemented at
long last, after much prompting from the
Assembly. The work being accomplished in
WEU's Special Working and Defence Represen-
tatives Groups will prove invaluable, but must
be extended in scope and urgency if it is to be
timely and effective 2.
26. In the Defence Committee's report on
" Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact
military potential) - reply to the annual report
of the Council " 3 the following recommendation
was made:
" The Assembly,
(xiil Considering that the WEU member
countries' security interests can be
defended only in the framework of the
North Atlantic Alliance but that in future
they must be harmonised more consist-
ently;
(xiv/ Pleased that the Council in its reply
to Recommendation 470 is considering a
WEU contribution to the CFE verifi-
cation system, emphasising * the exploi-
tation of European capabilities and the
pooling of member states' assets ",
RscouurNps rHAT rnE CouNctt
2. See Document l2l0 (Information letter from the
Secretary-General of WEU on the activities of the minis-
terial organs) for details.
3. Document 1204,6th November 1989, Rapporteur: Mr.
Steiner.
2. Take up the proposal made by the
French Prime Minister on 7th September
1989 and prepare a WEU programme for
purposeful verification and disarmament
co-operation;
......,
This, coupled with the proposal made by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal
Republic of Germany, Mr. Genscher, speaking
at the WEU Assembly's extraordinary session in
Luxembourg on Friday 23rd March 1990, sug-
gesting the creation of a European verification
agency, could and should provide the basis for a
positive contribution towards the safeguarding
of European security.
27. The WEU Council must be urged to take
the necessary measures to seize the initiative on
verification which otherwise is doomed to suffer
from the disparate actions of individual states.
The impetus for co-operation should come from
us, the European nucleus, and we should invite
our neighbours in both West and East, to join us
in establishing the new verification rdgime.
28. Already work is being done in the WEU
Ad Hoc Sub-Group on Space to study the possi-
bility of creating a WEU observation satellite
agency as suggested by the Assembly 4, and these
various proposals could well be brought together
to allow both West and East Europeans to com-
plement the superpowers' " national technical
means " and preponderance of advantage.
Setting up multinational teams for verification
could have an effect far beyond the immediately
obvious and could prove an essential
confidence-building measure which would serve
as a model in other domains as well. (For
example, if the Open Skies proposals are to be
effective, there will have to be a measure of close
co-operation 
- 
technical and logistic 
- 
between
the various nations involved.) Co-operation and
complementarity are the two watch-words for
success in the realm of verification, as was
stressed repeatedly throughout the Assembly's
symposium on " Observation satellites a
European means of verifying disarmament ", in
Rome on27th and 28th March 1990.
Y. Yienru timings
29. The outstanding decisions and agrce-
ments in Vienna must be concluded by the end
of June 1990 if enough time is to be available for
suitable texts to be drawn up ready for the pro-
posed signing of the treaty at a CSCE summitin November this year. Those most closely
4. " Verification: a future European satellite agency ", Doc-
ument I I59, 3rd November 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Fourr€;
" Scientific and technical aspects ofarms control verification
by satellite 
- 
reply to the thirty-third annual report of the
Council ", Document 1160, 7th November 1988,
Rapporteur: Mr. Malfatti.
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involved are reasonably optimistic about suc-
ceeding but only if further redefining of atti-
tudes is possible, especially where combat air-
craft are concerned.
30. Failing such agreement on aircraft, it may
prove possible to conclude a treaty without
them, although this would be something of a
parador after all, aircraft were accepted by the
West in the original mandate only after consid-
erable Soviet insistence! At present, the possi-
bility of a truncated agreement is not discussed
oflicially for fear of prejudicing the immediate
negotiations.
YI. Tlu way ohoad
(i) What should the future bring by way of arms
control negotiation?
31. Opinions are currently divided. On the
one hand, there are those who would wish the
CSCE process to take over the whole discussion
on European disarmament. The advantage
would be that a pan-European forum would be
opened further to reconcile and alleviate
East-West differences. There would be less of
the 'bloc to bloc' nature about discussions
compared with the CFE setting which would
suit especially French traditional attitudes and,
now, many of the Warsaw Pact countries who
are seeking to distance themselves from Moscow
and who see discussions at the * 23" (or n 22"
without the GDR) level as a continuation of the
old order. Others believe, however, that our own
interests are too important to be entrusted to the
vagaries of some of the neutral and non-aligned
countries...
32. The current fashion nevertheless is to seek
to institutionalise the CSCE process 
- 
creating a
permanent structure, offices, offrcials and
perhaps a parliamentary assembly. Your
Rapporteur has considerable doubts about the
desirability of such proposals, believing that an
ad hoc arrangement would be a preferable alter-
should obviously continue on a formal basis,
providing a useful forum for cross-fertilisation
of ideas, as well as an essential confidence-
building measure.
(ii) What should be on the agenda?
34. A consensus is emerging for further dis-
cussion of the present five categories of weapon
systems to aim at deeper cuts than those forth-
coming in CFE l. In a sense, therefore, it would
not be a question of a * CFE 2', but rather a
* CFE I (bis) ", for the immediate future. The
particular advantage of such an arrangement
would be to allow much more emphasis on indi-
vidual national capabilities in an attempt to
remove potentially destabilising factors from ttre
European theatre. A number of participants are
already indicating that these * national ceilings'
should be emphasised in the future. In any
event, the next * CFE tall6' may well have to
be structured differently.
35. Such an arrangement, however, would not
be possible without further and parallel discus-
sions in other forums, such as the UN Con-
ference on Disarmament, to ensure that Europe
is not left insecure vis i vis the growing armed
capabilities of non-European states and regional
grouplngs...
36. The Defence Committee is closely fol-
lowing such developments and negotiations and
will be reporting further in due @urse.
37. The above proposals are strengthened by
the fact that the imminent CFE treaty is likely to
take at least three years to implement (some
authorities say five and the Soviets say even
longer), during which time many developments
are to be expected, including the possible disso-
lution of at least one of the alliances involved.
As the treaty is based on the principle of parity
between two groups of states, gf,oups created for
the purposes of the treaty, and not on two alli-
ances, the continuing existence, or conversely
the disappearance, of one of the alliances need
not affect implementation of the treaty, pro
vided the former members of that alliance
remain content to work together as a group for
the purposes of implementing the treaty.
38. The key to the continued successful
implementation of the treaty will remain
political will. If the 22 remaining parties are
content to implement the treaty making such
practical adjustments as are necessary, then
there is no good reason why the treaty should
not continue in force. However, even given
excellent results from the CFE talks the resulting
treaty will not meet everyone's expectations and
will not solve all the problems. An agenda for
* Vienna 2' must be arranged as soon as pos.
sible and the West should respond positively to
Soviet proposals to begin the necessary prelim-
inary discussion of such an agenda.
native, with only the lightest supporting
framework. But perhaps a 'half-way house t
might prove a possible compromise.
33. If real progress is to be made in further
European disarmament, in an effort to ensure
the mutual security which is our aim, the five
principal actom amongst the neutral and non-
aligned nations (Austria, Finland, Sweden,
Switzerland and Yugoslavia) should conceivably
be invited to join the " 22 " in continuing the
CFE discussions in a broader and deeper
manner. Of the five, Switzerland is unlikely to
wqnt to participate, which would imply a forum
of 26 nations, all committed and directly con-
cerned to ensure mutual security and sta'bility:
an " expanded CEE' or CSCE * action group'.
The present link with the other NNA countiies
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39. In practice, there are a number of new
problems to resolve. For example, the ceilings
involved may have to be altered to take account
of the fact that the equipment of the former
GDR armed forces had passed into the pos-
session of the new, larger Germany. Alterna-
tively, instead of adjusting the ceilings, it might
be accepted that those on one side would be
shared among six, rather than seven. The prin-
cipal safeguard for the West is enshrined in the
sufficiency rule which will limit the proportion
of total holdings any one state may possess.
There will of course also have to be adjustments
to, in particular, the verification procedures,
especially during any transitional period in
which, say, some limited Soviet forces remained
on the territory of the erstwhile GDR. The veri-
fication r6gime envisaged in the treaty should be
sufliciently flexible to cope with this sort of
requirement, provided the governments con-
cerned have the necessary will.
40. Looking even further into the future, all
arms control subjects should be opened to dis-
cussion, either in the suggested new CFE
framework, or in the wider CSBM context which
should continue in parallel as the forum where
the majority of the neutral and non-aligned
nations are able to exert their influence.
YIL Actbn fu WEU
(i) Spreading the word
41. In addition to the initiatives suggested
regarding verification, the WEU Council should
now embark on a comprehensive programme to
explain arms control imperatives to the general
public. For its part, the Assembly should be pre-
pared to urge speedy ratification of the CFE
treaty in national parliaments.
42. The whole process could be helped further
on its way by increasing the opportunities for
East-West contact to discuss and explain atti-
tudes on security matters. Contacts should be
multiplied at all levels 
- 
between governments,
parliamentarians, offrcials and the public - to
ensure all possibilities for cross-fertilisation and
mutual education are taken. We should not be
afraid of tackling other arms control * hot
potatoes " such as short-range nuclear questions,
especially now that the Russians seem to have
grasped the message of WEU's Hague platform
and are themselves talking about the need for
maintaining minimum nuclear deterrence for
the foreseeable future. The Assembly is looking
fonvard to a fruitful co-operation with the
newly-created Paris.based WEU Institute for
Security Studies, with a view to furthering such
moves.
(ii) A parochial note and a word of thanl<s
43. In the report on ' Current aspects of arms
control: the Western European position 
- 
reply
to the annual report of the Council', which he
prepared for the Defence Committee, Mr. de
Beer included the recommendation that the
Council:
- 9. Urge the Chairman-in-Offrce to
establish at the highest level in his coun'
try's delegation in Vienna, a WEU liaison
oflicer for the CFE talks. "
The recommendation was adopted unanimously
both in the committee and by the Assembly on
6th June 1989. In its reply (dated 8th September
1989) to Recommendation 470, the Council
said:
'The presidency of WEU will keep the
Assembly and the Council informed of
developments in the Vienna arms control
negotiations. Furthermore, the presidency
will endeavour to ensure that the concerns
expressed by both the Council and the
Assembly are taken into account in the
negotiations.'
44. On l6th October 1989, Mr. Roland Beix,
in the French National Assembly, asked whether
the government:
'is considering endorsing the WEU
Assembly's proposal to urge the
Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council to
appoint at the highest level in his coun-
try's delegation in Vienna a WEU liaison
offrcer for the talks on conventional forces
in Europe? "
The reply reads:
'On the proposal that the Chairman of
the WEU Council appoint a WEU oflicial
to follow the Vienna talks on conven-
tional forces in Europe, this has never
been discussed by the organisation's
Council. The French Government has
therefore not had to decide whether or not
to endorse this proposal of which it did
not have cognisance.
Basically, the French Government is obvi-
ously in favour of the idea of consulta-
tions specific to European countries
members of WEU in the context of the
Vienna negotiations and will support any
appropriate initiative in this sense.'
45. Your Rapporteur applauds the latter
comment, while regretting the fact that the
Council seems to be experiencing a communi-
cation problem. To rub salt into this particular
wound, the present Chairman-in-Offrce of the
Council is alleged recently to have asserted that
the presidency was totally unaware of the
arrangement promised in the Council's reply to
t2t
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the recommendation... A further failure of com-
munication?
46. Rather than finish on such a disap-
pointing note, your Rapporteur would wish
instead to emphasise the positive aspect of the
Assembly's links with the Vienna negotiations.
Although there is perhaps no defined WEU
presence (unlike the European Community,
which has a permanent office in the Austrian
capital and is now asking for a place at the
CSCE table!), nor a formal 'WEU Caucus "
among the nations represented, an informalpattern of WEU discussion is gradually
emerying as a result of the Defence Committee's
assiduity in organising regular meetings in
Vienna and in ensuring that its rapporteurs are
frequent visitors to the various delegations (both
from East and West) to the negotiations.
47. The Defence Committee hopes in this
way to * show the WEU flag ", as well as keeping
abreast of developments in Vienna. The
co-operation of WEU Foreign Offices and the
Vienna Heads of Delegation in helping making
the arrangements for such visits and meetings is
Eireatly appreciated by us all.
(iii) The European veriJication centre
48. In recent years, the WEU Council has
been wont to take many of the recommenda-
tions emanating from the Assembly with the
proverbial 'pinch of salt ". Apart from one or
two notable exceptions to confirm the rule: the
creation of the institute, for example, or the
current study on the use of satellites for verifi-
cation, there have been few occasions when
practical measures have ensued as a result of the
various deliberations of the Assembly. Some-
times it has been a question of the ideas being
ahead of their time (for example, the suggested
regular meetings of chiefs of WEU countries'
defence staffs or the creation of multinational
forces or units 5, but in many cases the Council's
formal reply to a specific recommendation has
fobbed off the Assembly with the succinct
comment such as " not appropriate to WEU ",
etc., etc. One such recent phrase 6 runs:
" Given that WEU is not involved in the
day-today decisions about defence and
the conduct of the current negotiations
aimed at arms reductions... " (emphasis
added).
Assumptions and assertions such as this are
not commensurate with the r6le for WEU
envisaged by the nationally-elected representa-
5. *Naval aviation", Document 1139, 9th May 1988,
Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson; " State of European security 
-intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre ind
the north -, Document I183, 26th April 1989, Rapporteur:
Mr. Speed.
6. Document 1210.
tives who make up the Assembly. The latter is
increasingly aware that the time has never been
more ripe for Western Europeans to take the
lead in bringing halves of our continent back
together: WEU's unique contribution is and
should be in the realm of defence and security,
especially concerning arms control and verifi-
cation.
49. In its reply to Recommendation 470, the
Council made a very positive remark:
* With regard to the CFE verification
system, a possible WEU contribution is
under consideration, the emphasis being
on the exploitation of European capabil-
ities and the pooling of member states'
assets.
In this connection, attention is drawn to
the deliberations of the Council's ad hoc
working group which is studying the pos-
sible uses of space-based means for the
verification of conventional arms control
agreements.'
This is very good news and the Assembly hopes
that the study will particularly be looking, for
example, at the way in which future inspectors
are trained, at definitions of methods of work
and at the way in which the various verification
means are organised. It must be ensured that all
member countries have guarantees of equal
access to the necessary information. These are
the obvious first steps in the process.
50. Further steps in the right direction were
announced in the communiqu6 (he first since
1987) published after the WEU Council meeting
on Monday, 23rd April 1990 and elaborated
during the committee's joint meeting with the
Chairmen-in-Oflice on Tuesday, 24th April,
viz.:
(a/ establishing, by autumn 1990, a pro-
gramme of mutual trial inspections;
(b) opening national inspection teams to
include inspectors from other coun-
tries;
(c) the possibility of joint training of
inspectors;
(d) member countries to state their pre-
ferred geog;raphic areas for inspection(to harmonise efforts in a common
sense way).
51. Such moves, together with the proposal by
NATO to establish a verification co-ordinating
committee at the headquarters in Evdre, are
warmly welcomed by the Defence Committee
although your Rapporteur has two specific
observations:
(a) a slight doubt about France's will-
ingness to take part in a purely NATO
alliance-oriented arrangement. No
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such reservation is applied by France
to WEU (which Paris will preside
from lst July 1990);
(b) the absolute necessity now to move
away from the bloc-to-bloc atmo-
sphere of " NATO " and " Warsaw
Pact " per se to build better relations
for the future.
52. The boldest step now would be for the
countries taking part in the CFE negotiations to
set up a European verification centre as pro-
posed by Mr. Genscher on 23rd March. Thus,
membership of such a centre should not be
limited to the present WEU nations, but be
opened to all other countries (signatories of the
CFE treaty), from both West and East, who
would wish to participate. Its purpose would be
to help to bring about mutual confidence by
comparing and adjusting methods and proce-
dures governing verification operations and
developing exchanges of information between all
participating countries on the matters tackled.
53. Hence the recommendation of the present
report, which we should urge the Council to
accept without further ado. A European veriJi-
cation centre as a clearing house for co-ordination
of all aspects of verification would have an
immensely important r6le both in sharing out the
tasks between members and ensuring the
maximum of co-operation. Whether it is the
training of inspectors to common standards of
procedure, or running the enormous data-base of
information which will be amassed as a result of
a combination of on-site inspection, overflying
(Open Skies) or from satellite observation, such a
centre could play a critical r6le in generating
mutual confidence between its members and vis-
i-vis the superpowers.
54. It is your Rapporteur's view that the
Council should pounce on this new and exciting
recommendation without further prevarication
and prepare a major Western European Union
initiative aimed at furthering our most cher-
ished goals.
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Maadae for negotiatioa on conventionol armed forca I ia Eurup
The represeqtalives of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the
German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, iceland, italy,
Luxemboury. the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Tuikey, the Union 6i
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and thoUnited States of America hild consultations
in Vienna from lTth February 1987 to lfth January 1989.
These states,
Conscious of the common responsibility which they all have for seeking to achieve greater sta-
bility and security in Europe;
. 
Acknowledging. thltt it is their armed forces which bear most immediately on the essential
lgu1rty relatiorylip in__Europe, ir-r particular as they are signatories of the treaties bf Brussels (1948),Washington (1949) or Warsaw (1955), and accordingly are members of the North Atlantic Alliince 6i
parties to the Warsaw Treaty;
Recalling that they are all participants in the CSCE process;
Recalling that, as reaflirmed in the Helsinki Final Act, they have the right to belong or not to
belong to international organisations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties
including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance;
Determined tha!.a negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe should take place in the
framework of the CSCE process;
Reaflirmilg also that they participate in negotiations as sovereign and independent states and
on the basis of full equality;
Have agreed on the following provisions:
Participants
The participants in this negotiation shall be the 23 above-listed states hereinafter referred to as
'the participants'.
Objectives and methods
- 
Th9 objectives ofthe negotiation shall be to strengthen stability and security in Europe through
the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional arm-ed forces, wtiich include conven-
tional armaments and-equipment, at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability
anq qecu.nll; and the eliminatio_n, as a matter of priority, of the capability for launcliing surprise attaci<
and for initiating large-scale offensive action. Each and every participait undertakes io cdntribute to
the attainment of these objectives.
These objectives shall be achieved by the application of militarily significant measures such as
reductions, limitations, redeployment provisions, equal ceilings, and relaied measures, among others.
In order to achieve-the above objectives, measures should be pursued for the whole area of appli-
calio.n with provi^sions,. if and where appropriate, for regional differentiation to redress dispariiies
within the area of application and in a way which prechides circumvention.
- 
. _ 
f!g_ process of strengthening stability and security should proceed stepby-step, in a manner
which will ensure that the security of each participant ii not affected advers6ly at any stage.
Scope and area of application
. 
The subject of the negotiation shall be the conventional armed forces, which include conven-
tional armaments and equipnlent, of the participants based on land within th! territory of the partici-pants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.
The existence of multiple capabilities will not be a criterion for modifying the scope of the nego-
tiation:
- 
No conventional armaments or eguipment will be excluded from the subject of the negoti-
ation because they may have other capabilities in addition to conventional ones. Sirch armamenls or
equipment will not be singled out in a separate category;
l. Conventional armed forces include conventional armaments and equipment.
t24
APPENDIX I DOCUMENT 1223
- 
Nuclear weapons will not be a subject of this negotiation.
Particular emphasis will initially be placed on those forces directly related to the achievement of
the objectives of the negotiation set out above.
Naval forces and chemical weapons will not be addressed.
The area of application shall be the entire land territory of the participants in Europe from the
Atlantic to the Urals, which includes all the European island territories of the participants. In the case
of the Soviet Union the area of application includes all the territory lying west of the Ural River and
the Caspian Sea. In the case of Turkey the area of application includes the territory of Turkey north
and west of the following line: the point of intersection of the border with the 39th parallel, Muradiye,
Patnos, Karayazi, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, Dogankent, Giizne and thence to the sea.
Exchange of information and veriJication
Compliance with the provisions of any agreement shall be verified through an effective and strict
verification rdgime which, among other things, will include on-site inspections as a matter of right and
exchanges of information.
Information shall be exchanged in sufficient detail so as to allow a meaningful comparison of the
capabilities of the forces involved. Information shall also be exchanged in suflicient detail so as to
provide a basis for the verification of compliance.
The specific modalities for verification and the exchange of information, including the degree of
detail of the information and the order of its exchange, shall be agreed at the negotiation proper.
Procedures and other arrangements
The procedures for the negotiation, including the agenda, work programme and timetable,
working methods, flrnancial issues and other organisational modalities, as agreed by the participants
themselves, are set out in Annex I 2 of this mandate. They can be changed only by consensus of the par-
'ticipants.
The participants decided to take part in meetings of the states signatories of the Helsinki Final
Act to be held at least twice during each round of the negotiation on conventional armed forces in
Europe in order to exchange views and substantive information concerning the course of the negoli-
ation on conventional armed forces in Europe. Detailed modalities for these meetings are contained in
Annex II2 to this mandate.
The participants will take into consideration the views expressed in such meetings by other
CSCE participating states concerning their own security.
Participants will also provide information bilaterally.
The participants undertake to inform the next CSCE follow-up meeting of their work and pos-
sible results and to exchange views, at that meeting, with the other CSCE participating states on
progress achieved in the negotiation.
The participants foresee that, in the light of circumstances at the time, they will provide in their
timetable for a temporary suspension to permit this exchange of viewS. The appropriate time and
duration of this suspension is their sole responsibility.
Any modification of this mandate is the sole responsibility of the participants, whether they
modify it themselves or concur in its modification at a future CSCE follow-up meeting.
The results of the negotiation will be determined only by the participants.
Character of ageements
Agreements reached shall be internationally binding. Modalities for their entry into force will be
decided at the negotiation.
Venue
The negotiation shall commence in Vienna no later than in the seventh week following the
closure of the Vienna CSCE meeting.
2. Available from the Offrce of the Clerk.
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Extrocts from Anner II to the mandate for negotiation
on conventional armed forces in Europe
Statement of the Representative of Denmark
On behalf of the Government of Denmark, I wish to confirm that the Faroe Islands are included
in the area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.
Statement of the Representative of Norway
On behalf of the Government of Nonryay, I confirm that Svalbard including Bear Island, is
included in the area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.
Statement of thc Representative of Portugal
The islands of Azores and Madeira have by right the status of European islands. It has been
agreed in the mandate that all the European island territories of the participants are included in the
area of application. I can therefore state on behalf of my Government that the Azores and Madeira are
within the area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.
Statement of the Reprcsentative of Spaia
On behalf of the Government of Spain, I confirm that the Canary Islands are included in the
area of application for the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe.
Statement of the Representative of the Unioa ol Sovict Sociolist Rcpublics
On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I confirm that Franz
Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya are included in the area of application for the negotiation on conven-
tional armed forces in Europe.
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APPENDIX II
A. Cuwent negotiations 
- 
a primer
CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-opemtion in Europe)
History
The negotiations began on 3rd July 1973 in Helsinki and concluded with the Helsinki Final Act
on lst August 1975.
The first review conference took place in Belgrade from 4th October 1977 to 9th March 1978
and failed to reach any conclusions.
The second review conference was held in Madrid from l lth November 1980 to 9th September
1983. In the Madrid Concluding Document the "Stockholm Conference" (CDE) was set up.
The third review conference took place in Vienna from 4th November 1986 to l5th January
1989. In the Vienna Concluding Document two sets of talks were set up:
(a) the CSBM negotiations, and
(b) the cFE talks.
Participants: 35
Austria (NNA)
Belgium (NATO)
Bulgaria (WTO)
Canada (NATO)
Cyprus (I.[NA)
Czechoslovakia (WTO)
Denmark (NATO)
Finland (NNA)
France (NATO)
FRG (NATO)
GDR (wTO)
Greece (NATO)
Holy See (IIINA)
Hungary Q\rfo)
Iceland (NATO)
Ireland (NNA)
Italy (NATO)
Liechtenstein (NNA)
Luxembourg (NATO)
Malta (I.[NA)
Monaco (I.[NA)
Netherlands (NATO)
Norway (NATO)
Poland (wTO)
Portugal (NATO)
Romania (WTO)
San Marino (NNA)
Spain (NATO)
Sweden (I.INA)
Switzerland (I.INA)
Turkey (NATO)
United Kingdom (NATO)
United States (NATO)
ussR (wTo)
Yugoslavia (NNA)
(a) CSBM (ConJidence- and security-building measures)
History
The negotiations on CSBMs, within the framework of the CSCE, were originally set up in 1983
following the CSCE review conference in Madrid.
The CDE (Conference on conJidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in
Europe, also known as the " Stockholm Conference '), held in Stockholm from 17th January 1984 to
22nd September 1986, agreed to a * Stockholm Document ", which improved upon the CSBMs already
agreed iu Helsinki in 1975.
The third (Vienna) CSCE review conference, unable to agree upon a CDE follow-up, set up as a
compromise, in its concluding document on l5th January 1989, the two present sets of "Vienna
talks ": the CSBM and CFE negotiations.
The negotiations began on 9th March 1989.
Present location
Vienna.
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Participants
The 35 CSCE participants.
Agenda
According to the mandate: 'Elaborating and adopting a new set of mutually complementary
confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of confrontation in
Europe. "
(b) CFE (Conventional armed forces in Europe)
History
The mandate for the CFE talks, attached to the Vienna concluding doanment, was approved on
l5th January 1989. The talks began on 6th March 1989.
Location
Vienna.
Participants
The 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.
Agenda
See text of mandate at Appendix I.
(It is hoped that a CFE agreement will be completed by the end of 1990.)
CD (Coaferouc oa Disamwruat)
History
The CD was set up as the negotiating body of the United Nations for disarmament treaties
during the First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. It is independent of the LIN, but considers
recommendations from, and reports regularly to the United Nations General Assembly.
Location
Palais des Nations, Geneva.
Participants
40 countries: the 5 nuclear weapon states plus 35 other states.
Algeria 2l
Argentina 2l
Australia
Belgium
Brazil2l
Bulgaria
Burma 2l
Canada
Cuba 2l
Egypt 2l
Ethiopia 2l
FRG
GDR
Hungary
India 2l
Indonesia 2l
Ir:an 2l
Italy
Kenya 2l
Mexico 2l
Mongolia
Morocco 2l
. Netherlands
Nigeria 2l
Pakistan 2l
Peru 2l
Poland
Romania
Sri Lanka 2l
Sweden 2l
Venezuela 2l
Yugoslavia 2l
Zaire 2l
China*
Francet
United Kingdomi
United States+
USSR*Czechoslovakia Japan
2l a member of the neutral and non-aligned states within the CD (' the Group of 2l " \
* nuclear weapon state
Agenda
The permanent agenda of the conference deals with * the cessation of the arms race and disarm-
ament and other relevant measures in the following areas:
l. nuclear weapons in all aspects;
2. chemical weapons;
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3. other weapons of mass destruction;
4. conventional weapons;
5. reduction of military budgets;
6. reduction of armed forces;
7. disarmament and development;
8. disarmament and international security;
9. collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation
to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
10. comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament
under effective international control ",
most of these subjects being discussed in ad hoc committees.
The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, established in 1980, with all40 countries partic-
ipating, is working on a treaty to ban the possession, production and use of chemical weapons.
START (Stmtegic arms (imitatioa aad) rcduaion talks)
History
The United States and Soviet Union agreed on 7th and 8th January 1985 to conduct new negoti-
ations on strategic offensive weapons (following on from SALT I, SALT II, and START (the fifth
round of which ended on 8th December 1983).
The first session of the " new' START (also referred to as " treaty on strategic offensive
weapons'and "the group on strategic nuclear weapons") began on27th March 1985.
Location
Geneva (mainly).
Participants
United States and Soviet Union.
Agenda
" To work out effective agireements aimed at preventing an anns race in outer space and termi-
nating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. '; and
ultimately, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
ONa S*ies
History
On l2th May 1989 (after a suggestion by the Canadian Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney -
although the idea was originally proposed by United States President Eisenhower in 1955), President
Bush proposed " Open Skies ". The aim was to allow flights by unarmed surveillance aircraft over the
territory of the superpowers and their allies, in order to strengthen mutual confidence and transparency
in connection with military activities. On 23rd September 1989, following a meeting between Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Baker, the Soviet Union and the United States issued ajoint statement calling for an international conference on * Open Skies ".
Location
The first part of the conference took place in Ottawa from l2th to 27th February I 990 and the
second part is scheduled to be held in Budapest at the end of April or the beginning of May 1990.
Participants
All 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.
Agenda
The drafting of a convention permitting overflight of any part of a participant's territory by air-
craft containing members of another participant (operated on a quota system) - a convention initially
open to NATO and Warsaw Pact members, but eventually to be extended to other (European) coun-
tries.
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To encouragrc reciprocal openness on the part ofthe participants, thus enhancing confidence and
security, and facilitating the implementation and verification of existing disarmament and arms
control treaties.
* 23' talks
AA
AAM
AB
ABM
ACM
AD
AEW
AFAP
AFV
ALCM
APC
ASAT
ASM
ASW
ATBM
ATGW
ATK
ATM
AWACS
BM
BMD
BW
BWC
CBM
CBW
CD
CDE
CFE
CPD
CSBM
CSCE
CTB
CW
DEW
EDI
ENDC
EW
EWng
FAC
FAC(G)
FAC(P)
FAC(r)
FBS
FGA
FOTL
GLCM
Group of 23
Group of Six
GW
B. Glossary
Conventional Forces in Europe talks (CFE)
anti-aircraft
air-to-air missile(s)
airborne
anti-ballistic missl(s)
advanced cruise missile
air defence
airborne early warning
artillery-fired atomic projectile
armoured fighting vehicle(s)
air-launched cruise missil{s)
armoured personnel carrie(s)
anti-satellite (sometimes anti-satellite talks or weapons)
air-to-surface missil{s)
anti-submarine warfare
anti-tactical ballistic missile
anti-tank guided weapon(s)
anti-tank
anti-tactical missile
airborne warning and control system
ballistic missile
ballistic missile defence
biological weapon
Biological Weapon Convention
confi dence-building measun{s)
chemical and biological weapons
Conference on Disarmament
Conference on Disarmament in Europe
Conventional Forces in Europe talks
Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
confidence- and security-building measure(s)
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
Comprehensive Test Ban
chemical warfare
distant early warning radar system across Canada
European Defence Initiative, for tactical defence of Europe
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, a precursor of the CD
electronic warfare
early warning
fast attack craft (gun)
fast attack craft (missile)
fast attack craft (patrol)
fast attack craft (torpedo)
forward-based systems (US nuclear-capable delivery systems based out of the US
'fonrard' toward the Soviet Union)
.fighte(s), ground-attack
follow-on to Lance (SNF missile)
ground-launched cruise missile(s)
the 16 NATO and 7 WTO nations which put together the CFE mandate
Mexico, Sweden, India, Argentina, Tanzania and Greece, seet to halt arms race (also
known as Five-Continent Peace Initiative and Six-Nation Peace Initiative
guided weapon(s)
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HLTF
ICBM
IEPG
INF
IRBM
KT
LCA
LCAC
LCM
LCT
LCU
LCVP
LHA
LRTNF
LSD
LSM
LST
LTB
MAD
MARV
MBFR
MBT
MCMV
MENFZ
MICV
MIRV
MLRS
MR
MRBM
MRL
MRV
MT
NATO
NNA
NNFZ
NNPA
NNWS
NPT
NST
NTM
NWF
NWS
PNE
PTB
PUNE
RCL
RDF
RL
RV
RW
SALT
SAM
SANFZ
SAR
SCG
SDI
SES
SLBM
SLCM
SNDV
NATO's High Level Task Force
intercontinental ballistic missile(s)
Independent European Programme Group
intermediate-range nuclear forces
intermediate-range ballistic missile(s)
kiloton (l 000 tons TNT equivalent)
landing craft, assault
landing craft, air cushion
landing craft, medium/mechanised
landing craft, tank
landing craft, utility
landing craft, vehicles and personnel
amphibious general assault ship(s)
long-range theatre nuclear forces
landing ship, dock
landing ship, medium
landing ship, tank
Limited Test Ban Treaty
mutual assured destruction
manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks
main battle tank
mine counter-measure vessel(s)
Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone
mechanised infantry combat vehicle(s)
multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle(s)
multiple-launch rocket system
maritime reconnaissance
medium-range ballistic missile(s)
multiple rocket launche(s)
multiple re-entry vehicle(s)
megaton (l million tons TNT equivalent)
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
neutral and non-aligned
Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone
US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
non-nuclear weapon state
Non-Proliferation Treaty
nuclear and space talks, Geneva
national and technical means, usually referring to verification
nuclear weapon-free
nuclear weapon state
peaceful nuclear explosion, also Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty
Partial Test Ban Treaty
Conference on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
recoilless launche(s)
Rapid Deployment Force (US)
rocket launche(s)
re-entry vehicle(s)
radiological weapon
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty or talks
surface-to-air missile
South Asia nuclear weapon-free zone
search and rescue
NATO Standing Consultative Group, followed the INF negotiations
Strategic Defence Initiative
surface+ffect ship(s)
submarinelaunched ballistic missile(s)
sea-launched cruise missile(s)
strategic nuclear delivery vehicle
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SNF
SPNFZ
SRAM
SRBM
SRINF
SS
SSBN
SSD I
SSD II
SSD III
SSM
SSN
START
STOL
SVC
TASM
TTB
UNDC
v(/s)ToL
WDC
WEU
wTo
short-range nuclear forces
South Pacific nuclear weapon-free zone
short-range attack missile(s)
short-range ballistic missile(s)
shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces
surface to surface, designation for missiles
ballistic-missile nuclear submarine(s)
First Specid Session on Disarmament
Second Special Session on Disarmament
Third Special Session on Disarmament
surface-to-surface missile(s)
submarine(s), nuclear
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
short take-off and landing
Standing Verification Commission for INF Treaty
tactical air-to-surface missile
Threshold Test Ban Treaty
UN Disarmament Commission
vertical(/short) take-off and landing
World Disarmament Conference
Western European Union
Warsaw Treaty Organisation
Zero option US INF proposal to stop deployment if Soviets withdraw all medium-range missiles
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Communiqud issue.d after the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministen
Brusscls, 23rd April 1990
l. The Foreign and Defence Ministers of Western European Union, meeting in Brussels on
23rd April 1990, were particularly pleased that the ratification of the Protocol of Accession of Portugal
and Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty had been completed.
2. Ministers welcomed the sweeping changes which had taken place in Europe since their meeting
in November 1989. The division of Europe is now being overcome. The emergence of new democracies
following free elections is opening up new prospects for broader co-operation among Europeans.
They welcomed the return to democratic standards which the elections in the GDR and Hungary
represent, and looked forward to those to be held shortly in other countries of Central and Eastern
Europe.
The prospect of the forthcoming attainment of German unity, founded on the unequivocal
expression of the wishes of the population concerned, is an opportunity for Europe as a whole and an
important step forward towards constructing a just and lasting peaceful order.
The united Germany will thus take its place alongside its fellow members of the North Atlantic
Alliance and alongside its partners who have chosen to build a European union.
3. Ministers welcomed the new impetus being given to the CSCE process and the prospect of a
conference of heads of state and/or of government taking place by the end of 1990.
The CSCE is the framework within which all Europeans, together with the United States and
Canada, can establish new relations and develop co-operative structures capable of assuring each one
of them that peace and stability will be maintained and their legitimate interests safeguarded.
4. It was with this new prospect in view that Ministers recalled the importance they attach to
building a European union consistent with the Single European Act which they have signed as
members of the European Community. They also reaffrrmed the importance of the Atlantic Alliance
and Western European Union as essential instruments for the security of the member countries and as
factors for stability throughout Europe.
The continued presence of the forces of the United States and of Canada stationed in Europe
provides a necessary contribution to our common security and overall stability, together with the
contribution of WEU countries and their other European partners. Ministers reaflirmed the impor-
tance of The Hague platform and the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament of the
Atlantic Alliance.
5. Ministers stressed the importance they attach to the concluding of a CFE agf,eement and to the
holding of the CSCE summit before the end of the year. They regard such an agreement as an
important achievement in the process of improving security and adapting military postures to the far-
reaching changes 
- 
both military and political 
- 
which Europe is witnessing.They considered that the
momentum of the negotiation process should be maintained so as to enhance stability, promote
co-operative structures and expedite the attainment of a new peace order in Europe. Agreement on new
confidence- and security-building measures in parallel with a CFE agreement would contribute greatly
to that end.
6. European stability continues to be based on the collective and individual commitment of all
partners in the alliance. It is also an essential matter for the Europeans themselves. For the Europeans
to enhance their contribution to stability on the European continent and to the protection of their legi-
timate security interests, a greater degree of co-operation will be fundamental.
Ministers therefore recognised the need to continue working to strengthen the European identity
?gd tg promote the process of European integration including the securifu dimension. This growin!identity is destined to be given concrete expression in the form of close, ind even new co-ofleratioi
between the member countries.
In the field of verification of the CFE treaty and * open skies ', Ministers welcomed the specific
measures which had been adopted by WEU member countries particularly as regards the opening of
national inspection teams to include inspectors from other WEU member countries.
On the subject of the computerised processing of verification data, Ministers welcomed the fact
that a WEU group of experts had jointly defined realistic parameters for a system of interconnected
data bases, and that this common WEU viewpoint had been taken into account by the Atlantic
Alliance.
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Ministers also noted the progress which had been made in studying the possibilities for
European co-operation in the field of space-based observation systems for the purposes of arms control
verification, and also for crisis and environmental monitoring. They called for concrete proposals to be
submitted to them at their next meeting, inter alia with a view to examining the possibility of estab-
lishing a satellite verification agency.
7. Ministers recognised that European security has an extra-European dimension. As a conse-
quence the European countries follow closely developments in other regions of the world, in particular
the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
8. Peace, security and co'operation in Europe depend on an intensification of the dialogue at all
leyels. With regard to the new tasks for the organisation proposed by the incoming Presidency,Ministers agreed on the opportuneness of establishing contacts for two-way information with the
democratically-elected governments in Central and Eastern Europe. They instructed the Presidency
and the Secretary-General to organise these contacts. Ministers recognised that, by virtue of its acti-
vities, the parliamentary Assembly of WEU has an important r6le to play in opening up contacts with
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This has been illustrated by the recent extraordinary
session of the Assembly held in Luxembourg on 22nd and 23rd March. Likewise, the WEU Institute
for Security Studies, whose establishment was decided upon at the last Council, and which is to begin
operation from July this year, also has an active r0le to play in pooling ideas and in drawing together
the new strands of thinking being developed in both the East and the West.
9. Ministers congratulated the Belgian Presidency on the particularly active way in which they had
conducted the work of WEU. They hoped that, under its impetus and that of the incoming French Pre-
sidency, there would be a continued and intensive process of reflection and concertation among the
member countries, particularly with a view to the two major meetings scheduled to take place before
the end of the year, namely the CSCE summit and an Atlantic summit both aimed at giving appro-
priate responses to the changes taking place in Europe.
WEU provides an entirely suitable forum for its members to prepare a oommon approach to
these forthcoming meetings.
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WEU in the Atlantic Alliance
REPORT 
'
submitted on blwlf of tlu Political C-ommittctz
by Sir Geotfrcy Finsbetg, Rqprtcur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnnrt REcoMMENDATToN
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance
Expr.nNetonv MeuonnNouu
submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. The new situation
III. A short-term programme
IV. The future of European security
V. Conclusions
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geolfrey Finsberg, Mr. Martino (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Aarts, Beix(Alternate : Baumet), Bdhm, C-aro, C.oleman (Alternate: Parryl, Collart, Eich, Forni, Foschi, flil/, Hitschler, Koehl, van der
Linden (Alternate: Eisma), [ord Mackie of Benshie (Alternate: Lord Kirkhilt), MM. Miiller (Alternate : Kittelmannl, Natali,
PCcriaux, Pieralli, Mrs. Polfer (Alternate: Kollwelterl, Mr. Sarti, Sir William Shelton (Alternate: SWed), Mrs. Staels-Dompos,
MM. Stoffelen (Alternate: It|n. Verspaget), Thyraud.
N.B. Ile names of lhose taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Dmft Recommeadation
on WEU in tlp Atlantic AUiaace
l. THs AssrMsr-v recalls that Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty closely associates WEU's
activities with those of NATO and that NATO is still the essential guarantee of Europe's security
because it is the only framework in which the deterrent power of the United States can be used for the
benefit of Europe.
It recognises the progress made towards limiting armaments but notes that the Soviet Union has
not yet taken any decisive steps to reduce its forces and armaments and still remains the leading mil-
itary power on the European continent.
It considers that the security situation in Europe has been fundamentally changed through the
democratisation processes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe and the opening of borders,
including the one between the Federal Republic and the GDR.
It wishes the CFE negotiations to be concluded rapidly, a new mandate to be drawn up by the
CSCE for a subsequent reduction in the level of armaments, exclusively defensive military systems to
be established and negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons to be started immediately.
It welcomes the development of the CSCE and the efforts made in that framework to establish a
new peaceful order in Europe.
It considers that in the context of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures,
the Vienna negotiations and other forums significant steps are being taken to improve the security situ-
ation in Europe.
It considers that, with the increasing pace of European developments and the changing nature of
security problems, planning for European security co-operation must be accelerated.
It considers that, in the new circumstances, Western European countries will have to pldy a
larger r6le in this planning process, which will require closer co-operation between WEU member
states.
It therefore RscouusNos that the Council do its utmost to facilitate the United States Govern-
ment's action to maintain and strengthen the association of the United States with the organisation of
European security by:
(a/ asserting itself as the European pillar of the alliance, inter alia by moving the seat of its min-
isterial organs closer to that of NATO;
(b) asktng those of its members which do not participate in the NATO integrated commands to
examine to what extent the new situation and the new r6le to be played by NATO allow them
to associate their armed forces more closely with joint deployment;
(c) keeping the Assembly constantly informed of the discussion that is to be held on the
reorganisation, r6le and future of NATO in the context of the transformation of the military
pacts into political alliances following arms reduction agrements;
(d) tightening its links with the European members of the Atlantic Alliance which are not at
present members of WEU;
(e/ ensuring that member countries make a military effort suffrcient to guarantee a balance of
conventional forces between the West and the Soviet Union;
fi for this purpose, fixing the troop levels that each ofthem undertakes to place at the service ofjoint defence and providing for these undertakings to be revised in conformity with future
CFE agreements;
(g) ensuring maximum security in Western Europe with a minimum deployment of forces and
urgently studying the conditions in which multinational units might be set up;
(h) organising, in the framework of a general reduction in military expenditure and the level of
armaments, fair burden- and responsibility-sharing in the alliance and between WEU
member countries.
2. THr AssrMsI-v considers it necessary for a reunified Germany not to be neutral and that it be
integrated in the European Community ariO ptay a full part in an all-European security system as soon
as it is set up by the CSCE and, during a transitional period, a search be made for solutions acceptable
to all concerned with maintaining balance and peace in Europe.
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It also considers that reunified Germany must formally recognise the frontiers with its neigh-
bours resulting from the second world war and recognised by the Helsinki agreements.
It therefore Recouurxos that the Council facilitate the search for a status for reunified Germany
which ensures that it participates in the collective security of Western Europe while giving the Soviet
Union and the Central and Eastern European countries the political and military assurances necessary
for maintaining a balance of forces and advancing future negotiations on peace and disarmament.
It also Rrcouurnps that the Council ensure consultations between its members on matters on
the agenda of the negotiations on the status of Germany between the two German states and the four
powers directly concerned.
3. THr AssrMsly considers that recent developments in certain non-European countries, particu-
larly in the Near and Middle East, are a new danger to international peace and the security of Europe.
It notes that the Atlantic Alliance is making no-provision for the necessary guarantees against such
threats but that any initiatives Europe may iake io counter them help to strengthen American confi-
dence that the alliance is operating correctly.
It therefore RecouurNps that the Council make regular assessments of all possible threats to
European security and inform the public of the results of its work on security in the Mediter-
ranean.
4. THr AsseMsr-v hopes that the difficulties now arising in the CFE negotiations, in part-icular over
the level of air forces, will be rapidly overcome, that an agtreement will be concluded in 1990 and that
further negotiations will be started 6efore the end of the year to speed up the reduction in the level of
forces and armaments in Europe.
It welcomes the steps taken by the Council to co-ordinate member countries' action for applying
an open-skies agreement and for eirsuring the effectiveness of verification operations.
It RrcouueNps that the Council contribute to the success of the disarmament negotiations and
enable member countries to play an active part in verifying and implementing future agtreements by:
(a) takine an early decision on the joint production and use of observation satellites;
(D/ widening the decision taken in Brussels on 23rd April in order to o_rganise a permanent
' ' 
exchange of information between its members on the results of each one's verification opera-
tions;
(c/ organising co-operation between member countries and, possibly, other-European members
. 
of NATO for training the staff necessary for carrying out these operations.
5. THr AssrMsr.y notes that Western European security continues to be guaranteed through imple-
mentation of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty.
It therefore Rrcour,lrNos that the Council fulfil that guarantee by ensuring that member states
make an effort to facilitate the rapid conclusion of the first phase of the Vienna negotiations on con-
ventional disarmament and urge the immediate commencement of Vienna II negotiations.
6. THe nssnrvrsr-y notes that the limitation of forces and armaments in Europe will lead to a
reduction in arms production and troop levels in national armies.
It therefore RrcouueNps that the Council exercise its mandate and at last give the necessary
impetus to the establishment of interoperability of armaments used by NATO and the standardisation
and joint production of armaments by member countries by:
(a/ assessing the requirements of European security in this area during the period of implemen-
tation of the CFE agreement;
(D/ fostering understanding between arms-produqing firms in member countries, inte_r alia
' ' through-harmonisationbf relevant national legislation, as suggested in the study conducted
by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee in April 1982;
(c) having the WEU Institute for Security Studies give priority to- studying the economic and
' ' 
social-consequences of a potential reduction in the activities of the arms industries and the
number of persons employed on defence work.
It RrcorrarraeNos that the Council take steps to prepare for changing military strategies and doc-
trines and to adjust to the new situation in Europe: whilst retaining defensive capabilities, the Present
strategy of fonn'ard defence and flexible responst in Europe will have to be re+xamined and in this
context the armed forces may have to be changed.
It welcomes the decision of President Bush and the NATO Nuclear Planning Group to terminate
the follow-on to Lance programme and to cancel any further modernisation of United States nuclear
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glil.ry shells deplo-yed in Europe. which indicates the willingness and ability of the alliance to take theinitiative in a rapidly changing situation.
7. THr Assel{slv welcomes the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies are now open to exchanges
of views and information with the west on defence and security matters.
It therefore RscouurNns that the Council help to restore mutual confidence between Eastern
and.Centrjl European countries and Weste-rn European countries by holding, together with the WEa
Institute for Security_Studies, exchanges of informition with approlpriate b6iies-in the Soviet Union
and the Eastern and CentflEuropean countries on matters rehling to security, disarmament and veri-fication, as decided on 23rd April 1990.
8. THr Assruuv welcomes the Council's efforts to help to inform the public about its work. It notes
with satisfaction that, forthe.first time, the Council has given it a docum6nt in which tne IEpC Ci;ii iiinformation about its activities. It considers, h^owever, that this policv of openness is stiU inaaEquati,
which is detrimental to the cohesion of NATO.
It therefore RrcouurNps that the Council provide the public with more information about the
w^or-k o[$lependent organ-s qnd the resultg they-obtain. It flio recommends that it ask the piisiOencyof the IEPG to report regularly and directly to the Assembly on its activities.
9. THr AssrMsl-v notes that the decisions taken by the Council on the abolition of arms control and
of thg llgditg Armaments Committee have in fact impaired the wEU ministerial organs; reraiioni
with NATO. It welcomes the steps taken by the Council to develop other forms of cdniact-
- 
Hoygver, it Rrcouurxos that the Council resume the practice of asking the NATO authorities
for an^opinion orl matters within their purview raised by Ass6mb[ recommeniations or *ritt* qo""
tions from members of the Assembly.
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Expbnatory Memorandum
(submiud by Stu Gqlfiyy Finsberg, Rapprteur)
I. Introduction
l. The present report was discussed in detail
at the Political Committee's meeting on 24th
April 1990. The discussion revealed significant
differences of views, perhaps less over what
should be done in the immediate future than on
longer-term prospects for Europe's security.
Some members believed the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe should
take over the major part of the security burden
in the fairly near future. Others, on the contrary,
including your Rapporteur, feared that the
thirty-five powers taking part in the conference,
whose foreign and security policy concepts
varied considerably, would not be able to
assume responsibility for security for quite some
time. Furthefinore, a French member of the
committee referred to his country's position
towards NATO. No one, however, contested
your Rapporteur's main ideas, and particularly
that the association of the United States and
Canada with Western European defence through
the intermediary of NATO was at present an
irreplaceable factor of deterrence of benefit to
the European order that alone allowed a policy
of arms limitation to be pursued and the resto-
ration of mutual confidence necessary for the
CSCE to make progress.
2. Furthermore, the committee noted that
forthcoming events at the end of April and
beginning of May 1990, with the Community
summit meeting in Dublin and the NATO min-
isterial meeting, were likely to throw more light
on the facts of the matter it had to discuss. It
therefore decided to defer adopting the report
until the end of May.
*
*i.
3. While the 1948 Brussels Treaty resulted
from steps taken by five European countries
determined to ensure their security together by a
deployment of their own forces, the signing of
the Washington Treaty in 1949 changed the situ-
ation considerably. The signatories of the North
Atlantic Treaty included all members of
Western Union and, as soon as a military system
was established in Europe by virtue of NATO, in
1950 Western Union transferred to it the
exercise of its responsibilities as a military
organisation. Since that date, WEU's activities
have been inextricably linked with those of
NATO and, in 1954, this enabled the Brussels
Treaty to be used to permit the creation of a
German federal army integrated in the NATO
military commands.
4. The revision of the treaty naturally took
into account the existence and activities of
NATO and Article IV defined the basic prin-
ciples for co-operation between the two
organisations, as follows:
'In the execution of the treaty, the high
contracting parties and any organs estab-
lished by them under the treaty shall workin close co-operation with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
Recognising the undesirability of dupli-
cating the military staffs of NATO, the
Council and its Agency will rely on the
appropriate military authorities of NATO
for information and advice on military
means. "
5. Furthermore, Protocol No. II to the Paris
Agteements fixed maximum levels of forces of
member countries under NATO integrated mil-
itary command and, in the case of the United
Kingdom, a minimum level that that country
undertook to maintain, and made respect for
these provisions subject to a review procedure
whose basic element was NATO's annual
review, which took into account the recommen-
dations of its military authorities. Thus, the r6le
assigned to WEU in the military field was to
organise member countries' participation in the
defence of Europe, which was itself ensured by
NATO.
6. This concept of relations between WEU
and NATO has not been changed by measures
taken by the Seven since 1984 in the context of
the reactivation of WEU. The withdrawal of
French forces from NATO command in 1965
merely transferred from SACEUR to the French
authorities the obligation to inform the Council
of the level of French forces, considered to be
* internal defence and police forces " under
Article V of Protocol No. II (something of a
paradox when the forces concerned are sta-
tioned on the territory of the Federal Republic
of Germany). The texts adopted by the Council
since 1984 have specified the governments'
views on relations between WEU, whose reacti-
vation was making it increasingly an organ for
political co-operation, and NATO. The Rome
Declaration already indicated that:
n 4. ... The Ministers are convinced that a
better utilisation of WEU would not only
contribute to the security of Western
Europe but also to an improvement in the
common defence of all the countries of
the Atlantic Alliance and to Sireater soli-
darity among its members.
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5. The Ministers emphasised the indivisi-
bility of security within the North Atlantic
Treaty area. They recalled in particular
the vital and substantial contribution of
all the European allies, and underlined the
crucial importance of the contribution to
common security of their allies who are
not memberc of WEU. They stressed the
necessity, as a complement to their joint
efforts, of the closest possible concertation
with them. "
7. According to the subsequent Bonn
communiqu6 issued on 23rd April 1985:
'2. The Ministers... reaffirmed their
determination to strengthen their soli-
darity and that which links them with
their allies of the Atlantic Alliance, which
remains the only body for implementing
common defence and the expression of
the fundamental bond between the
security of Europe and that of North
America.
7. The Ministers... underlined the impor-
tance of the continuing bilateral consulta-
tions with their partners in the Atlantic
Alliance as an essential element of allied
cohesion.'
On 3fth April 1986, the Venice communiqu6
added:
" 2. T\e Ministers... recalled the indi-
visible nature of western security and
their firm determination to strengthln the
ties and the solidarity which bind them
together and to the other members of the
alliance.'
Finally, the platform adopted in The Hague on
27th October 1987 set common goals for the
WEU countries and assigned a major r6le to
transatlantic relations in the organisation of
European security, as follows:
* 1.4. ... the security of the Western
European countries can only be ensuredin close association with our North
American allies. The security of the
alliance is indivisible. The partnership
between the two sides of the Atlantic rests
on the twin foundations of shared values
and interests. Just as the commitment of
the North American democracies is vital
to Europe's security, a free, independent
and increasingly more united Western
Europe is vitd to the security of North
America.'
It added the following point, which is highly
important in the new circumstances:
'5. It is our conviction that the balanced
policy of the Harmel report remains valid.
Political solidarity and adequate military
strength within the Atlantic Alliance,
arms control, disarmament and the search
for genuine d6tente continue to be integral
parts of this policy. Military security and
a policy of ddtente are not contradictory
but complementary. "
8. It is thus plain that, since the decision to
transfer WEU's military activities to NATO in
1950, member countries have not changed their
concept of relations between the two institu-
tions. It was to NATO that they entrusted imple-
mentation of the defence of Europe. It was to
NATO that they assigned as a matter of priority
the implementation of a security policy that
included disarmament, which they consider
impossible other than in close co'operation
between Western Europe and its North
American allies. WEU's r6le is viewed in terms
of the requirements of this defence and this
security policy which is to ensure that Europe
plays a fuller part in both. Your Rapporteur has
been assigned the task of examining how such
participation can be ensured in the new circum-
stances arising from developments in the world
in general and in Eastern and Central Europe
and their relations with the West in particular.
9. It should be noted, however, that the reac-
tivation of WEU led to a diminishing in its rela-
tions with NATO, probably not because of a
deliberate will on the part of the governments
but because the WEU organs which maintained
organic relations with NATO no longer play a
r6le in WEU.
10. (a) This is the case for the Standing
Armaments Committee, which was abolished in
December 1989. Until 1975,it was composed of
member countries' permanent representatives to
NATO whose activities, including those of its
working groups, were open to NATO observers,
with whom there were exchanges of infor-
mation, and whose agxeements were open to all
NATO member countries.
I l. (b) This is also the case for the Agency for
the Control of Armaments, which now verifies
chemical weapons only and therefore no longer
has to rely on NATO for exercising arms con-
trols in respect of integ;rated forces and reporting
on them and no longer holds annual meetings
with NATO on the aims and techniques of such
controls. The Council's annual visit to SHAPE
and its meeting with an o(Iicer to discuss
matters raised by arms control have therefore
lost much of their importance.
12. (c/ Conversely, welcome initiatives have
been taken by the Permanent Council of WEUto ensure contacts between the two
organisations. Moreover, the Assembly's Pres-
ident, chainnen, committees and rapporteurs
have always had a warm reception by the NATO
authorities.
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13. It is thus the weakening of WEU struc-
tures that has taken WEU further away from the
NATO structures. The Assembly suffers the con-
sequences since the Council seems to have
allowed to lapse its hitherto regular practice of
asking NATO to answer Assembly recommenda-
tions and written questions by its members on
matters within the purview of NATO.
14. This situation must now be remedied so
that WEU can effectively play the r6le of the
European pillar of the alliance, which the
Council wants just as much as the Assembly.
II. The ww situation
I 5. The alliance was born in I 949 of the need,
following the Prague coup d'6tat, to bar the way
to the expansion of the Soviet Union which had,
by force, imposed communist r6gimes on all the
countries " liberated " or occupied by the Red
Army at the end of the second world war. The
European members of the alliance were anxious
to discourage Soviet aggression by ensuring that
the United States retained a sufficient military
presence to make it clear to the Soviet Union
that any attack against Europe would bring
American forces into action and that it would,
consequently, have to contend with United
States nuclear power. The European countries
therefore did not play a major part in collective
defence and their military deployment was
aimed mainly at satisfying the Americans, who
did not wish to help to defend countries which
would not defend themselves. Hence, it was
normal that the United States should play a pre-
ponderant part both in the military commands
and in alliance policy. This situation obviously
made it easier for Germany to accede to the
alliance in 1954 but it probably also helped to
bring about France's withdrawal from the inte-
grated military structure in 1965.
16. The emergence of Soviet nuclear power,
the subsequent shift in the alliance's strategic
doctrine away from 'massive retaliation'
towards " flexible response ", completed by that
of * forward defence ", and then the start of the
first nuclear arms reduction talks changed the
nature of the respective interests of the
European and American members of the
alliance. On the American side, it came to be
thought that nuclear deterrence could be exer-
cised even after the outbreak of an armed con-
flict. NATO's military deployment was therefore
increasingly aimed at meeting a conventional
attack either by stopping it or by delaying it so
that negotiations could be held before nuclear
weapons were used. The United States conse-
quently insisted that its allies assume a greater
share ofthe conventional defence ofEurope and
itself deployed so-called theatre nuclear weapons
in Europe designed to delay the deployment of
strategic weapons still longer. Europeans for
their part feared a decoupling of Europe's
defence from that of the United States and
therefore made the effort asked of them in order
to ensure that large numbers of American forces
remained in Europe. They placed emphasis on
the political activities of the alliance which were
to allow them to have their say in both joint
strategy and everything relating to allied
security, in particular arms control negotiations.
Finally, the United Kingdom, and then France,
acquired nuclear weapons that were intended to
give Europe a deterrent capability to prevent a
possible enemy considering waging and winning
a war in Europe thanks to its conventional
superiority and escaping nuclear retaliation.
Europeans and Americans therefore agreed that
the post of SACEUR be assigned to an
American, thus enhancing the guarantee of
United States participation in the defence of
Europe, but also that the Secretary-General of
NATO be a European so that Europe might have
more influence on alliance policy. The aim of
the 1967 Harmel plan was to organise the
alliance on these new twin bases.
17. Mr. Gorbachev's coming to power in
1985 marked the start of a major evolution in
the threat to which the alliance had to respond,
for various reasons:
18. (a) Because they wished to restore the
Soviet economy, the new Soviet leaders gave
serious thought to means of limiting the coun-
try's military expenditure:
(i) by a general reduction in the level of
its armed forces;
(ii) by abandoning the Soviet Union's
armed interventions outside Europe,
particularly in Afghanistan and
Africa, and making cuts in force
leyels and the number of Soviet bases
far from Soviet territory;
(iii) bV negotiating arms control measures
with the NATO countries and
accepting the verification measures
the West had been insisting on since
1955 but which the Soviet Union had
always refused.
19. (D/ Since the Soviet Union was anxious
that its security should not be affected by cuts in
its defence budget, it used all available means to
create conditions favourable to negotiated dis-
armament by the two alliances:
(i) by rcplacing the offensive strategic
doctrine hitherto followed by the
Warsaw Pact with a defensive stra-
tegic doctrine and an appropriate
military deployment;
(ii) by making serious concessions to
allow negotiations to be started and
brought to a successful conclusion,
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particularly on verification and the
definition of targets such as rea-
sonable sufliciency and equal
security, while agreeing to give pri-
ority to negotiations on conventional
arrns, proposing the adoption of
confidence-building measures and
promoting the solution of conflicts
outside Europe;
(iii) by adopting liberalisation measures,
both in the Soviet Union and in the
countries under its then control,
entering into new undertakings in
this sense in the framework of the
CSCE and allowing the development
of cooperation between Eastern and
Western Europe in many areas.
20. (c) lt bee,ame clear that, although the
Warsaw Pact had considerable military forces, it
was suffering from serious restrictions on its
ability to act: its members lacked cohesion and
even the will to defend themselves.
(i) ln the Soviet Union itsell the
liberalisation measures showed that
the country's unity was questioned by
many of its inhabitants, particularly
in the Baltic republics, Moldavia, the
Caucasian republics, Central Asia
and even the Ukraine. The procla-
mation of Lithuania's independence
by its parliament, elected directly by
the people in March 1990, followed
by Estonian moves towards its own
independence, confront the Soviet
Government with a formidable alter-
native: to grve in, which might
encourage pro-independence move-
ments in other republics, or to use
force to make the two countries obey,
which would imply renouncing much
of perestroika and the democratic
line adopted by Mr. Gorbachev. At
the time of writing, the Soviet
authorities are still trying to avoid
this impossibe choice and find a
middle way, but it is not certain they
will manage to do so.
(ii) As soon as they realised that the
Soviet Union was not intervening to
maintain the r6gimes imposed on
Hungary and Poland as it had done
in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in
1968, the populations of the 'peo-ple's democracies " demonstrated
their desire to escape from com-
munist domination. They have all
obtained a promise of free elections
in the first half of 1990. They have all
questioned the monopoly of power in
the hands of the party. Two coun-
tries, Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
have called for the withdrawal of
Soviet forces from their territory.
There is now some question as to
whether they will all remain members
of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet
Union itself has agreed to reduce its
military presence in the Warsaw Pact
member countries to 195 0@ men
instead of the present figure of
500 000, provided the United States
reduces its forces stationed in the
Federal Republic of Germany to the
same level (they now number about
250 000), while retaining about
30 000 men in the United Kingdom,
Spain, Italy and Greece.
(iii) Ac*ording to a well-known expert in
the history of the Eastern European
countries, Frangois Fejtiit, the
Warsaw Pact has, since 1955, con-
tained secret provisions authorising
Soviet military intervention in any
member countries where there is a
threat to the communist party
remaining in power. This is tanta-
mount to the Brezhnev doctrine
forming part of the commitments
entered into by the members of the
pact. Abandonment by the people's
democracies and then, in February
1990, by the Central Committee of
the Soviet Communist Party of the
principle of the monopoly of power
in the hands of the party thus calls in
question the very survival ofthe pact.
Hungary and Poland have already
denounced these provisions, without
asking to leave the pact. However, if
Soviet forces are withdrawn from
those countries in the near future, as
some have called for, as Hungary
obtained a guarantee in an agreement
reached in Budapest on 2nd February
and as the Soviet Union has also
accepted in the case of Czechoslo-
vakia, their membership of the pact
would no longer have much signifi-
cance and the continued presence of
Soviet forces in the GDR would
become almost impossible.
21. (d/ Communism has stopped giving the
impression of an ideolory that meets pr€sent-
day realities. Solidarity between communist
r6gimes and parties has collapsed. No credible
proposals are now being made on the
organisation of tomorrow's world. In western
countries, the electorates are turning away from
parties endorsing communism.
l. " The Commission must co.ordinate assistance to Central
Europe " in 'I-es enjeux de I'Europe ", Supplement to No.
472, winter 1989.
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22. This does not mean there is no longer a
threat but that the threat has changed and that
military deployment in Europe is not the only
means of countering it. Moreover, deployment
itself is contested by some western societies,
which are finding it hard to accept the financial
sacrifices that NATO requires. It is noteworthy
that, from 1985 to 1988, when the collapse of
the Soviet bloc was still far from evident, the
share of the gross national product of NATO
countries earmarked for defence fell by an
average of 0.3%, which is very significant if it is
borne in mind that this share is on average
about 4%. There is every reason to think that
events in 1989 will lead to even larger cuts in
defence budgets in the coming years, particu-
larly in the United States.
23. Similarly, the people of Western Europe,
who had accepted the disadvantages of NATO
military deployment on their territory in earlier
years, are becoming increasingly sensitive as the
military threat appears to be diminishing. Cam-
paigns against nuclear weapons, low-altitude
flying and all the constraints imposed by col-
lective defence have found a large audience in
recent years, particularly in the Federal
Republic, where a section of public opinion
seems open to propaganda claiming that the mil-
itary allianoes are obstacles to the legitimate
aspirations of the German people to the reunifi-
cation of their country. Finally, in the United
States, there is growing pressure on the gov-
ernment to withdraw at least some of the
American forces stationed in Europe.
24. In such circumstances, it is essential for
the members of the Atlantic Alliance to give new
thought, as they did in 1967, to the security
concept round which they intend to shape their
action, thus implying, as Mr. Harmel said in his
paper at the Florence colloquy on 22nd March
1989, that they specify:
* (i) the material conditions for the
cohabitation of the peoples of
Europe, account being taken ofgeo-
political circumstances;
(iy' economic and social relations;
(iii) political relations in their widest
meanlng;
(iv) and, of course, the state of existing
armed forces and military equip
ment. "
25. However, it must be noted that the
Eastern and Central Europeans, while appar-
ently prepared to deal with all these matters in
their relations with the western countries, are in
fact able to tackle in depth only the first point,
in the framework of the CSCE, and the fourth,
in the various disarmament negotiations. Con-
versely, although the free elections held in the
German Democratic Republic and Hungary on
l8th and 25th March respectively produced
majorities clearly in favour of reverting to ecG
nomic freedom, they are far from having
defined their own concept of economic and
social relations in a future which, according to
the present governments of the other countries,
will remain'socialist', although this word does
not refer to any clear options in regard to state
participation in economic initiatives, the r6le of
the currency, limits on freedom of transactions
and the extent of social protection. At the
meeting of the European Council in Strasbourg
in December 1989, the European Community
was instructed to study the economic and social
aspects of East-West co-operation with a view to
co-ordinating the West's action in this area. The
Malta summit meeting aimed at defining
political relations between the two sides, but the
Eastern and Central European countries,
including the Soviet Union, seem incapable at
present of determining the nature and extent of
the reorientation of their external policies in
regard to their relations with their former
partners and those they intend to have with the
western countries.
26. The aim of examining the security
concept is not therefore to speculate on the
organisation of peace in Europe but to specify
how this concept can be achieved in the shifting
context of the Europe of today.
III. A short-term prcgrurnme
27. Events in Eastern Europe in 1989 led
some to wonder about the necessity, possibility
and expediency of maintaining the Atlantic
Alliance. It is perfectly easy to understand the
Central European countries, now that they are
trying to put an end to communist dictatorship,
endeavouring to rid themselves of the con-
straints imposed on them by the Warsaw Pact
and their bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union
and, at the same time, calling for the Red Army
to withdraw from their territory. It is obviously
easier for them to call for the abolition of mil-
itary pacts in general, a familiar theme of Soviet
propaganda for many years, than to take the
Warsaw Pact as their sole target. The fact that
the GDR is part of the pact and the Federal
Republic a member of NATO makes Germany
particularly sensitive to this aspect of ddtente
since the two German states'membership of two
opposing alliance systems is an obstacle to and
might limit the reunification of Germany.
Finally, certain sections of public opinion in the
West, too, seem convinced that the existence of
alliances is a factor of tension.
28. Yet, however concerned the West may be
to facilitate the liberation of the nations of
Eastern Europe, it cannot sacrifice an essential
element of its own security or renounce a major
factor of peace in Europe and throughout the
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world. Not only has NATO played this r6le for
forty years, it is continuing and will probably
continue for a long time to be essential, for
several reasons:
29. (a) The Soviet Union has not yet dis-
armed to any substantial degree. The Warsaw
Pact is still there. The Red Army is still presentin the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and
Hungary. Its withdrawal is the subject of agree-
ments between two of those countries and the
Soviet Union which, without rejecting its allies'
calls, has tried to delay effective withdrawal.
While there seems no doubt that Mr. Gorbachev
intends to reduce military deployment in
Eastern Europe and move towards negotiated
arms control, it is not certain that he will remain
in power and that the Soviet Union will con-
tinue to pursue the policy he started. In any
event, the Red Army has not yet been reduced
significantly and its armaments are still at their
former levels and are being modernised. The
West, for its part, can disarm only to the extent
that it is certain of the balance of forces in
Europe being restored and an acceptable
deterrent system being retained to ensure that a
change in Soviet policy does not involve the
world in a dangerous situation.
30. (b) ln 1949, the United States, for the
first time in its history, undertook in peacetime
to guarantee the security of Western Europe,
which was a decisive contribution in raising a
barrier against the expansionist tendencies then
being shown by the Soviet Union and safe-
guarding peace. It would be senseless to put a
deliberate end to such a positive aspect of
United States policy or even to take initiatives
that might make American public opinion
change its mind about maintaining a large
number of forces in Europe.
31. (c) ln any event, the Soviet Union will
remain a geat military power and the disap
pearance of the Warsaw Pact, far from affording
a better guarantee of peace, might well lead to an
increase in national conflicts in Europe. The
best way of preventing these conflicts degener-
ating and threatening international peace is to
preserve, for the benefit of the West, a
maximum of cohesion and hence of deterrent
capability compatible with a policy of nego-
tiated arms control in Europe.
32. (d) Only NATO ensures that American
forces remain in Europe. If, for some reason,
these forces were to be withdrawn, the North
Atlantic Treaty would be even more valuable
since it would then represent the only United
States commitment towards Europe and
NATO's essential military task would be to
protect the Atlantic sea lanes between America
and Europe so that, if necessary, American
forces could return in the event of a crisis. It
would also have to ensure that the necessary
depOts remained on European territory to allow
the speedy redeployment of American forces in
case of need in view of the facility with which,
thanks to territorid continuity, the Soviet
Union could redeploy its own forces in Central
Europe.
33. (e) T\e emergence of new military powers
outside the area covered by the North Atlantic
Treaty makes it more than ever essential to
co-ordinate allied efforts to maintain peace
outside Europe.
34. fi The smooth progress of arms control
negotiations also requires harmonisation of
allied positions to ensure that they do notjeopardise joint security.
35. These various reasons now make the
Atlantic Alliance and its organisation, both
political and military, more essential than ever,
not only for maintaining peace but also for
developing disarmament and East-West
co-operation. This does not necessarily mean the
alliance and its military system must not be
open to change, but the present study must con-
sider their adaptation in the light of the new cir-
cumstances rather than their disappearance. The
prospects of a less dangerous atmosphere are
bound to make many of our fellow citizens in
Western Europe question the need for con-
tinuing high defence expenditure. We have
already seen the * peace dividend " syndrome
emerge in the United States with many siren
calls to spend it before it is earned 
- 
earned in
the sense of requiring proof of actual arms
reductions by the Soviet Union. We need to
explain the issues clearly and ensure that our
parliaments and media have the facts they need
to understand the realities of the situation and
how important it is to be cautious.
36. The prospects offered by the transfor-
mation of the Soviet Union and the Central and
Eastern European countries and the swift devel-
opment of negotiations on arms control, security
and co-operation in Europe and the future of
Germany make one speculate about what might
become of the Atlantic Alliance in the years
ahead.
37. Its r6le may possibly be defined as
follows:
38. (a) As long as necessary, its military
deployment should be sufficient for the West to
continue, faced with the deployment of the
Soviet Union and its allies, to be sure of
Western European security, to convince those
countries that, whatever the ups and downs in
their domestic affairs, the policy of d6tente and
disarmament embarked upon by Mr. Gorbachev
is the only one that can guarantee peace and
security in Europe without endangering internal
stability in their countries. This is not a matter
that can be settled quickly, in view of the
duration of arms control negotiations and,
above all, the time it will take to implement any
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agreements that are concluded. The CFE agree-
ments, for instance, should lead to the
destruction of almost 60% of Warsaw Pact arms
and this, according to the Soviet Union, will
take at least seven yea$.
39. However, the West cannot afford to relax
its guard until the CFE agreement comes into
force particularly as there are clear signs that in
the past three months the Soviet position on the
CFE, START and other negotiations has
hardened considerably. It may well be that
Mr. Gorbachev now has to look over his
shoulder at a military which feels threatened by
force reductions and the consequent weakening
of its influence. Many scenarios can be
envisaged but one of the worst would be a less-
ening of Mr. Gorbachev's influence and a partial
disintegration of the Soviet Union. This might
well produce a resentful Russian Republic which
was nationalistic, anti-semitic and xenophobic,
with a feeling of isolation, yet powerful in its
forces.
40. (b) A strategy should be worked out that
meets the new military situation. Some com-
mittee members felt the notions of flexible
response and forward defence should be radi-
cally. reassessed. This is not your Rapporteur's
oplnlon.
4L, In the case of flexible response, it seems
impossible to-return to the alternative, mass
retaliation, i.e. immediate counter-attacks on
the enemy's towns in the event of an attack on
alliance forces. More than ever, the only possible
credible deterrence is to prepare a counter-
attack, suffrcient to stop the enemy offensive but
not necessarily or immediately raising the level
of hostilities to disastrous proportions. Fighting
should be avoided but, if deterrence fails, it
must be limited. This does not mean that every
part ofthe present western defence system nec-
essarily has to be maintained. Since the interna-
tional situation makes an armed attack less
probable and eliminates the possibility of sur-
prise attack, it may allow some of these parts to
be reduced or even eliminated altogether in the
framework of specific agreements whose appli-
cation would be subject to satisfactory verifi-
cation procedure.
42. Similarly, the notion of forward defence is
still irreplaceable, first because Western Europe
does not have the required depth to be able to
consider sweeping fall-back movements and
again because it is difficult, a priori, to consider
wagrng a battle on the territory of allied coun-
tries. However, application of this concept
leaves wide scope for arrangements, inter alia to
avoid giving the Eastern European countries the
impression that NATO is able to adopt an
aggressive strategy. Be that as it may, the notion
of forward defence will have to be defined in the
light of the two plus four decisions on the mil-
itary status of reunified Germany.
43. On these two questions, your Rapporteur
was interested in the speech by Senator Sam
Nunn, Chairman of the Armed Forces Com-
mittee of the United States Senate, on l9th
April, in which he defined the essential elements
of a new NATO strategy:
(i) even if nuclear deterrence remained
the basis of western strategy, it would
have to be at levels significantly
lower than at present;
(ifl American frontJine forces would
have to be reduced, while the rein-
forcement capabilities of their allies
would have to be increased;
(iii) reserve forces would have to be
increased and oryanised to conduct
such reinforcement missons;
(iv) all American forces would have to be
trained intensively for missions that
might be fixed at the last minute;
(v/ funds earmarked for defence shouldbe reduced but gleater thought
should be given to their use in order
to improve effectiveness;
(vfl since he did not believe recourse to
the threat of a first nuclear strike in
response to a conventional attack was
credible, Senator Nunn proposed
eliminating ground-based short'range
missiles and nuclear artillery in the
framework of an agtreement between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
44. These proposals are an interesting attempt
to adapt NATO strategy to the evolution of
East-West relations and your Rapporteur
believes they are worthy of in-depth study by the
United States Government and also by NATO
and WEU governments.
45. (c) The western defence system should be
adapted to the requirements of the arms control
agreements and member countries' capabil-
ities.
46. (d) Member countries' positions should
be co-ordinated in the arms control negotiations
in which each of them takes part.
47. (e/ Members of the alliance should be
allowed to play an effective part in the verifi-
cation measures that will be needed in order to
implement disarmament agreements and the
confidence-building measures and constraints
that will be provided for at the conference on
disarmament in Europe or even in a future
agreement banning chemical weapons. Verifi-
cation will clearly become increasingly
important and involve thousands of experts and
very heavy investment. In order to be effective,
it will have to be organised and co-ordinated by
the alliance so as to record data, study questions
arising, develop means, specify tasks and
publish results.
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48. (/ It must help to organise a new security
order in Europe so that the United States and
Canada have a place in the system. Some com-
mittee memberc believe the CSCE is the natural
framework for this new system. Your
Rapporteur thinks it premature to decide this
matter today since it is far from clear that
forty-two countries, some of which are members
of NATO and some of the pact, while others
have permanently neutral status or pursue a
neutralist policy, would be able to agree not only
on defining this new security order but, above
all, on guaranteeing its application. The present
alliances are still the foundations on which
peace should be organised in Europe. Even if the
CSCE is the appropriate forum for joint consid-
eration of security matteni by eastern and
western countries, it has no executive instru-
ments and probably will not have any in the
near future.
49. (g) Therc must be consultations and, pos-
sibly, co-ordination between its members'
actions so as to meet any threat to peace from
countries outside the area covered by the North
Atlantic Treaty. Out-of-area actions, such as the
Gulf, may occur more frequently in the future.
Whilst we in NATO and the Warsaw Pact build
on confidence measures, other nations not in
either alliance possess nuclear and chemical
weapons against which both East and West may
need to react more swiftly. We must ensure that
appropriate mechanisms are in place as soon as
possible for this purpose. A new-style NATO
and a renovated Warsaw Pact with different
objectives from the present ones may well have
to act as the joint guarantors of peace in Europe,
and elsewhere.
50. While there are few objections to such a
definition of the future r6le of the alliance, there
is certainlj not unanimity on the order of prior-
ities to be given to these tasks, particularly in the
United States.
51. In January 1988, a group of American
experts, headed by Mr. Ikl6 and Mr.
Wohlstetter, proposed a reorientation of NATO,
designed above all to counter threats from
outside the area covered by the Washington
Treaty. Their thinking was based on the idea
that any trouble outside that area was, in one
way or another, caused by the Soviet Union with
a view to weakening the West. Although such an
analysis does not seem to have been confirmed,
there is a school of thought in the United States,
and in Europe too, championed by the former
United States Defence Secretary, Caspar
Weinberger, that attaches considerable impor-
tance to threats to international peace not
deriving from the Soviet Union and wishes
NATO's activities to be aimed essentially at
responding to that threat. All members of the
alliance are certainly, to various degrees, aware
of this new dimension to the dangers facing the
west, but some of them do not seem prepared to
rely on the alliance to counter it. Under the
Washington Treaty, they are not obliged to do
so, and it seems rather unlikely that there would
be a consensus in favour of giving priority to
such concerns.
52. Speaking in Berlin on l2th December
19E9, the Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, on the
contrary described the future of the alliance as
being to organise d6tente and cooperation in
Europe. While this conforms with the North
Atlantic Treaty, it nevertheless marks a break
with the past and would have the disadvantage
of putting the Soviet Union and its allies in a
delicate position. The Soviet Union could,
indeed, hardly agee to NATO becoming the
federator of the new Europe because such a
Europe would appear to be simply an extension
of the American area of influence at the expense
of the Soviet Union. In particular, there were
negative reactions to the proposal made by Mr.
Baker on the same occasion that a reunified
Germany be admitted to the Atlantic Alliance,
and the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as the
European members of the alliance, made a
number of counter-proposals and rectifications.
On 6th February, the United States Gov-
ernment, following a meeting between the Sec-
retary of State and Mr. Genscher, Federal
German Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated thatit was not considering NATO military
deployment on the other side of the Elbe, thus
significantly limiting the impact of the proposalit made on l2th December. The question of
reunified Germany's membership of NATO is
now one of the most delicate aspects of current
negotiations on the reunification of the country.
While the Soviet Union is no longer making
neutralisation of Germany a condition of reuni-
fication, it persists in opposing reunified
Germany remaining in NATO and at present it
is diflicult to see how the powerc taking part in
the two plus four conference will be able to find
a solution which ensures that the country
remains in a collective defence structure.
53. A significant United States, Canadian and
British military presence on the mainland of
Europe, i.e. in particular on the territory of the
Federal Republic, with adequate conventional
and nuclear weapons and under integrated mil-
itary command, remains an important element
of European security, as Mr. Hurd, United
Kingdom Foreign Secretary, underlined in an
address in St. Augustin, near Bonn, on 6th Feb-
ruary. There are now 254 000 American troops
stationed in the Federal Republic and 60 000
Eritish, 50 000 French, 25 000 Belgian, 7 700
Dutch and 7 300 Canadian. These levels might
be reduced in parallel with a reduction in Soviet
forces stationed in the Centrd and Eastern
European countries in conformity with existing
treaties and in agreement with the Federal Gov-
ernment and the NATO and WEU countries.
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However, such a reduction should not imply
military disengagement, which might appear to
be political disengagement, too, and would
therefore lead to a disturbing weakening of
western cohesion and the West's ability to con-
tribute to maintaining peace in Europe. From
this point of view, the reference by Mr. Co6me,
Belgian Minister of Defence, on 26th January to
a possible withdrawal of Belgian troops from the
Federal Republic, although referring only to a
possible scenario and not to a political decision,
had the unfortunate effect of suggesting that the
European members of the alliance considered
developments in Eastern Europe were likely to
make them question their commitment to
common security at the very moment when the
reorientation of the Belgian military structure
had deprived Belgium of any possibility of con-
sidering engaging its forces outside an integrated
military system. In the event, which many
observers do not rule out, of the United States
deciding, in the more or less long term, to make
further large-scale reductions in their military
presence in Europe, and particularly the Federal
Republic of Germany, the WEU countries'
responsibility in western military deployment
would be increased and it would be regrettable if
premature unilateral decisions deprived them of
the means of exercising this responsibility.
54. Conversely, it is possible to improve the
defensive and deterrent capability of the forces
of WEU countries in accordance with the aims
defined in The Hague platform by improving
the organisation of their armaments in terms of
interoperability, standardisation and joint pro-
duction.
55. Moreover, on several occasions in recent
months, the Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. van
Eekelen, has referred to the idea of strength-
ening European solidarity in NATO, while the
latter would redefine the tasks of the American
forces assigned to it. Thus, in his speech in Lux-
embourg on 23rd March, he said:
" The reduction of forces should be done
in a co-ordinated manner, taking into
account the ways and means of rede-
ploying American and Soviet forces. Inev-
itably, the problem of forces stationed in
Germany, whatever their nationality orjuridical rdgime, will be a subject of
polemic. A possible solution in the
direction of European unity would be to
form major units on a multinational basis
for our forces. It is for WEU to study the
practicality of audacious and imaginative
approaches leading to increased security
for all the nations of Europe from the
Atlantic to the Urals because they will
show that recourse to military force in
Europe will no longer ever be a purely
national prerogative in the service ofego-
istic interests.'
Much thought is being given to Mr. van
Eekelen's concept of a multinational force, but ifit is to be even a starting point it has to be
recognised that interoperability of equipment is
essential.
56. On 27th March, during the symposium
organised by WEU's Technological and Aero-
space Committee, General Charlier, Chief-of-
Staff of the Belgian Army, used the following
terms when he presented an outline plan for a
military system in the future Europe, thus
endorsing Mr. van Eekelen's remarks:
'Once the CFE agreement has been
implemented, threats to Europe will no
longer be attributable to a single
adversary, localised on a single line, pro-
nounced in a single direction; the threat of
a massive surprise attack along a wide
front will have disappeared so that it may
be thought that the military system will be
relaxed, forces will move farther apart and
they will be less numerous. Since warning
time will be increased,alarger proportion
of military potential will consist of
mobilisable forces. On the other hand,
active forces and the ability to deploy mil-
itary forces from a long way off will have
to remain.
The missions of these forces would be of
two types:
- 
multinational stationed forces who, by
their presence, would ensure regional
balances or ward off or deter conflicts
or threats;
- 
first-strike forces to monitor, channel
and delay threats.'
While the political advantages of such an initi-
ative seem evident, it would be desirable for
countries which have already carried out such
experiments, in particular France and the
Federal Republic which have set up a joint
brigade, to submit a substantiated report on the
problems encountered in implementing such an
initiative before final decisions are taken in this
sense.
57. Two Eastern European countries - the
Soviet Union through Mr. Gerasimov, Ministry
for Foreign Affairs spokesman, on lst February
and the German Democratic Republic through
its Prime Minister, Mr. Modrow 
- 
proposed that
all foreign forces stationed on the territory ofthe
two German states be withdrawn and that
reunified Germany have neutral status imposed
on it or, at least, that it be forbidden by treaty to
belong to any military alliance. This took up a
proposal dating back to Stalin's days that was at
the time intended to prevent the Federal
Republic acceding to the Atlantic Alliance.
Their suggestion was immediately rejected by
Chancellor Kohl who, like Chancellor Adenauer
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before him, refused to have Germany reunified
at the cost of disengagement which would mean
the Federal Republic and, through it, Europe as
a whole losing the principal guarantee of its
security. On 4th February, NATO in turn
rejected any link between reunification and the
neutralisation of Germany.
58. This question of Germany's membership
of NATO was the main topic at the colloquy
organised by the German magazine Wehrkunde
in Munich on 3rd and 4th February. The gov-
ernments of most alliance countries were repre-
sented at a high level, which made the discus-
sions particularly interesting. It became clear
there that some SPD representatives thought
Germany might be neutralised as a compen-
sation for reunification but that many partici-
pants considered it possible for reunified
Germany to belong to the alliance, although
some of them thought it possible and desirable
to grant it special status in the alliance, inter alia
allowing it to remove its forces from integrated
military command. This last possibility was
rejected by most member countries, including
the United Kingdom, whose Foreign Secretary,
Mr. Hurd, recalled when addressing the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation on 6th February that the
Federal Republic was 'a crucial element in the
security of us all ".
59. Two conclusions can apparently be drawn
from the colloquy. First, there are no valid
reasons for the dismemberment of the Warsaw
Pact, which several of its member countries
seem to wish, to lead to a parallel dismantling of
the Atlantic Alliance, which was not considered
to be linked with continuing East-West tension
but far more as a neoessary structure for a
peaceful order in Europe to which the Soviet
Union should not be hostile. Secondly, if
Germany were to change the nature of its parti-
cipation in the alliance in which it still plays a
major r6le, it would be desirable, in order to
maintain a credible military system in Europe,
for France, in the new European security condi-
tions, to resume the place it occupied in the alli-
ance's integrated military system until 1965.
One only needs to glance at the map of Europe
to see that, if neither France nor Germany forms
part of such a system, that system can no longer
exist. If WEU managed to bring France more
firmly into the defensive organisation of Europe,it would obviously be bound to play an
important part in defining a European security
policy.
60. There is obviously a close link between
the alliance's traditional vocation to maintain a
defensive military system adequate to deter any
attack against Western Europe, and its new,
essentially political, move towards active parti-
cipation in building a new and peaceful order in
Europe, the purpose in both cases being to asso-
ciate the North American allies as closely as pos-
sible with the attainment of these aims.
However, while in a military context it was
essential for the United States to play a prepon-
derant part in the allied system to mark the asso-
ciation between the defence of Europe and
American nuclear weapons, it .seems no less
essential for Europe to play a r6le in the alliance
such as it has not yet played, because it is peace
in Europe that has to be organised and this
cannot be done without active European partici-
pation. This is one of the conclusions drawn by
observers from the Wehrkunde colloquy at
which many speakers repeated a theme familiar
to our Assembly, i.e. the need to organise a real
European pillar of the alliance. Some, such as
the French Minister of Defence, Mr. Che-
vdnement, stressed WEU's vocation to fulfil this
r6le, at least during an intermediary period,
until such time as the structures that are to
preside over the organisation ofpeace in Europe
have assumed a permanent shape, acceptable to
dl.
61. This does not mean any great change in
the attribution of NATO military commands. In
particular, the idea of a European SACEUR at
the head of NATO forces would give American
public opinion the impression that the defence
of Europe was no longer a major aim of United
States policy. The presence of the United States
and Canada in the alliance with a substantial
number of troops in Europe is vital and WEU
has to make it clear to the United States in par-
ticular that it is as welcome as ever. The idea
that, for example, SACEUR should be a
European would be grist to the mill of those who
wish to see an American withdrawal from
Europe 
- 
and, indeed, NATO.
IY. The futurc of European security
62. The future of the Atlantic Alliance
depends largely on the provisions on which all
the countries taking part in the CSCE manage to
agree in order to fix the status of reunified
Germany and, more generally, org;anise a new,
peaceful order in Europe. However, if the future
r6le of WEU is to be examined, that of NATO
cannot be disregarded. As in the past, WEU will
obviously have to cover ground not covered
either by the European Community or by
NATO so as to be certain that Western Europe
has the means to eDsure its security. There still
much confusion in the United States as to the
different r6les played in defence by NATO, the
European Community and WEU. No oppor-
tunity should be lost of clarifring the fact that
only NATO and WEU are, by treaty, competent
to discuss or act on defence issues, that their
action is complementary and that WEU's activ-
ities are in no way intended to limit the legit-
imate influence of the United States in the
alliance but, on the contrary, to ensure that
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Europeans play a grcater part in NATO. But in
view of prevailing uncertainty about the kind of
activities which will effectively devolve on
NATO, it is possible only to examine likcly
trends and not to be specific about what WEU's
field will actually be. It should be underlined
that the modified Brussels Treaty recognises
that NATO is the overall alliance and that WEU
is the European pillar of NATO. European
members of NATO feel somewhat marginalised
and it would be of help if Greece, Norway and
Turkey became members of WEU.
63. This situation is particularly irksome in
view of the fact that, once Portugal and Spain
have become members, the WEU Council is to
start the process of revising the modified
Brussels Treaty. When the decision was taken, it
was evident that the planned revision should
concern the arms controls provided for in the
treaty and organised in the protocols thereto.
The governments did not seem to agree that the
revision should go any further and, in fact, there
does not seem to have been a consensus in
favour of altering other parts of the treaty. Some
would have liked to delete the provisions
relating to economic, cultural and social
co-operation between signatory countries
because the exercise of WEU's responsibilities
in these areas has been transferred either to the
European Community or to the Council of
Europe. In fact, however, these transfers have
facilitated and improved the application of the
modified Brussels Treaty and had no adverse
effects. On the contrary, it may be useful to
retain a link between Europe's security and its
economic, social and cultural activities by
making member countries' accession subject to
endorsement of the principle of coherence
between the various aspects of their co-
operation. This link is worth recalling now that
many Central European countries, whether or
not members of the Warsaw Pact, are planning
sweeping changes in their external policies.
64. It would obviously be dangerous to asso-
ciate Central and Eastern European countries
with the organisation of European security if
they were not prepared to develop the other
aspects of European co-operation. The diffr-
culties encountered in implementing the final
act of the cscE in Helsinki as from 1975
showed clearly, in particular with the devel-
opment of the opposition in Czechoslovakia, on
the one hand that ddtente was indivisible and on
the other that the CSCE does not offer a firm
enough framework to ensure the implemen-
tation of principles on which participants seem
to have agreed. The presence, among the
thirty-frve countries participating in the CSCE,
of neutral and non-aligned states and countries
with very varied views on their security would
make it extremely diflicult to give it permanent
structures to replace those set up by the West
over a period of more than forty years.
Moreover, the international structures set up by
the Soviet Union for Central and Eastern
Europe now seem too weakened to be able to
play an effective r6le in the organisation of
tomorrow's Europe. It is therefore important for
the organisations created by the West since 1945
to remain and to be able to take in any countries
really determined to join them, but this opening
to the East must not endanger the cohesion of
Western Europe as affrrmed with ever-
increasing strength over the years. Without
attempting to encroach on the prerogatives of
other organisations, WEU, backed by Articles I,
II and III of the modified Brussels Treaty, asso-
ciates co'operation in security matters with
co-operation in economic, social and cultural
matters. This is a necessary fail-safe device that
the CSCE cannot offer countries taking part in
it.
65. The future well-being of Europe may well
depend on the construction of a new linkage
between the East and the West. NATO and the
Warsaw Pact have, in effect, ensured peace for
forty years, but now we have to examine a fresh
sceriario. It is doubtful if there is a strong desire
to create yet another permanent organisation,
except amongst the bureaucrats, and it would be
preferable to build upon the democratic struc-
tures we now possess. The work of the CSCE
could be parcelled out in three or four ways.
Economic matters might be placed with the
European Parliament or with OECD, whose
activities are overseen in annual debate at the
Council of Europe. Security affairs would go
either to WEU or remain with a CSCE which
was summoned to meet every two or three years
and which would not require a pennanent secre-
tariat. Matters relating to human rights fal
squarely into the realm of the Council of Europe
without any real difficulty. In all the preceding
suggestions it goes without saying that the
United States, Canada and the Soviet Union
must be associated in the work of OECD, WEU
and the Council of Europe in ways which are
acceptable to all parties and which will ensure a
democratic parliamentary oversight of their
work.
66. Finally, the Assembly, while specifying in
Recommendation 472 that it wished to
'maintain the provision in Article IX for the
Assembly to be composed of delegations from
the national parliaments of member countries ",
has always made it plain that it was not com-
mitted to those delegations remaining those
appointed to the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe. The Portuguese and Spanish
Parliaments, on the one hand, and the Federated
Group of Christian Democrats and European
Democrats of our Assembly, on the other, have
said they wished national parliaments to be rep
resenteci in the two European assemblies by
wholly or partly separate delegations if they so
desired. Such a decision would relieve the
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present excessively heavy burden on representa-
tives and allow parliamentarians who are more
interested in areas within the purview of one or
other assembly to play a better part in work that
corresponds to their interests.
67. In present circumstances, however, there
are other questions, including that of whether
arms controls will not have to be restored
because of East-West agreements, particularly in
regard to Germany as a whole. It is obviously
too soon to express an opinion on this matter,
which is subject to decisions on disarmament
that have to be taken in the framework of the
CFE negotiations or on the status of Germany in
that of the two plus four. We must also consider
whether member countries will have to
undertake to make a minimum military effort
for joint security, if only to participate actively
in verifying any arms control agreements that
may be concluded in the framework of the CFE
negotiations and implementing the " open
skies " agleement. Verification under the CFE
agreement and by the CSCE will clearly be a
national responsibility in most cases, but
co-ordination of information, standards and
training will be vital and WEU has a part to play
on this front. It is gratifuing that the Council took
decisions at its ministerial meeting on 23rd April
1990 in order to advance in this direction.
68. Discussions on these various factors,
which have only just started, have shown that
there are several possible courses for WEU to
follow in the coming years, although it is ndt yet
clear which will prove appropriate.
69. (a) What some, particularly in the Eastern
European countries, know about WEU is essen-
tially that it is European, includes none of the
superpowers and, for some forty years, has guar-
anteed that the Federal Republic had none of
the anns it renounced in 1954, especially
nuclear weapons. Hence they consider WEU to
be an instrument capable, in the future, of pro-
tecting a Europe in which the Eastern European
countries have taken their place, at one and the
same time against a possible attempt by the
Soviet Union to regain its influence and against
the re-emergence of German military power.
They could therefore consider countries which
are now members of the Warsaw Pact joining
WEU.
70. As yet, no one seems to have made a
detailed assessment of what such a European
security organisation might be. It takes little
account of the link that exists between WEU and
NATO. In particular, the question of the
accession of non-member countries of the
Atlantic Alliance to Article V of the modified
Brussels Treaty would disrupt the European
security system with what might become very_
serious consequences, either in the event of
certain signatories having difliculties in their
relations with one of the superpowers or in the
event of crises breaking out in Eastern Europe
over matters relating to frontiers or national
minorities, for instance. It does not seem,
therefore, that the idea of enlarging WEU to
include Eastern European countries, apart from
the case of reunified Germany, is practical at
present.
71. (D/ Conversely, some United States and
European analysts consider WEU to be merely a
rather inactive group of member countries of the
Atlantic Alliance and hence a subsidiary body of
NATO intended mainly to ensure that member
countries assume a greater share of the burden
of joint defence carried out in NATO. The per-
ception of WEU in the United States was much
enhanced by the action in the Gulf in 1988 but,
although the administration still has a good
opinion of it, WEU is now falling back to its pr+
vious position of being unrecognised by Con-
gress and the public.
72. Such a concept was largely justified in the
days when NATO ensured the military
deployment of allied forces in Europe. It might
be far less so once it seems that the political
vocation of the Atlantic Alliance has to be juxta-
posed with, if not take over from, its military
rOle and Europe has to play a far greater r6le in
the alliance. Admittedly, if WEU can help to
make Europeans accept the burdens of joint
defence with better grace, it will remain a useful
instrument, but it will be able to play this r6le
effectively only insofar as it also has a political
r6le that allows its members to consult each
other on security matters, relating inter alia to
regions not covered by the Washington Treaty,
and to work out truly European concepts in this
atea.
73. (c) WEU will certainly have to seekapath
between these two extremes. It can derive two
aspects of its new vocation from the first
concept. On the one hand, if necessary, it would
guarantee, vis-i-vis the Soviet Union and its
allies, that all its members, and in particular
reunified Germany, would continue to pursue a
peaceful policy, and, on the other, it would
establish and develop links with the Eastern
European countries so as to bring about a better
knowledge and better mutual understanding of
the concerns of all in security matters to allow
negotiations to be held in an appropriate
framework, and in the CSCE in particular, on
aspects of a new European order: security, main-
taining the alliances, levels of armaments, force
deployment and arms control from all stand-points of direct interest to the Western
European countries. This would apply inter alia
to application of the CFE agxeements and the
verification measures they involve, the * open
skies' agreement and agreements on
confidence-building measures which may
emanate from the CSCE summit meeting to be
held in autumn 1990.
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74. The second concept suggests that WEU
might play a rOle in assessing on a continuing
basis the nature and magnitude of any threats to
Western Europe and the efforts member coun-
tries would have to make to counter them and
make public opinion understand the need to
maintain a level of forces and armaments com-
mensurate with the situation.
75. This would be an important rOle since the
threat would stem far less from the deployment
of forces of the Warsaw Pact, or even the Soviet
Union alone, than from new problems seeing the
light ofday because ofthe reduction in, or even
dilappearance of; the Soviet military presence in
Central and Eastern Europe. Although it is to be
hoped that the CSCE will define the principles
that should govern the establishment of a new
European order, particularly in regard to respect
for fiontiers and the rights of national minor'
ities, there is little chance that such an
organisation will immediately be able to settle
thE specific problems that will inevitably be
raised by the implementation of these prin-
ciples. Since the West may well for a long time
tocome be alone in having sound international
structures, it will have to assume responsibility
for meeting any threats to peace that may arise
in Central and Eastern Europe. Events in recent
months in Bulgaria, over the Turkish minority,
in the Soviet Union, over the Romanian popu-
lation of Moldavia, and the Baltic republics,
over the Hungarian minority in Romania, and
above all in Yugoslavia, where the survival of
the state seems to be in question, not only
because of Albanian unrest in Kosovo but also
because of the break between the Slovenian and
Croat communist parties and the essential
Serbian Yugoslav party, indicate that Europe's
security wil require wide-ranging, continuing
diplomatic action in order to counter such chal'
lenges to European stability.
76. Furthermore, particularly in the Middle
East, powers have emerged that have recently
acquired ballistic missiles of suffrciently long
range to be able to reach Western Europe and
weapons using the most advanced technology,
thus including them to a growing extent in
Western Europe's security zone. The enormous
growth throughout the world of Moslem funda-
mentalism is a menace to both East and West.
We have seen its effects in Iran and in the Soviet
Union, and it is unlikely to remain quiescent in
other places. Firm resolve by both West and
East will be needed to control it, and we have a
responsibility to inform our populations so they
can play their part in a constructive - not racist
- 
campaign. An examination of the threat from
that enlaryed zone is now among the tasks of any
organisation whose purpose is to ensure
Europe's security, whereas it is not among
NATO's responsibilities. This obviously does
not imply that useful consultations are necessary
on thia foatter with the American members of
NATO or even, if necessary, with the Soviet
Union or any other country concerned.
77. This being so, there is a wide range of sub'jects that the WEU member countries 4ight
handle either in the framework of the Com-
munity or in that of NATO or the CSCE and on
which there can be consultations only in
WEU.
78. (a/ Member countries' ministers should
pay particular attention to the question of
Western European countries' share of joint
defence since the coming deadline for the single
European market at the beginning of 1993
means that they must examine the distortions
that will affect the operation of that market due
to the varying proportion of member countries'
GNP earmarked in defence budgets for joint
security. In abolishing the WEU Standing Arma-
ments Committee, the governments chose to
tackle problems linked with joint production in
the IEPG. However, while this association of
users applies procedure for cooperation at tech'
nical level, it does not provide the necessary
political framework. WEU's vocation, on the
contrary, is to give the necessary political
impetus to such co-operation at intergovern-
mental level, as underlined by the WEU Council
since 1985. This impetus has become increas-
ingly necessary as d6tente has led certain coun-
triEi to consider drastic cuts in the equipment of
their armed forces.
79. Political impetus by WEU in this area
should follow two lines:
- 
The consequences should be drawn
from past, present and foreseeable cutsin member countries' military
investment so as to avoid such cuts
Ieading to over-long delays and allow
European industries to maintain the
highest level of advanced technology.
The reductions that are foreseeable and
have already started in the markets that
national armed forces represent,
together with growing production costs,
mean there must be co-oPeration in:
(il establishing a concerted definition
of arms and defence equiPment
requirements by means of Per-
manent consultations between
member countries' military head-
quarters;
(ii) defining programmes that meet
Europets new security needs and in
particular, in Present circum-
stances, the requirements of verifi-
cation;
(iii) research and develoPment bY
pooling results obtained in this
area;
(iv/ production.
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- 
It should be ensured that there is a fair
sharing of military burdens and
expenditure, not only between the
European and American members of
the alliance but also between European
countries.
80. (b) One of WEU's essential r6les should
be to help to establish a new security order asso-
ciating Eastern and Western European countries
in areas for which WEU is responsible:
(/ by giving the Eastern European coun-
tries a guarantee that commitments
entered into in the context of disarm-
ament agreements will be respected,
be it for the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons, a ban on chemical
weapons or limiting the level of
forces and conventional weapons;
(ii) by ensuring that Western European
countries are able to take part in veri-
fying such agreements in conditions
that they have or will have prescribed
by means of a constant exchange of
information and the pooling of
implementing methods such as the
training of inspectors and the use of
observation means, particularly from
the air and in space;
(iii) by promoting consultations intended
to specify European security require-
ments for arms, the deployment of
forces and everything relating to
confidence-building and security
measures.
81. (c) ln any event, WEU's vocation, as
defined in the platform adopted in The Hague,
is modified neither by the trend of East-West
relations nor by any of the decisions taken in the
framework of the European Community. This
vocation is to guarantee the security of member
countries in face ofany external threat, whether
or not from Eastern Europe, by ensuring
cohesion of military deployment and foreign
policy with due respect for the full sovereignly
of states. Because of continued Soviet military
power, the questions raised by Eastern European
countries again having a free hand in their
external policies and more internal democracy
and the growing military power of a number of
non-European countries, this cohesion which, to
the benefit of Europe's security and peace,
makes the most of the means of deterrence and
defence available to member countries, must not
be renounced.
82. At the present juncture, the modified
Brussels Treaty, due in particular to its Articles
V and VIII (apart from the provisions relating to
arms control), corresponds more than ever to
this aim and the course followed in the Council's
work in 1989 conforms with these requirements.
However, in the absence of conclusions, it does
not fulfil them completely, if only to the extent
that the Council has never managed to accom-
plish one of the tasks it set itself in 1986, i.e. to
inform public opinion of the threats to
European security and the efforts member coun-
tries had to make to meet them. Action by the
Assembly or the Secretary-General in this area
cannot make up for the Council's constant
failures. Everyone sees WEU as being first of all
the Council and if it does not manage to explain
to the public the nature and importance of what
it does it is not assuming its due r6le. The fact
that a very short communiqud was published,
for the first time in 1990, after rare meetings at
non-ministerial level is not enough to offset this
failing. Conversely, there is every reason to
welcome the publication of a more substantial
communiqu6 at the close of the ministerial
meeting in Brussels on 23rd April.
83. A very senior NATO official usefully drew
your Rapporteur's attention to the drawbacks of
the inadequacy of information issued by the
WEU Council on the organisation's activities
for the smooth running of the alliance. He
believed the impression that WEU was acting
secretly made the American members of NATO
and European mernbers not members of WEU
fear that a bloc of countries pursuing action dif-
ferent from that of their allies might be formed
within the Atlantic Alliance. The existence of
the parliamentary Assembly and the Council's
obligation to submit an annual report to it were
intended to avoid the development of secret
diplomacy with the mistrust it might have
aroused. However, the way the Council, in
recent years and in particular since the reacti-
vation of WEU, has restricted its communica-
tions to the Assembly and the public helps to
make public opinion wonder whether there has
really been reactivation and, wrongly, to arouse
suspicion among allied countries.
84. It may be thoughl that the Institute for
Security Studies which the Council decided to
set up in WEU in November 1989 and which is
due to start work on lst July 1990 will give it the
wherewithal to respond to the needs stemming
from the new trend of European security. Thii
will have to be ensured by means of informatioh
and political action as much as by military
deployment. It remains to specifo the tasks
assigned to the institute to ensure that it meets
the real needs of the decade ahead. However, it
is a pity it has not yet been decided to collocate
the WEU ministerial organs in Brussels close to
NATO headquarters because this would facil-
itate the necessary cooperation between two
organisations which are more than ever comple-
mentary.
85. As long as Eastern Europe has not become
stabilised, the German problem has not been
solved and a new, peaceful order has not been
established in Europe, WEU's r6le will remain
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primarily to ensure Western Europe's partici-
pation in an Atlantic Alliance which, as a
itructure, is still essential for the confidence of
all in peace itself. The scale of this participation
may evolve with that of the presence of
American forces in Western Europe, with the
development of negotiations and the conclusion
of arms control agxeements and with the estab-
lishment, particularly in the context of the
CSCE, of new relationships based on greater
confidence between eastern and western coun-
tries, but it will always be essential because
Europe cannot rely on others to ensure its
security without jeopardising its own freedom.
Y. Conclusions
86. The rate of developments in Eastern
Europe in the last six months has made it impos-
sible for western governments to work out a
really concerted answer to all the questions thus
raised. Today there is still considerable mystery
about the very nature of events within the
member countries of the Warsaw Pact, not to
speak of their relations with Moscow. It would
be very hazardous to try to diagnose the Soviet
Unionis present power. There is a considerable
divergence between proposals made in public by
political leaders, positions adopted by their rep
resentatives in the many disarmament-related
negotiations and the actual reduction in force
lev;els, and no one can know on what basis to
start reflecting on the future of European
security. Similarly, the state is collapsing so fast
in the German Democratic Republic that every-
thing now indicates that it will not be possible to
apply in time the wise provisions worked out by
governments, with a rapidity albeit ra{e in diplo-
matic practice, to include the reunification of
Germany in the more far-reaching oryanisation
of a pea&ful order in Europe. Since the future of
WEU depends on how these various questions
are solved, it is very difficult to say much that is
firm on the subject today.
87. However, precisely because of the prolife-
ration ofevents and the extent ofuncertainty, it
would probably be wise today to try, as far as
possible, to safeguard those elements which have
ensured Europe's security for the last forty years
and adapt them to new requirements. Just as the
European Community has decided to gather
strength in the exercise of its responsibilities to
tackle in the right conditions a policy of openingto Eastern Europe and assistance to and
co-operation with any Warsaw Pact countries so
wishing, the Atlantic Alliance must strengthen
its political structures before proceeding to the
measures to limit forces and arms that develop-
ments in East-West relations in Europe are now
making possible. At the same time, it must
acquire the necessary means to implement dis-
armament agreements, in particular the verifi-
cation aspect. WEU must first facilitate adap
tation of the alliance to new circumstances by
inducing member countries to continue to stand
together in ddtente and disarmament as they did
when there was a more obvious threat. This
implies that, after due preparation, they must
tackle in the WEU Council all the questions
raised by western cohesion at this new juncture:
the status of reunified Germany, current mil-
itary deployment, European participation in
verifying anns limitation agrcements and
co-operation in armaments matters. There is no
doubt that the Council has grasped the extent of
these tasks, to judge by the description of inter-
governmental activity in the framework of WEU
as described in successive letters from the Secre-
tary-General to the President of the Assembly.
88. The communiqud issued in Brussels at the
close of the ministerial meeting on 23rd April
shows that it had learned certain practical
lessons:
- 
the decision to open the national
inspection teams set up to verify the
CFE agreement and aPPIY the open-
skies r6gime to include inspectors from
other WEU member countries, which
allows all member countries to play an
effective part in these inspections;
- 
the joint definition of parameters for a
system of interconnected data bases
which has been * taken into account'
by NATO;
- 
the decision to consider, on the basis of
concrete proposals, the possibility of
establishing a satellite verification
agency, as requested by the Assembly;
- 
recognition of the opportuneness of
establishing contacts for two-way infor-
mation with the new democratically-
elected governments in Eastern
Europe.
89. However this may be, the Council has not
yet managed to convince public opinion of the
importance of the European dimension of
security problems. Accelerating ev-ents in
Eastern Europe and in the vast area of disarm-
ament mean that it must take much swifter
action than has been the case hitherto.
90. In any event, at present WEU is still there
to resort to and must be kept intact to allow
Europe to play its proper part in organising its
own iecurity if, on the one hand, NATO does
not manage to meet the essential requirements
of this security in full or if, on the other, the
policy of opening towards the East embarked
upon by the European Community does not
aflow it to take action in areas not explicitly
within its purview. This r6le has been that of
WEU since the outset and recent developments
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in Europe offer no reason to call this in
question.
91. The western world is at the crossroads 
- 
a
choice of routes is open for the first time in over
four decades. One road is the old, dark, battle-
scarred road which we have been following up to
now. The second seems to lead directly to
distant sunny uplands, but there are shadowy
pqtcheq on the.way which may conceal dangers.
The third looks longer, but winds its way more
clearly towards the point at which one will be
able to see a further clear stretch ahead.
92. We in Europe, as a pillar of the NATO
Alliance, must take this last highway, which has
several lanes which sometimes converge and at
other times diverge, but to reach oui mutual
goal they must come together again and stay that
way.
93. In this fashion we shall be better able to
seize the new opportunities that are available,
which can lead to that common European house
whic_h has been forty years in the making and in
the final building of which our North American
partners have a vital r6le.
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Dmft Renmrnenfution
^no'my#i:'&yry#';;i."wf:#:*,tions
(t) 
. 
THe Assplr{sLv is aware that it is important for WEU to take full advantage of the work of the
various research institutes concerned with security ?nd defence and which are iapable of exercising
considerable influence on public qpinion and politicians, thus contributing to the inlargement of th6public debate on these questions;(ir) It welcomes therefore the fact that the organisation of relations with such institutes in and
beyond Western Elrope and-the development of greater public awareness of European security ques-
tions are among the tasks of the newly-created WEU Inititute for Security Studi6s;(iil lt_is gratified that according to the Council's reply to Recommendation 474 the institutes's
unclassified work will be widely available to the public;
(iv) 
-It is happy that one of the tasks of the institute will be to establish and keep upto.date a databank for research and information purposes;
(v) 
_ 
lt recalls that its services have so far no means of access to computerised documentation systems
established in various research institutes and documentation centres;(vil It considers the advantages WEU could derive from closer collaboration with appropriate non-
gov_ernmental organisations capable of giving maximum publicity to the organisation's iirns, initiatives
and achievements and promoting a public awareness of Europ6an security questions in ail countries
concerned.
THe Assrusly therefore Rscorr,rurNos that the Council:
l. Grant the WEU Institute for Security Studies the broadest possible independence for its work,
including the development of fruitful relations with parliamentarians, the media and the public and foi
establishing an active information policy;
2. Allow the Assembly appropriate access to the institute's documentation data base for its own
work;
3. With the help of the institute, develop closer co-operation with those international non-
governmental organisations which are particularly representative within the organisation's sphere of
competence-P{, by their activities,-are capable of contributing to promoting a European-security
identity and inform the Assembly of the action taken.
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Draft Order
" 
n 
"' mfr!; T!;f#,,#, ffi ';w'tf:#:n isat io ns
THr AssrMsly considers the advantages to be derived from closer collaboration with non-
governmental organisations capable of giving maximum publicity to.the Assembly's aims, iniliatives
Ind achievementi and promoting publiCawaieness of European security questions in all countries con-
cerned.
Tss Asseuuy therefore instructs its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations:
To examine how to organise a working relationship between the Assembly and appropriate non-
governmental organisations Concerned with European security and defence and report on this matter.
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Expbnatory Memorandum
@ubmitted by Mr. Stegagaini, Rapponeu)
I. Introduction
l. Recommendation 467 on the establish-
ment of a European institute for advanced
security studies was not the first sign of the
importance the Assembly attaches to defence
and security research. In April 1986, the report
by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations on the promotion of parliamentary
and public interest in WEU matters presentedby Mrs. Fischer had already suggested
improving contacts with institutes that were
capable of exercising considerable influence on
public opinion and politicians. The committee
therefore took advantage of its visit to Portugal
on 8th and 9th November 1989 to obtain infor-
mation on the activities of the Portuguese
National Defence Institute in Lisbon.
2. The Council's l3th November 1989
decision to create the WEU Institute for
Security Studies gave a new dimension to
thinking on this subject insofar as the Council
instructed the institute to co-operate with insti-
tutes in member countries to encourage greater
awareness of European security-related matters
and to establish contacts with institutes in other
countries, including those of Warsaw Pact coun-
tries. It is now time therefore for the Assembly
to explain what its interest is in regard to the
work of the research institutes concerned.
3. Similarly, consideration should be given
to possibilities of developing and making gtreater
use of WEU and its Assembly's relations with
non-governmental organisations concerned with
defence and European security matters, a
question which has so far been neglected
somewhat. However, the information report on
parliaments, public opinion and defencer pre-
sented on behalf of the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations by Mr. Eysink in
December 1985 stressed the importance of
intensifying links with appropriate non-
governmental organisations, the purpose being
" to ensure that these organisations take due
account of WEU and its Assembly in their own
work'.
4. The r6le of non-governmental organ-
isations in extending the frameworks in which
matters for which WEU is responsible might be
discussed with the public was also referred to by
Mr. Terlezki in his report on parliamentary and
public relations 2, adopted by the Assembly in
December 1986. However, it seems WEU has
not yet taken the proper steps to be able to take
l. Document 1038.
2. Document 1080.
full advantage of the existence of
non-governmental organisations working in its
area of responsibility. This is the subject of the
second part (Chapter III) of this report, whose
aim is to make a few firm proposals in this con-
nection.
II. Research institates
(i) Analysis of the utivities and specifrc featurcs
of the iastitutes concened
5. In the context of this study, your
Rapporteur asked the secretariat to contact
about a hundred research institutes, mostly in
Western Europe, for information on their activ-
ities and statutes, a description of their aims,
their annual reports and lists of their publica-
tions and institutions with which they are in
contact.
6. So far, forty-one institutes located in
fifteen countries have submitted useful infor-
mation about their activities. They include two
institutes in Belgium, eight in France, six in
Germany, four in Italy, two in the Netherlands,
one in Spain and eight in the United Kingdom,
representing thirty-one institutes in seven WEU
member countries. Regarding Portugal, the com-
mittee obtained interesting information on the
activities of the Portuguese National Defence
Institute during its visit to Lisbon in November
r 989.
7. The remaining ten institutes which
replied to the questionnaire are divided as
follows: one institute in Norway, one in Switz-
erland, one in Greece, one in Denmark, one in
Ireland, two in Sweden and one in the United
States.
8. Based on the information submitted by
the abovementioned establishments about insti-
tutions with which they are in contact, a non-
exhaustive list ofrelevant research institutes has
been drawn up r. Furthefinore, at the commit-
tee's request, the Rapporteur's working paper
discussed at the committee meeting on 5th
March 1990 has been sent to all member delega-
tions to allow them to study it, make remarks
and if necessary, complete the list of research
institutes and non-governmental organisations.
The United Kingdom Delegation has submitted
a revised list of United Kingdom research insti-
tutes and non-governmental organisations on
3. See Appendix I. Some universities are included although
this study covers first and foremost specific research insti-
tutes.
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the basis of which Appendices I and II of the
report have been completed.
9. It is clear that the statutes and aims of
the establishments concerned are very diverse.
There are international institules which are inde-
pendent, such as the International Institute
for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, the
Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute (SIPRI), the International Peace Research
Institute (PRIO) in Oslo, the International
Peace Research Institute (GIPRI) in Geneva.
Others depend on international organisations
such as the United Nations Institute for Disarm-
ament Research (UNIDIR) or the European
Institute for Public Administration (EIPA) in
Maastricht or the NATO Defence College in
Rome.
10. At national level there are various
important establishments which are inde-
pendent or set up by and responsible to national
governments. In regard to the subjects they
handle, it must be recalled that the work of the
Assembly and its three political committees
covers every aspect of security. It is therefore
evident that it should be interested in all kinds
of research in this connection, i.e. the work of:
- 
institutes specialising in foreign policy
and international affairs;
- 
establishments dealing more particu-
larly with security, defence and disarm-
ament matters;
- 
establishments handling technical and
scientific aspects;
- 
those examining industrial and eco-
nomic aspects;
- 
those dealing with the evolution of
public opinion in security matters.
Whereas the Assembly's political committees
should deal mainly with the extent to which
institutes are prepared to assist the Assembly in
its work and take due account of its activities in
their research, the Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations should give priority to
ascertaining how far these research institutes are
prepared to develop public debate.
ll. The impact on the public is supposed to
be less evident for institutes directly dependent
on defence ministries which are primarily con-
cerned with training military personnel. How-
ever, when the committee visited the Portuguese
National Defence Institute in Lisbon on 9th
November 1989, it was impressed by the insti-
tute's efforts to make public opinion as a whole
aware of defence problems and to organ-
ise lectures and courses open to those working in
public and private sectors, education, science,
politics, etc.
12. An important factor that might foster
awareness of WEU-related matters is the
training of officials in all European countries.
There the European Institute for Public Admin-
istration in Maastricht made some useful contri-
butions in 1985 and 1988 although its aims
are first and foremost to contribute to the
co-operation and integration in the European
Community.
13. National research institutes working on
specific questions raised by their parliaments or
governments such as the German Foundation
for Science and Politics (Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik) in Ebenhausen near Munich can
have an important influence on decision-makers
and parliamentarians.
14. Among institutes with independent status,
close co-operation has been developed between
the following four establishments in particular:
- 
the French Institut des relations
internationales (IFRI) (Institute for
International Relations) in Paris;
- 
the Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen
Gesellschaft fiir Auswflrtige Politik(Research Institute of the German
Foreign Policy Association) in Bonn;
- 
the Royal Institute of International
Affairs (RIIA) Chatham House, in
London; and
- 
the Istituto affari internazionali (IAI)(Institute for International Affairs) in
Rome.
15. These four institutes, which of course
have contacts with various similar bodies in
Europe and throughout the world, for instance
the Council on Foreign Relations (COFR) in
New York, co-operate closely in areas of interest
to WEU and its Assembly. Thus, on 22nd and
23rd November 1988, three of them organised a
conference on Western European co-operation
in security and defence matters at the Ch0teau
d'Esclimont near Paris at which the r6le of
public opinion played an important part, but no
conclusions on this matter were made public.
16. An annual four-party meeting on politico-
strategic questions is organised jointly by IFRI,
the Royal Institute of International Affairs(Chatham House, london), the Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik (Ebenhausen) and the
Rand Corporation (Santa Monica, California).
17. In 1985, the abovementioned group of
institutes set up the European Strategy Group(ESG) to determine conditions for studying
security matters in a wider research framework
and to strengthen co-operation with non-
European partners such as the Aspen Strategy
Group (ASG) and the European-American
Institute for Security Research (EAI).
18. In spite of the large number of available
publications emanating from research institutes,
well known for their high standard and compe-
tence, there is a tendency for some of them to
restrict participation in their internal discus-
sions to a small select circle. For instance, in
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1989 the French Institut des relations inter-
nationales launched a new system of restricted
meetings: the IFRI meetings in camera attended
by people working on the most topical questions
of the day. It is therefore particularly important
for relations between the institutes and WEU to
be developed to allow the latter to be heard and
take advantage of the results of their work.
19. In this connection, it would be interesting
to study the statutes of the major institutes in
order to ascertain how an organisation like
WEU might join them in one form or another.
This would be possible, for instance, in the case
of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
(Chatham House) in London of which WEU as
an organisation is a corporate member. Simi-
larly, the International Institute for Strategic
Studies and the French Institute for Interna-
tional Relations allow other organisations tojoin them as corporate members.
20. On the other hand, every Assembly
member is free to seek individual membership
in relevant associations and research institutes
located in his home country, and some of them
are already doing so. Every parliamentarian
should use his membership in such associations
and institutions to propagate the views of the
Assembly.
21. With regard to the public relations effort
of research institutes, it might be useful to study
more thoroughly the relevant activities of the
Uniled States Council on Foreign Relations(COFR), a non-profit and non-partisan organ-
isation dedicated to improving understanding of
American foreign policy and international
affairs. The Council, based in New York and
Washington, has created so-called Committees
on Foreign Relations as member organisations
composed of influential citizens in thirty-eight
major cities across the country. These com-
mittees allow important contributions to be
made to the Council's nationwide educational
mission by offering the opportunity for distin-
guished foreign policy personalities to meet with
influential goups throughout the North
American continent.
22. In a country in which the media play a
crucial r6le in political life, it is natural for the
American Council on Foreign Affairs to have a
strong Public Affairs Department, in order to
increase the visibility of its activities. It hosts
briefings for journalists and has regular contacts
with the televised media. Its senior fellows
appear regularly on major television pro-
gxammes. Furthermore, it might be of special
interest to know that in 1989 the Public Affairs
Department of the COFR finalised a study on
foreign affairs programming on television and
radio. That study surveyed current foreign
affairs programming and recommended alter-
native broadcasting methods for improving the
media's coverage of international affairs. A
summary of the study was published and
received positive reactions from foundations,
educational institutions and the media. The
Council's public affairs efforts include the devel-
opment of new electronic proggamming initia-
tives. The briefings organised by the Council's
Public Affairs Department also include foreign
parliamentarians. The institute has even created
a Public Affairs Advisory Committee, offering
guidance on how the Public Affairs Department
can be more responsive to the needs of the
media.
23. Some of the institutions in Western
Europe which submitted information on their
work attach similar importance to public rela-
tions using different means. The Peace Research
Institute (Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und
Konfliktforschung) in Frankfurt for instance
organises seminars for journalists, press
briefings and exhibitions. Furthernore, it par-
ticipates in working gloups drawing up teaching
guidelines on security policy for schools.
24. The Welsh Centre for International
Affairs in Cardiff concentrates its activities on
education including the creation of an informed
public opinion, work in schools, international
youth service and information.
25. The Information Section of the Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
devotes much of its time to answering factual
queries on defence issues around the world from
members, the media and the public. The
Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) distributes press releases,
booklets and other information material to a
wide range of policy-makers, researchers, jour-
nalists, organisations and the public. A major
press conference is arranged in Stockholm every
year for issuing the SIPRI Yearbook.
26. The Research Institute of the German
Foreign Policy Association organised the first
conference of publishers and chief editors of
European periodicals and magazines dealing
with international relations which took place in
Bonn in Decembei 1988 with the participation
of representatives of Denmark, Finland, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.
The conference agreed to seek better planning
coordination, to envisage simultaneous publica-
tions and eventually to publish a European peri-
odical containing selected articles from different
national publications.
27. These few examples show the very dif-
ferent ways and means chosen by several
research institutes for improving the public
impact of their activities. Some of them might
provide useful impetus for the future public rela-
tions effort of the WEU Institute for Security
Studies.
160
DOCUMENT I226
j
/
(ii) WEU's place in the wor* of rcsearch iastitutes
28. Although it is impossible to collect com-
plete information on the activities of all relevant
research institutes, it seems that several of them
are showing increasing interest in Western
European Union. Already, in May 1985, the
European Institute for Public Administration in
Maastricht (Netherlands) had organised a col-
loquy on the reactivation of WEU and its reper-
cussions on the European Community and its
institutions. Major contributions were made to
the discussions by the President of the Assembly
and the Secretary-General of WEU. Following
this colloquy, the institute published a booklet
on " The reactivation of Western European
Union: the effects of the EC and its institu-
tions ". In 1988, the institute published a study
entitled * Western security in a changing world:
From the reactivation of WEU to the Single
European Act ".
29. In 1989, the Danish Commission on
Security and Disarmament (SND), established
by the Danish Government in 1980, published
an information booklet on Western European
Union. Since it represents the voice of a non-
member country institution, it is worth quoting
extracts from its summary, in order to under-
stand its attitude towards WEU:
* WEU countries have developed a close
co-operation in the fields of information
transfer and as for harmonising attitudes
to security policy. This co-operation has
reached a certain level and is valued by
the main Western European countries. At
the same time, however, the publication
also points out that WEU continues to
exist in the shadow of more powerful
organisations such as NATO and EEC
and its future development remains
uncertain...
The uncertainty surrounding the status of
WEU and its future stems mainly from
the diverging views among members as to
WEU's future rOle and tasks...
The paper points to the fact that several of
the principals would prefer to develop
European political co-operation as a
European pillar in the alliance, rather
than WEU, but also that there is
resistance in some quarters against giving
EPS more of a military dimension
(Ireland). One of the chances for WEU is
that several countries would prefer one
European defence organisation which,
contrary to economic and social devel-
opment, is built up without integration
and with consensus decisions on all
important issues. More recently, contacts
between WEU and NATO have become
closer and there is little doubt that the
potential for development of WEU lies in
a removal of American reservations
against the organisation and the estab-
lishment of an institutional co-operation
or task-sharing with NATO. "
30. The same institute issued a report on
" The European pillar in NATO co-operation as
seen in the context of the European political
co'operation (EPC) and Western European
Union (WEU). " The Royal Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs in London is considering pub-
lishing documentation on Western European
Union in April or May 1990.
31. As more information about WEU appears
in documentation issued by independent institu-
tions which do not represent the organisation's
oflicial position, it becomes more important for
the public also to be kept informed by WEU
itselfand its representatives. It is therefore to be
welcomed that, in September 1989, Mr. van
Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, published a
study entitled " Future European defence
co-operation the r6le of WEU " in the
framework of the European Strategy Group
(ESG), whose presidency is now held by IFRI. A
first step for providing quick basic informationfor the general public was taken by the
Secretariat-General of WEU in April 1990,
when it issued, for the first time, a brief infor-
mation leaflet on Western European Union.
32. One of the priorities recently set by the
Peace Research Institute in FranKurt (Hessische
Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung) is
the foreign and security policies of Western
European defence co-operation. But so far the
institute has made no specific reference to the
r6le of Western European Union in the
matter.
33. The interest of the Royal United Services
Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) in WEU
matters was shown recently when its Newsbrief
published on 30th January 1990 an article on
* WEU and future European defence co-oper-
ation " pleading strongly for an increased r6le
for this organisation, particularly regarding veri-
fication. The Centre for Defence and Disarm-
ament Studies of the University of Hull main-
tains contacts with various defence and security
organisations including WEU.
34. Conversely no such relations were so far
developed with the German Peace Research and
European Security Studies Working Group in
Mosbach (Federal Republic of Germany), which
is concerned in particular with research into
space questions, the SDI, weapons technology
and verification, all matters of main interest for
WEU and particularly for the Assembly's Tech-
nological and Aerospace Committee. According
to the list of some hundred participants from
both East and West who attended the conference
organised by that group in Germany in
December 1989 on verification, arms control
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and European security, WEU was the only
European organisation concerned that was not
represented.
35. Thanks to the contacts established with
this working group in the framework of this
report it was possible to invite its Chairman to
the symposium organised by the Assembly's
Technological and Aerospace Committee in
Rome on27th and 28th March 1990 on * Obser-
vation satellites 
- 
a European means of verifying
disarmament ".
36. Furthermore, it is to be welcomed that,
thanks to the symposia organised frequently by
the Technological and Aerospace Committee,
worthwhile relations have been established
between many technological and industrial
groups and the Assembly of WEU.
37. On the other hand, there are many
examples showing that, among the hundreds of
bodies in existence, many work in areas of
interest to WEU without being aware of its work
and without WEU and its Assembly being aware
of the activities of those bodies. This report
might, therefore, be a first step towards
improving exchanges of information between
WEU and research institutes.
38. Your Rapporteur would also recall the
initiatives that led to the organisation of
European sessions of advanced defence studies,
first in November 1988 by the Institut des
hautes dtudes de d6fense (IHEDN) in Paris and
then in December 1989 in Belgium. An associ-
ation of alumni of these sessions has been set up
under the aegis of WEU. This association should
be better used for enlarging and intensifying the
public debate on European security questions.
39. Your Rapporteur believes that all organs
of WEU should take note of the activities of
research institutes studying particular subjects
which might become major security problems in
the future. Some of them are:
- 
the changing nature of security
problems in the third world (priority
given by the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, IISS);
- 
relationship between politico-military
security and environmental security(priority given by the International
Peace Research Institute, PRIO, in
Oslo and by the Finnish Tampere Peace
Research Institute);
- 
ethnic conflicts in the third world(PRrO);
- 
the security questions resulting from
refugees and minorities problems (these
issues are studied particularly by the
Institut frangais de pol6mologie and
the Belgian Helsinki Committee in
Brussels).
- 
social aspects of security, political psy-
chology and peace education (priority
given by the Peace Research Institute in
FranKurt and by Tampere Peace
Research Institute);
- 
conflict management and conflict resolu-
tion (T ampere Peace Research Institute).
40. For the Committee for Parliamentary and
Public Relations it would be of particular
interest to develop contacts with all institutes
observing the evolution of public opinions.
There are various opinion poll institutes in
Western Europe and also a public opinion
research Institute in Prague. Since the public
perception of security problems is a crucial
matter, WEU and its newly-created Institute for
Security Studies should not overlook estab-
lishing links with this kind of research
institute.
(iii) The crcatioa of thc WEA Institate
lor Security Studies
41. It is gratifying that one of the tasks which
the WEU Council has assigned to the newly-
created institute is " to encourage and help the
existing institutes in the member states " and
* in collaboration with existing institutes,
organise meetings with institutes in countries
not belonging to Western Europe, particularly
those in the Warsaw Pact countries ".
42. It is not for the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations to establish
methods of work for future co-operation
between the institute and the Assembly.
However, after the Council decided to place the
institute under its authority and instruct it to
conduct research * principally for the Council',
the question is to what extent will the Assembly
be able to benefit from its activities and, in par-
ticular, the relations it establishes with outside
research bodies.
43. According to paragrcph 5 of the minis-
terial decision of l3th November 1989:
* The Assembly may, with the Council's
approval, assign to the institute studies
relating to the Assembly's own activities.
The Assembly shall have access to the
results of the institute's unclassified
work. "
44. Following his appointment by the Council
as Director of the institute, Mr. John Roper
said a: ' One of the objectives of the institute is
both to provide papers for the governments but
also 
- 
and I hope this will be the bulk of our
work 
- 
to make available documents for the
public. One of our purposes is to help stimulate
and add to the general debate on these
important issues of security and defence in
4. Interview in the
January 1990.
(
\
162
International Herald Tribune, 22nd
(
DOCUMENT 1226
I
Europe. " It would be very desirable for the
independence that the Council grants the
institute in conducting its research to be inter-
preted in the widest possible sense so that the
Assembly and European public opinion may
derive greater benefit from the institute's activ-
ities than it did from the former agencies for
security questions.
45. Furthermore, it would be most desirable
for the Council to grant the institute all the
financial and technical means to ensure the visi-
bility of its activities in the eyes of public
opinion and the media.
46. Another area of interest for the Assembly
is the task assigned to the institute to * establish
and keep up-to-date a data bank for the pur-
poses of research into the defence efforts ofthe
WEU member countries and for studies relating
to European security ". For documentation pur-
poses, the Assembly has hitherto been working
in conditions that do not correspond to the level
that most national parliaments and interna-
tional assemblies have for long considered
essential if they are to operate properly.
47. The Assembly has no computerised
means of handling documentation and thus has
no access to external data banks. This is particu-
larly regrettable since most documentation
centres and libraries belonging to parliaments,
governments and research institutes now have
remarkable documentation services, sometimes
with very sophisticated technical facilities with
which the Assembly cannot communicate.
48. It may therefore be wondered whether it
will be possible to establish close co-operation
between the relevant Assembly services and
those of the institute so that the Assembly may
take full advantage of the computerised docu-
mentation system which will be procured for the
institute. In any event, the Assembly must have
access to all means of documentation and infor-
mation necessary for its own work.
49. In establishing an Assembly library, there
should be exchanges of documents, publications,
periodicals and books with institutes working in
the same field as the WEU Assembly. There
should also be exchanges of information on pro-
grammes of work and the dates, places and
agendas ofconferences organised by the various
institutes.
III. WEU and non-governmental organisations
concerned with security issues
50. In Europe, there are many non-
governmental national and international
organisations dealing with matters within the
purview of Western European Union, but our
organisation has never really taken advantage of
their existence to serve as a " conveyor belt "
between the general public and WEU.
51. Non-governmental organisations include
all kinds of associations, movements and groups
independent of governments. They each have
their own area of activity and work on a non-
profit making basis. Examples of groups which
might be of interest to WEU are listed at
appendix to this report 5.
52. In Mr. Terlezki's report on parliamentary
and public relations 6, he recalled that an
Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) was set up in
the framework of NATO " in 1954 as an interna-
tional non-governmental organisation composed
by the national member associations existing in
all NATO member countries on a voluntary
private basis.... It created special progmmmes
such as the Atlantic Education Committee and
the Atlantic Association of Young Political
Leaders ".
53. Whereas the ATA's annual conferences
provide a major public forum allowing political
and military leaders from the alliance to com-
municate information, there is nothing compa-
rable at the level of Western European Union.
54. However, there is no lack of initiatives of
various kinds in this sense. The creation of the
association of alumni of European sessions of
advanced defence studies under the auspices of
WEU, for instance, is the sign of growing
awareness that bodies are needed to convey to
the general public the idea of a European
identity in defence and security matters, in
order to strengthen the European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance.
55. It would be a great help for all these initia-
tives if public opinion were better informed
about the specifics of Western European Union
and the areas in which this organisation alone is
authorised to play a rOle. Various interested
associations would thus be in a position to prop-
agate the fact that:
(/ WEU's aim is to * preserve the
principles of democracy, personal
freedom and political liberty, the
constitutional traditions and the rule
of law ", to 'strengthen the eco-
nomic, social and cultural ties
between their members, to afford
each other assistance " in accordance
" with the Charter of the United
Nations in maintaining international
peace and security and in resisting
any policy of aggression " and " to
promote the unity and to encour-
age the progressive integration of
Europe ";
(ii) on the basis of Article V of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, WEU consti-
tutes a defensive alliance far more
5. Appendix II.
6. Document 1080, lTth November 1986.
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binding than the North Atlantic
Treaty or any other treaty in force
since it commits the forces of all the
member countries unconditionally in
the event ofan attack on one ofthem
in Europe;
(iii) there is no geographical limit placed
on WEU's security responsibilities
so that at the request of any of its
partners WEU shall consult with
regard to any situation which may
constitute a threat to peace, in
whatever area this threat should
arise (the WEU concerted action in
the Gulf was the first practical appli-
cation of that wEU treaty obli-
gation);
(iv) WEU is the only western forum in
which both foreign affairs and
defence ministers of member coun-
tries are required to meet together
regularly;
(u/ WEU is the first successful case of
an agreement which makes it
incumbent on mainland member
countries not to exceed a certain
levels of forces without unanimous
agreement and to submit their force
levels to the Council for approval,
making all member countries' heavy
weapons subject to verification by
WEU;
(vi) WEU is the only organisation which
has created an instrument with suc-
cessful experience of the control of
armaments freely-accepted by a
group of states with equal rights
which can also offer guarantees for a
future European security system;
(vii) the Assembly of Western European
Union assumes crucial democratic
supervision responsibilities as the
only offrcial international parlia-
mentary body with competence in
defence and security matters based
on an international treaty.
56. A number of WEU representatives have
already taken the opportunity to use contacts
with appropriate NGOs to propagate the
organisation's position. Mr. Goerens, President
of the WEU Assembly, for instance, accepted an
invitation from an association called Young
Europeans for Security ffES) to speak at a
seminar that it organised in Berlin from 4th to
l0th February 1990 on * Which Germany in
which Europe? ". YES is a European youth
organisation set up in the Netherlands in 1985
which endeavours to stimulate awareness of
common interests in security, peace and
democracy as important values in Western
European democracies. It has steadfastly shown
interest in establishing closer contacts with the
Western European Union Assembly.
57. The Belgian Helsinki Committee, a
private organisation interested mainly in the
protection of minority rights and in the
problems of nationalities, has also expressed the
wish to establish closer relations with WEU and
its Assembly. It considers that the fair treatment
of ethnic and minority problems is a necessary
condition for the establishment of a just,
peaceful and secure order in Europe.
58. To take another example at national level,
there is the Deutsches Strategie-Forum (DSF)
(German Strategy Forum) in Bonn, whosg tasks
include helping, through information- and
exchanges of ideas, to bring about awareness of
security and defence policy matters both inside
and outside the Federal Republic of Germany.
For this purpose it organises regular meetings
between persons working in the public sector,
science and the economy and church representa-
tives. At its meeting in Bonn from l4th to l6th
March 1990, Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-
General of WEU, spoke about European
co-operation in security matters.
59. As reflected in his information letter on
the activities of the WEU intergovernmental
organs from 16th November 1989 to l4th
March 1990, the Secretary-General of WEU
continued to make considerable efforts in
addressing conferences of relevant private
organisations and associations interested in
security matters.
60. From an answer to a question put by a
member of the United Kingdom House of
Commons 7, we learn that the British Govern-
ment organises twice-yearly meetings with non-
governmental organisations dealing with arms
control and disarmament. These organisations
include:
- 
the Verification Technology Informa-
tion Centre; and
- 
the European Proliferation Information
Centre.
In the United Kingdom, there are also a British-
American Security Information Council and a
Defence Fax Organisation.
61. The non-governmental organisations with
which WEU might establish useful links might
also include associations of teachers, newspaper
editors, journalists and representatives of
libraries, documentation and research centres
and industry.
62. In order to establish more regular contacts
with non-governmental organisations, WEU
might take advantage of the experience gained
\
\
164
7. Question put by Mr. Cryer and answer by Mr. Walde-grave, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, Hansard, Volume 166, No. 39.
DOCUMENT 1226
i
tI
by the Council of Europe during almost forty
years' experience in this area after having
decided, in 1951, to take the necessary steps to
consult non-governmental organisations hand-
ling matters for which it is responsible. It thus
established working relations with them in
granting them consultative status.
63. The development of relations with non-
governmental organisations concerns the WEU
Council, the Assembly and the newly-created
institute. All WEU organs should be interested
in extending the framework of the public debate
on matters for which they are responsible. The
non-governmental organisations concerned
might be a good additional means of giving
maximum publicity to Western European
Union's initiatives and activities. The Assembly,
for its part, would have to decide to establish
working relations with the non-governmental
organisations and work out ways and means of
doing so.
64. These organisations might be consulted
by the relevant Assembly organs on matters of
mutual interest. They might submit memoranda
to an Assembly committee and be invited to
give their views, orally or in writing, on matters
on the agenda of the committee concerned.
65. They might receive the Assembly's
agendas and public documents and be invited to
send observers to attend the Assembly's public
sittings, without the right to speak.
IY. Conclusions
66. The establishment of closer relations
between WEU organs and research institutes
and non-governmental organisations concerned
with security and defence is justifred for various
reasons. Whereas the impact of the work of the
research institutes on the public is limited to a
circle of qualified personalities, others have
developed considerable means in order to
establish relations with the media and public
opinion. The experience gained by these institu-
tions and their working results can be very
useful for the Assembly's own activities.
Working relations with them should therefore be
intensified on a reciprocal basis. While it is to be
hoped that the Assembly will benefit from the
external relations that the newly-created WEU
Institute for Security Studies establishes 
- 
and
the Assembly hopes that the independence
granted to the institute will be interpreted in the
widest meaning of the word 
- 
the latter can but
develop its own links with the institutes con-
cerned.
67. Where the r6le of non-governmental
organisations is concerned, it is clear that they
might be an excellent link between the general
public and WEU by giving maximum publicity
to the activities of all WEU organs. For this
puqrcse, procedure for institutionalising liaison
with the organisations concerned should be
introduced in accordance with the above consid-
erations.
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APPENDIX I
Research institutes in WEU member countries,
other European countries and outside Europe
WEU member countries
Belgium
Paul-Henri Spaak Foundation,
Brussels
Institut royal supdrieur de ddfense,
1040 Brussels
Centre europden d'6tudes politiques,
1000 Brussels
Institut europ6en pour la paix et la s6curitd
(IEPS),
1050 Brussels
Comit6 international pour la s6curit6
et la coop6ration en Europe
Groupe d'6tude des politiques europdennes
(GEPE), Brussels
France
Institut frangais des relations internationales(rFRr),
75863 Paris Cedex 14
Fondation nationale des sciences politiques,
75007 Paris
Institut d'histoire des conflits contemporains,
75007 Paris
Institut d'6tudes de d6fense,
75004 Paris
Centre d'6tudes politiques et de soci6t6,
75007 Paris
Fondation pour les 6tudes de ddfense nationale,
75007 Paris
Institut frangais de pol6mologie,
75007 Paris
Centre d'6tudes diplomatiques et strat6giques,
75006 Paris
Institut d'6tudes des relations internationales,
75007 Paris
Centre national de la recherche scientifique(cNRS),
75000 Paris
Fondation m6diterrandenne d'6tudes strat6-
giques,Toulon 
rc6
Institut royal des relations internationales,
1050 Brussels
Vereniging voor Internationale Relaties (VIRA),
Brussels
Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la
paix, 1030 Brussels
Service d'information internationale pour la
paix (IPIS),
2808 Anvers
Centrum voor Polemologie, Vrije Universiteit,
Brussels
Institut des hautes 6tudes de ddfense nationale
(THEDN),
75700 Paris
Qentre des hautes 6tudes d'armement,
Ecole Militaire,
75007 Paris
Institut des hautes 6tudes europdennes,
Centre de documentation europdenne,
67081 Strasbourg Cedex
Centre d'6tudes de prospective strat6gique,
75007 Paris
Fondation du futur,
75007 Paris
Acad6mie de la paix et de la sdcurit6 interna-
tionale,
06000 Nice
Centre international de formation europ6enne(crFE),
06000 Nice
Institut europ6en des hautes etudes internatio-
nales (IEHEI),
06000 Nice
Ecole des hautes dtudes internationales (EHEI),
75000 Paris
Centre d'6tudes des relations entre technologies
et stratdgies (CREST)
Centre interdisciplinaire de recherche sur la paix
et d'6tudes stratdgiques (CIRPES)
\
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Centre europ6en de relations internationales et Institut de relations internationales et strat6-
de strat6gie (CERIS) giques (IRIS),
Paris
Observatoire europden de gdopolitique (OEG), Centre de sociologie de la ddfense nationale
69000 Lyon (CSDN)
Federal Republic of Germany
Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik,
fiir Auswflrtige Politik, 8026 Ebenhausen
5300 Bonn
Peace Research and European Security Studies, Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktfor-
6950 Mosbach schung,
6000 Frankfurt I
Bundesinstitut liir Ostwissenschaftliche und Institut fiir Internationale Angelegenheiten,
Internationale Studien, 2000 Hamburg
5000 Ktiln
Haus Rissen: Internationales Institut fiir Politik Institut fiir Europflische Politik,
und Wirtschaft, 5300 Bonn
2000 Hamburg 56
JANUS, Institut {iir Kernphysik, Fraunhofer Institut fiir Naturwissenschaftlich-Darmstadt Technische Trendanalysen,
Euskirschen
Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Forschungsinstitut der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,
5300 Bonn St. Augustin
Institut fiir Internationale Politik, Institut fiir Friedensforschung und Sicherheits-
I Freie Universitiit Berlin politik,Universitiit Hamburg
I Aspen Institut, Forschungsinstitut fiir Friedenspolitik,7 Berlin Starnberg
Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundes-
wehr (SOWI),
Miinchen
haly
Centro alti studi della difesa, Istituto affari internazionali (IAI),
00165 Roma 00195 Roma
Association italienne d'6tudes de politique Soci6t6 italienne pour I'organisation interna-6trangdre, tionale (SIOI),
00186 Roma 00186 Roma
Centre d'6tudes et de documentation sur la paix Istituto di studi previsione e relazioni interna-
et le ddsarmement, zionali,
00186 Roma 00186 Roma
' C"ntre d'6tudes et de documentation inter- Centre d'6tudes " Manlio Brosio ",nationale, 10128 Torino
10129 Torino
Centre d'6tudes de politique internationale Institut d'6tudes europeennes " Alcide de(CEPI), Gasperi ",
00187 Roma 20121 Milano
Forum Problemi Pace e Guerra
50132 Firenze
Institut d'6tudes et de recherches sur la d6fense Institut italien de pol6mologie et de recherche(ISTRID), sur les conflits,
00186 Roma 20l2l Milano
Institut italien de recherche sur la paix, Institut de recherche sur le d6sarmement et la
86136 Napoli paix, 00198 Roma
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NATO Defence College, National Research Council (CNR),
00144 Roma Istituto Biofisica,
Pisa
Centro militare di studi strategici, Centro studi strategici (CSS),Roma Universitd libre de Rome
Centro studi e documentazione internazionali,
Universitd de Turin
Lurenbury
Institut europ6en pour les questions de s6curit6,
Luxembourg
Naherlands
European Institute of Public Administration, TNO National Defence Research Council,
621I HE Maastricht Den Haag
994tq europden de recherche, Netherlands Institute of International Relations,
2508 DH Den Haag 2509 AB Den Haag
Institut nderlandais sur la paix et la sdcuritd, Institut atlantique de recherche,
2508 CC-Den Haag 25t4 Jt-Den Haag
Portugal
Institut d'€tudes stratdgiques et internationales, National Defence Institute,
16@ Lisboa Lisbon j
\
Spain
Fundacion Jos6 ortega y Gasset, Instituto Nacional de Industria,
28010 Madrid 28071Madrid
Institut espagnol d'6tudes strat6giques, Soci6td d'dtudes internationales,
Madrid 28046 Madrid 14
Institute for International Questions (INCI), Centre d'information et de documentation inter-
28007 Madrid nationale (CIDOB),
Barcelone
Unitd Kiagdom
International Institute for Strategic Studies Royal Institute for International Affairs t0ISS), (Cliatham House), I
London WC2E 7NQ SWly 4LE London
Sovql Cq!_eg_e_ o! Dgfence Studies, Centre for Defence and Disarmament Studies,London SWIX 8NS The University,
HU6 7RX Hull
welsh centre for International Affairs, council of Arms control,
Cardiff CF l3AP London
Institute for European Defence and Strategic Defence Study centre (Dsc),Studies, University of Aberdeen
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Tlp new filc of national delegations in thc octivities
of the WEU Assembly
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Pablic Relations2
by Sir tohn Hunt, Ropporteur
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on the new r6le of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly
Expl-nxnronv MeluonnNpuu
submitted by Sir John Hunt, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. Areas in which the r6le and the activities of national delegations should be
strengthened
(il Strengthening the impact of the Assembly's work in parliaments
(ir/ Strengthening the co-operation between national delegations and the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations
(iii) Enhancing the public image of delegations in member countries
III. The r6le of national delegations in the debate on the forthcoming revision
of the modified Brussels Treaty
IY. Conclusions
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee : Mr. Pontillon (Chairman) ; Mr. Ewing (Alternate: ^EIilI), Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Bdhm) (Yice-
Chairmen) ; MM. Biichner (Alternate: Ahrens), Biihler (Alternate:, Lenzer), Caccia, De Bondt (Alternate: Mrs. Staels-Dompas),
De Hoop Scheffer (Alternate: Dees), Fiandrotti, Gouteyron, Greco, Hardy (Alternate: Parry'1, Sir John Hunt (Alternate: .Sir
GeoJIrey Finsberg\, MM. Kempinaire (Alternate: Picriaux), Kollwelter, Pfuhl, Seitlinger, Sir William Shelton (Alternate:
Wilkinson), MM. Stegagrrini, Tummers (Alternate: Eisma), Vial-Massat.
N.B. Iie names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics
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Dmft Resolution
oa ttu acw *- 
"lfffifliffifi ia thc utititia
(t) THr AsseMsLv recalls t!r! importaqce of taking full advantage of a European parliamentary
system provided by the modified Brussels Treaty in which the existence of del-egatiohs formed iir
national parliaments ensures their full participation in decisions to be taken with regard to future
European security;(it) 
.It regrets that for some time most WEU member governments prefer to avoid public statements
stressing the options offered by this treaty;
(jii) It is convinced therefore that the question of establishing a new peaceful and secure order in
Europe requires enhanced efforts by national delegations to dissehinate tLe Assembly's views and pro.
qosals and to urge member governments to upe the means offered by WEU to respond to all expecta-
tions;
(iv) 
. 
lt yglcomes recent initiatives taken by several delegations and their members to intensify thepublic dialogue with governments on the r6le WEU can play in this matter;(y) It stresses, however, that the rapid communication of information and co-operation between all
delegations, political groups and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations should be
improved,
THS ASSEIVISLY THEREFORE INVITES THE CHntn}'{TN oT NnrloxnI DeIecerIoNs:
1.. 
. 
T9 organise insofar as possible joint delegation initiatives in their parliaments when matters
within the Assembly's competence are being debated, and to ensure that the Assembly's voice is heard
in these debates;
2. To request the governments to report regularly to parliament on the evolution of WEU as is
already done by the German Government and toorganise dlebates on those reports in plenary sitting;
3. 
_ 
To organise regular meetings with the press as is done by the French Delegation and to
endeavour to have articles published in the international press oi appropriate specialised period-
icals;
4. To ensure that the relevant information concerning any WEU related initiatives made by
members in parliaments, committees, political groups or in ihe piess, are transmitted without delay t6
the Commitee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
t76
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Erplanatory Memorandum
(submiltcd by Sit lohn Hunt, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. When studying the subject of the fol-
lowing report, it might be justified to ask why
national delegations to the WEU Assembly
should play a " new' r6le in view of the fact that
so far there has been no change in their status
and composition.
2. In fact, the rOle and duties of national del-
egations need to be reconsidered for several
reasons. There is a growing number of com-
plaints that national parliaments are being
increasingly deprived of means of controlling
the evolution of European integration. Of
course, this primarily concerns the work of the
European Community and the problems of rela-
tions between the European Parliament and
national parliaments of its members. But there
are also complaints that national parliaments do
not know enough about the activities of WEU
and its Assembly, despite the fact that it is com-
posed of delegations formed in and by national
parliaments.
3. The lack of impact of the Assembly's
activities in member parliaments is even more
critical if we consider the Assembly's rights and
responsibilities in controlling the work of the
WEU Council. As Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak,
former chairman-in-office of the WEU Council
recalled in his afterword to the booklet " Ten
years of seven-power Europe' published in
t964:
* The Assembly has always had a consid-
erable influence on the development of
the organisation and I believe what I said
in 1955 is still valid; the. success of the
work that has been undertaken depends
to a great extent on the comments, crit-
icism and also the encouragement of the
Assembly. It is to be hoped that, as in the
past, it will make every effort tofulfil its
supervisory and incentive r6le with
regard to the member states, and that in
the national parliaments, its members,
together with those of the other European
assemblies, will support and encourage, if
necessary, the zeal of those who are
impatient to press forward with the unity
of Europe which is our common
concern.'
The political groups and national delegations
therefore all have particular responsibility as a
link between the Assembly and member parlia-
ments which are still the only bodies controlling
governmental decisions in defence and security
matters.
4. The forthcoming revision of the modified
Brussels Treaty, the importance of which has
increased considerably in the light of the radical
changes in East-West relations and the need to
establish a new security and peace system,
probably including new democratic parliaments
in Central and Eastern Europe, may affect the
composition of the WEU Assembly as a whole
and its delegations. It therefore seems necessary
to recall the importance and usefulness of main-
taining a parliamentary system in which the
existence of delegations formed in parliaments
ensures their full participation in all decisions to
be taken for the future of European security. At
the same time, it will be necessary to consider
ways of rendering the activities of national dele-
gations more effective for the work of our
Assembly.
II. Areas in which the rdle and octivities of
national delegations shouW be sfienglhened
(i) Strcaglhenins the impact of the Assembly's work
in pailiaments
5. At first, it might be worth considering the
development of follow-up action in parliaments
on texts adopted by the Assembly and selected
by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations for debate in parliaments since last
year. As text No. 50 of the collected texts
relating to parliamentary action in implemen-
tation of recommendations adopted by the
Assembly (Paris, November 1989) shows, a dia-
logue between members and governments could
be registered in only three member parliaments
between June and November 1989. No such
activities were reported in Belgium, Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
6. Since the session last December, a few
encouraging signs of improvement are to be
noted, but unfortunately in only four or five
member parliaments.
7. A number of United Kingdom Delegation
members are active on an individual basis in
engaging a dialogue with the United Kingdom
Government on WEU issues, in putting oral and
written questions and in making speeches on the
basis of texts adopted by the WEU Assembly.
8. This was demonstrated recently by the
speech made in the House of Commons on 2lst
December 1989 by Mr. Atkinson on Recommen-
dation 477 concerning the future of the
Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral
Export Controls (Cocom) and the question put
by Mn Hardy on lfth January 1990 on Recom-
mendation 476 concerning force comparisons
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between NATO and Warsaw Pact military
potential.
9. On l5th December 1989 and l6th Feb-
ruary 1990, Mr. Hill put a series of eight ques-
tions on Recommendations 474, 475,476, 477
and 478 answered by Mr. Waldegrave, United
Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs and Mr. Maude, Sec-
retary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs; Mr. Wilkinson prut a question on IEPG
and WEU (answered by the Minister of State for
Defence Procurement on 7th February 1990).
He also made a speech evoking the conse-
quences of the revision of the modiflred Brussels
Treaty for the British military presence in conti-
nental Europe during the debate in the House of
Commons on 28th February 1990 on the Royal
Air Force. In the debate on East-West relations
on 22nd February 1990, Mr. Amery, who is not
a member of the Assembly, pleaded strongly for
Western European Union as a nucleus for the
necessary European defence system.
10. [n a special action on lTth April 1990,
twenty-seven representatives and substitutes of
the Assembly's German Delegation representing
the three largest political groups, including MM.
Ahrens, Antretter, Binding, Blunck, Bdhm,
Bi,ichner, Biihler, Feldmann, Mrs. Fischer, MM.
Hdffkes, Holtz, Irmer, Kittelmann, Klejdzinski,
Lenzer, Miiller, Niegel, Reddemann, Scheer,
Schmidt, Schmitz, von Schmude, Soell, Steiner,
Mrs. Timm, MM.Unland andZierer, submitted
to the German Government a question without
debate. Under the title * WEU initiatives on
security in Europe'the delegation put ten ques-
tions covering almost all the recommendations
adopted by the WEU Assembly in December
1989. This is the second time since March 1989
that the German Delegation has taken such an
initiative. Since the political impact of suchjoint action is much gxeater than putting indi-
vidual questions, it would be useful if other dele-
gations could take similar steps following pro-
cedure in their parliaments.
11. This does not mean that individual action
is less important. It is therefore gratifying that
on 2nd March 1990 Mr. Niegel asked the
German Government to inform him about the
abolition of the WEU agencies for security and
defence questions and the repercussions for
their staff.
12. The Bundestag, as well as its delegation to
the WEU Assembly, is privileged in a certain
way since the government of the Federal
Republic of Germany is still the only WEU
member government that issues half-yearly
written information reports to parliament on the
activities of the Council and its organs. Until
now, these reports covered the periods between
I st April and 3 I st March. Since these periods do
not correspond to the rhythm of work of WEU,
the Bundestag has now decided to request that
the German Government present half-yearly
reports covering the periods from lst January to
30th June and from lst July to 3lst
December.
13. At present the Bundestag merely takes
note of these information reports in plenary
session'after they have been transmitted first to
the relevant committees. Perhaps it would be
worthwhile for the German Delegation to con-
sider procedure by which the impact of these
reports might be improved. For instance, the
delegation could request that these documents
be presented at a plenary session of the Bun-
destag by means of an oral statement by a
member of the Federal Government, followed
by a parliamentary debate in which delegation
members would have the opportunity to take the
floor.
14. It is worth recalling that, in February
1986, on the initiative of Mr. Murphy, then a
member of the United Kingdom Delegation, the
United Kingdom Government was ready to
adopt Mr. Murphy's suggestion for a gov-
ernment statement on the work of Western
European Union to be presented to parliament
annually and proposed to make such a statement
after the autumn ministerial meeting of the
Council. In accordance with the answer given by
Mr. Eggar, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs on 8th May 1986 to
a question put by Mr. Murphy, a written report
by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office dated
2lst May 1986 on the activities of WEU was
placed in the Library of the House of Commons.
On 20th February 1987, Mr. Eggar announced
that the next report to parliament on WEU
activities would be made after the spring
meeting of foreign and defence ministers in
Luxembourg on 27th and 28th April 1987.
There is nothing to suggest that there were any
further government statements on an annual
basis, and therc should now perhaps be renewed
pressure for these reports to be presented on a
regular basis, either by means of a written
answer in parliament or by being placed in the
Library of the House of Commons.
15. All delegations being regularly briefed by
the competent ministers or offrcials prior to the
part-sessions (this is so far practised in the
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of
Germany) should play an active part in these
meetings, thus demonstrating that they do not
serve mainly as an audience and sounding-board
for ministers' speeches. In order to render these
meetings as fruitful as possible, specific ques-
tions should be prepared by the delegations'sec-
retaiat with the help of the Assembly's Offrce of
the Clerk.
16. ln France, several delegation members
have been active in following up Assembly rec-
ommendations. Mr. Seitlinger put four ques-
tions on Recommendations 474, 475,477 and
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478 (lst, 5th and 8th March 1990). The replies
of the French Government are not yet known.
On 29th March 1990, Mr. Pontillon, Chairman
of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations, put two questions on Recommen-
dation 479 on the establishment of a just,
peaceful and;secure order in Europe. On 2nd
April 1.990,.Mr. Fourri put a question on the sit-
uation of the forty agents affected by the abo-
lition of the WEU agencies for security ques-
tions.
17. The Belgian Delegation has informed the
committee secretariat of an intervention in the
Belgian Chamber on 9th February 1990 by Mr.
De Decker on WEU's rOle in the framework of
changes in East-West relations.
18. On 21st December 1989, the Permanent
Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the
Netherlands Second Chamber of the States-
General 
- 
in preparation for the public debate
on the foreign affairs budget 
- 
put questions on
the definition of a European union with full
security responsibilities, the future r6le of WEU
and the problem of collocation. Your Rap-
porteur has no particular information about how
the Netherlands Delegation to the Assembly was
involved in the matter. Nor has he any infor-
mation about particular activities of the Luxem-
bourg Delegation.
19. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that
increased parliamentary activity on WEU
matters is evident. Unfortunately, not all delega-
tions transmit regular or ad hoc information on
their activities.
(ii) Strenglheaing co-operatioa futweea national delegatioas
and the Commiuee for Parliamentary and Public Relations
20. Improving the information given to the
committee on the activities of member delega-
tions should be relatively easy to achieve since
the secretaries ofdelegations take part ex officio
in committee meetings.
21. Thus, at the last committee meeting on
5th March 1990 the ltalian Delegation secre-
tariat submitted useful information about its
efforts to inform the Italian parliamentarians
and particularly the foreign affairs and defence
committees of the Chamber and the Senate and
the chairmen of political groups immediately
after Assembly sessions about the recom-
mendations adopted and speeches made. For
these purposes, immediately after sessions, the
delegation's secretariat issues information notes
and summaries of the debates.
22. The French Delegation has recently made
a particularly welcome effort since it now pub-
lishes a regular information bulletin on its activ-
ities in the Council of Europe and in Western
European Union. The January-February 1990
issue of this document contains useful infor-
mation on
- 
a working lunch of the delegation held
on 30th January 1990 under the chair-
manship of Mr. Fourr6 attended by the
Clerk of the WEU Assembly;
- 
a working lunch with the press
organised by the delegation on 3lst
January 1990;
- 
correspondence between the French
Prime Minister, Michel Rocard and the
delegation chairman, Mr. Fourrd, on
the future rOle of WEU which was ini-
tiated by the latter. It is worth recording
that in his letter, the French Prime
Minister confirmed that " Western
European Union has a leading r6le to
play in preparing the more open, more
co-operative Europe which is to be
built. The actions of Eastern Europe
have succeeded in gaining their
freedom; it is for the democratic
Europe we are shaping to propose to
them new processes, new structures for
exchanges and political expression,
including in the field of defence. "
23. The French Delegation's initiative should
encourage other delegations to seek their own
ways of improving information. In his working
paper discussed by the committee on 5th March
1990, your Rapporteur put forward the idea of
inviting all national delegations to transmit
regular reports on their activities and those of
their members between sessions to the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
24. Furthermore, he invited delegation secre-
taries to submit their proposals and suggestions
for enhancing co-operation with the committee.
The United Kingdom Delegation secretariat
favours the idea ofregular delegation reports to
the committee. This has also been proposed in
the corresponding committee of the Council of
Europe.
25. The United Kingdom Delegation sec-
retary submitted the following suggestions in
this respect:
* It would be helpful to lay down a time-
table and a format for reports from
national delegations. In order to allow for
the information to be collated, translated
and published before each WEU plenary,
the periods covered by the report should
be the six months from lst April to 30th
September and from lst October to 31st
March. The material supplied by each del-
egation secretary should be broken down
into suitable categories, e.g.:
- 
debates in the Chamber;
- 
oral questions and answers;
- 
written questions and answers;
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- 
motions tabled but not debated;
- 
specialist committees;
- 
political groups;
- 
delegation briefings;
- 
individual press articles, etc. ".
26. There are advantages and disadvantages
in formalising procedure allowing enhanced and
improved information to be communicated to
the committee through regular delegation
reports. The advantage of annual or six-monthly
reports might be to collect comprehensive infor-
mation. On the other hand, as shown by the
experience with the annual reports of the WEU
Council, the topicality of the information is lost
and these documents become more or less ofjust
historical interest.
27. The committee has always an interest in
ragid ad hoc information on special activities of
delegations in member parliaments in order to
circulate such information as quickly as pos-
sible. By doing So, similar action can be
launched in other parliaments and delegation
activities might be intensified in all member
parliaments. The delegation secretariats should
therefore be asked to transmit by telefax every
relevant action immediately to the committee
secretariat.
25. Furthermore, in order to ensure more
comprehensive and regular information about
the delegations'activities, it would be useful at
each committee meeting to invite delegation sec-
retaries to give an oral presentation of current
delegation activities and to submit, if necessary,
the relevant documents. Delegations not repre-
sented at the meeting should be asked to submit
these accounts in writing. As for the content of
information, delegations should be guided by
the proposals of the United Kingdom Dele-
gation set out in paragraph 25.
29. Further means of enhancing co-operation
should include:
(a) advance information by delegations to
the committees on forthcoming pro-
grammes of work, agendas and visits
of national committees working on
issues that are within the purview of
Western European Union. (Some time
ago an appropriate information pro-
cedure was started with the Foreign
Alfairs Committee of the House of
Commons.) This information can be
used to provide interested committees
with relevant Assembly documents;
(b) as proposed in Mr. Ch6nard's report
on the " Impact of the WEU
Assembly's activities on parliaments
and public opinion " r, all national
delegations issuing information reports
to parliament after ordinary Assembly
sessions should be invited to inform
readers of the texts selected by the
Committee for Parliamentary and
Public Relations for transmission to
parliaments, emphasing the reasons
for the choice, i.e. that they should be
the subject of debates; so far all dele-
gations except the United Kingdom
Delegation are producing such docu-
ments;
(c/ improving the availability of Assem-
bly documents to interested parlia-
mentarians who are not members of
the Assembly. Only in a few member
parliaments are Assembly reports dis-
tributed to the relevant committees.
ln most parliaments they are available
only on request. But if they are to be
requested it is essential to know that
they exist.
30. It might be noted that, when Sir Russell
Johnston asked in the House of Commons on
27th June 1989 about the availability of WEU
documents, Mr. Waldegrave, Minister of Statefor Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
answered as follows:
* Documents produced by the Assembly
are distributed to all members of the
British Delegation to the Assembly, who
have not so far asked that they be made
more widely available'.
31. In the United Kingdom, the texts of rec-
ommendations and reports selected by our com-
mittee and sent by the President of the Assemblyto the presidents of member parliaments
stressing that these texts should be the subject of
speeches or questions are normally placed in the
library of the House of Commons. Conversely,
in the Belgian Senate, they are transmitted to the
committee concerned. In the Italian Senate, rec-
ommendations are immediately translated and
transmitted to the committees concerned and to
the political groups.
32. There is no oflicial link between the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations
and the political groups in member parliaments
although they play a crucial r6le in parlia-
mentary activities. These links could be
developed through the national delegations,
which should also try to co-ordinate the appro-
priate actions in parliaments with the political
groups.
33. The recent initiative of the German Dele-
gation in the Bundestag (see paragraph l0)
shows that this can be achieved. In the Nether-
lands, the socialist delegation members report to
the socialist group every three months on devel-
opments in WEU. In the United Kingdom, there
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are periodic reports by the labour delegation
members to the House of Commons Labour
Party group.
(iii) Enhaacing the public image of delegations
in mcmber countrics
34. Every Assembly delegation should take
advantage of the period during which its gov-
ernment assumes the chairmanship-in-office of
the WEU Council to enhance its image in the
national press. For this purpose, the relevant
delegation chairman should approach the appro-
priate national authorities to ask them for
instance:
- 
to facilitate contacts between the dele-
gation secretariat and the press services
of the appropriate ministries in order to
draw up a list of interested press con-
tacts;
- 
to organise a reception prior to Council
meetings to present the relevant
Assembly delegation to the national
press under the chairmanship of a
member of the government, with a
speech by the host country and by the
chairman of the delegation;
- 
at the press conference held at the close
of Council meetings, invite the
chairman of the delegation to sit on the
rostrum beside the Chairman-in-Oflice
of the Council and the President of the
Assembly.
35. Furthermore, delegation and committee
chairmen and/or rapporteurs should seek more
opportunities for publishing articles in major
international newspapers or specialised period-
icals on topical security questions with special
reference to WEU's r6le. The office of the Clerk
is always prepared to help and provide the nec-
essary documentation.
36. The image of delegations could also be
improved if their chairmen and members played
a more active part in parliamentary debates on
security and defence matters. Two concrete
examples demonstrate this:
During the debate on France and the
future of Europe held in the French
National Assembly on lfth April 1990,
Mr. Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
sought to limit French ambitions for
Western European Union which, in his
view, from the very start had suffered
from the conditions under which it was
created. It was therefore meritorious that
Mr. Fourr6, chairman of the French Dele-
gation to the WEU Assembly, reiterated
the crucial r0le of WEU elaborating a new
European security system.
On 29th March 1990, six days after the
Assembly's extraordinary session in
Luxembourg, the Bundestag debated a
motion on " disarmament and security
1990 " initiated by the social democrats.
Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly,
recalled on that occasion that some of the
French members of the Assembly had
assessed as a'cold shower'the speech
made by Mr. Genscher in Luxembourg
since he had said nothing on the future
r6le of WEU. But Mr. Wilz, who is not a
member of the German Delegation, was
the only parliamentarian to call for a
strengthening of the r6le of WEU and its
enlargement to include other countries.
III. The rdk of national delegations
in the debate on thc fonhcoming revision
of the modified Brussels Treaty
37. In Recommendation 472 the Assembly
recommended inter alia that the Council:
- 
specify as soon as possible which provi-
sions of the modified Brussels Treaty it
intends to revise; and
- 
maintain the provision in Article IX for
the Assembly to be composed of delega-
tions from the national parliaments of
member countries.
38. Both the United Kingdom and the
German Governments have indicated in replies
to questions in parliament that they are pre-
pared to contact their respective Assembly dele-
gations before deciding what changes they want
to be made in the modified Brussels Treaty. The
Luxembourg Government recalled in this con-
nection " that the Luxembourg representatives,
because of their dual mandate of deputies and
members of the WEU Assembly, would have an
important r6le to play if proposed changes to the
Brussels Treaty were to be submitted to the
Chamber of Deputies for approval ".
39. With regard to the future wording of
Article IX of the treaty which specifies the
composition of the Assembly, so far only the
German Delegation has adopted a firm position.
In a Bundestag resolution adopted on 2lst June
1989 on the ratification of the protocol of
accession of Portugal and Spain to the WEU
treaty, the German Bundestag expressed the
wish that:
'Changing the provisions of the treaty
should allow an end to be put to the obli-
gation to appoint a single delegation of
representatives of the Bundestag to the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe and the Assembly of Western
European Union. "
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40. Furthermore, in a question without
debate put jointly by members of the
CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP Groups in March
1989 the Federal Government was asked if it
shared the view of the German Delegation to the
WEU Assembly that the latter's importance
should be enhanced by granting it rights and
responsibilities equivalent to those of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in
regard to the admission of new members, for
instance.
41. The Federal Government confirmed in its
reply that it shared the view of the German Del-
egation that greater weight should be given to
the Assembly. It recalled, however, that any
change would certainly require the consent of all
member states.
42. On the other hand, when asked by Mr.
Klejdzinski in the Bundestag on 28th November
1989 about relations between the Assembly and
the Council, Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, gave the following answer:
* Extension of the responsibilities of the
parliamentary Assembly vis-i-vis the
Council of Ministers of Western European
Union corresponds to our basic demo-
cratic concept since all bodies having
decision-taking powers 
- 
less important in
the Council of Ministers of Western
European Union than in the European
Community 
- 
must from the outset be
subject to democratic control. However, I
consider absolute priority must be given to
strengthening the rights of the European
Parliament because we are moving
towards the European Union. "
43. In fact there is a tendency in the present
discussion to look first and foremost at demo-
cratic shortcomings in the framework of the
European Community and difliculties arising
out of the transfer of matters that are the respon-
sibility of national parliaments to European
Community bodies. It is therefore essential that
the relevant governments be reminded of the
importance of maintaining an effective parlia-
mentary control system in European defence
and security matters based on national delega-
tions composed of political, military and techno-
logical experts.
44. This will require both the definition of a
firm Assembly position in this respect based on
a report by the committee concerned and appro-
priate pressure by all delegations in member
countries on their respective governments.
IY. Conclusions
45. Since the Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations has obtained the status of a
perrnanent committee in accordance with
Article VII of the Charter of the Assembly, its
responsibilities are no longer exclusively:
- 
the selection of texts adopted by the
Assembly to be debated in national par-
liaments; and
- 
bringing the Assembly's work to the
attention of national parliaments and
the public and the press in member
countries.
46. However, the freedom of action it has
obtained in all matters concerning parlia-
mentary and public relations should not lead it
to stop carrying out the abovementioned tasks,
which will remain an important part of the com-
mittee's responsibilities. They require enhanced
co-operation between the committee and
national delegations at both administrative andpolitical levels. It is therefore particularly
important that the secretaries of delegations take
part ex officio in committee meetings, in order
to give advice and support.
47. It is true, as Mr. Biichner stressed at the
committee meeting on 5th March 1990, that all
efforts to enhance the Assembly's public impact
are without real effect if the substance of WEU's
work is not improved. But it is also true that, by
increasing parliamentary political pressure, the
Assembly and particularly its delegations can do
much to achieve this.
48. Recommendation 479 on the estab-
lishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in
Europe adopted at the extraordinary session in
Luxembourg, offers an opportunity for- specific
action. Your Rapporteur therefore invites all
delegations and their members to use this doc-
ument as a basis for a dialogue with their gov-
ernments. Suggested questions to be put in par-
liaments on that recommendation are being
distributed separately.
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Dmft Recomnendaion
oa thc Indprrdeilt Earcpaa Ptogrumme Gmup (IEN)
aad llestqn Eumlnaa Uaion
The Assembly,
(t) 
__Recalling-that, ilthe Rome declaration of October 1984 revitalising WEU, the Council stated
that WEU slguld provide political impetus to European co-operation in armamenis matters and reite-
rated that this is a key r6le for WEU;
(ii) Believing that reductions in East-West military confrontation in Europe should lead to a
necessity {or pti-oqalisatio-n, diversification and, wherb appropriate, specialisation so as to manage
overcapacity in defence-related industries;
Qi!) Aryare that the possibility of substantial troop reductions on the part of both NATO and the
Warsaw Pact as well as of withdrawals of United States military manpowir from Western Europe will
heiglten 
-the significance of weapon effectiveness and sophistiiation ln deterrence at a lower livel ofin-place forces;
(iv) Conscious that reductions in defence budgets must be anticipated which will put a premium on
the benefits of arms cooperation to secure value for money and bn the utilisatiori of the most eco-
nomic productive and maintenanoe capacities for defence 6quipment;
(y) Anticipating-that, whilst the United $14es'political and nuclear guarantees to the security of
WS$.tn Europe will remain,-pressures ofpublic opinion in the United Stites will induce congressi6nalinitiatives for reductions of transatlantic co-op-erative equipment programmes in favoui of pro
curement from United States domestic sources;(vi) Mindful that the IEPG operates in a political vacuum sustaining no significant information prG
gramme on its work and winning no European constituency of support foi its activities;
(vit) Convinced that-the IEPG can offer, through the harmonisation of operational requirements and
re-equipment timescales as well as through a cohcerted European militari, research programme, cost-
effective defence-equipment-programmes to meet the challengLs of a rapidiy evolvingiec[rity situationin Europe, and that its work merits more substantial backi-ng,
RrcorraNrsNps THAT rnr couNcrr-
1. - Arrange.folthe presidency of the IEPG to address the Assembly once ayear to inform it aboutdevelopments in European armaments cooperation and to answer questions ?rom members;
2. Organise-the regular circulation of_progress bulletins to the Committees on Technology and Aer-
ospace and Defence of the Assembly of WEU to sustain a better appreciation of the work o'ithe IEPG
among key political opinion formers in Europe;
3. Ensure that the Commission of the EEC is formally informed on a regular basis of the work of
the IEPG so as to sustain a beneficial dialogue on issues oi mutual interest srich as the maintenance of
Europe's industrial base, technical capability and competitiveness;
4. Build on the welcome creation of a small permanent secretariat of the IEPG in Lisbon by con-
centrating the support of the p-residency^there and by establishing a strengthened corpus of ipetiAist
expertise through longer detachments of procurement experts tolhe secrEtariat;
5.. Pursue vjBorously.the initial stages towards more integrated European military research under
the.auspices of the Euclid programme by increased joint fuiding and tire rationalisLtion ofi*isiing
national defence research establishments;
I Explore with the Commission of the EEC possibilities for some acceleration of harmonisedEuropean company law to facilitate fair cross frontier competition and the processeJ oi ttaosnationa
merger, acquisition and collaboration between defence companies;
7. Maintain effort^s to secure- a 
-po.re genuin-ely open defence equipment market in Europe by uni-venal distribution of contract bulletins-and dada cb[ection and exihange whilst ;s"rfi1hit theinterests of the developing defence industry countries are secured
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mn Wilkinsoa, Rqportcur)
I. Intmduction
1. Two years ago the committee held a sym-
posium on European co-operation in armaments
research and development. The conclusions
drawn from this symposium were summarised
in a recommendation which was unanimously
adopted by the Assembly in June 1988 (Recom-
mendation 455). First, it recommended the
establishment of a European advanced defence
research agency funded from a common budget
initially provided by WEU nations and later by
other European NATO member countries as
well. Secondly, the Assembly proposed that the
Independent European Programme Group
flEPG) be granted a small permanent interna-
tional specialist secretariat and that a regular
dialogue be institutionalised between the IEPG
and the Assembly of WEU.
2. The purpose of this report is to determine
what progress has been made in the IEPG since
June 1988 and at the same time to examine what
scope for further improvement exists in its r6le
in enhancing cooperation in defence equipment
procurement and thereby in furthering efli-
ciency and economy in the Western European
armaments industry.
II. The structare of the IEPG
3. Before examining current prog;ress in the
IEPG, note should be taken of the structure that
has been established to perform its various
tasks. The main features of this structure are
explained in a document which, after repeated
requests from the Assembly, has been prepared
by the Belgian presidency of WEU for the infor-
mation of the members of the Assembly.
4. Reference is therefore made to this doc-
ument, attached to a letter from the Secretary-
General of WEU to the President of the
Assembly, dated llth April 1990 (Document
t22t).
5. Unfortunately, the document was drafted
in 1989 and was not updated before being sent
to the Assembly. As a consequence, it does not
reflect the decisions taken at the IEPG minis-
terial meeting in Gleneagles in February 1990,
which are dealt with in Chapter VI of the
present report. At its last meeting with the Presi-
dential Committee of the Assembly on 24th
April 1990, however, the Council stated that, as
from now, a firm channel will be established in
order to make sure that future regular communi-
cations from IEPG about its work will reach the
Assembly at the earliest possible time.
6. Here, it should be recalled that the IEPG
functions through three panels which report to
six-monthly meetings of national armaments
directors (NADs). The NADs, in turn, report to
defence ministers who meet three times every
two years. The chairmanship of the IEPG
rotates every two years between member states.
The United Kingdom, the current chair nation,
will relinquish its responsibilities at the end of
1990, at which time Belgium.will take over.
7. Panel I, under Norwegian chairmanship,
is responsible for operational requirements and
equipment programmes. Panel II, chaired by
France, is responsible for research and tech-
nology, including the new Euclid programme.
Panel III is chaired by the Federal Republic of
Germany and oversees economic policy and
matters, in particular implementation of pro-
posals in the action plan. Some of the activities
of the different panels will be highligbted in
more detail in this report.
8. The permanent secretariat in Lisbon,
which in view of the increasing activity of IEPG
seems to be indispensable, started its work in
May 1989. It plays an important r6le in
co-ordinating the activities of several bodies and
working groups, also ensuring continuity. At the
moment, including the head of the secretariat, it
is composed of five executive offrcers of dif-
ferent nationalities supported by a small admin-
istrative staff.
IIL IEPG ministerial meetings
9. Since June 1988, a number of ministerial
meetings have been held in the framework of the
IEPG, where important decisions have been
taken to set the pace for improved European
arrraments co-operation. In this chapter, they
will be recapitulated briefly.
(a) Lutnboary, 0th at d 9th Novcmber 1988
10. Ministers agreed an action plan to
implement the key recommendations of the
1987 European Defence lndustry Study (EDIS)
report'Towards a stronger Europe ". The main
objectives of this action plan for a more effrcient
European defence industry are:
- 
the pursuit ofa transnational open and
competitive market;
- 
a dedicated European co-operative
research effort;
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- 
the encouragement of the developing
defence industry nations (DDIs):
Greece, Portugal and Turkey.
11. As part of their effort to establish an open
and competitive transnational market, all
member countries undertook to establish focal
points within their national ministries of
defence, where foreign companies may register
their interest in bidding for contracts. A new
working Broup, Panel II, under the chair-
manship of France was created in order to
develop a cmperative European technology
progfamme.
(b) EsbrtL 28th tum 1989
12. At this meeting, ministers launched a
common research and technology progamme in
fundamental defence research and technology
which they called Euclid, an acronym for
European co-operation for the longer term in
defence. Common funding was agreed by all the
ministers, with contributions by participating
countries amounting to 120 million ECU. Each
country would participate according to its spe'
cific interests and the capabilities ofits national
defence industries.
13. A working group was asked to make pro-
posals for programmes which should be initiated
within the Euclid framework. This working
group was requested to inform the European
industry and to invite it to make co.operative
proposals, including the appropriate financial
participation.
(c) Gloaeagbs,21t February 1990
14. Ministers stressed that, notwithstanding
recent events in Eastern Europe and significant
developments in arms control negotiations,
there would be a continuing need for European
co-operation in research, development and pro-
duction of defence equipment in Europe. They
reaflirmed the IEPG as the main forum for
achieving this objective.
15. The ministers reviewed progress which
had been made towards the implementation of
the action plan for opening the European
defence equipment market, such as the publi-
cation of bulletins announcing defence contract
opportunities and the establishment of a
network of IEPG national focal points.
16. They also examined the progress made on
the outline plan for the Euclid programme. It
was expected that a memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) with a basic framework for this
defence research and technology programme
would be ready for signature before the end of
1990.
IY. Opening up the European defence
equipment mailwt
17. At their November 1988 meeting in Lux-
embourg, the IEPG Ministers laid the founda'
tions for an action plan for the creation of a
European armaments market. The main features
of this action are summarised in the following
paragraphs.
18. The IEPG ministers considered the recip
rocal lifting of limitations on non-national
armaments procurement a first prerequisite to
the facilitation and encouragement of cross-
border purchasing. To this end, each member
country should establish a focal point. These
focal points in the national procurement
agencies of the member countries have a twofold
task. On the one hand they should resolve
queries on the opportunities to bid published in
the bulletins mentioned hereafter and record
data on companies wishing to participate in the
programmes which have been announced. On
the other hand they should provide support to
companies from DDI countries in their pursuit
of contracts. In order to facilitate fair compe-
tition, compatibility of national procedures for
inviting bids and placing contracts should be
secured. A very important step forward in this
respect was the decision to start publishing con-
tract bulletins containing basic information on
bid opportunities for overseas companies to par-
ticipate in national defence equipment pro-
grammes. Each of the member countries has
undertaken to publish these contract bulletins at
regular intervals, a practice which France and
the United Kingdom have pursued for some
years already on a bilateral basis. It was also rec-
ommended to develop a standardised reporting
procedure to be used to record and report to the
IEPG those bid opportunities which were
publicised on an IEPG-wide basis and the con-
tract awards implemented on a transnational
basis, including any subcontracts. According to
the presidency of IEPG, all focal points and
national contract bulletins will be operative by
the end of 1990.
19. Ministers were aware that member gov-
ernments would accept crossborder competition
only if they could be sure to secure an equitable
and fair return in a reasonable period to match
their vital national interests and individual
countries' capabilities. However, while they con-
sidered this fair return as a means of obtaining
the support of member countries for crossborder
competition, it should not be an end in itself.
The economic aspects should therefore, as a
rule, tike precedence over the search for a fair
return. Accordingly, ministers state that juste
retour could be achieved on a multi-project
basis and over a reasonable time scale. A
standardised recording procedure for all cross-
border contracts as a basis for annual reports to
IEPG member countries should be set up. It was
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also thought that a central co-ordinating
organisation could contribute greatly to
summarising national records in an IEPG-wide
report which could be the basis for a reasonable
fair return system.
20. Transfer of technology was considered to
be an important element in the building of a
European defence market. The ministers,
however, were aware that they could try to make
arrangements only as far as technologies
resulting from government-funded programmes
were concerned. It was decided to work out an
agreement to ensure that the intellectual
property in government-funded national and
collaborative projects is available, through the
usual commercial processes, to facilitate subse-
quent use by other IEPG nations for defence
purposes.
21. At the same time the ministers said they
envisaged systematic research and technology
co-operation based on technological priority
areas. Even if they recognised that, for such a
co-operative programme, common funding
would be the best solution, it was still too early
in November 1988 to obtain support for such
funding.
22. Finally, the ministers decided that the
special problems of LDDI (less-developed
defence industry countries), which have since
been renamed DDI (developing defence
industry countries), would be taken into account
in shaping the European arrnaments market.
These three southern tier nations of Portugal,
Greece and Turkey will require special
treatment in technology transfer and in active
procurement initiatives on the part of the more
industrially developed members of the IEPG to
take advantage of the DDI nations' advantages:
low manpower cost, for example in mainte-
nance.
Y. WEU, a possible lagal framework
for an open Eurolrcan defence equipment marlet
23. Since the adoption of the principles for an
action plan leading to the creation of a European
armaments market in November 1988, progress
has been made. The publication of bulletins
announcing bidding opportunities and the estab-
lishment of focal points which will be operating
in all thirteen IEPG countries by the end of 1990
have been a step in the right direction. Many
more steps have been taken, such as the DDI
initiative and Euclid, which are all signs of a
basically positive attitude among the member
countries. But it should be kept in mind that,
until now, the initiatives taken were never man-
datory. The IEPG is not based on an interna-
tional treaty between the participating countries.
It is based on an agreement to co-operate, but
the decisions, even if they are always taken
unanimously by ministers, are not binding in
that their implementation cannot be enforced.
24. So far, this relatively informal character
of the IEPG cooperative arrangements has
worked quite satisfactorily as there have been no
vital national interests at stake. The IEPG has
not yet been much engaged in the important
stages of the procurement of major defence
equipment. This situation may well be about to
change considerably.
25. It can be expected that in the near future
the grim financial prospects for defence min-
isters will compel them to concentrate ever more
on the economic aspects. The need to rationalise
the European defence equipment market is
rapidly impinging upon the Western European
governments. Subsequent stages of the IEPG
action plan will therefore certainly be more
intrusive. If the IEPG countries really wish to
create an open European defence equipment
market, they will have to accept crossborder
purchasing and they will have to give up the
preferential treatment of their national defence
equipment industries. As a consequence, the
structure and even the existence of such national
industries may be deeply affected.
26. Such consequences are now far from
hypothetical in a shrinking defence equipment
market with demand increasingly oriented
towards more sophisticated and technologically
advanced products, in order to offset the
potential reduction in manpower which may
ensue from the CFE talks and any subsequent
troop reduction negotiations with the Soviets.
27. It may well be questioned if participating
nations will still be prepared to act voluntarily
when it really comes to the crunch. Historically,
the existence of more or less well developed
national armaments industries has always been
considered vital for national sovereignty. Even
the post-war structure of Europe, with an ever
more intricate network of binding treaties, and
international obligations with increasingly less
room for the pursuit of strictly national policies
in the field of defence, has not caused this
notion to disappear. Admittedly, in some cases
national defence industries have managed to
gain an important position in export markets,
but more numerous are those which have been
kept alive with orders from national armed
forces and related financial government support
on a substantial scale.
28. Unfortunately, arguments of national sov-
ereignty and autonomy have been confused and
even obscured by unemployment and social con-
siderations over the closure of national defence
industries. No government in Western Europe
wishes to face the next election with direct lia-
bility for unemployment, even if it is the
by-product of the laudable process of defence
equipment rationalisation.
'29. Within the legal framework of the
European Community it took many painful
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years to bring about the unified internal market,
due to come into being by the beginning of 1993.
It seems unlikely that the establishment of an
open defence market will have an easier genesis,
bearing in mind that six of the present IEPG
countries, when drafting the EEC treaty, specifi-
cally exempted the defence industry in Article
223.
30. Notwithstanding unremitting attempts by
the European Commission to include the
defence equipment market within its purview,
dl IEPG countries are strongly opposed to such
a development. Only recently, the IEPG made
this perfectly clear to the European Commission
at the highest possible level.
31. Even so, a number of IEPG member
countries, aware of the problems ahead, feel the
need for a legal framework to embody a number
of obligatory rules to prevent member countries
backing out of less attractive obligations. Under-
standably, there is great reluctance to conclude a
treaty to create another European organisation
with a rather limited field of action. This is par-
ticularly the case in the armaments business in
which the imperatives of profitability for manu-
facturers have to be reconciled with national
economic and defence interests.
32. In preparatory meetings for this report, it
was rightly suggested by some that the modified
Brussels Treaty, which created WEU, could
provide a perfect point of departure. It is the
only treaty specifically concluded between exclu-
sively European countries in order to maintain
peace and security and it is sufficiently exten-
sible to include all related activities, such as
the creation of an open European defence
equipment market. According to Article VIII of
the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council (of
Ministers) of WEU can * set up such subsidiary
bodies as may be considered necessary ".
33. Here it should be noted that on 7th May
1955, in application of this Article VIII, the
Council of WEU decided to set up a Standing
Armaments Committee, which, according to
paragraph l0 ofthat decision, should " in close
relation with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation, seek to improve consultation and
co-operation in the sphere of armaments with a
view to finding joint solutions which would
assist governments of member countries in
meeting their equipment requirements ".
34. In spite of the fact that the Standing
Armaments Committee existed for almost thirty-
five years, the Council always treated it as an
unintended stepchild. Without trying to analyse
the details of this rather negative attitude, it
seems that until recently the Council has been
afraid to show too much affection for exclu-
sively European solutions in arms co-operation
and defence procurement. Thus it happened that
in the wake of WEU's revitalisation effort at
Rome in October 1984, inspired by the wish to
intensify consultations on defence issues in a
European forum, the Council of Ministers also
decided to abolish the Standing Armaments
Committee which, due to the reluctant attitude
of the Council, has never been able to realise its
potential and to develop into a useful body'.
Ironically, the final execution of this 1985
decision took place in November 1989 when, in
an unprecedented series of shocks, the entire
political situation in Eastern Europe was set in
motion causing Western European countries to
rethink their security policy and their responsi-
bilities in that field.
35. Altogether, in the light of recent develop-
ments, together with the determination of
European countries to create an open defence
equipment market, there is reason enough to
reconsider the opportunities for a legal frame-
work offered by the modified Brussels Treaty.
The fact that not all IEPG countries are
members of WEU should not necessarily
paralyse action in such a direction. The Council
has asked a working group to examine the dif-
ferent possibilities of amending the treaty. It is
suggested here that consideration be given to the
possibility of association agreements with
Western European non-member countries for
specilic ends, particularly entry into a common
defence market.
YI. Thc Eutopean resetrch ard technologt
prugrunn,e, Eaclid
36. Since November 1988, when the action
plan for the stepby-step creation of a European
armaments market was adopted, there has been
steady development towards a dedicated effort
in European research and technology co-oper-
ation.
37. In June 1989, it was decided to prepare
the establishment of a oommon defence research
and technology programme called Euclid. It was
also agreed that, in 1990, this programme
should have joint government funding of about
l2O million ECU. The European Defence
Industry Group (EDIG) was to be invited to
submit proposals for common programmes and
also for their financial contribution. Together
with the existing common technology projects(CTPs), Euclid was meant to facilitate the tech-
nological development of DDI countries.
38. Preparatory work had progressed enough
for ministers to clarify the framework of Euclid
at their February 1990 meeting in Gleneagles.
l. More details on the recent history of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee can be found in Document I I19, Chaptert (b).
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Eleven common European priority areas
(CEPAs) have been designated, in each of which
there will be a number of research and tech-
nology projects (RTPs), all of which are con-
cerned with basic defence research. It is said that
all together 60 RTPs are being planned. Initially
the following priority areas will be studied:
- 
modern radar technolory (airborne
radars);
- 
silicium microelectronics;
- 
composite structures;
- 
modular avionics;
- 
electronic gun;
- 
artificial intelligence;
- 
signature manipulation;
- 
optoelectronic devices;
- 
satellite surveillance technology
(including verification aspects);
- 
undenvater acoustics;
- 
human factors, including technology for
training and simulators.
39. The general conditions for Euclid will be
defined in the programme memorandum of
understanding (PMOU), while individual RTPs
will be covered by implementing arrangements
to the PMOU.
40. Each research and technology project will
be undertaken by industries and laboratories
from the participating member countries, to be
represented by a single legal contractor, chosen
by competition wherever practicable. The single
legal contractor will be responsible for placing
subcontracts with other participating con-
tractors. On behalf of the participating nations,
each research and technology project will be
managed by a lead nation which will deal with
the single legal contractor.
4L. Nations participating in a research and
technology project will, in principle, contribute
an equal government share of the anticipated
costs unless they decide a different breakdown,
which may, in particular, occur when they wish
to facilitate the participation of DDI nations.
42. As regards the important issue of intel-
lectual property, ministers decided that it will be
owned by those generating it, but that it will be
made available for the use of participating
nations for their own defence purposes subject
to conditions to be defined in the programme
MOU. There can be no doubt that the decisions
which have now been taken indicate a promising
and energetic approach.
43. Nevertheless, some thorny questions
remain to be solved in the PMOU, such as those
regarding intellectual property and technology
transfer. In an earlier report on this subject 2, it
2. European co-operation in armaments research and devel-
opment 
- 
guidelines drawn from the colloquy (Document
ll4l, paragraph 37 et seq).
was argued that, for an industrial company,
unique technological knowledge is one of the
main means of gaining a lead over competing
companies and consequently making profit.
Sharing knowledge with others at an early stage
of research is therefore, in fact, a contradictory
activity in a situation of competition. Also, a
clear distinction should be made between gov-
ernment- and privately-funded research. If
industry is expected to contribute financially to
the RTPs, it should be allowed to reap the
rewards of its own investment.
44. There is, however, sufficient reason to
suppose that even such problems will be
resolved, since all participating countries
recognise that there is no reasonable way to be
engaged in highly-sophisticated basic defence
technology research programmes other than
through cooperative progf,ammes. Government
funding of the RTPs may be another problem in
a period of decreasing defence budgets.
45. On a national level, any progress achieved
in arms control negotiations will certainly be
seized as an argument to use research and devel-
opment funds to stop gaps in the defence
budget. On the other hand, defence experts in
both East and West agree that significantly
reduced armed forces would in the future have
necessarily to be better equipped, making use of
the most advanced defence technologies.
46. For the time being, however, France,
West Germany and the United Kingdom, which
together account for 90% of all the money spent
in defence research and development in Europe,
have made it clear that they are fully prepared to
go ahead with their funding of Euclid pro-
grammes. In particular, the Federal Republic
has a long-term research and technology pro'
gramme which is being funded by the Ministry
for Research and Technology. Technological pri-
ority projecis which have bebn designated by the
armed forces form part of this programme. It is
recognised, however, that the progtamme has
some blanks in basic defence research since, for
several different reasons, West Germany is not
able to tackle such projects on its own. These
projects, for which funding is available on the
German side, will be suggested as RTPs in the
Euclid framework. The United Kingdom has
appropriated about 20 million ECU for RTPs in
t990, but its final financial commitment will
depend on a case-by-case assessment of the
projects which will be available for partici-
pation. France has been very active in preparing
the establishment of Euclid and funds have been
earmarked for participation in RTPs, but it has
not made a financial commitment so far.
47. The other ten IEPG member countries,
which together account for l09o of the total
amount spent on defence research in the IEPG
countries, are all positive about their contri-
bution, but it is clear that much will depend
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on initiatives taken by the abovementioned
three countries and their leading defence indus-
tries, which account for the other 9070 of
defence research spending. Also, it should be
clearly understood that, even if government
funds have been earmarked for Euclid, the
formal commitment to spend will become
effective only on the signing of an implementing
arrangement for a specific research and tech-
nology project (RTP). At present, it is unlikely
that enough RTP implementing arrangements
will be ready for signature in 1990 for the full
amount of 120 million ECU in common funding
which has been earmarked for 1990 to be allo-
cated.
48. The financial contribution of the indus-
tries which will actually participate in research
and technology projects (RTPs) under Euclid is
estimated at roughly 2501o. The European
Defence Industrial Group (EDIG) has already
established working groups to discuss, on a per-
manent basis, all questions regarding Euclid and
RTPs with IEPG Panel II. Moreover, important
defence industries in five European nations(Aeritalia, Adrospatiale, British Aerospace, Casa
and MBB) have recently signed a co-operation
agreement to manifest their determination to
contribute jointly to the success of Euclid. The
signatories pledged jointly, and in agreement
with their governments, to propose projects and
also to develop for these projects implementing
conditions as regards organisation, technology
and finance. It should be noted here that this
agreement does not affect the interest of the
existing defence industries in smaller IEPG
nations, as the rule in Euclid will be that indus-
tries participating in an RTP will all have an
equal share.
YII. luste tetoar
49. Juste retour is an established expression
for a system whereby mutual agreements guar-
antee that nations participating in crossborder
defence procurement contracts derive an equi-
table and fair return in exchange for their
expenditure. At their Luxembourg meeting in
November 1988, the ministers rightly stated
that, because of the very important national
interests at stake, some kind of juste retour has
to be arranged in order to make crossborder
competition acceptable to the IEPG countries.
Understanding the potential conflict betweenjuste retour and their call for competition, min-
isters also made it clear that the economic aspect
of procurement should as a rule take precedence
over perfectionist and mechanistic 10070 return.It was their aim to achieve juste retour on a
multi-project basis and over a reasonably
extended period of time. More specifically, they
added that concrete invitations to bid were not
to be interlinked with conditions which mightjeopardise competition.
50. Finally, the ministers proposed proce-
dures for juste retour which included a
standardised recording system to register all
crossborder contracts in order to provide a basis
for annual reports. Meanwhile, the permanent
secietariat of the IEPG in Lisbon has been made
the co-ordinating organ for these activities. The
only mention made ofjuste retour in the Estoril
and Gleneagles ministerial meetings of July
1989 and February 1990 was that work would be
continued for studying, improving and imple-
menting a pragmatic and flexible system ofjuste
retour through concrete, transitional measures.
51. In its abovementioned report on Eur-
opean co-operation in armaments research and
development (Document I l4l), the committee
has already drawn attention to the fact that juste
retour is diametrically opposed to ration-
alisation, more efliciency and greater savings.
Every politician will emotionally understand
that governments will stick to juste retour or the
principle of fair return with the geatest persis-
tency, but on the other hand one thing cannot be
denied. Whatever final solution will be foundfor the most equally balanced juste retour
system, it will always be a painful but indeed
almost inevitably circuitous route to the open
European defence equipment market.
52. In the chapter which follows, attention
will be paid to a fairly recent phenomenon in the
defence industry on a European scale which may
render many complicated juste retour proce-
dures superfluous. This is cross-frontier co-
operation between industries and the growing
number of mergers and acquisitions.
YIII. Developing defence industry countries
53. A particular problem in the IEPG is the
inequality of capabilities in the defence indus-
tries of the member countries. Specifically
Greece, Portugal and Turkey, which are referred
to as developing defence industry (DDI) coun-
tries, have defence industries which are in no
way comparable to those which exist in the other
nations.
54. In a recent address, the Spanish national
armaments director summarised the basic char-
acteristics of defence industries in development
as follows:
- 
shortage of advanced technologies,
specialised personnel and modern man-
agement techniques;
- 
lack of capability for the design and
integration of arms systems and a low
level of research activity;
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- 
small domestic market and difliculty in
finding access to foreign trade
markets;
- 
inadequate industrial structure as well
as lack of an auxiliary fabric of small
and medium-sized enterprises.
55. IEPG ministers have been aware of the
desire of these DDI countries to share in the
opportunities offered by the opening of the
European defence equipment market. It has
already been recognised that they should be
granted a special transitional period. At the
same time ministers are prepared to continue
and, if possible, to increase their direct support
to these countries in the defence equipment
field.
56. The developed defence industry countries
have established special information centres for
developing defence industry countries in order
to guarantee them the possibility of obtaining
contracts. A dedicated effort is being made to
find ways to let these countries participate in
research and technology programmes. Addi-
tional measures are being considered, such as
technical assistance, capital investments for
their defence industry and exemption from
entrance fees for co-operative projects. At
present a number of programmes have been
chosen which will be offered for participation by
developing defence industry countries.
57. Even if the approach to the DDI countries
which has now been chosen by the ministers
should be endorsed, the ambiguity of this
question cannot be denied. With an existing
overcapacity in the European defence industry
and a clear possibility of further reductions in
the demand for defence equipment, it appears
not to make sense to encourage the development
of new or the expansion of existing defence
industries in the DDI countries. However, it
may well be that DDI countries, where labour is
still relatively cheap, are able to make their con-
tribution to the efficient use of diminishing
defence budgets. But the increasing sophisti-
cation of modern high technology weaponry also
requires a grcat number of highly skilled
employees and a high degree of technological
know-how, both of which are not always
available at moderate prices, even in DDI coun-
tries.
58. Trying to secure an appropriate solution
to this conundrum which will satisfy both devel-
oping and developed defence industry countries
will require a balancing act of exceptional
finesse. Lower manpower costs in defence equip-
ment manufacture and support are attractive to
all IEPG member countries if defence budgets
are declining. The problem is that the resources
are physically far removed from their markets.
IX. Operational requirements
and equipment pnogtan mes
(a) Procedures
59. The core of Panel I's work is the
equipment replacement schedule (ERS) exercise,
its principal mechanism for identifying potential
projects for collaboration. The ERS, outlining
all the IEPG nations' forward equipment plans,
is updated annually in January and compiled in
five volumes, regarding maritime, army, air
force, communication and electronic and air
defence equipment. After publication, these
volumes are studied by the individual nations
and then thoroughly reviewed by five ad hoc
subgroups in mid-June.
60. The purpose of this review is to highlight
equipment areas where prima facie reasons exist
for co-operation, that is, where two or more
nations appear to have broadly similar require-
ments with in-service dates (ISD) up to a
maximum of five years apart. These equipment
areas, together with any opinions that the group
may have on what might be done to harmonise
requirements, will be circulated to all Panel I
members for consideration in their respective
national capitals in advance of the next Panel I
meeting.
61. Nations will subsequently examine the
equipment areas highlighted by the ad hoc sub-
group and will in addition undertake a funher
national review of the schedules in order to
indicate any additional equipment area which
might offer potential for co-operation.
62. The next phase will take place at the PanelI meeting when nations will be invited to
comment on the result of the ERS review and
their subsequent examination. The panel will
prepare a report to NADs, which will outline the
equipment areas which appear to offer scope for
co-operation, highlighting those for which it is
proposed to form exploratory subgroups and
those that no longer seem promising.
63. If there are nations with a declared
interest in a specific equipment area, explor-
atory subgroups are set up, composed of repre-
sentatives of interested nations, and these will
actively search for co-operative possibilities and
harmonisation of requirements. With national
commitments to proceed, the subgroup, in con-
sultation with industry, will continue with the
development of a European stafftarget based on
an earlier draft outline European staff target(oEST).
64. Panel I, as its Chairman has stated
explicitly, seeks to create an integrated rather
than an additive approach to the harmonisation
of requirements. At the same time, it seeks to
fashion an iterative approach to the estab-
lishment of requirements where cost and per-
formance are considered jointly at the maryin.
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65. In the whole development process of oper-
ational requirements and equipment pro-
grammes, the European Defence Industry
Group (EDIG) plays a useful and constructive
r6le. A representative of EDIG sits in as
observer in all Panel I meetings. EDIG is
therefore fully aware of work and progress in
Panel I and vice versa.
A) Rcsahs of thc no* ol Pawl I
66. Currently Panel I has some 19 subgroups
and a further l8 have been discontinued having
run their course without resulting in viable
projects.
67. Since revitalisation in 1984, it has pro-
duced 17 OESTs/ESTs, but as yet no finalised
ESR.
68. Of the 19 extant subgroups, 12 are still at
the harmonisation of requirements stage, 5 are
running projects and 2 manage dual production
arrangements.
69. Since 1985, no projects have moved
through the cycle past the EST stage, but draft
ESRs for 2 projects are in hand and future large
aircraft (FLA) and microwave landing system(MLS) appear to have significant potential.
70. Of the total of 19 current subgroups,
4 projects have been earmarked by NADs as
having particular potential for developing into
co-operative programmes. These are in addition
to the two already mentioned: 155 mm artillery
systems and an automatic grenade launcher/
heavy support weapon. These are actively fol-
lowed by Panel I through their various stages of
development.
71. The developments in Eastern Europe and
the CFE have resulted in a hiatus in nations'
equipment planning, which of course is reflectedin Panel I's lack of new subgroups, and a
number of major projects have been either tem-
porarily postponed or shelved, or nations have
withdrawn resulting in projects no longer being
viable.
X. Eurolrcan session fot armaments managefit
72. Among the initiatives taken by the IEPG,
th-e European session for annaments managers is
of particular interest. The idea is to offer study
programmes of several weeks twice a year to rel-
evant oflicials, each time in a different IEPG
nation. The aim of these programmes is to
favour mutual information relating to the oper-
ation of organisations in charge of arms pro-
curement, as well as to improve relations
between partners who are supposed to work
together. They reflect a sincere intention on the
part of IEPG countries to create a European
cadre of armaments managers who are well
acquainted with each other's procurement
problems and procedures and who know each
other personally through intensive joint expe-
rience, which is also important. The first
meetings took place in 1989 in France and the
United Kingdom. In 1990, meetings will take
place in France and Spain.
73. A full study programme covers four weeks
and consists of lectures, working group meetings
and visits to industrial and military establish-
ments.
XI. The trunsatlantb dialogae
74. The determined effort of European
NATO allies to create an open European
defence equipment market has not failed to
c,ause some anxieties on the other side of the
North Atlantic. Americans, and to some extent
Canadians, both in government and industry,
are worried that the EEC, in constructing a
simple integrated market from 1993, is also cre-
ating a fortress Europe as regards defence
equipment.
75. On the other hand, with serious defence
budget constraints in the United States together
with congressional pressures for arms reductions
and dim prospects for the world defence market
in the yearc to come, Europeans fear that the
United States is going to be increasingly protec-
tionist in its own defence market.
76. In order to balance these considerations,the IEPG attaches $eat importance to
explaining exactly what its action plan for the
open defence market is and that American
worries about a fortress Europe are unjustified.
At the last semi-annual meeting of the Con-
ference of National Armaments Directors(CNAD) of NATO in October 1989, the pres€nt
Chairman of the IEPG, Sir Peter Levene, took
the opportunity of making a statement on the
action plan and explained that efforts in the
IEPG should not be seen as a move towards pro-
tectionism and competition with CNAD, but
rather as a European effort to rationalise
cooperation between all allies. More activities
of such an explanatory nature will be under-
taken in order to make sure that the transat-
lantic dialogue, in defence equipment, can con-
tinue at the highest possible level of mutual
confidence.
Nunn amendment progrummes
77. It will be remembered that the pro-
grammes based on the Nunn amendment,
adopted by the United States Congress in
autumn 1985, made a very promising early
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start 3. In 1986, twelve anns co-operation pro-
grammes obtained funding from both sides of
the Atlantic. Four ofthese had been proposed by
the IEPG nations.
78. Meanwhile, initial enthusiasm seems to
have subsided into more down to earth realism.
The United States Congress has voted consid-
erably less funding than in the framework of a
general revision of defence expenditures. The
initial amount of $250 million voted by Con-
gress in 1986 fell to $154 million in 1987, $150
million in 1988, $ 145 million in 1989 and $ I I 5
million in 1990. In the draft budget for 1991, an
amount of $95 million has been applied for. It
was also understood that a concentrated effort
in a few programmes would yield more results
than a long list ofunder-funded projects. In fact,
it appeared that some of the programmes had
been far too ambitious, such as NFR 90, a pro-
gramme to develop a NATO frigate replacement
for the 1990s. In the second half of 1989, the
United Kingdom, France, Italy and West
Germany successively withdrew, followed in
January 1990 by Spain and the Netherlands.
The only remaining partners, Canada and the
United States, then decided to terminate the
programme.
79. Former participants are still considering
how to meet their existing requirements. Dis-
agreements on the size and the mission of the
frigate and cost factors seem to have been the
main reasons for the failure of the programme.
Furthermore, the United States and the United
Kingdom have opted out of the project for a
modular stand-off weapon (MSOW). A full list
of programmes under the Nunn initiative is
given at Appendix IV.
XlL Reorganisation in the European
defence industry
80. With governments actively seeking to
improve and rationalise their co-operation in
anns procurement, the defence industry is not a
passive bystander. A very significant parallel
development is taking place in armaments and
equipment companies at a European level.
81. While at an earlier stage of armaments
cooperation, the impetus of arms co-operation
had been collaborative agreements for single
specific multinational programmes, mostly
encouraged and sometimes forced upon industry
by governments, now there is a discernable
trend towards far closer industrial links between
companies. The European defence industry is
characterised by joint ventures, mergers and
acquisitions. Most of these developments since
June 1988 have been summarised briefly in
Appendix III.
82. There are several reasons why defence
companies should strive to achieve closer
co-operation and economies of scale. The prin-
cipal reason is the same as that which forced
governments to rationalise their procurement
policy, i.e. the excessive increase ofresearch and
development costs caused by the intensive
efforts which have been pursued in developed
countries towards more sophistication in new
weapon systems. The application and inte-
gration of modern technologies in new weaponry
require an ever longer and more expensive
research and development period. It may be suf-
ficient here to mention the technologies required
for stealth, precision-guided weapons, electronic
warfare, all-weather capabilities, electronic
warfare and C3I to recall the huge technical
problems which have to be overcome.
83. To preserve Western Europe's defence
industrial base, armament companies must
revise their strategies to accommodate them-
selves to the considerable changes taking place
in world-wide economic and strategic relations
which have already recorded a decline in the
production and export of weaponry. Moreover,
the European defence industry is feeling the
fierce competition of an emerying defence
industry in third world countries which are
offering weapon systems at attractive prices and
with ever improving capabilities. Countries such
as Israel, Singapore and Brazil are becoming
important arms exporters.
84. Finally, both the private and even the
government-owned and government-dependent
defence industries in Western Europe are too
closely linked with civilian industry to ignore
the coming into effect of the single market by lst
January 1993. It should not be forgotten that
defence-related companies, with the prospect of
lean times ahead, will have to diversify and
extend their activity into the civilian sector.
That is why, not surprisingly, the French
company Adrospatiale announced that in 1988,
for the first time in its existence, civilian orders
had overtaken military orders with 5l%, a devel-
opment which was continued progressively in
1989. In the same vein, the Soci6t6 nationale des
poudres et explosifs (SNPE), a French state-
owned company established in particular to
ensure the propulsion of the boosters of France's
nuclear forces, announced that in 1989, for the
first time in its existence, its defence and space
division represented slightly less than 50Vo ofits
total turnover of F 3.7 billion.
85. In short, defence and civil applications
will for economic and market reasons become
increasingly interdependent. Defence companies
are already seeking to extend the range of their
3. European armaments cooperation - reply to the thirty-
second annual report of the Council, Document lll9,
paragraph 77 et seq and Appendix I.
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activities and to diversify into such comple-
mentary fields as civil telecommunications, air
transport, information technology and the space
business.
86. The IEPG will have to have the strategic
vision to respond to this development by
appropriate liaison with the Commission of the
European Communities which, while it has no
treaty remit in military matters or relevant
expertise, has a definite interest in the efficient
use of industrial resources on a European basis
and the economic development of Europe's pro-
ductive capacity.
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APPENDIX I
Structure of the IEPG
MINISTERS
STATE SECRETARIES
(UK)
I
I
I
National ArmEuropean Defence
Industry Group
(UK)
Staff Group
(UK)
Panel I
Operational
Requirements
Programmes
(NO)
Panel II
Research and
Technolory,
including Euclid
(FR)
I
I
I
Subgroup 6
Common technology projects
(NL)
Permanent
Secretariat
(SP)
Ad Hoc Group 1992
(BE)
Panel III
Procedur onomic
matters and Action
Plan
Task Force C3
(GE)
Ad Hoc
Working
Group I
(Competition)
UK)
Note: (\ Chairing Nation.
Ad Hoc
Working
Group II
(Juste Retour)
(NO)
Ad Hoc
Working
Group III
(Technology
Transfer)
(IT)
SubEoup 7
(DDI)
(GR)
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APPENDIX II
Panel I sabgroups
key: BOLD = chair; ( ) = observer; 
- 
= considering participation
FUTURE LARGE AIRCRAFT FIMA industrial group is bidding nowIT BE FR GE
SP TU
PO
VEHICLE ROBOTICS May be incorporated in Euclid programme
GE FR SP UK
NL
SONOBUOYS AND ACTM MOUs signed, in progress towards European staffDIPPING target
SONAR/MAD BUOYS
UK FR GE IT
l55MM ARTILLERY Rocket launchers are also being considered
SYSTEMS
FR BE DE IT
NO SP UK PO TU
MPA
FR rT NL (SP)(UK)
ARMOURED BRIDGELAYER In progress towards European staff targetINTEROPERABILITY
BE FR GE
NL SP (UK)
ANTI-TANK GUIDED Mou finalised, programme is going ahead
WEAPONS THIRD
GENERATION
FR BE GE NL
UK
ANTI-TANK MINE programme is going ahead(DIRECT EFFECT)
FR GE UK
MICROWAVE LANDING
SYSTEM
UK BE DE FR GE
IT NO SP(NL) TU
COASTAL MINESWEEPER A Belgian-Netherlands design is available, the fourBE NL No nationi mentioned are discusiing the poriiuiiityoi Gil;(PO) common components
MSAM (medium-range Not active at the moment
surface-to-air missile)
FR BE GE IT
NL NO SP UK
MISTRAL
FR BE DE IT
SP NO
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LOW CALIBER Requirements have been identified throughout European
INDMDUAL AND SUPPORT nations
WEAPONS
BE FR GE rr SP (UK)
PO TU
M483/M864 l55MM
ARTILLERY AMMUNITION
NL TU UK
NBC
FR IT SP UK
STINGER
GE GR NL TU
ASRAAM (advanced
short-range air-to-air
missile)
UK FR NO
CA US SP
AMRAAM (advanced)
medium-range)
air-to-air missile)
GE NO UK(rr) (NL) (sP) ru
In production
Not active at the moment
United States weapon system, in licence production in
Europe
The future of both programmes, which are intercon-
nected, is very uncertain
EXPLANATORY GROUPS There is not much prospect for these groups
ON SUBMARINES
NL FR PO GE NO
The following subgroups, still mentioned in Document 1221, have been disbanded:
ADVANCED PILOT SURVEILLANCETRAINER AND TARGET
ACQUISITION
ARMOURED CARRIER MEDIUM AND HEAVYVEHICLE MORTARS
MI 13 MLU
ACTIYE/PASSIVE HEAVY SUPPORT
TOWED ARRAY WEAPONS/AGL
SYSTEMS
LOGISTIC
VEHICLES
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APPENDIX III
Other Eurolnan onns co-operation progrut tmes
Inertial navigation system Canada, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom
EH l0l helicopter ltaly, United Kingdom
Radar for Cobra air defence system France, west Germany, United Kingdom
MLRS phase 3 Italy, France, west Germany, United Kingdom,
United States
Rescue tank France, United Kingdom
European fighter aircraft (EFA) west Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom
A-129 Tonal anti-tank helicopter Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom
RTM 322 helicopter engine France, United Kingdom
Tiger anti-tank/attack helicopter France, West Germany
Anti-tank guided missile Trigat France, West Germany, United Kingdom
Family system of air defence missiles (FAMS) France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom
Helios observation satellite France, Italy, Spain
Midge Canada, West Germany, United Kingdom
NATO NH 90 tactical transport helicopter France, Italy, Netherlands, West Germany
ANS long-range anti-ship missile France, West Germany
Aster advanced surface-to-air missile France, Italy
Hot 2, improved Hot anti-tank missile )
Milan anti-tank weapon t Euromissile (France, west Germany)
Roland all-weather surface-to-air missile /
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APPENDIX IV
Programmes under the Nunn initiative os of lst Apfl 1990
ADA project support environmen.' united states, canada, united Kingdom, Flqnce, west
Germany, Netherhndi, Norway, Spain, Italy, Denmark; withdrew: Belgium. The MOU has been
signed.
Airborne stand-off radar demonstrator system (ARDS): United States, United Kingdom, France;
observer: West Germany.
Multifunctional information distribution system (MIDS): United States, 
-Canada, Uni,tedKingdom, France, West Germany, Nonway, ltaly, Spain. The MOU for project definition phase has
been signed.
155 mm autonomous precision-guided munition: France, West Germany, Netherlands, Spain,
Italy, Turkey. The MOU for the predefinition phase has been signed, but now that the United States
andihe Uniied Kingdom have withdrawn, the remaining participants are reconsidering their position
as regards this programme.
Modular stand-off weapon: Canada, France, West Germany, Spain, Italy; withdrew: United
States, United Kingdom.
Advanced sea mine: United States, United Kingdom.
Enhanced Jighter maneuvrability: United States, West Germany.
The Roch,vell/MBB demonstrator aircraft was rolled out in March 1990.
Advanced short take-off and vertical landing technology: United States, United Kingdom.
Baulelield information collection and exploitation system (BICES): United States, Italy;
observers: Canada, France, West Germany, Greece, Netherlands, United Kingdom.
HAWK mobility enhancemen.' United States, Netherlands. The MOU for the development
phase has been signed.
Tactical communications system post 2000: Canada, Italy, France, United Kingdom, United
States, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, West Germany. The MOU has been signed.
Tactical aircraft night combat capability enhancemenl; Netherlands, United States, United
Kingdom, France.
NATO anti-air warfare system (NAAWS): Canada, Netherlands, Spain, United States.
199
DOCUMENT 1228 APPENDIX V
APPENDIX V
Mergen aad talceoven in the Eurolrcan dcfence iadastry since lunc 1988
September 1988
October 1988
December 1988
January 1989
January 1989
February 1989
February 1989
l6th March 1989
25th March 1989
l5th April 1989
22nd April 1989
J_[e__Frgnc! companies SEP and Matra together create a new company, calledMSII, for lmage-processing which should employ 450 people ind- have a
turnover of F 5@ million in 1988.
Fiat sells its 22% stake in the united Kingdom helicopter firm westland to
GKN, which is connected with United Technologies.-
In spain a new electronics group unites INISEL's ERIA and relefonica's
Entel to create the leading firm in the Spanish civilian and defence software
market.
INI's PESA and INISEL agreed to team up with Telefonica's Amper
Espanola in the telecommunications sector.
ESD and Marconi decide to co-operate in the field of self-guidance systems
for anti-air missiles.
Thomson abandons its activities in microcomputers and concentrates on
electronics for the general public and defence purposes.
E Germany, MBB, Daimler-Benz and Siemens are linked and, if the GEC/
Siemens bid for Plessey goes ahead, there will be a share connection which
will firmly extend to major United Kingdom companies.
Matra concludes an agreement with Daimler. Matra will create a subsidiary
for its space defence activities and will exchange a 20% stake with Deutsche
Aerospace. The two companies will make similar propositions to the GEC
subsidiary Marconi and to the Swedish company Saab.
A6rospatiale (turnover in 1988: F 28 billion) and rhomson-csF form a newjoint avionigs gqoup by merging Adrospatiale's subsidiaries crouzet, SFENA
and EAS with Thomson CSF's General Avionics Branch (AVG). The new
group, called Sextant Avionique, employs 9 200 people with a consolidated
revenue in 1988 of $850 billion and is thought by its mother firms to be
c-apable of rivalling European and international leadters. Sextant Avionique is
the largest European grouping in this business and the fourth on the *orld
market in terms of turnover after the American companies Honeywell-
Sperry, Litton and Allied.
Proposed merger of the French aerospace manufacturer Labinal and a turbo-
engine 
-manufacturer Turbomeca, resulting in a group with annual sales of
about $l.l billion.
The French Defence Minister announces plans to transform the Groupement
Industriel des Armements Terrestres (GIAT) into a nationalised industry
with a structure similar to that of SNECMA irnd Adrospatiale. GIAT is pro
ducing land-ba,sed systems r-angrng from rifles to heavy artillery and niain
battle tanks. The purpose of the reorganisation, reducihg the wbrkforce by
l- 200 employge$ is to give the group greater flexibility and among othei
things to enabre it to associate with other French or foreign companieslGIAT
has now 14600 employees, down from 25 000 in 1977, and a reduced
turnover of $ l.l billion.
Aeritalia announces the 5090 acquisition of Elmer spA (Rome) and Laben
!p4 (Milan), both subsidiaries of the United Kingdom electronics and
defence Houp Ferranti. Aeritalia and Ferranti have arready collaborated in
many projects for many years.
s4GE]4 (Frynce) will sign a co-operation agreement in defence erectronics
with Fiat (Italv). SAGEM,- working in the freld of inertial systems and
optronics, has a turnover of $l.l and a workforce of 7 700.
SNECMA takes a controlling 5l% stake in FN Moteurs, the aeronautics
division of Fabrique Nationale, the Belgian armaments group. FN made it
clear that its FN moteun-division, with a $155 million turnov6r in l9gg, was
too small to compete effectively in the future European single market.
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lst July 1989
22nd July 1989
2nd September 1989
September 1989
23rd September 1989
3fth September 1989
October 1989
25th November 1989
9th December 1989
23rd December 1989
25th December 1989
l3th January 1990
Adrospatiale and Thomson-CSF (both France) and Selenia (Italy) establish a
consortium to cGoperate on a new family of ground-to-air missiles to
counter aerial threats ofthe 1990s.
Alcatel-Bell buys the space, defence and telecommunations division of ACEC
(Ateliers de Construction Electrique de Charleroi, Belgium) which was said
to have a turnover of $66 million.
Ferranti's turnover in 1988 was $1.7 billion.
Philips (Netherlands), which is planning to divert itself from all its defence
subsidiaries, sells its major defence subsidiary, Hollandse Signaal-apparaten(HSA), to Thomson-CSF, which now has an 8070 interest in HSA.
The West German Government gives its conditional approval to the pro-
posed merger of Messerschmitt-Btilkow-Blohm (MBB) and Daimler-Benz(ng). ln an earlier stage, Daimler-Benz had already taken over MTU and
Dornier (both in 1985) and AEG.
All aerospace and defence activities of the new group will be concentrated in
Deutsche Aerospace (DASA), with 75 000 employees and a turnover of
almost DM 16 billion in 1989, while AEG will be the electronics division
with 78 000 employees and a turnover of DM ll.5 billion.
Matra SA's United States subsidiary completes its acquisition of the United
States firm Fairchild Divisions Space, Communications, Electronics and
Control Systems.
The Italian firm ELSAG (Elettronica San Giorgio SpA) acquires Bailey Con-
trols, which specialises in automation, control and computerised systems and
which had a turnover of $370 million in 1988.
In December 1989 and spring 1990 Anelo-French government-sponsored
business briefings to be held in Paris and London in order to increase defence
co-operation in the industrial sphere.
The Canadian firm Bombardier completes its takeover of Short Brothers, an
aircraft and missile manufacturing company in Belfast which incurred a loss
of $250.7 million over 1988.
The FrenCh Government announces more radical measures to restructure
GIAT, which in 1988 showed a loss of over F 500 million ($80 million) on a
turnover of F 6.68 billion. In 1984, the turnover was F 9.9 billion. The
number of employees should be cut by 4 050 in 1992 from today's l5 @0.
The Belgian Fabrique Nationale-Herstal makes a bid to take over Matra-
Manhurin-Defence (MMD), a branch of the French Matra group, which pro'
duces handguns and cartridges with total sales of F 230 million in 1988. FN
Herstal has said that this acquisition would bolster its position as a world
leader in small arms manufacturing.
Following the takeover by West Germany's MAN and Daimler-Benz of the
civilian branch of Enasa, the Spanish state-owned truck manufacturer, INI,
the Spanish state holding group, will shift Enasa's military production to
Santa Barbara. INI is said tb be planning also a further centralisation of the
production of guns and othgr heavy military hardware in Spain. All these
moves are clearly inspired by the future single European market.
Three months after completion of the takeover of Plessey by GEC-Siemens,
GEC-siemens acquires 60Yo of Plessey, including radar and defence
systems.
GEC (United Kingdom) and Matra (France) sig;n an MOU to establish a
Europian space technology company, called Matra Marconi Sp-ace NV.
Matra tras a 5t% shareholding, while GEC holds the remaining 49%-
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27th January 1990
3rd February 1990
l0th February 1990
17th February 1990
3rd March 1990
l0th March 1990
27th March 1990
Deutsche-Aerospace, the defence division of the Daimler/MBB consortium,
is negotiating with Matra on closer ties.
GEC (united Kingdom) takes over Ferranti Defence Systems and Ferranti
Italia for f,310 million ($521 million).
The French and United Kingdom Governments give their approval for
Thomson-CSF and British Aerospace to integrate their missile aCtivities in ajoint missile venture, called Eurodynamics, with a turnover of $2.35 billion.
Ferranti International and rhomson-csF announce an agreement on a joint
venture in their sonar businesses.
Deutsche Aerospace (DASA), the result of the Daimler-Benz/MBB merger
with its production sectors for aviation, space, defence and propulsibn
systems divided over MBB, Dornier, MTU and Telefunken System T-echnik,
has a total workforce of 54 640 employees and a turnovei of DM 12.36
bilti-on ($7.4 billion) (see JWD, 24th February 1990 for Daimler turnover),
while the 1989 turnover is expected to be DM 14.5 billion.
Aerospatiale and Matra are discussing a joint venture on missiles.
The Italian Government is considering a close collaboration of several units
in the defence industry with activities in the field of electronics. The com-
panies concerned are Galileo and SMA, both parts of Finbreda, and Selenia
and ELSAG, both parts of Finmeccanica, with combined sales of $1.2 billion.
A6rospatiale and MBB, which are partners in the anti-tanl/combat heli-
copter Tiger and in the development progxamme for the NH 90 tactical
transport helicopter, have decided to intensify their co-operation. They agree
to merge the activities of their helicopter branches and to create a flrnancial
company, Eurocopter SA, before the end of 1990, which will control one
French and one German company responsible for the industrial and com-
mercial activities of the two groups in the lield of helicopters. If the merger is
a fact, the new company with sales of $1.3 billion would be the world's
second largest producer after Sikorsky.
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Amendments I and 2 7th June 1990
The Indepndent Eumpean Programmc Gruup (IEPG)
and Westera EuruTnan Union
l. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after " cross-frontier
competition" and insert *and transnational collaboration between defence companies'.---
2. 
- . 
In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out * developing defence industry ,
and insert ' member'.
Signed: FounC
AMENDMENTS I and 2t
tablcd by Mn Found
l. See 5th sitting, 7th June l99O (amendment I negatived; amendment 2 amended and agreed to).
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Druft Recommendation
oa dqcbpttunts in ommaad, contrul" commanications aad iatelligcncc (CtD
The Assembly,
(t) Recognising the tightening of defence budgets in all allied countries;(ir) Conscious of the serious intentions of both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to reduce their
conventional armed forces;(iii) Considering that a combination of reduced conventional forces and limited defence budgets calls
for improved co-operation between allied forces in order to employ troops and equipment most effi-
ciently;(iv) Convinced that an integrated allied command, control and information system as it is now being
planned by NATO will act as a force multiplier and will greatly improve the performance of the lesser-
armed forces that will be available in the future to guarantee peace and security for Europe;(v) Convinced that some systems for command, control, communications and intelligence, in par-
ticular those for airborne early warning and control and for stand-off surveillance and targeting, could
also play an important r6le in the process of verification of conventional arms reduction agree-
ments;
0A Convinced that the systems mentioned in paragraph (v/ could greatly contribute to building con-
fidence about military matters if members of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO agree to open their
skies for unarmed aerial surveillance flights over their territory as proposed by President Bush in May
1989,
RrcorraurNps rHAT rnr CouNcrr-
l. Urge member governments to endorse NATO's planning for an integrated command control and
information system for Allied Command Europe and to provide the required financial means;
2. Study the possible r6le of European and multinational aerial systems for stand-off surveillance
and targeting and of airborne early warning and control in the process of verifying the implementation
of a CFE treaty, and in the framework of a future open skies agxeement.
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I. Introduction
l. Even if the world of command, control,
communications and intelligence, or C3I as it is
more commonly designated, is little known
outside the community of military and defence
experts, it has been an important subject from
the very beginnings of organised warfare.
2. C3I is an indispensable process familiar in
any kind of war, be it fought with archers and
lances or with the most advanced twentieth
century equipment, which works along the fol-
lowing lines: the commander, having given his
instructions (command), wishes to be able to
keep a check on their execution (control),
choosing the most appropriate way to convey
these messages (communication), meanwhile
keeping account of all possible information(intelligence) which is needed for his deci-
slons.
3. The basic components of the process
described here have not changed in past cen-
turies, but modern technology has caused an
unrivalled progress in means of communications
and intelligence gathering, opening up vast
opportunities for commanders at all levels of
armed forces to follow the action very closely in
real time. While this new technology offers great
opportunities, its use also involves risks such as
the taste of commanders for unrestrained quan-
tities of information or their inclination to be
omnipresent. At the same time, the increasing
number of systems 
- 
operational or under devel-
opment 
- 
creates problems of interoperability
and the application of scarce resources.
4. The need for efficient use of existing
resources is even more urgent with less money
available for defence budgets in NATO coun-
tries and consequently fewer troops and
weapons systems at their disposal to guarantee
the security of NATO territory. The growing
interest in arms control with parties engaged in
negotiations striving for tangible results in the
not too distant future only reinforces this
requirement.
5. In this report an attempt will be made to
present a picture of C3I systems in use in
allied forces in Europe and to examine some
important questions related to the subject.
6. It should be recalled, however, that much
information on this subject is of a confidential
nature. Although discussions with experts in
preparing this report have been extremely
helpful, much important information could not
be obtained and other information could not be
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur)
revealed in this report, thus limiting its scope
considerably.
II. National military iletworks
7. A majority of NATO member countries
have implemented, or are in the process of
implementing, digital strategic and tactical mil-
itary networks. The strategic defence networks
are mainly based on commercial equipment and
standardised in accordance with International
Telegraphic and Telephone Consultative Com-
mittee (CCITT) standards.
8. These networks, while differing in detail,
are meshed digital circuit, packet and message
switched networks with supporting digital trans-
mission facilities. Within their national
boundary, they provide more flexible and robust
connectivity and a higher capacity than NATO
would be able to build.
9. As most of these systems are already in
operation, acquisition or advanced develop
mental stages, there is little chance to influence
their technical parameters. While they are based
on certain CCITT standards, hardware and
software have been modified to meet military
network requirements, such as those regarding
security, survivability and network control and
management. As a consequence these national
systems, while having similar capabilities and
characteristics in broad terms, in general are
incompatible with each other and require
unique gateways to interoperate.
10. Altogether, this has led to a very complex
national/NAT0 communications environment
and a level of interoperability between NICS
and the national military networks which for the
foreseeable future will be limited to special
gateway interfaces.
III. NATO integrated communications
system (NICS)
11. The general framework for allied commu-
nications in NATO is the NATO integrated
communications system (NICS) for which the
concept was established by the North Atlantic
Council in 1970. This concept was to provide an
integrated, meshed, common user and automati-
cally switched network to serve the communi-
cation needs of all eligible users, NATO's
military command and control, political consul-
tations and other civilian agencies across the
conflict spectrum.
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Nation Strategic Systems Tactical Systems
Belgium
Denmark
Federal Republic of Germany
France
BEMILCOM
FIKS*
GAFACS (GAFDIN)**
ISDN Bundeswehr
RA 70 (ANALOG)
HEDICS
TRI SERVICE NETWORK**
DIGITAL UPGRADE
ASCON
ASCON REPLACEMENT
NDDN
TAFICS
UNTTER (BOXER
SKYNETI**
DFTS
AUTOVON ETS
EUR (AUTODIN* DDN
DEB DSCS)*
DCS
RITA
ANALOG DIGITAL
AUTOKO (ANALOG)
DIGITAL
RITA
?
CATRIN
ZODIAC
TADCOM
?
PTARMIGAN
TRI.TAC
G
Itnlv
Netherlands
Nnnpev
Trrrkev
United Kingdom
United States ...
Military networks used by NATO countries.
12. In the NICS, an important r6le is assigned
to the TRI-MNC C2 plan, the command and
control improvement plan of the three major
NATO commanders. This plan is a program-
matic document which provides authoritative
statements of military requirements, system
deficiencies and funding priorities for correcting
these deficiencies over the next eighteen years,
and is updated every two years.
13. The main integrated communications
systems currently in use in ACE (Allied Com-
mand Europe) consist of transmission or bearer
systems and switching systems.
14. The transmission systems are:
- 
landlines, rented from the national PTT
authorities, which provide connectivity
where NATO owned systems are not
available or have inadequate capacity;
- 
ACE HIGH, an analogue tropospheric
scatter system which has already ful-
filled its useful economic life;
- 
SATCOM 
-1, the NATO satellite system
which can be regarded as an overlayto both abovementioned systems.
SATCOM 3 has one operational sat-
ellite, and a number of fixed and trans-
portable ground stations;
- 
AP 67, apredominantly analogue line-
of-sight microwave radio relay system,
integrated with ACE HIGH and
SATCOM, which is the main NATO
transmission medium in the central
region;
- 
a number of radio systems, among
which are a very low frequency (VLF)
system for submarines and several
emergency high frequency (HF) systems.
15. Two NATO switching systems provide
voice, data and telegraph, using NICS bearer
systems. These are:
- 
TARE, a telegraph automatic relay
equipment.
- 
IVSN, initial voice switched network,
providing voice and limited data facil-
ities.
16. Apart from these strategic systems, the
United Kingdom's I lth Signal Brigade has been
assigned to SACEUR as a tactical mobile com-
munications resource which can replace, overlay
or bypass key elements of NATO's fixed com-
munications system if need be, in particular in
the central region.
17. The future NICS will be an integrated ser-
vices digital network (ISDN) based on common
civilian concepts, technologies, standards and
protocols to the greatest extent possible. Such an
approach will enable all participants to use com-
mercial off-the-shelf technology effectively and
to minimise development cost and time scales.
18. The important objective of end-to-end
security for classified voice and data traffrc
will be achieved largely through end-to-end
encryption. Switched interconnections with
national defence strategic networks based on
special gateway converters will be extensively
deployed to enhance network survivability and
208
DOCUMENT 1229
flexibility. The tactical digital communications
interface will be at the gateway level and will use
NATO tactical interface STANAGs (standardi-
sation agreements).
IY. Cunent information systems in ACE
19. Information systems in ACE can be con-
sidered in two categories, management infor-
mation systems (MIS) and automated command
and control information systems (ACCIS). They
are funded differently because MIS are normally
expected to serve a peacetime, offtce-orientated
function and ACCIS the wartime, decision-
making function. However, these boundaries are
becoming blurred.
20. Each ACE region and SHAPE has a MIS
plan to provide for management need in an evo-
lutionary manner. SHAPE is the most advanced
in this respect and will have some networked
terminals installed next year.
21. ACCIS has also erown up on a regional
basis with no attention given to interoperability.
The northern region has 3 individual systems
being developed as the Northern European
Command ACCIS. Priority has been given to air
operations so far. UKAIR has ASMA (air staff
management aid), a simple national display
system, and has a state-of-the-art ACCIS on
order to be operational in 1991. This will be
integrated with their improved United Kingdom
air defence system. The southern region has no
integated regional system as such. There is a
maritime CCIS at the MEDCENT HQ in Italy
which is being replicated separately at the coun-
terpart HQs in Greece and Turkey. The 3
land/air HQs also have separate interim systems
which should start to be upgraded in 1993.
SHAPE and the central region have equipment
based on the United States world-wide military
command and control system (WWMCCS)
which allows C2 information to be passed
between some 13 HQs in the region.
Y. NATO air command
and control system (ACCS)
22. NATO's ACCS, an automated command
and control system, will combine the control of
air defences, offensive air and air support mis-
sions. It could be considered to be a vehicle for
continuing the close ties between United States
and European industry.
23. Early in 1990 NATO will approve the
development of the first phase of ACCS which is
meant, ultimately, to integrate national and
NATO funded systems for air command and
control.
24. Data from NATO radar and passive
tracking systems will be gathered into fixed and
mobile, ground-based automated data-processing
computers. Data and signals from different
systems and sensors will all be matched and
compared in order to provide accurate infor-
mation on the deployment of enemy forces.
Then the information will be disseminated to all
participants for use in the air battle through
state-of-the-art communications equipment.
25. The full ACCS system, which is estimated
at around $25 billion, will be implemented over
the next 15 to 20 years, with the financial means
being contributed by both NATO infrastructure
funds and individual NATO countries. It is
expected that NATO will award a two-year
project definition contract likely to be signed in
early 1990, which should produce a set of per-
formance parameters in order to enable NATO
to develop detailed specifications to be used in
the future bid for an offer to the industry. Full
implementation and procurement should start
at the beginning of 1992.
26. ACCS will interact with other NATO
command and control elements now under
development. In this framework, the battlefield
information collection and exploitation system(BICES) will serve as a complementary pro-
gramme, while NATO's multifunctional infor-
mation distribution system (MIDS) will interact
with the battlefield collection and exploitation
system by controlling air assets which would be
used against enemy targets. NATO's airborne
early-warning system (AEW) will provide air
and maritime surveillance information to ACCS
ground systems, respectively naval headquarters/
forces.
27. With a fundamental new approach to air
command and control, the military require-
ments will certainly be a challenge for the elec-
tronics industry and software developers. One of
the most diffrcult challenges will be automatic
sensor fusion, which is the ability of an auto-
mated system to pull data from radars and
passive sensors to $oup them together in one
place and then understand what the operational
consequences should be.
28. A new agency, NATO Air Command and
Control Management Agency (NACMA), is
being set up in order to implement the ACCS
progiamme. It will be responsible for conceptual
design and planning, system iniegration and
inteioperability with national systems and other
NATO communications networks, procurement
and testing and ensuring that new technology
does not disrupt the overall network.
29. It has not yet been decided which parts of
the programme will be centrally managed by
NACMA and which parts by individual nations.
Whereas ACCS planners are in favour of central
management of issues regarding software and
209
DOCUMENT 1229
testing, national experts have not yet agreed to
this idea. NACMA's links with the two other
NATO C3I agencies, NAPMA and NACISA, willbe established through the NATO C3
Co-ordination Office.
YI. BICES (battlefield information collection
and exploitation systems)
30. The BICES concept was established as an
effort to enable nations and ACE commands to
link existing and planned information systems
and capabilities to improve the flow of intelli-
gence througlrout the alliance. As such this initi-
ative has significant potential in supporting
arms control and verification processes.
31. The idea of BICES is to provide an
umbrella under which current national tactical
C3I systems are linked together. The basic idea is
that the data collected by the sensors of the dif-
ferent national systems will be communicated to
BICES which will correlate the information
received and transmit it to NATO command
centres. This means that sensitive national data
will be shared throughout NATO. As a conse-
quence, this system requires a high level of
security and measures to prevent " hacking ".
One of the challenges will be to grant access to a
large number of users through secret codes
which are easy to use but difficult to penetrate.
A huge effort will have to be made in software
and encryption design.
32. The different computer systems used for
information transfer will have to be
standardised or at least made compatible.
33. It is expected that at the beginning of
1990 NATO will seek industry proposals for a
two-year pilot study which should clearly define
the basic specifications which will allow BICES
to meet military requirements.
34. While the NATO Communications and
Information Systems Agency is responsible for
the management of the initial pilot study and
the building up of BICES as a whole, the indi-
vidual NATO countries will be responsible for
the funding and development of both hardware
and software which should link their own C3I
systems with BICES. Initial operation is
scheduled for 1993-94, but BICES will become
fully operational only after the year 2000.
YII. ACE information systems planning
35. It will have been noted from Part IV that
the present information systems in ACE lack
interoperability. To put this right a system
design and integration contract has been let to
recommend how best to go about the task. The
report is expected in 1991 and concentrates on
the central and southern regions plus SHAPE
whose new integrated information systems will
have to interoperate also with the new systems
already being installed in the northern region
and UKAIR.
36. This will all take time but, by the turn of
the century, ACE expects to have a fully-
integrated ACE automated command and
control information system serving all levels
above principal subordinate command (PSC)
and with interfaces to the relevant national tac-
tical systems.
37. The new ACE ACCIS will provide the
bearer system to convey the information pro-
cessed on the ACCS and BICES systems, and
others not mentioned here, to the NATO com-
manders.
YI I I. Stand-olf sumeillance
and targuing systems
38. In an earlier report, the then Committee
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace
Questions paid particular attention to stand-off
surveillance and targeting systems (SOSTAS) r.
Such systems are intended to provide military
commanders with a continuous picture of the
battlefield and rear areas. The use of synthetic
aperture radars with both fixed and moving
target indicators allows fairly accurate infor-
mation to be obtained on possible targets such
as wheeled and tracked vehicles, tanks and heli-
copters and even allows these targets to be clas-
sified.
39. At the moment, several national SOSTAS
are being developed. The most ambitious one is
the United States joint surveillance target attack
radar system (JSTARS or joint STARS) with
radar equipment to be installed in Boeing 707
airframes. Joint STARS will be able to cover an
area up to 300 by 400 km in size but, for reasons
of self protection, the airborne radar platforms
will fly over friendly territory at a considerable
distance from the fonvard line of troops and will
cover an area of not more than 150 km behind
the enemy lines.
40. France is developing Orchid6e, a lower-
level system using a Super Puma MK II heli-
copter with a pulse doppler radar which can
detect columns of moving vehicles and heli-
copters at low altitude at a maximum distance of
100 km.
41. The United Kingdom has a technology
demonstrator programme called ASTOR (air-
borne stand-off radar) with two different plat-
forms. A synthetic aperture radar mounted bn a
Canberra aircraft will cover a large area with
2t0
!. 
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fixed target surveillance and a snapshot moving
target indicator. Complementary to this, a low-
flying PBN Islander will be fitted with a moving
target indicator radar which will have the same
performance as the French Orchid6e.
42. Germany is developing the GEAMOS-LR
system with a moving target indicator radar
mounted on an unmanned helicopter and with a
range of 120 km. At the same time, two other
systems, called Lapas and Loras, now under
development, are using a high-flying fixed-wing
aircraft, Egrett, as their platform.
43. Finally, Italy is working on a system
called Creso, mounted in a AB-412 helicopter,
with a mode of operation similar to Orchid6e,
but more modest as far as range and accuracy
are concerned.
IX. Airborae early warning
and control (AEWAC)
44. The NATO AEW&C programme has been
dealt with in full in a report by the then Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aero-
space Questions in 1984 2. The NATO AEW&C
programme is a unique and specially funded
multinational programme established in 1978 to
counter the increasing low level threat from air-
craft over both land and sea. The AEW&C
system provides an all-altitude aircraft warning
and detection capability, together with improve-
ment in the alliance's maritime surveillance
capability. It also contributes to the direction
and control of tactical air forces and to the gath-
ering of information on enemy ship and aircraft
movements.
45. In 1985, the last of eighteen NATO E-3A
aircraft was delivered and the programme is
running to the satisfaction of all participating
nations. Meanwhile, three used Boeing 707 air-
craft have been acquired from Sabena for
training and cargo purposes. After refur-
bishment and modification, the third of these
aircraft was delivered on 22nd December
1989.
46. In the framework of the AEGIS (AEW
ground integration segment) programme, forty
ground radar sites in nine NATO member coun-
tries have been upgraded in order to be able to
interoperate with the AEW&C aircraft via the
secure data link JTIDS.
47. Apart from the main operating base at
Geilenkirchen (FRG), there are forward oper-
ating bases at Konya (Turkey), Preveza (Greece)
and Trapani (Italy) and a fonrard operating
location at Oerland (Nonray). Meanwhile, seven
enhanced E-3 aircraft have been ordered
2. AWACS and Nimrod aircraft, Rapporteur: Mr. Spies von
Biillesheim, Document 974.
by the United Kingdom and four by France.
Italy and Spain are at different stages ofnegoti-
ation for an order offour, respectively three, E-3
aircraft. At the moment a $700 million pro-
gramme is nearing formal approval for the
modernisation of the existing l8 NATO E-3A
aircraft, with main attention being paid to the
radar, airborne communications system,
operator controls and the storage capacity ofthe
on-board computer, with self-protection also
being investigated.
48. In fact, the situation is such that the
nations involved have indicated their com-
mitment to the $700 million near-term pro-
gramme. An initial funding of $100 million can
be found in existing NAEW&C programme
resources. The remainder will be funded by 12
NATO nations on the basis of a special pro-
gramme contribution scheme during the years
r99t-97.
X. Command and contrcl of Allied Command
Europe (ACE)
49. Allied Command Europe (ACE), with
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) as its chief commander, covers the
entire NATO territory in Europe from the North
Cape of Nonvay to the southern borders of
Turkey. It is divided into a northern region(AFNORTH), a central region (AFCENT), a
southern region (AFSOUTH) and the United
Kingdom Air Forces (UKAIR). Within ACE
there are also two more organisations directly
controlled by SACEUR, i.e. the multinational
ACE mobile force (land) and the NATO air-
borne early-warning force command.
50. In order to be able to deter aggression
and, if deterrence fails, to counter aggression
with appropriate responses, ACE requires a
broad and flexible command and control
system. This is a requirement of vital impor-
tance, given the fact that SACEUR must have
continued ability to command and direct ACE's
nuclear assets. ACE s command and control
concept must therefore include a significant
crisis management and politicaVmilitary consul-
tation capability. Its communications and infor-
mation systems must be reliable, interoperable
and survivable and provide fast secure
systems.
51. At all levels there is a basic operational
requirement to have the capability to receive
and disseminate information, to conduct
decision-making and to send and receive
orders.
52. The facilities at SACEUR's disposal to
meet this requirement include a network of war
headquarters ranging from bunkers to land-
based mobile headquarters and command ships
at sea.
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53. The general requirements of ACE's
command and control concept are translated
into actual hardware, software, facilities and
support systems through the overall tri-major
NATO commanders command and control plan(tri-MNC C2 plan). This is a long-term strategy
for C2 acquisition, now in its fourth edition.
XI. Sumivability
54. In order to support the strategy of flexible
response, which requires NATO to decide upon
and conduct any desired form of response
regardless of the nature of attack, CrI systems
must be highly survivable. In its overall concept,
NATO is aiming to provide an acceptable level
of survivability through redundancy and
selective hardening. Essential wartime users are
provided multiple independent connectivities
through a combination of NICS, national mil-
itary networks, commercial PTTs and special
overlays in accordance with their needs. Basi-
cally, the idea is to have a two-level system
available with the level I system being a
rationalised military communications network
composed of a core of a NATO-owned network
and supplemented by national defence networks
through interconnects and other means to derive
additional redundant paths and media mix. The
PTT networks are used to derive alternative
connectivities and flexibility. This combination
of NICS, national military switched networks
and PTT connectivity would be designed to
provide the necessary communications support
through conventional conflict. Level II systemis a low+apacity, hardened overlay network
designed to provide additional connectivities to
the essential wartime users at higher levels of
conflict. This overlay will comprise appropriate
media mix, such as adaptive HF and mobile
SATCOM terminals, and these will have the
necessary protection against jamming, electro-
magnetic pulse (EMP) and other nuclear
effects.
55. An important issue is the extent to which
the NATO common user network should be
hardened against the effects of electromagnetic
pulses and other disruptions which may be
caused by nuclear explosions. EMP from a high-
altitude nuclear burst affects electronic equip
ment over a range of several thousand kilom-
eters in diameter. It is a threat that renders
redundancy, the basic survivability principle,
ineffective.
XII. The need to sift information
56. With increasingly sophisticated means of
collecting and communicating data, the quantity
of information which theoretically could be
available for commanders is almost without
limits. Consequently, more attention will have
to be paid to developing methods for selecting
and sifting information.
57. Apparently there is a need to tackle this
problem, but it cannot be done without a better
understanding of the process of command. At
the moment, it is only rudimentarily understood
how commanders reach their decisions and
likewise what kind of information would help or
on the contrary hinder them in making their
assessment before taking decisions and issuing
orders. An additional problem is not only that
there are many different types of human
behaviour, but also that individual commanders
will react differently depending on circum-
stances and the degree ofstress. In an ideal situ-
ation, C3I systems, designed to support decision-
making, should take account of as many aspects
of human behaviour as possible, in particular
the behaviour of individual commanders under
different circumstances. However, know-
ledge in this area is only in its infancy and spec-
tacular progress should not be expected in the
short term.
58. A hierarchical process of sifting infor-
mation, even with the use of some kind of auto-
mation, is clearly inevitable. In many cases, to
think only of identification technology, signal
processing and pattern processing, no human
being would be able to do the job properly. But
no filtering system whatsoever should exclude
the possibility for a commander to call for that
particular information which he personally con-
siders to be vital for his decision.
XIII. The employment of artiticial intelligence
59. Basically, commanders need three cate-
gories of information:
archival information, which has been col-
lected over a long period and which
involves such information as geographical
data, enemy doctrine or even biographical
data of opposing commanders;
intelligence analysis, which provides
an assessment of enemy intent and
behaviour over a relatively recent period;
real-time sensor information and reports,
which give a continuous update ofcurrent
events.
60. In order to be able to use their archival
information, commanders will need powerful
text retrieval technology.
61. Here expert systems might help to find the
information which would be relevani for a given
situation.
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62. Likewise, intelligence analysis requires
patterns to be recognised over quite long
periods, comparing and associating information
on current events with historical information.
Expert systems, artificial intelligence and neural
network machines could be of great assistance in
this kind of work.
63. An urgent problem is the processing of
real-time information derived from all kinds of
sensors such as radar, sonar, radio receivers and
reports from troops in war.
64. Indeed, modern sensor equipment has a
built-in data-processing capability which enables
it to recognise and extract essential information.
However, it will become ever more important to
correlate the information available in order to
be able to recognise and trace targets, a process
which is called data fusion. Expert systems are
expected to enhance significantly the effec-
tiveness of data fusion.
65. At the moment, expert systems are being
developed which are meant to help commanders
in planning their action, thus reducing their
planning time from hours to minutes.
66. It should be added, nevertheless, that
much of the technology mentioned here is in its
early stages and that it still may be a long time
before results of research and development now
being undertaken will be available opera-
tionally.
XIY. Rationalisation and interuWrobility
67. Given the growing need of modern armed
forces world-wide for higher performance C3I
systems, defence electronics companies are
entangled in tough competition for their share in
this important international market. As usual,
each of the allied nations is trying to fulfil its C3I
requirement with the help of its national elec-
tronics industry which results in as many
national research and development investments
and resulting systems. With less equipment and
possible ammunition shortfalls, interoperable
communications will be a key feature in
NATO's ability to maintain a credible defence
system.
68. It should, however, not be forgotten that
there are limits to rationalisation from both the
technical and operational perspective of main-
taining cohesive NATO communications for
exercising positive command and control under
stress conditions.
69. As far as interoperability with the diverse
national military systems is concerned, a
common agreement on secure voice terminals,
communications security and other system-level
parameters is a precondition to achieve the
requisite level of interoperability between
NATO and national switched networks.
70. In the area of Allied Command Europe,
the different regions are now having built their
own C3I systems which no longer meet the rec-
ommendations of a past architectural design
study. It is possible for the regional systems(northern region, UKAIR, central region,
southern region) and the system at Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe to inter-
connect and to exchange information, but the
situation is far from ideal and a practical design
for interoperability between all regions is still
lacking.
71. NACISA, the NATO Communications
and Information Systems Agency, has therefore
initiated a study into system design and inte-
gration which should indicate how best to inte-
grate future systems with existing ones. Towards
the end of the 1990s, this effort should even-
tually lead to an integrated automated command
control and information system (ACCIS) for
Allied Command Europe.
72. In the meantime, the systems which
already exist or are under implementation are
being interfaced, where possible, by STAMINA(standard automated message interface for
NATO ACCIS), a specification which has been
developed by NACISA to solve current
interoperability problems.
73. The future ACCIS will also serve as a
bearer for other systems which will provide
indispensable information for the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe to exercise effective
command and control. These systems are in par-
ticular:
BICES battlefield information col-
lection and exploitation systemsACCS air command and control
system
ATCCIS 
- 
army tactical command and
control information systems (France,
United Kingdom, Federal Republic of
Germany, United States)
NMOS 
- 
NATO maritime operational
intelligence support.
74. Within NATO the NATO Airborne Early-
Warning and Control Programme Management
Organisation was set up to be responsible to
implemertt the NATO AEW&C programme. Its
executive agency, the NAPMA, manages the
programme on a day-to-day basis. The NATO
Communications and Information System
Agency (NACISA) is responsible for the man-
agement of NATO's main C3I efforts. There are
firm plans to also establish the NATO Air
Command and Control Agency (NACMA) to
implement the future air command and control
system.
75. When there will be two agencies respon-
sible for the management of different parts of
NATO's C3I systems (NACISA and NACMA),
and NAPMA responsible to ensure the NATO
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E-3A aircraft are interoperable with these
systems, it will be increasingly difficult to ensure
co-ordination of the overall effort in these activ-
ities. NATO therefore decided recently to set up
a high-level co-ordinating committee, chaired by
the Deputy Secretary-General, with the task of
advising the three agencies on how to harmonise
all these activities from the political and proce-
dural points of view.
76. NAPMA having its own specific and well-
defined task, it is clear that the main effort of
the new co-ordinating committee will be
directed towards the relations between NACISA
and the NATO Air Command and Control
System Management Agency (NACMA), in par-
ticular since both are developing technically
complicated systems which ultimately should be
completely interoperable. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the co-ordinating committee
as it is now being set up, with vague responsibil-
ities and a very small staff, will be able to
prevent conflicts between NACISA and
NACMA or to settle disputes between these
agencies.
Xl/. Cottclusions
77. At the present juncture, with new political
changes in Eastern Europe occurring almost
every other day, it is extremely difficult to give a
clear picture of the requirements for Western
Europe's security and defence. However, the
CFE negotiations in Vienna will most probably
produce quick results, thus leading to significant
reductions in conventional arms in Europe. A
further tightening of defence budgets is written
on the wall. A security system which relies on
ever less troops and weapons systems will have
to employ these forces in the most efficient
manner. The only way to do this is to have an
up-to-date, efficient alliance-wide C3l system.
NATO is now trying to achieve this with the
planned introduction of an integrated allied
command control and information system for
Allied Command Europe. These plans should be
supported wholeheartedly by all the nations con-
cerned even though it may not always be pos-
sible to find cheap solutions for the many
problems to be solved.
78. There is one aspect of C3I systems which
deserves close attention for a different reason.
Data-collection is an important part of any C3I
system, given the fact that data on the enemy's
activity are the raw material on which military
commanders will have to base their decisions.
Considerable ingenuity has therefore been
injected into many different sensor systems
designed to collect such data.
79. Two systems, in particular airborne early
warning and control and stand-off surveillance
and targeting, might well be able to fulfil a dif-
ferent r6[e. They have been designed to provide
detailed information on the whereabouts and
activities of the enemy's weapons systems, be
they in the air or on the ground or afloat. Such
systems could also play an important r6le for the
verification of conventional arrns reduction
agreements.- The open skies proposal, recently
made by President Bush, would offer vast
opportunities for such systems, already oper-
ating or under development, to be used for the
benefit of Europe's security in a manner
somewhat different from the one for which they
were designed. The BICES and ACCIS projects
could provide the essential conduit and collation
and processing capabilities to enable the rapid
assessment of collected data to support these
efforts.
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Dmft Renmmcnduion
on obrcnation satUitcs 
- 
a Eurupeaa meaas of wrifyiag disrmaotcat 
-guifuliws druwn frum the symposium
The Assembly,
(t) Noting that the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), now taking place in
Vienna, are likely to lead to an agreement within a year's time;(ii) Considering that European nations have played a substantial r6le in these negotiations and will
also be signatories to a future CFE treaty in their own right;(iii) Aware that a future CFE treaty will also include extensive arrangements for verification and
exchange of information considered as confidence-building measures by all parties concerned;(iv) Conscious that, apart from co-operative measures of verification, national or international tech-
nical means of verification, in particular satellites which can be employed without the cooperation of
the contracting party whose territory is under investigation, are of perennial importance in the entire
verification process;
(v) Taking into account that verification satellites can also be employed to monitor territories in the
world where new security threats might arise;(vil Stressing the need for Western European nations to develop an autonomous European verifi-
cation satellite capability in order to meet their responsibilities in a changing security situation while at
the same time strengthening the alliance as an equal partner;
(vir) Aware that all the technological and industrial capabilities required for the establishment and
operation of a full-scale verification satellite system are available in the WEU member states;
(viii) Awarc of the plans for a research and technology project on satellite surveillance technology in
the framework of the Independent European Programme Group's Euclid programme;(ix) Recalling that the European Space Agency has gained invaluable competence and experience in
managing complicated international space programmes including earth observation,
RrcoMtaeNns rHAT rxr CouNclr-
l. Decide as a matter of urgency on the establishment of a WEU satellite image-processing and
interpretation agency;
2. Reach decisions on further steps for establishing a full-scale European verification satellite
system without delay, taking into account the time necessary for developing the various segnents, such
as optical satellites, ground stations and, in a later phase, synthetic aperture radar satellifes and data-
relay satellites.
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Explananry Memorandum
(submittcd by Mr. Iza4er, Rappoaeur)
I. Introduction
l. In December 1988, the Assembly adopted
two recommendations (465 and 466) on the cre-
ation of a European agency to verify future con-
ventional arms reduction agreements. The rec-
ommendations accompanied two reports
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
and the Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee by Mr. Fourr6 and Mr. Malfatti respec-
tively.
2. The Assembly considered it essential for
WEU to fulfil Europe's responsibilities in the
implementation of future arms control agree-
ments.
3. To the Assembly's great satisfaction, in
spring 1989, the Council mandated an ad hoc
suU-group on space of the Special Working
Group tb examine this subject. An interim
report was submitted to the Ministerial Council,
which, at its meeting on l3th and l4th
November 1989, requested the ad hoc sub-group
to continue its work and to undertake the tech-
nical studies required for the preparation of a
possible ministerial decision on the devel-
-opment by member states of a European obser-
vation satellite programme.
4. With the activities of the Council in mind,
the Technological and Aerospace Committee
thought the time was ripe to oryanise a gYm:
posirlm to bring together the various political
opinions in member states and allow representa-
tives of the European space industry to present
their latest viewi on the technical capabilities
available for developing an autonomous
European satellite observation system.
5. This report will endeavour to summarise
the discussions at the symposium and draw con-
clusions for inclusion in a draft recommen-
dation. It is hoped that, by so doing, the
Assembly will be able to make a useful contri-
bution t6 the discussions in the Council in prep-
aration for its decision later this year.
II. Prospects for conventional arms rcduaions
in Europe: CFE and beYond
6. Strictly speaking, commenting on arrns
reduction negotiations and agreements is not the
true field of action of the Technological and
Aerospace Committee. On the other hand, given
the fact that such agreements and their conse-
quences are the main reason for the committee
to be interested in observation satellite systems, a
few words need to be said about this subjectr.
7. In the first place, it is important to note
that the CFE treaty, possibly to be signed before
the end of I 990 or in early 199 l, will be the first
arms reduction agreement since World War II to
include not only the United States and the
Soviet Union as contracting parties, but also
their allies in Eastern and Western Europe.
Here, the European countries have made a sub-
stantial contribution in negotiations leading to
an aflns reduction agreement in which they will
be partners, each ofthem on an individual basis.
8. Effectively, the coming CFE agreement
and the commitment to withdraw troops unilat-
erally from several Warsaw Pact countries will
remove the Soviet Union's capability to carry
out a surprise attack. Moreover, the CFE
agreement will also include an extensive system
o-f verification and exchange of information
which is considered as part of a system of
confidence-building measures by all parties.
9. All participants in the negotiations on
CFE I, even if the treaty itself has not yet been
signed, are in favour of using tle. existing
favourable conditions to start negotiations on a
follow-up agreement, CFE II, immediately after
the signituri of CFE I. An important ryason for
follow-up negotiations is that Western European
countries wifl also have to reduce their military
forces if they wish to maintain credibility in the
process of dEtente. Moreover, a positive attitude
towards continuing the CFE negotiations wouldbe a political sign to en@urage further
democratisation in Eastern Europe.
10. Meanwhile, an important parallel devel-
opment is taking place. Due to a number of
iriternal currents and unilateral decisions, the
armed forces of a number of Eastern European
countries and in particular the Soviet Union are
in the process of iestructuring, equipment of dis-
bandeil units being reallocated and units with-
drawn from Central Europe being deployed in
other Soviet territories. Naturally, there are no
agreements on verification or inspection of
activities in this process.
III. Future thruats to Eurolnan security
I l. Naturally, the tremendous changes in
Eastern Europe during the last months, con-
firming the collapse of-communism as practised
l. For an extensive discussion on the CFE negotiations, ref-
erence is made to Document 1223 entitled'Vienna, disarm-
ament and Western European Union ", submitted on behalf
of the Defence Committee by l,ord Newall.
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by the r6gimes of the Soviet bloc, delighted
everybody in the western democracies. The cold
war was over and the threat of a massive
Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe had dis-
appeared. To many people it seemed that armed
forces were no longer needed now that the most
formidable enemy seemed to have vanished.
The fruitful development of the Vienna negotia-
tions on CFE only reinforced the idea that war
and defence were concepts of days gone by.
12. It should not be forgotten, however, that
the antagonism of East and West during the cold
war, with its deplorable arms race, nevertheless
had the relative advantage of bipolar stability.
With this no longer being the case, even for
Europe, the world will be a less orderly and
sometimes even less secure place.
13. In his address to the symposium, General
Charlier rightly pointed out that the existence of
a verifiable CFE I and possibly a CFE II will not
be a^suffrcient guarantee for Europe's security in
the future.
1.4. Too. many questions remain outstanding,
thus creating just as many possible new threati
to peace and security. Suflice it here to mention
the problems still existing at Europe's borders.
The rOle, position and attitude of the Soviet
Union in a post cold war era have yet to be
settled, and the prospects for a satisfactory
solution of the many national and ethnic diffei-
ences in Eastern Europe and the Balkans are still
dim.
15. 
_ 
O,n top of that, Islamic fundamentalism, a
declared enemy of the western industrialised
and secularised world, is gaining importance
among all nations along Europe's iouthern
border. This fundamentalism, combined with
ethnic and nationalistic ambitions and a still
increasing arsenal of armaments, is beginning to
constitute a serious threat.
16. In this framework, Mr. Martinazzoli, the
Italian Defence Minister, made it clear that an
important task of the strategic observation sat-
ellite Helios will be to survey the Mediterranean
area with its many possible crises and conflicts
and with some nations deliberately developing
new weapons of mass destruction to- be
delivered by missiles.
I\. The wed fu an autonomous Euru1rcan
obsemation satellite sumeillance copaht@
!.^ Mr. Renon, the French State Secretary ofDefence, and a number of other speakers righAy
stressed that transatlantic solidarity was s[iU i
vital part ofEurope's security. It is essential for
keeping the balance and is even recomised as
such by the Soviet Union. Neverthelesslwith the
diminishing Soviet threat and the liberation of
the Eastern European countries, some of the
conditions in this alliance are bound to
change.
18. There can be no doubt that the presence
of American forces in Europe will be-reduced
considerably in the near future. In this new situ-
?ligl, Euroae will have to shoulder its responsi-bilities. While maintaining the alliance wilh ttre
United States, Europe will have to pull together
an-d respond to the new challenges. Only then
will it be able to play its part and guarantee its
security in a changing world.
19. With an apparently growing need for
monitoring by satellite, for a numbei of reasons,
pur-ope_,_ notwithstanding the existing capability
in the United States, should have its-own obsei-
vation satellite system. The establishment of a
European observation satellite system wouldglve a tremendous boost to 'co-operation
between the various national verification
organisations which are now being set up in
European countries with a view to-verification
of the CFE agreement. Observation by satellite
on a world-wide scale will be one of the key ele-
ments in future security measures because it
allows the development of threats to be followed
autonomously. Europe cannot rely only on the
means of verification written into armi control
treaties: if one of the contracting parties backs
out of its obligations, technical-means should
remain for observing its military activities to
offer- warning o{ any possible tLreat. Finally,
with less armed forces available in Europe in t[6
future, it will be all the more importhnt and
timely to have at its disposal detailed infor-
q?lioq on changes in the military situation and
shifts in the proportion of military forces in
Europe or adjacent territories with possible con-
sequences for the world's security.
20. 
. 
With its responsibilities for verifying the
existing INF treaty and the future START
agreement, the United States will have to make
more extensive use of its existing monitoring
capability. For budgetary reasons, the United
States Congress will be very reluctant to allow
the number of satellites to be increased.
21. Opponents of an autonomous European
observation satellite capability always refer to
th.e- existing American means which, it is said,
will always provide the European alties with th6
information.they require. Without blaming the
Americans, it should be observed here that they
only provide their satellite data up to a certain
point.
22. Since the second world war, there has
indeed been close co-operation with the United
Kingdom in these matters, but this does not
apply to other European allies. The United
States understandably is reluctant to share with
its allies extensive information obtainedlrom its
satellites so as not to compromise its capabilities
in this field. This has been demonstrated time
and again. Whenever the United States has
wished to denounce important events or devel-
opments in unfriendly territory which no doubt
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had been observed in'detail by their own satel-
lites, it has always made use of Spot images, as-
has 
.been 
the case in many recent editions of
" Soviet Military Power ", the Defence Depart-
ment's annual assessments of the Soviet military
capabilities.
23. This complete European dependency on
United States satellite data was quite embar-
rassing for some European governments during
the INF crisis when, in a discussion which domi-
nated the entire political debate in their coun-
tries, they were not able to provide autonomous
information on the number of SS-20 missiles
deployed by the Soviet Union. The fact that
infoniration obtained from satellite data was
provided by the United States, considered to be
a biased party in the debate, did not help to
calm down heated emotions. There can be no
doubt that in this case an autonomous European
observation satellite would have facilitated a
rational debate.
24. For Europe, equal partnership with its
American allies requires an autonomous obser-
vation satellite capability in order to enable it to
co-operate on equal terms with the United
States. Mr. Martinazzoli argued that under such
circumstances it would be desirable to engineer
a specific field of responsibility for the European
naiions, the purpose of which would also be to
avoid allowing relations with the United Statesto become unbalanced. An autonomous
European effort in the verification of arms
control agreements would clearly demonstrate
the determination of European nations to meet
their responsibilities as sigratories of such ag;ree-
ments. At the same time, this would lead to a
division of tasks between the United States and
Europe in an unequivocal effort to share the
burden within the alliance.
25. The security interests of the United States
will not necessarily be exactly the same in all
parts of the world as European security interests.
it may well be, therefore, that the United States
wi[ sbmetimes focus its monitoring capability
on areas which are of less interest for Europe,
leaving no room to use this capability for spe-
cific European interests.
Y. Yerification measanes in the framework
of arms reduction agraements
(a) Ditlercnt kinds of verilicatiot metsures
26. An intricate system of verification mea-
sures is part of any anns control agreement, on
the one hand to prevent treaty violations and on
the other hand to protect the signatories against
possible consequences of such violations 
^bybther parties, in which case only timely infor-
mation will enable the potential victim of such
violations to take those measures which it deems
appropriate.
27. In verification, a major distinction is
made between co-operative measures and
national means of verification.
28. Ceoperative measures can only be
applied in co-operation with speciflrc other sig-
n-atories concerned. Such measures are for
instance on-site inspections, aerial survey and
exchange of data. National means of verification
can be employed without the co-operation of the
contracting party whose territory is under inves-
tigation. Foi these national means a further dis-
tinction is made between national technical
means, including satellites, and other national
means of information gathering. Among the
co-operative verification measures now being
enviiaged in the CFE framework are the on-site
inspecfions which allow contracting parties to
conduct inspections with teams of verification
experts within days of prior notification of the
sites covered by the CFE treatY.
29. At the moment, attempts are also being
made to conclude a separate agreement on an
airborne observation system, called open skies,
as a contribution to greater openness in military-
activities, thus being part of a system of
confidence-building measures. It is thought that
this open skies agreement could also play-a
useful supplementary r6le in the verification of a
CFE a$eement. Such airborne observations, to
be cariied out by aircraft equipped with appro-
priate sensors, would also be subject to prior
notification.
30. Recognising the inadequacy of co-
operative verificalion measures, both East and
West agree that, according to earlier arms
control agreements between the United States
and the Soviet Union, national technical means,
in particular observation satellites, can be used
for verifying a CFE agreement.
(b) Disdvanlages ol co'oprutive wrificatioa ,rwottanes
31. Beyond all doubt co-operative verifi-
cation measures must be the main constituent of
a CFE treaty verification r6gime, not forgetting
their value, for confidence-building. Never-
theless, at the symposium, it was rightly pointed
out that co-op6ratlve measures such as on-site
inspections, even if they provide the most
detailed information on the treaty implemen-
tation, also entail certain disadvantages which
are significant enough to pr-event them from
being ihe only means of verification.
32. Without claiming to be exhaustive,
speakers mentioned the most conspicuous dis-
a-dvantages as follows. On-site inspections are
confined'to a limited list of sites as mentioned in
the treaty. Even if the contracting parties even-
tually agree to extend this list, it would.still leave
large areas undisturbed by 
-inspection. Fur-
the-rmore, the sheer number of sites included in
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the treaty is far too large to allow for more than
sample inspection. The number of on-site
inspections which really can be carried out is
limited by quotas, notification deadlines and
rules which leave a malevolent contracting party
ample leeway for evasive action.
33. Th'ere is one other aspect of the most
important category of co-operative verification
measures which cannot be neglected. The
expected 250 on-site inspections per year in the
CEE framework will require a considerable
effort in manpower and cost. Mr. Jasani
reminded the audience at the symposium that a
staffof I 500 people will be needed, while $570
million will be needed for establishing the
on-site inspection r6gime with an annual
running cost of about $200 million.
34. Finally, it has been observed that on-site
inspections, intrusive by nature, will certainly
not implove the atmosphere among contracting
parties if they are employed to resolve a dispute
on the iqplementation of the treaty during a
period of rising politicd tension.
(c) Abailaga of satelliu vedfuatioa
35. Satellite verification will never be able toprovide the detailed information obtained by
on-site inspection. Likewise, it does not producb
or enhance mutual confidence between con-
tracting parties in the same way as co.operative
measures if carried out in a positive manner.
But the advantages, as pointed out below, are
such that its application is compulsory to make
up the deficits of co-operative verification mea-
sures.
36. The area of the Warsaw Pact countries
between the Atlantic and the Urals to be
observed strictly within the framework of the
CFE treaty covers some 8 million sq km. There
are several thousands of sites where troops and
weapons are located, the reduction or the
destruction of which is to be verified.
37. Observation from space could provide an
overall impression of activities over a vast area
in a very short time. It should be noted here that
a spacecraft, with a l0 m resolution sensor, trav-
elling at a ground speed of nearly 7 km per
second, could observe, from an altitude of 800
km, an area of about 2 850 000 sq km an hour.
The same satellite, if equipped with a I m reso-
lution sensor, could observe about 285 @0 sq
km in the same period.
38, The specific ability of a verification sat-
ellite to cover vast areas in a short time enables
it to fulfil a warning r6le. Anomalies which have
been observed by satellite could provide a
reason to carry out an inspection in a more
intrusive and detailed manner.
39. Satellites are the only means of observing
the territory of other nations without prior noti-
flrcation. No co-operation by the Contractingparty whose territory is to be observed is
required, which makes satellite verification par-
ticularly useful if the good faith of such a party
is open to doubt.
40. Finally, verification satellites enhance
security in the framework of reduced conven-
tional forces since they can offer an almost real
time picture of the military strategic position of
other nations, thus completely ruling out the
possibility of a surprise attack on any important
site.
YI. Requiremeats for vedfuation by satellite
41. In their introductions, Mr. Pucci as well
as Mr. Holt and Mr. Rothmeyer provided
helpful indications regarding the requirements
for the satellite system which would be needed
to implement verification r6les following a CFE
treaty and, with this as a starting point, the fol-
lowing list of basic requirements may be drawn
up:
(i) The area to be verified is the speciflrc
area in Europe from the Atlantic to
the Urals, as covered by the treaty,
and a rather large area beyond, in
order to be able to track possible
storage, transformation and other
activities carried out on equipment
and forces outside the treaty area.
(ii) The objectives to be verified are the
sites notified for location, storage,production, repairs, maintenanc€
and destruction of material, the
zones for training and stationing
units and the declared points ol
entry and exit from the treaty
zone.
(iii) The satellite system should be able
to obtain information on relevant
military establishments and on the
five categories of equipment con-
cerned by the treaty, that is: mainbattle tanks, armoured combat
vehicles, artillery, combat heli-
copters and combat aircraft. The res-
olution and quality of the satellite
images required depend on the
information which is to be obtained.
In Appendix I to Document I160 it
can be seen that an increasing degree
of detail is required for de-tection,
general identifi cation, precise identi-
fication, description and analysis.
For general identiflrcation of the
most important categories of
equipment concerned by a CFE
treaty, a resolution of around I m is
required.
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(iv/ With a view to the existing geo-
graphy and weather in the treaty
area, a full-scale system should have
a day-and-night and all-weather
capability. For a system to be
effective, it should have both
multispectral, panchromatic optical
sensors and radar sensors.
(v) For the detection of any important
developments, observation of the
same territory once every three days
would be an acceptable frequency.
(vi) The time needed to obtain, process
and interpret data from the satellite
should be minimised. Control
centres for satellite missions and
centres for the reception, processing
and interpretation of data should
therefore be situated in the best pos-
sible geographical position. The
deployment of a data relay satellite
system appears to be inevitable in
the long run. Measures should be
taken to safeguard the interests of
nations participating in the system.
(vii) Basic ground segnent elements are
antenna stations for receiving and
transmitting data, preprocessing sta-
tions, a mission planning centre, sat-
ellite control centres, data-processing
centres, a verification centre and
finally central archives for raw data
and results.
YII. Possiblc tosks of obsenation satellites
42. Whenever the subject of observation sat-
ellites is being discussed, there is a tendency to
suggest that such satellites could perform a great
number of different tasks. These tasks can be
summarised as follows:
- 
verification of conventional arrns
reduction agreements, primarily CFE I
and a possible follow-up, CFE II;
- 
verification of other potential arms
reduction agxeements on nuclear, bio-
logical and chemical weapons and naval
forces;
- 
verification of the 1986 Stockholm
agreement on confidence- and security-
building measures (CSBMs) in Europe,
under which parties are required to give
advanced notification of the site and
location of military manoeuvres;
- 
monitoring of territories in Europe or
elsewhere where new threats or crises
threatening European security could
develop;
- 
managing of future military operational
activities;
- 
monitoring territories which are under
surveillance by relatively small United
Nations peacekeeping forces, deployed
in large areas;
- 
detection and control ofecological dis-
asters;
- 
providing information for other civilian
applications such as crop forecasts,
search for natural resources, coastal
protection and environmental planning.
43. At first sight it appears to be attractive
indeed to attribute all these different tasks to a
future European observation satellite system,
not the least because the more political wishes
can be fulfilled, more easily will such a system
be endorsed by parties of the entire political
spectrum.
44. One should however keep in mind that
the requirements for the various observation
tasks mentioned above do not always coffe-
spond. An attempt to meet all political wishes in
this matter in one system would lead to an
extremely extensive and expensive system
which, in addition, would not be available in the
short term because of the many technological
problems to be solved. Verification of conven-
tional arms reduction agreements should be the
first priority, but this choice should leave
unhampered the possibility of using such data
for other purposes.
YIII. ESA'y ochievements in earth obsemation
45. As is well known, the European Space
Agency (ESA) 2, according to its convention, is
to provide for and promote, for exclusively
peaceful purposes, co-operation among
European states in space research and tech-
nology. ESA is a research and development
organisation. Its activities are either mandatory,
in which case all member states contribute to the
programmes on the basis of gross national
product, or optional, where the levels of contri-
butions of participating states may reflect their
interest in a particular field of activity. The
latter is the case for ESA's earth observation
programme.
46. Mr. Goldsmith illustrated a number of
ESA's activities which are of particular interestfor those European countries wishing to
establish a verification satellite capability.
2. The current full membership of ESA includes thirteen
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom). Finland is an associate member and Canada has
an agreement for close co-operation with ESA and partici-
pates in some of its programme.
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47. In this framework specific reference was
made to the development of the ERS-I spac€-
craft. ERS-I is the first European spacecraft
equipped with synthetic aperture radar (SAR).
The principal objectives of this satellite are to
exploit all weather radar imagery of ice and
ocean features for the prediction of climatic
changes. Its SAR provides a single fixed 100 km
swath and a resolution of 30 m. Raw radar data
are processed and transmitted to data-collection
ground stations at a data rate of around
100 megabits per second. ER$l will be
launched around the end of 1990 into a near-
polar, sun-synchronous orbit to perform 14 orbits
per day. The programme for this satellite was ini-
tiated in 1978, which indicates that collaborative
projects require long gestation periods.
48. In addition, ERS-I is capable of all-
weather radar imaging of the earth's surface,
using the SAR imaging mode of its active
microwave instrument. The data rate of this
imaging mode is too high to allow on-board
storage, so that images can only be acquired for
areas within the reception zone of suitably
equipped ground stations.
49. It is interesting to note that ESA has
already developed and implemented a very
effective ground segment, consisting of three
receiving stations in Kiruna (Sweden), Fucino(taly) and Maspalomas (Canary Islands) with
fast processors able to generate one SAR image
of a l@ km x 100 km area with a resolution of
25-30 m within 25 minutes. These images will
be disseminated to users in participating coun-
tries via telecommunication links in order to
provide them with near real-time information
and data.
50. At the moment, SARs with resolutions of
down to 20 m are being studied by ESA in the
SAR 2000 project to meet longer-term needs.
The SAR 2000 is planned to fly on board the
European polar platform around the year 2@0
and should allow longer operating time per orbit
and more versatile operating modes.
51. To support the needs of future low earth-
orbiting systems such as the international space
station elements, ESA is developing the
European data relay satellite system which,
placed in a geostationary orbit, will allow con-
tinuous transfer of data to and from low earth-
orbiting spacecraft to ground stations. This tech-
nology is of the greatest importance if one
wishes to obtain real-time data from verification
satellites with inevitably a high data rate.
52. Finally, Mr. Goldsmith also referred to
other expertise and competence acquired by
ESA amongst others in space-qualified technol-
ogies, in the management of international space
programmes and in data policy which can be
extremely useful when establishing an auton-
omous European satellite verification capa-
bility.
IX. Optical sensor capocity
53. In his contribution at the symposium, Mr.
Cayla paid particular attention to European
capabilities in optical sensors.
54. For several reasons, such as cost and time
constraints, it is thought that, in an initial phase,
a European verification satellite agency could
manage with a satellite with optical sensors with
a resolution down to I m. This should not be a
problem, as considerable experience has been
acquired with the Spot satellites now opera-
tional, while the technological performance of
both the Spot 4 and even more so the Helios sat-
ellite will almost meet the needs of a verification
satellite.
55. As is well known, the Spot 4 satellite is a
further development of Spot 1,2 and 3, with an
enhanced infrared capability and a higher reso-
lution in the range of 5 m. Like the other Spot
satellites, Spot 4 will be able to vary the visual
angle of its optical system, so as to revisit a
given area if need be once every 2.5 days.
56. Helios is a purely military optical recon-
naissance satellite system now being developed
by France, Italy and Spain in a co-operative prG
gramme on the basis of Spot 4 technology. In
order to meet military requirements, the image
precision and the data transmission and pro-
cessing speed are being enhanced considerably.
With a satellite life-time of five years, the
alleged resolution of Helios is in the range of
1 m. The first launch of Helios is expected to
take place in 1993.
57. According to Mr. Cayla, there is room for
improvement in following programmes, particu-
larly in enhancing the resolution and in
extending the spectral Iield of sensors into the
thermal infrared, which would facilitate the
interpretation of the satellite images obtained.
X. Radar sensot capacity
58. It is recognised that a European verifi-
cation satellite agency in an early stage will have
to operate with optical sensors exclusively. Con-
sidering, however, the many serious short-
comings of an optical sensor, early decisions are
required to develop a synthetic aperture radar(SAR) satellite to provide an all-weather and
night-observation capacity indispensable for
verification purposes in the CFE treaty area and
neighbouring territories. At the symposium,
Mr. Goldsmith of ESA argued that Europe is
well on its way in this field with the ERS-I sat-
ellite, to be launched in 1990, but one should be
aware that the performance of this satellite is
not adequate for verification purposes.
59. Both Mr. Jean-Claude Husson and Sir
Peter Anson gave a succinct outline of what can
be done in this area. Mr. Husson explained that
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in France studies are being conducted at the
Centre National des Etudes Spatiales for a sat-
ellite project called Radar 2000 with a variable
resolution of less than 20 m and a swath width
variable between 20 and 40 km. Studies being
conducted for the French Defence Ministry aim
at a still higher resolution.
60. Only recently, the French Defence Min-
ister, Jean-Pierre ChevBnement, made it clear,
however, that for reasons of technical feasibility
and the availability of financial resources, the
launch of a purely French radar satellite to fill
the gaps of the optical Helios system is not
foreseen before the beginning of the next
decade.
61. Recent studies have demonstrated that
with new technologies a resolution in the order
of several metres can be obtained, using a solar
energy generator of 6 to l0 kw. Such high reso-
lution radars, however, produce a high data rate,
with a possible average of 240 megabits per
second, which makes high demands for data
transmission and, if need be, for data storage
capacity.
62. Sir Peter Anson also referred to studies
conducted for ESA with a view to developing an
SAR 2000 with resolutions of down to 20 m and
a variable swath width from 100 to 500 m. This
SAR satellite will include technological develop
ments such as a larger steerable phase array
antenna and could be readily adapted to provide
higher resolutions down to a few metres over a
* spotlight " atea. According to Sir Peter Anson,
the CFE space verification r6le would require no
more than the optimisation of existing sensor
and processing developments. Here it should be
recalled that Mr. Goldsmith referred to the
development of several SAR data processors in
Europe, for instance in Norway, which will be
available in the 1992-94 timeframe. These pro-
cessors seek higher performances than feasible at
present and will, typically, be able to produce a
full image in a few minutes.
63. In the framework of the Independent
European Programme Group's (IEPG) research
and development programme Euclid, a SAR
development programme is being considered
which is expected to commence at the end of
1990. This Euclid SAR programme is expected
to aim at a spotlight resolution of less than 5 m
and a data rate of less than 500 megabits. Initial
plans foresee launch of such a satellite in 2005,
but one could imagine that, if need be, a more
concentrated effort could well lead to an earlier
launch date.
XI. Data handling
64. Several speakers at the symposium
stressed the importance of data handling in a
verification satellite system. Important ques-
tions involved here are the data-storage capacity
of the satellite, data-transmission capacity from
satellite to ground stations, possibly through a
geostationary data relay satellite, ground sta-
tions, data-processing capacity and the interpre-
tation capacity, whether or not partly through
computer detection.
65. The technological challenges connected
with data handling should not be underesti-
mated. Optiqal sensors with a resolution of
around I m produce high-quality data, and hig[-
resolution radar sensors have even higher per-
formances. Data can be transmitted only if the
satellite is in direct sight of the ground station.
Only ground stations located near the arctic
would be able to receive data from a satellite in
polar orbit for a number of minutes during each
earth orbit. Ground stations at a lower latitude
would be able to do so for only a few earth orbits
of the satellite.
66. If data cannot be transmitted to a ground
station directly after their reception through its
sensors, the satellite will have to store them until
the next opportunity to transmit. Should the
operator wish to have real-time satellite data
available covering the whole CFE area being
observed by a verification satellite, a number of
ground stations in different parts of the world
would have to be set up.
67. A different and in the long run pre-
sumably preferable solution would be to deploy
data relay satellites in geostationary orbit which
would enable the verification satellite to
transmit data on the areas of interest at any
given time through the relay satellite to a single
ground station. This would at the same time
solve the problem of data storage on board the
satellite with magnetic tape recorders with rela-
tively limited life-time and storage capacity.
68. The next stage is processing the raw data
so as to prepare images for interpretation by
human experts. This data processing requires
high-performance computer capacity and a wide
range of techniques such as decompression and
decryption for image formation, followed by
radiometric and geometric corrections and
image enhancement through noise removal, con-
trast manipulation, smoothing, deblurring,
colour coding and finally a process of edge
detection on a statistical basis and the recog-
nition of simple patterns.
69. If different sensors, such as optical and
radar, were used, image fusion would also be
possible and advantage could be taken of their
operational and thematic complementarity.
70. Only then does the human expert
intervene for detailed interpretation, i.e. the
extraction and evaluation of semantic infor-
mation about objects, object constellations or
events.
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71. In his address at the symposinm, Dr.
Drewniok made it clear that the analysis of the
huge amount of data is time-consuming and a
main bottleneck in the use of observation satel-
lites for verification. He pointed out that the
limited quality of satellite imagery does not allow
for recognition of objects in an image solely
based on visible intensity structures. Many addi-
tional souroes of knowledge on image character-
istics, temporal and spatial scene context and the
expected scene contents are needed to give a
meaningful interpretation of an image.
72. A large staff of experienced specialists
would be needed to guarantee effective and
quick data interpretation. Studies have shown
that one hundred specialists, working in shifts,
would be a minimum requirement for the
regular day-today interpretation of satellite data
for verification purposes alone.
73. The intensive use of computers to support
human interpreters is essential for solving the
data interpretation problem. Apart from the
intensive and still increasing use of computers
for various methods of data processing, the use
of artilicial intelligence could greatly contribute
to solving interpretation problems of satellite
images. For a number of reasons, however,
clearly set out by Dr. Drewniok, there is still a
lot of research and development to be done
before systems using artificial intelligence for
this purpose are ready for practical use. Appli-
cation of fully-automatic data interpretation
cannot be expected in the 1990s.
XII. The road towards a Eumlnan satellite
obsemation syslem
74. In view of the many technical, financial
and managerial questions connected with the
establishment of a European verification sat-
ellite agency, the countries involved in the WEU
ad hoc sub-group on space still have divergent
opinions on the course to follow. At the sym-
posium, several different scenarios were sug-
gested.
75. The Netherlands Defence Minister,
Mr. Ter Beek, suggested that the first step
should be for France, Italy and Spain to enter
into agreements with other European nations on
the sharing of information obtained by their
Helios satellite for the verification of arms
control agxeements. Such co-operation could be
followed by the creation of a consortium of
countries interested in the construction and
management of a European observation satellite
system, following the example of similar
co-operation arrangements within ESA.
76. The suggestion to share data gathered by
Helios was however not agreed to by the French
speakers at the symposium, who argued that
Helios data will be classified and protected as
such. In addition, the capabilities of Helios are
fully saturated with the military requirements of
the three participating nations.
77. Supported by Under-Secretary of State
G6rard Renon, Ing6nieur-Gdn€ral Bousquet of
France suggested a different approach in three
successive stages.
78. In his view, interested nations could, in a
first phase, establish an image-processing and
interpretation agency. The main task of this
agency should be the training of photo inter-
preters, making use of images provided by the
existing Iandsat and Spot satellites. Such a pro
cedure would not only build up an essential staff
of photo interpreters at an early stage; it would
also help to determine the required performance
of the satellite system. The investment for a fully
operational agency should be estimated at
100 million ECU, with yearly operational costs
of 30 million ECU.
79. In a second phase the abovementioned
agency could develop and operate a full-scale
European satellite system. This system should at
least have one satellite at its disposal at all times,
with a replacement satellite to be launched every
two or three years. The deployment of a full
system would take between five and seven yearsif technology from the Helios programme is
employed. In order not to waste time, a detailed
examination of this system should be initiated
already in parallel with the establishment of the
image-processing and interpretation agency. The
investment for this second phase should be esti-
mated at 1.3 billion ECU, the two flrrst satellites
and the ground seglnent included, while mainte-
nance over ten years, replacement satellites
included, would cost about I billion ECU. If
Helios technologies could be employed, one might
save a total amount of 600 million ECU.
80. Finally, in a third phase, the satellite
system could be extended to include radar and
infrared imagery in order to have a day and
night and all-weather capability, while at the
same time the simultaneous use of different
sensors would enhance the observation results.
Given the technologlcal problems still to be
solved, General Bousquet thought it would be
hazardous to make a cost estimate for this third
phase.
81. Mr. Trillas Ruiz, Director General of the
Spanish National Institute for Aerospace Tech-
nology, also recognised that, even ifthe decision
were taken to establish a full verification sat-
ellite system, it would take considerable time for
it to become operational. He therefore suggested
that, during a transitional phase towards an
autonomous system, Europe should make use of
opportunities already available. Useful expe-
rience could be acquired by processing and
interpreting images obtained from Spot and
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Landsat. Also, Mr. Trillas Ruiz thought that
experience gained in the Helios programme
could be useful in the initial development stage
towards a European system.
82. The Italian Defence Minister, Mr.
Martinazzoli, argued that in the short term a
co-operative effort among the WEU member
countries could be to set up a WEU training
centre for specialised staff and to increase
co-ordination in the acquisition, analysis and
utilisation of satellite data furnished by opera-
tional systems. Later, this training centre could
be integrated into an autonomous European
observation satellite system.
83. Dr. Eschelbacher of the Bundeskanz-
leramt thought that the establishment of a future
system should allow different stages of devel-
opment. He agreed with previous speakers that a
first stage of development should be concen-
trated on the acquisition of the necessary ref-
erence material and training and instructing per-
sonnel in evaluating satellite data.
XIII. The institutional fmmework
86. In a quickly changing interplay of forces,
it is not easy to decide which would be the best
political framework for a European verification
satellite system. An additional difficulty is that
the development of a full-scale system from
scratch will take a number of years and conse-
quently a political framework cqnsidered
suitable now might be less so in ten years' time.It would therefore be advisable to remain
flexible and clearly mark the definition, devel-
opment and operational phases. With the
political maps of Europe in a state of fluctu-
ation, it may not be good policy to establish a
fixed core of participants which cannot be
extended in a later phase.
84. A comprehensive concept for the gradual
establishment of a full-scale European verifi-
cation satellite system was also presented by Dr.
Hollstein, who proposed distinguishing four dif-
ferent stages. The first should start in l99l with
the exploitation of existing satellite data from
Spot, Landsat and ERS-I. The second,
beginning in 1995, should include an optical
sensor satellite with a resolution of less than
5 m, an adapted processing and receiving
station and a satellite control station. The third,
beginning in 1998, should comprise an addi-
tional SAR satellite, with a spotlight resolution
of less than 5 m and a survey mode resolution of
less than l0 m. Furthernore, the processing and
receiving station and the satellite control station
should be adapted for enhanced capability ofthe
system. In the fourth and final stage, beginning
in 2000, the existing system should be extended
with a data relay satellite, an optical sensor with
enhanced capabilities in the visible and thermal
infrared light and an adapted ground seg$ent.
85. He accompanied hig concept with the fol-
lowing cost estimate:
87. On the other hand, if a limited number of
Western European countries is determined to go
ahead for a verification satellite system in the
short term, there is no reason to postpone a
decision. Taking into acount the considerable
lead-time before a system will be operational,
there is no time to be lost now.
88. For the time being, therefore, the CSCE is
out of the question as a viable framework. The
sheer number of countries with still widely-
diverging political traditions, societies, financial
and industrial resources and also national
interests would immensely complicate discus-
sions and put off a necessarily early decision
endlessly. Moreover, the absence of an essential
institutional framework would make itself felt
all too soon.
from 1991
ca.20
to ca. 300 from 1995
ca. 100
to ca. 200
per year
Stage 0 up to 1991
from 1991
ca.20
to ca. 300
Total cost
for stage 0
to stage 3 1991-2005
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Time frame Investment
cost
Operational cost
per year
Replacement
cost
ca. 100
Stage 1 from l99l to
199s
ca.1700 .2500
Stage 2 from 1995 to
I 998
ca.2000 .2600
Stage 3 from 1998 to
2005
ca. 700 ....... 800
ca.4500 .6000 ca. 1100-2000(total)
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89. With the European Space Agency (ESA),
the situation is entirely different. This orga-
nisation of European nations has built up, as Mr.
Goldsmith rightly pointed out, a unique expertise
and competence in international cooperative
space activities. It has an existing in-orbit infra-
structure and on-ground facilities for satellite
testing and data archiving, processing and dis-
semination. It could provide assistance and
support for a European verification satellite pro-
gramme. On the other hand, it is unlikely to be
the institutional framework for a European veri-
fication satellite system, the more so if crisis
monitoring and related activities are to be an
additional task of such a system. Some of the
ESA member states are extremely reluctant to be
involved in or even remotely connected with
international co-operative military or defence
activities. To effect a change in this long-standing
attitude would take precious time. For the time
being, as Sir Geoffrey Pattie put it, ESA will go
out of the door as soon as the ministry of defence
comes in by another door.
90. Under present circumstances, WEU is the
only viable European organisation for defence-
related activities. At the moment, it may lack
the scientific and technical international staff to
manage a progf,amme of the size envisaged for a
verification satellite system, but it unites coun-
tries which are determined to co-operate in
security matters and which, moreover, have the
industrial and financial resources necessary for
such a system. Only WEU offers a framework to
take early decisions, while its basic treaty, the
modified Brussels Treaty, is flexible enough to
take advantage of future needs.
91. As regards the rights of countries partici-
pating in a verification satellite system, there
seems to be no reason to depart from the basic
rule in European space co-operation that only
countries which participate in financial and
industrial terms will be entitled to have their
equal share in decisions on system architecture,
operational management and data distribution.
92. This leaves a number of problems to be
solved if at a later stage other countries wish to
participate in the system or at least to have
certain data at their disposal.
93. The Netherlands Defence Minister advo-
cated that the European observation satellite
system should also be of benefit to other users.
He thought that, first of all, close co-operation
should be established with the United States,
each side permitting access to the other's infor-
mation. Other European countries, from both
West and East, and the United Nations should
also be allowed to have access to data from these
satellites on payment.
94. Here, Sir Geoffrey Pattie rightly brought
some delicate questions to the fore on the
subject of sharing intelligence. In this regard,
smooth international co-operation may clash
with national interests where intelligence
systems and intelligence communities are con-
cerned. An important question is also whether
data is shared in relation to the amount of
funding that is put in. If not, will data be shared
on a need-to-know basis, depending on the geo-
graphic proximity to errors or faults revealed by
the verification system, or will each participant
have its data on an equal basis?
XIY. Auivities of thc WEU Council
95. In its reply of 3fth January 1989 to the
Assembly's Recommendations 465 and 466
regarding the creation of a European agency to
verify future conventional arms reduction agree-
ments, the Council revealed a rather aloof and
lukewarm reaction.
96. To the ereat satisfaction of the Assembly,
however, the Council showed a far more pos-
itive attitude when, in May 1989, a mandate was
agreed for a study ofspace questions concerning
the identification, by collecting details of tech-
nical means already available or to be estab-
lished, of those areas where co-ordination of
member states' activities was both necessary and
beneficial.
97. On the basis of an interim report, pre-
pared by the ad hoc sub-group on space of the
Special Working Group, the Ministerial
Council, at its meeting on l3th and l4th
November 1989, discussed the value for
Europe's security of member states' space prc.
gtammes currently in progress or planned.
98. Among the Ministers there was a broad
consensus on Europe's interest in observation by
satellite for verification of arms control agree-
ments, monitoring crises with security implica-
tions and also environmental hazards. They also
thought that it could offer greater security for
member states and the alliance as a whole,
increase Europe's contribution to and expertisein the monitoring and verification of arms
control agreements and enhance European
industrial and technological capabilities.
99. On that basis, Ministers requested the ad
hoc sub-group to continue its work and to
undertake the technical studies required for the
preparation of a possible ministerial decision on
the development by member states of a
European observation satellite programme.
100. These pre-feasibility studies would have
to cover both the use of satellite systems already
in existence or being developed and the tech-
nical and" financial feasibility of developing a
European satellite observation system. They
would involve the definition and analysis of the
various national and European operational
requirements which observation satellites might
meet and of the corresponding technical means
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as regards sensors, satellite platforms and
ground facilities. The inventory of usable data
from scientific, commercial and military satel-
lites and the study of how such data are to be
processed and assessed for quality would have to
be conducted in parallel. Finally, consideration
would have to be given to the definition of an
appropriate institutional framework for the
effective management of the programmes
involved.
l0l. At its last ministerial meeting on 23rd
April 1990, the Council took note of the
progress which had been made in the ad hoc
sub-group on space, and called for concrete pro-
posals to be submitted at its next meeting in
November 1990, inter alia with a view to exam-
ining the possibility of establishing a satellite
verification agency.
102. Mr. Depasse in his address pointed out
that quite naturally WEU is the European
framework to study the possibilities of verifi-
cation by satellite because this organisation
unites the European NATO countries with a
common concern over security. He admitted
that this framework is not fully satisfactory
because the organisation is lacking the scientific
and technical staff to manage a study pro
gramme for space projects, which is why this
study is being conducted now on a governmental
base. He thought that WEU will nevertheless be
the focal point of a European verification sat-
ellite programme in which the production and
exploitation of the equipment would depend on
its member states, united in a management
structure still to be defined.
103. Mr. Depasse made it clear that, in the pro-
gxamme study now being undertaken, an order
of priorities is recognised with, in the first place,
the verification of conventional arms control
agreements, followed by data acquisition to
monitor crises in geographical zones of interest
for the participants and finally earth observation
to help protect the natural environment. In a
second study phase, the compatibility of the
requirements for different activities will be
examined and compared with the technology
available. A final decision will also depend on
other factors such as the relative importance of
verification by satellite as compared to other
means of verification but, if a positive decision
is taken, Europe would be able to have a clearer
view of the world, thus better guaranteeing its
security and taking its technological capabilities
to new heights, as Mr. Depasse rightly said.
XY, Conclusions
104. The purpose of the symposium was
twofold. First, it offered the industry and
experts concerned an opportunity to review
briefly the technologies and capabilities now
available or under development in Europe
which are considered essential for the estab-
lishment and operation of a full-scale European
verification satellite system. On the basis of
presentations at the symposium, it may be con-
cluded without exaggeration that in the WEU
member states all the basic technology required
for such a system is available, while research and
development projects are under way to provide
enhanced capabilities. Moreover, ESA has
gained invaluable competence and experience in
running complicated operational space prc
grammes and also in earth observation. The
only thing remaining for governments to do is to
take the political decisions to go ahead towards
a truly European verification satellite system.
105. Second, it tried to bring political opinions
in different WEU member states to grips with
the advantages and feasibility of an autonomous
European verification satellite system. In fact,
irrespective of the political leanings of the dif-
ferent governments, there appears to be a broad
consensus in most, if not all member states, on
the advantages of such a system for Europe. It
was also agreed that the satellite system would
gain interest il apart from verifying arms
control agreements, it could also monitor devel-
opments with possible consequences for
Europe's security in areas other than those
covered by arms control agreements and envi
ronmental hazards. Tasks other than verifi-
cation would, however, be considered only
within the limits of the capabilities of the sat-
ellite system which, in an initial phase, should
not be overestimated.
106. With great unanimity it was ascertained
that a European verification satellite system
could greatly contribute to strengthening the
Atlantic Alliance as it would be unequivocal
proof of Europe's determination to meet its
responsibilities in security matters and be a
fully-fledged equal partner as sollicited by its
American ally.
107. As the satellite system required is quite an
ambitious project, a full-scale system will have
to be established step by step.
108. Government representatives speaking at
the symposium agreed that in an initial phase a
European agency could be created to process
and interpret Spot and Landsat satellite data
available commercially which are of interest for
the verification process.
109. No agreement could yet be discerned over
the implementation of subsequent steps which
should include the launch of an optical satellite,
the establishment of a corresponding ground
segment, and eventually the extension of the
system with a synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
satellite and a data relay satellite capacity, both
of which seem to be essential for long-term efli-
ciency.
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I10. While it is known that the cost of a sat-
ellite system is a factor which still causes serious
hesitation in government circles, not one of the
political authorities present addressed this
subject at any length.
l1l. It is the Assembly's conviction, however,
that the cost of a full-scale verification satellite
system, of which rough estimates were given by
some speakers, cannot be an insurmountable
problem. Even though the political climate in
Europe has improved, there is yet no reason to
consider money spent on defence and security as
ill-considered waste. Security still has to be paid
for and it can be argued that defence money
spent on a verilication satellite system is well
spent because it can greatly enhance security
while not being an aggressive or threatening
factor in the military balance.
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APPENDIX
Programme ol the symlnsium
Rome, 27th and 2Eth March 1990
Tuesday, 27th March 1990
10 a.m. First sitting
Opening remarks
Mr. GornrNs
President of the Assembly of Western European Union
Mr. SrrcecNtNI
Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
Prospects for conventional arms reduction in Europe: CFE and beyond
Mr. Ter Brx
Minister of Defence of the Netherlands
Mr. RrNoN
State Secretary of Defence, France
General Cuenlmn
Chief of the Defence staff, Belgium
Discussion
2.30 p.m. Second sitting
The rille of European satellites in verification of conventional arms rcduction agree-
ments
Mr. Txrlmz Rurz
Director-General, National Institute of Aerospace Technology, Spain
Mr. MenrrNtzzoLr
Minister of Defence of Italy
State of technology requiredfor an obsemation satellite as now available in Europe
Mr. Golostrrnn
European Space Agency
Dr. HousruN
Dornier, Federal Republic of Germany
Dr. Puccr
Selenia Spazio, Italy
Mr. Cnvu
Matra-Marconi Space and Matra Espace, France
Sir Peter ANsor.t
Matra-Marconi Space, United Kingdom
Discussion
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Wednesday 2tth March 1990
9.30 a.m. Third sitting
Mr. Holr
British Aerospace Space Division, United Kingdom
Mr. HussoN
Alcatel Espace, France
Discussion
System architectare and cost
Ing6nieur G6n6ral Bousqurr
Directeur des Engins, France
Discussion
Requiremcnts for the pedonnance of a aumber of dWrent obsenation satellite
activities
Dr. EscHrr,sAcHER
Bundeskanzleramt, Federal Republic of Germany
Dr. JnseNr
King's College, [ondon
Dr. Dnewtror
Universitlt Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany
Dr. Rorsueyrn
Electronic Systems Gesellschaft, Federal Republic of Germany
Discussion
3 p.m. Fourth sitting
The woy fornoard
The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Peme, MP
United Kingdom
Mr. Drpnsss
Hon. Ambassador, representing the Chairman of the WEU Council
Discussion
Conclusions
Mr. Lrxzen, MdB
Rapporteur of the symposium, Federal Republic of Germany
5 p.m. Press crnference
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London, l5th May 1990
INFORMATION LETIER
from Mr. van Eekelen, Seuetary-General of WEU
on the activities of the intergovernmcntal organs
(15th March 
- 
thh May 1990)
The outcome of the elections in the German Democratic Republic on 18th March and in
Hungary on 25th March is clear evidence of the ovenvhelming resolve of the peoples of these countries
to take ihe most direct path towards democracy in their political and social lives and towards the wes-
ternisation of their economic life. They have confirmed their desire for national considerations to take
precedence over membership of a pact imposed upon them. Eastern Europe will not be the test-bed for
i purified or regenerated socialism, as prophesied by the West late last year, despite the new realities.
There will be no third path. Marxist ideology has failed and been rejected, and there is no turning back.
The East is drawing cl-oser to the West and coming to share the same aspirations. German unity must
therefore foreshadow the unity of a whole continent on the basis of institutional arrangements formu-
lated in Western Europe, wh6se diversity reflects the dynamic process of European integration.
The second major factor, one that has so strikingly erupted as a central issue in European pro-
blems, is the renaissance of nationalism. An equal intensity of feeling underlies the Baltic States' aspi-
ration to independence, the claims to autonomy being made by national groups in the Yugoslav Fede-
ration and th-e upsurge of irredentist and separatist movements triggered off by the new popul-ar
democratic r6gimes. Like ttre god Janus, such nationalism has two faces, one looking.to th€ past, the
other to the future. Now that fhese peoples have regained control over their own destiny, they should
learn the lessons of their turbulent history and reject the temptations of intolerance and the desire to
dominate, the inescapable consequences of which were so tragically demonstrated in Transylvania on
l9th and 20th March last.
The key issue in the two-plus-four talks is the place that a united Germany should occupy within
Europe and iis anchorage in a western security system. It would be premature, or even unrealistic, to
try t6 define a pan-European architecture before the developments unleashed in East_ern_-Europe and
the Soviet Union have run their natural course, culminating in the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact
in its present form and the full exercise of the right to self-determination for all the peoples of the- last
contintntal empire. From now on, Russian and German national interests will coincide,-esplcially in
the economic field. A united Germany will honour all the agreements reached between the GDR and
the Soviet Union,laying the foundations for close co-operation between them. Germqny, a k9V partner
in the Atlantic efiance, will not be a strategic vacuum generating instability. The withdrawal of Soviet
troops will have repercussions on the stationing of allied contingents ald on NATO's nuclear strategy
and iactical thinking. As the threat recedes geographically, what level of military effort will be regarded
by public opinion in WEU countries as acceptable? How far will Europeqg. defence_budgets blcut?
Thdre is a risk of countries apeing the American plan to reduce forces by 25% within Iive years. There
are likely to be sensitive discussions on the minimum threshold that should be set for defence to be cre-
dible. Itis vital for WEU member states to harmonise their policies in this area and to evaluate the eco-
nomies of scale that might accrue from increased specialisation, closer co-operation on annaments and
equipment and the pooling of resources for the verification of future conventional arm_s corrtrol agrg-g-
mbn-ts. Europeans ale preparing for these steps, which will be the focal issues for the WEU Council's
working groups over the coming months. WEU parliamentarians will also be exploring new solutions
and op6ri'ing up new prospects, in so doing giving guidance to the work of Council and, from July
onwards, the WEU Institute for Security Studies.
Perestroika is marking time and risks becoming bogged down since it has not yet of_fere.d a1y lan-
gible proof that any inroadJ have been made into the immense problems faced-by the Soviet Union.
Fresident Gorbach6v is the most powerful leader since Stalin but, because of the fragmentation of what
used to be the monolithic structuie of Soviet power, he is having to navigate without instruments. Is he
the person best equipped for any trial of strength? His standing in the West has barely been affected,
but is now being rind6rmined Ui tris tense opposition to the laltic republics' attempts to expedite the
transition to ind-'ependence. There is a real risk of violent confrontation. The economic blockade is an
expedient that wiil, at most, delay matters, but it will aggravate resentment. Were submission to the
di6tates of Moscow to be obtained at this price, the Soviet Union would forego the benefits it might
otherwise derive from a fruitful partnership based on autonomy of decision. What promises might
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exasperated generals exact from their leaders for the sake of the indivisibility of the Soviet Union? Fol-
lowing its timely initiative in making contact with the Supreme Soviet, the WEU Assembly is justified
in keeping a watching brief on developments and, if necessary, expressing its views publicly. Surely it is
in the accession of reformist elements to local parliaments that hopes for the gradual democratisation
of the Soviet Union lie. The conflicting views expressed by Soviet leaders on the security aspects of
German unity and their vacillation in the Vienna negotiations testify to their disarray and lack of
vision when contemplating this new European landscape. The communist party is losing its leading
r6le. Its anachronism and growing discredit are also denying it a stabilising r0le. The moment of truth
will be its forthcoming congress.
At the invitation of the Soviet CSCE Committee, I visited Moscow from 25th to 29th April,
about three weeks after the visit which you yourself, Mr. President, and the Presidential Committee
made earlier in that month at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet. May I now share my thoughts and
conclusions with you, in the light of what was in every respect the instructive experience of speaking
with high-ranking officers, diplomats, parliamentarians and several experts in international affairs.
My visit provided an opportunity for contacts with the Diplomatic Academy, the Institute for
World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the Institutes for Europe and North America
and the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defence Questions. All those to whom I spoke stressed the
enormity of the problems to be overcome to ensure the success of perestroika: they recognised the han-
dicaps represented by the loss of a sense of initiative, lack of competitive spirit, ignorance of the way
the market economy operates and disappearance of the independent peasant class. Comecon was
vitually defunct and the development of new relations with the European Comunity would be more
diflicult for the USSR than it would be for the countries of Eastern Europe. As far as the latter were
concerned, the challenge was to make the transition from a relationship based on the Communist
parties and a homogeneous ruling class to inter-state relations where ideology no longer had any place.
The USSR was in the throes of losing its buffer zones (glacis) and was preoccupied by the upsurge of
nationalist feeling. The Soviets do not appear to have any clear political purpose. They are aware of
what they are losing but do not perceive the benefits which may accrue in the longer term. No doubt
they fear that things will get worse before they get better. Their concern and uncertainties are heigh-
tened by the prospect of seeing this evolution affect whole tracts of the Soviet Union itself, such as the
Baltic states. They have difficulty accepting that the treaties still binding them to countries of Eastern
Europe should be adapted on the lines of the Finnish model. They do not think that their relations with
these countries would be cordial enough to allow this to happen. During my visit to the General Staff,
General Moiseev asked me abruptly if, unlike NATO, WEU could enhance the security of the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact. He then stressed the American desire to strengthen NATO and the fact
that, once the CFE agreement had been implemented, NATO would be more powerful than the Soviet
Union, particularly in its naval forces.
Turning to the question of German unity, General Moiseev recalled the historical reasons why
the USSR wanted watertight guarantees about the inviolability of European frontiers. Neither the
German constitution nor Germany's dual membership of both the European Community and a
defensive alliance seemed to him to be sufficiently reassuring. The USSR saw itself encircled by 300
NATO bases, and was concerned at the prospect of Hungary joining NATO now that Soviet troops
were being repatriated and the Warsaw Pact was losing its military character. The Soviet Union's pre-
ferred option was clearly a peace treaty or a comparable legal arrangement regarding the frontiers,
underpinned by Germany's membership of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Quite clearly, the current uncertainties over the events taking place for which the Soviets were
quite unprepared are wreaking havoc and causing deep concern. All my interlocutors stressed the need
for those in the West to understand their need for reassurance, especially psychological in my view.
Whereas the Soviets may not have a very clear idea of their security interests, they have at least under-
taken a process ofreflection on'European architectures'at their Institute for Europe. They perceive
the need to create a European peacekeeping force able to respond to any conflicts which might arise
from the " political vacuum " in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. That would presuppose a military
committee, meetings of Chiefs of Staff, a risk-reduction centre, a verification agency with a space com-
ponent and a counter-terrorist agency. The Warsaw Pact would be maintained, at least for a transi-
tional period, as a partner in the arms control negotiations and because of the fact that the Eastern
European countries are dependent on the USSR for spare parts and training.
At the Institute for North America, attitudes towards NATO were broadly comparable to those
expressed at the General Staff headquarters. A united Germany in NATO would be tantamount to a
' strengthened adversary " and be unacceptable to the Soviets. NATO had to undergo far-reaching
change even if there was no suggestion of pushing the United States from Europe. NATO had to
abandon its doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union wanted to be given the r6le of
guarantor of regional security in Eastern Europe and could envisage agreements between the Warsaw
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Pact, NATO and WEU as well as pan-European security arrangements as an extension of the CSCE
process.
The Soviets wished to synchronise the process of German unification and the developmentof
the CSCE in the field of securiiy. The Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Petrovsky, and those offt-iial ion..111.d in the CSCE department of the Ministry, have taken up Mr. 
_Genscher's idea of; purAf.f constructivism " under wnicn Germany would a.c! as a bridge. between East and West. The
CSCB would thus become a safety net in the the transitional period from confrontation to pan-
nu-p.un co-operation in the fieldi of verification, technology exchange and the environment. The
Soviets wanted the entire northern hemisphere, including the Asian part, to be involved, at the same
ti*i i.rog"ising the need for some flexibility as to what forms_participation might take, given^the
maintenaice ofihe existing organisations. Thdy were also favourably disposed torvards initiatives for a
*nference on the Mediterlanein along CSCE lines. The CSCE summit plann-ed for the end of the year
could therefore be, in their opinion, an important stage in the construction of the " common European
home'.
The meeting with the members of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Defence Questions pro-
uiOeO an opporturi'ity for a fresh debate on these problems. The Committee expressed interest in conti-
nuing contacts with WEU.
***
The Permanent Council and its working groups met seven times to complete preparations^for th.9
tvtinistiriat-Council. fhi iirmirent Council"iet on t+ttr and 29th March and as an Enlarged Council
;-ath /$;if ai-*frict in. pofiti.at directors from the fofign ministries and representatives of the
o.i.n." Jiunr *... pr"rini. -rli. meeting of the Enlarged Coincil clarified lhe w_ay in which the minis-
i.riJ oii.ursions *ould be oiganised iround the to[ical questions mentioned in the report on theiil;f;;;;fity i"ri-n."riind the prospects.for conventional arms control and for streletheninB
trr. c'str p;;;eai. rne couniit ioopteoi diicussion paper destined for Ministers, the introduction to
wnicn restited the con"loiioos of ttri Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group
"on""*ing the 
Europian iiiriiiv environment in tgIt-t995. this document set out several qu-estions
iormuratei by the td;;;;rpJ*iii"t were designed to stimulate Ministers'discussions on the following
topics:
- 
What should the overall concept and objectives of conventional arms controlbe following the
conclusion of a Cff Treaty and the a-doption 6f new confidence-building measures?
- 
How can a credible deterrent be guaranteed which is consistent with furgp-g'-! minimum
security iiq"irementsZ wtrat should be thJ mix of nuclear and conventional forces? What balance
,nluld'ui it-Ct *itiiin trre auia"ce in order to strengthen its solid3rity? what extra responsibilities
iliould the member countries of WEU take on for the defence of Europe?
- 
Are NATO's strategic concepts still valid? How will the concepl_-of defence at the borders
evolve given the 
"oniinuio ioriiGt c^ijmmitment to territorial 
integritytwhat would be the political
and military utitity of multinational forces in Europe?
- 
How can co-operation between Eastern and Western Europe be promoted whilst at the same
time woiking to strengihen European institutions on the basis of the commitments linking WEU coun-
tries to each other and to their North American allies?
The Enlarged Council undertook a detailed examination.of a preliminary draft communiqu6
which was to be-issued to the public after the ministerial meeting.
The Enlarged Council also approved lyo chapters 9f th" report on the^European security envi-
ronment anO a rEpoJ;;-6;*iio" of *fU couniries in the verification of a CFE agreement, allof;-ii.h;*. to Udforwaided to the Council of Ministers. The Secretary.Qeneral's oral reports.on the
aciiuitiis of the Mediterran."n Srrb-Group and the ad hoc Sub Group.on Space were also submitted to
tfr":t 
-i.tirg. eff tfr.ii aoirrn.ntr were tire fruit of the Spercial Working Gro3n meetings on 13th and
,nh ffir"h, the latter being a joint meeting with the Defence Representatives Group.
The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space held its eighth meetiqg. on 20th 
-M^arch and continued its
u**rtnrnt of iiquiie-enti-i"ittr a -uir* to identify-ing capabilities needed for a luropean satellite
oUii*aiio" system. Delegations exchanged information on the pos_sibilities for.short-term co-ope-
iution between ttre membEiiountries ard'on the contribution of satellite observation systems in veri-
iying .onu.ntional arms control agreements and in relation to out-of-area threats.
To improve the Permanent Council's working methods by relieving it of routine tasks and
helpini *ittr 'it e prepaiati,on of certain decisions, the Group of Deputies to the Permanent Representa-
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tives h-eld its first two Tsetings on l2th and 26th March with a view to the Council meetings to be heldon the following days. pn 29ah March, the Permanent Councit ratified-ihis;;;;kir#ffi;il;iby approving the mandate for the Group:
" ...The Council instructs the Group of Deputies to Permanent Representatives 
- 
which shall beknown as the'Cormcilworking.proup'- tb p1epary its decisions. iiltoilciiwo.tiot 6-up;
shall also deal with_other queitions entrusted io it Uv the Council, inj;adg tnose wi-tnin ife
competence of the Institutional Working Group.
The ordinary Council Working Group is therefore wound up..
***
The Ministerial Council meeting_on 23rd April-provided an opportunity for a particularly usefuldebate on the likely future role for-wEU,-.the-only o.garrisatioi *iif;;pilffi i;il1j;;;;
co-operation on matters of security, in a radically alieredEuropean context.
WEU has undeniable advantages which derive from its threefold vocation:
- q9 an organisation in which the European members of the alliance may come together anddiscuss their security concerns as well as the necessary aoapiaiion # tirir nri"i.E i" li,
changing situation;
- 
as the only specificglly European organisation whose members are committed by treaty to
come to each other's assistance if their frontiers are under attack;
- ql an o.rea{s1i_on representing governments resolved to include a defence and securitydimension in the process of build-ing a future European union.
The events of late 1989 and early this year have merely strengthened the urgent need and obli-gatiog for member states to achieve tlie co-oqgration objictives t"fictr r"e-ri atin? origi, or wgUt
reactivation and are restated in the. H3qu. plaiform. Thosl events, however, a.i posing rii* p-r"Uf".r,in particular wEU's r6lein rgspect ofEasrcrn eglopean countriili. ;id;iif,.-l;6r.rt &iild by
some of those countries in the organisation and iti two-part structure. The Ministeriaf Couniil-fra's
reviewed these questions and publicly arrived at certain'conclusions
The ministerial resolutions may be summarised as follows: Ministers discussed the implications
of the new Euro.pean security e-nvironment for the continuance of thJ armi-conirof and ieAuitionprocess, the maintenance of effective deterrence, developm^ents in defence Ooctrinis-*O i-"fii"European security and defence identity in the framework'of increasinjft;-Ed;un ceoperati6r.
. 
H-avinp agreed on the need to conclu^de 3_CFE agreement without delay on the basis of the pro,posals-already tabled, * with the prospect.of a 35-natioi summit at thi end-olih; y;;,'rr,ri"iri""r?i"
cussed the various arrangements that might be considered for the ne*t stage-o1'tnese'regotiaiionr.
In order further to coordinate the views of member states, the ministerial organs will continuetheir discussions on the definition of a security system rqted dttre;;;a;;iEi,ioitin til fil;;l;
*ltil,-"r^ gf-ttt objectives.of, qnd procedures ior, post-cre ,"gotiationi, inirOr. oit.;&;;-i;ih;Atlantlc Alliance and multinational military co-optration.
Ministers also expressed the hope that the Special Working Group would be the forum forconcertation among member state! in preparing foi the Atlantic-Alliini" rrrn.it and tne-CSCi
summit (communiqu6, paragraph 9).
The Defence Representatives Group yi! be concentrating on the adaptation of the alliance,s
militarY functions and the-specific responsibilities to ue snoutcierio uv ini Effid;;;. it *1r Gdy tt;feasililiU of setting-up-a.European centre for conflict .a"agJment titict .igrrt-6e established underthe CSCE framework. Ministers have endorsed the grorf', iiopoiai cortilT+.".p"*ti.onam;;
member states on the verification of a CFE agreenient:'
- drawing up a programme of trial inspections between member countries;
- 
the opening of national inspirction teams to participation by inspectors from other member
countries;
- 
the opening of inspector training courses to nationals of other member countries.
.. 
Having noted the oral.report on the activities of the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space, Ministers asked
tle grouplo.continue with its detailed study of tne potentiA ioaErrod;i .o-oi"*tion in this field.The completion of this work would now dep6nd on tfe iiarisation of technical studies to be carried outby member states. The group was also asked to examinethe p.r.ibititt;f Jii"Uri'r-ni"-g an agency for theexploitation of satellite images.
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The problems of the Med,iterranean have also been discussed and the mandate of the Mediter-
ranean Sub-Group has been confirmed.
For the first time since the adoption of the Hague platform by the Ministerial Council on 27th
October 1987, Ministers decided to issue a public communiqud, evidence of their desire to define a
common strategy on European security. The Brussels communiqud is in a way an extension of the
Hague platform, which has lost none of its relevance. A few commentators mistakenly thought they
could discern some hesitation, even the seeds of division, among member states, for example on the
subject of deterrence. In fact, Ministers thought it would be sufficient to refer to previous WEU and
alliance texts without repeating them word for word, since they were still the basis on which they ope-
rated.
There are two points that should be stressed. In the first place, the very firm stance in favour of
maintaining the forces of the United States and Canada in Europe. In this respect, member states will
have to take the initiative in submitting concrete proposals to their North American partners as soon as
possible. It is in this context too that thought should be given to the value of multinational units, whose
organisation might facilitate tactical co-operation with North American forces. The planned division-
level trial involving German, British and Dutch troops in the Northern Army Group, together with the
lessons learned from the creation of the Franco-German brigade, provide a useful basis for more
detailed thinking.
Secondly, Ministers have taken note of the need to give active support to the process of democra-
tisation in Eastern Europe by strengthening the political dialogue at every level. They have welcomed
the initiatives taken by the Assembly in this respect. The incoming French Presidency of the Council of
Ministers and the Secretary-General will draw up a plan of action over the next few weeks so that this
dialogue can be initiated at the appropriate level on behalf of the Nine.
***
Since the ministerial meeting, the Permanent Council has met on 9th May to organise the pro-
gramme for its working goups and to make further implementing arrangements for the WEU Institute
for Security Studies. Its Director, Mr. John Roper, took up his post on lst April. Experts are now being
recruited and there is every reason to believe that the institute will be operational by lst July next. Mr
Roper has already made a number of contacts with the Clerk of the Assembly and its Committee for
Parliamentary and Public Relations to lay the foundations for fruitful co-operation between the
Assembly and the institute.
The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space met on 3rd May. It gave preliminary thought to the proposal
made to the Council of Ministers to set up an agency for the exploitation of satellite images within
WEU, as well as continuing its work on the assessment of requirements and accessible data with a view
to reporting on the parameters of a future European satellite observation system.
t
rt*
With regard to relations between the Council and Assembly, the Council fonrarded on I lth
April the second part of its 35th annual report to the Assembly. The Council's replies to the recommen-
ditions adopted by the Assembly during the second part of its 35th ordinary session were all forwarded
to the Assembly between 20th February and 6th April.
On I lth April, in accordance with the decision taken a year ago by the United Kingdom Presi-
dency of the Council to keep the Assembly regularly informed of IEPG activities, I sent an information
letter to the Office of the Clerk. In future, IEPG information letters will be sent to you as an annex to
my information letter on the activities of the ministerial organs.
***
On 4th and 5th April, I paid an official visit to Spain accompanied by Mr. E. Destefanis,
Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs.
I was honoured to be received by His Majesty the King in the presence of the Secretary-General
for Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry and the Spanish Ambassador to London.
I was received by the Prime Minister at the Moncloa Palace for talks which lasted more than
45 minutes.
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During this meeting, I was struck by the strength of Mr. Gonzdlez's European commitment and
his wide-ranging ideas on the future European union. The Prime Minister believed that the events in
Central and Eastern Europe would result in a rapid transformation of the military structures of the
Atlantic Alliance. Mr. Gonzdlez advocated a reshaping of the American presence in Europe but was
convinced that this presence should be maintained. The Prime Minister hoped that the European
Community, and in particular European political co-operation, would be able to play a r6le in the field
of defence and security. It was for that reason that he envisaged WEU ultimately being incorporated in
the political co-operation structures of the future European union.
Turning to the Mediterranean, the Prime Minister was convinced that the United States and the
Soviet Union would maintain an active presence in that region. The Mediterranean was set to become
extremely important for European security. Mr. Gonzdlez was worried that demographic, social, eco-
nomic and religious factors would ultimately lead to North-South confrontation. Consequently, he
hoped that WEU would continue to reflect on the problems of the Mediterranean and that this would
lead to a clear long-term European strategy for the Mediterranean basin as a whole.
As regards the Soviet Union, Mr. Gonz{lez was convinced that Moscow would seek to place
greater emphasis on defensive nuclear weapons (strategic and tactical) and that, in its new defensive
security concept, the Soviet Union might abandon the doctrine of no first use of nuclear weapons.
The talks with the Foreign Minister Mr. D. F. Fernandez Ordofiez and the Defence Minister Mr.
N. Serra focused on the agenda topics of the ministerial meeting.
During my talks with the President of the Senate and with the President of the Chamber of
Deputies, they stressed Spain's European vocation and its willingness to play a dynamic r6le in a
European security system.
Finally, I met a number of Spanish parliamentarians who would be participating in the forth-
coming Assembly session in Paris.
*
**
In the field of public relations and information on the r6le and tasks of WEU, my colleagues and
I took part in the following events:
- 
from l4th to l6th March, I attended the conference organised by the " Deutsche Strategie
Forum " in Bad-Godesberg and spoke about the new European frameworks for ceoperation
in the field of security;
- 
from lTth to 20th March, I paid a visit to the United States during which I gave two talks, the
first to the Defence System Management College of the United States Departement of Defence
and the second to the Atlantic Council;
- 
on 29th March in London, I took part, together with several of my colleagues, in the joint
meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly's Special Committee on nuclear strategy and arms
control and the Sub-Committee on the future of the armed forces; the purpose was to brief
parliamentarians on WEU thinking on the conventional arms control negotiations and on the
adaptation of member countries' armed forces to the changing bircumstances of European
security;
- 
on 3fth March, I took part in a meeting of the Sligting Group in The Hague;
- 
on 3lst March in Athens, I gave a paper at the conference on European security policy
organised by the Hans Seidel Stiftung;
- 
on lst and 3rd April I took part in a conference organised by the Rand Corporation on NATO
crisis management in a changing Europe;
- 
on 2nd April, at the invitation of General Rogers, I joined several members of the Permanent
Council in a visit to SHAPE at Casteaux to hear a series of talks on the politicomilitary
problems of the alliance;
- 
on 5th April, Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, represented the Secretariat-
General at the NATO annual economic symposium on East European economies in the 1990s:
prospects and constraints;
- 
let me here just remind you that, from 25th to 3fth April, I visited the USSR at the invitation
of the Soviet CSCE Committee;
- 
on 7th May, I addressed the Praestes PR support in The Hague;
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- 
on l0th May, finally, I gave a speech at Newcastle University on the problems of European
security;
- 
Ambassador Holthoff represented the Secretariat-General at the European Community/
United States conference held from l0th to 12th May under the auspices of the CEPS and the
American Assembly on the subject: old relationship: new agenda.
Throughout this period, and more especially around the time of the WEU Ministerial Council, I
have maintained frequent contact with the media to explain the current direction of WEU activities,
the place of our organisation among the European institutions and its invaluable contribution to the
forglng of a European security identity, a key element along the path to European union.
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QUESTTON 2Es
pat to the Council by Mr, Pontillon
on 16th taauary 1990
Can the Council say:
l. how it intends to improve its public rela-
tions effort following the WEU seminar on
changes in public perceptions of European
defence;
2. what proposals the Secretary-General has
made in this connection;
3. whether it is prepared to include the
problem of WEU's information policy in its
agenda as a matter of urgency with a view to
examining specific initiatives, e.g.:
(a/ publishing guidelines for the press at
the close of meetings of the Per-
manent Council;
(b) preparing and publishing easy-to-
understand basic information docu-
ments for widespread circulation in all
member countries;
(c) creating a WEU periodical in the
oflicial languages of all member coun-
tries for the dissemination of articles,
communiquds and news about WEU
activities;
(d/ establishing WEU information oflices
in the European member countries of
the alliance and, in particular, in the
United States and Canada;
(e) inviting member governments to
release more information about
WEU;
0 defining methods of organising
opinion polls at European level;
(g/ strengthening co-operation with
groups, associations and private insti-
tutes in order to enhance the interest
aroused by studies on Western
European security matters;
(ft/ strengthening co-operation, discus-
sions and exchanges of views with
industrial associations, trades unions,
cultural associations, educational
establishments and universities;
(y' using television as a means of pre-
senting WEU;
_ 
Written Question 285 and later fmm Mr. van Eelwlcn,
Suretary-General 9f WEU, to Mr. Pontillon, Chairman of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public relations -
23rd May 1990
4. in the light of the abovementioned consi-
derations, whether it is prepared to grant the
financial means WEU needs to pursue a public
information policy;
5. whether it is prepared to follow up my
proposal to set up a WEU public relations com-
mittee composed of representatives of both the
Assembly and the Council?
Letter from Mr. van kkclen,
Secmary-Genual of WEU,
to Mr, Pontilloa, Chairman of the Committee
for Parlianuntary and Public Relations
London, 6th March 1990
lt was with the greatest interest that I took
cognisance of the written question you put to the
Council on l6th January 1990 on WEU's infor-
mation policy and the WEU ministerial organs'
public relations effort. I therefore wish the Per-
manent Council to be fully able to give your
question and the suggestions it contains as
detailed and precise an answer as possible des-
cribing a future programme of action rather than
merely reflecting a situation that is becoming
outdated.
For the time being at least, we are faced
with a twofold difficulty. On the one hand, the
Council of Ministers has attributed tasks in this
area to the future WEU Institute for Security
Studies and will grant it adequate means for car-
rying them out. In this connection, the Director
of the institute will have to make proposals in
the very first weeks after taking oflice. These
proposals should be an important part of the
Council's reply to your question. On the other
hand, the WEU secretariat will have to be
expanded and adapt itself to the new tasks
arising from the progress of work in the Coun-
cil's working groups. This should be a second
new element of which the Council will wish to
keep the WEU parliamentary Assembly
informed.
At the present juncture, the informationpolicy of the ministerial 
-organs is marked bycontinuity in the types of activities and in the
framework of the working structures excellently
described by my predecessor, H.E. Ambassadoi
Alfred Cahen, in his letter to President Goerens
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dated l6th December 1987, circulated by the
Office of the Clerk as Document 1132. Since
August 1988, the Assembly has been exhaus-
tively informed by Ambassador Cahen and then
by me of all the public relations activities of the
ministerial organs.
In this context, I believe it expedient to
propose to the Permanent Council that it give a
iubstantial answer to your question in the weeks
preceding the second part of the thirty-sixth
ordinary session of your Assembly at the
beginning of December 1990. I wished to warn
you of this here and now.
Your question gives the Permanent
Council an opportunity to discuss WEU's public
relations, and I trust the matter will be on the
agenda of one or more of its meetings in the
months ahead.
You may be sure that, like you, I attach
the greatest importance to WEU's public rela-
tions and to co-operation between the Assembly
and the Council in this area. I am fully at your
disposal to discuss these matters if you feel this
desirable.
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Replies of the Council to Recommendations 474 to 479
RECOMMENDATION 474I
on WEa in the single European marleet 
-
reply to the half-yearly report of the Council2
I
The Assembly,
(t) Co.nsidqring that the Single European Act is in harmony with the principles and aims set out in
the modified Brussels TTg.llv, pqt!g{?.tv in its preamble and Articles I and iI, and considering thatthe respective rosponsibilities of WEU and the European Community are complementary;
(iL_- Considering that the creation of a single Europcan market raises problems of security for the
wEU member countries to which they will have to hnd concerted soluiions;
(iit) 
.Not-ing t-hat lhe European-Comr,nission has set up a service to deal with security and defencequestions but that the prospect of the developTent of relations between the European Community and
several neutral countries or non-members of the Atlantic Alliance should deter ihe Community'fro;
handling such matters which, in any case, fall within the competence of WEU under the m6dified
Brussels trealY which has not been superseded and which are of greater importance because of recentpolitical developments in Europe;(t!) 
-Considering that the Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of European security but that the r6leplayed by Europe in the alliance should be re-examined,
Rrcouuruos rHAT THE CotrNcu.
l. Instruct a workin-g grou._p to.conduct, in consultation with the European Commission, a detailed
study of the problems that will arise for the security of member states wh-en frontier controis are abol-
ished and report to the Assembly on its conclusiohs;
?,* Study carefully the disparities that will arise in the single European market due to the presentdifference between the burdens imposed on member states by their defence policies with a view tofinding a remedy;
3. 
- 
With the Fyto.Ppal Commission, set up a joint working group to prepare a list of products and
technologies. which, if released to third countries, might jeopardise world peace, the aim being to ban
any sugh action by member countries, and endeavour to promote the same rules imong other eiporting
countries;
4. Seek better methods so that, wherever
harmonised and agreed in joint programmes,
approach;
_possible, specifications and requirements may be
thus facilitating an effective co-ordinated Eurofean
5.. 
- . 
Epmi.ng procedures in the various member countries for placing orders for the armed forces
with industrial firms with a view to achieving a unified approacL;
6. In the same context, examine the obligations of staff employed by industries manufacturingpartly or solely for defence purposes.
Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1989 during the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (9th sitting).
Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the political Committee (Document l20l).
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II
Furthermore, the Assembly,
(t) Considering with regret that the Council does not make suflicient use of its statutory means of
pursuing a dialogue with the Assembly;
(iil Considering in particular the delay in replying to Recommendation 467;
(iii) Noting with satisfaction that, in its reply to Recommendation 472, the Council renewed its
undertaking to report to the Assembly on all aspects of the application of the modified Brussels TrgalY,
even when this is done in other forums, but noting that it has given no information about the activities
of the European Commission in defence matters;
(iv) Welcoming the fact that the Secretary-General's address in Brussels on 2lst.Septemb-er 1989 pro
vi6ed interestinglnformation on the state of the reactivation of WEU, but regretting that the Assembly
has not yet received an official communication of the same standard;
(v) Considering that the Council's requirements in respect of the management of the Assembly's
iupplementary budget would, if carried into effect, be detrimentallo the principle of the_Assepbly's
bud-getary auionomy and the responsibilities of the President of the Assembly as defined in the
Financial Regulations;(vi) Welcoming the steps taken by the Council in 1989 to allow more in-depth thinking Uy th9
administration oi membei countries on keeping the public informed and on artificial intelligence and
the pursuit of European sessions of defence studies,
RrcoratvreNDs rHAT rHr CouNrcu.
1. Use its statutory means to give the Assembly precise, full information on its structures, work and
plans so as to allow a true dialogue;
2. Give priority to the Assembly when communicating such information;
3. Enable the Assembly to take part in its thinking on the tasks to be attributed to the future
institute;
4. Take no measures that may involve relations between the new institute and the Assembly
without securing the latter's prior agreement;
5. Respect the principle of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy in the conditions that the Council
itself laid down in 1987;
6. Inform the Assembly of the measures taken in the European Community to allow the European
Commission to study security and defence questions;
7. Continue to associate the Assembly with the seminars and colloquies that it organises;
8. Examine in what conditions and in which framework a European centre for preventing military
risks might be set up and inform the Assembly of the conclusions of its study.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 474
l. Communicated to the Assembly on llth April 1990 and received at the Offrce of the Clerk on lTth April 1990.
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l. The Council shares the Assembly's view that the principles and aims set out in the modified
Brussels Treaty_and reiterated in The H.ague platform, in farticdlar the desire to fromote tne unit, andto encourage the progressive integration of Europe, aie concordant with thi spirit of t[J SingteEuropean Act.
2- The Council notes that Article 30, paragraph 6, of the Single European Act stresses the impor-tance of closer cooperation within the Twelva on questions df euioffi iJiir.iti U.t lftif'G
co-ordination of positions_to the-politicaland economic aspects of sCuriiy. Th;;il; articfe reiJrsto
c.losgr co'ope1atio-n_ilt!. field of iecurity between certain member staiei o'rtne i;;i";,;;i;urv-i;itii,
the framework of WEU.
3. The Council considers that both the modified Brussels Treaty and the Single European Act
s-peclfy with sufficient clarity the respective responsibilities of the WEU organs a"A Ine instit-utio"i oithe European Communities.
4- The Council has made a prelim-inary study of, and continues to keep.on its agenda, the question
of the implications for the security of wEU memU6r states of the measui6r iatinln connection withthe creation of a large unified European market.
5. The Council considers that the setting-up of working groups jointly or in consultation with theEuropean Commission to address questions of security andOef6nie canhot Ue contempf.ated f; ;[;time being.
6. The member states consult together concerning the budgetary burden of their defence policies.
7 - The harmonisation of technical specifications and standards regarding defence equipment andthepossibilities for jor.nt programmes are studied within the IndepenOe-nt rur6pei; Frotilriilb-roiip(IEPG)..As stated !yI!. united Kingdom Defence Secretary, rrli. youngei, irlii ioarirs tJt[e-rGUAssembly in June 1989, the memberitates represented in tdi IEPG werimovingafriaO with the deve-lopment of a more open and competitive European defence equipmint marlei.---
8. The Council endeavours to maintain a regular dialogue with the Assembly on all matters coming
within the purview of the organisation. The Periranent Co-uncil followswith kd, iraerest the activitiei
of the Assembly.
The information on the Council's activities and structures given in the annual report of theCouncil to the Assembly__are supplemented by the Secretary-Generil's information tettenio inJpre-
sident of the Assembly. Jh.e mgelings betweeri the Assembly's Presidenti.dt afi;ittee - acco.paoieOoncg a year by.the Political and Defence Committees 
- 
and the Council presidency are also un -oppor:tunity to appri-se the Asselnbly of the progress o.f ryork being done uiiue couricit-;"d id;|}ii;;groups and to have an exchange of views on their future prolramme.
. 
In his speech to thg Assembly at its December 1989 session, the Secretary-General stated that, ifit was the Assembly's wish, he wa-s prepared to address its cominitieii oi nitio-rui d;6gai6r;.--'--
The member states are fully aw.are of the importance of involving the Assembly closely in the
seminars and colloquia they organise, just as they arb themselves interest-ed in -Uiinfinvited to the col-loquia organised by the Assembly.
9. As the Council tras already noted_ in its replyto Recomryendation 467, ithas, during its discus-sions on lhg nractical arrangements for establisLing a *EU tnsiitJte ioi Seiuritv stu?iii,-iaten
account of the Assembly's point of view, as expressEd in that reco-merrdadrd, ;ri tne tasti to Ui
assigned to this institute.
Piflo.grg-beJwqen the Assembly and the.Council-re-gardirlgthe tasks to be carried out by the ins-titute is desirable in that the institute;s work will be wide$ auaif-aUre to it 
" 
prUfii 
":rO 
in"iitr"tnTiriiiriwill naturallt*rypt.Pent the.Assembly's discussions. This is, moreorer,in[tiafi pfanneO ifiih;Assembly-will, with the. Council's agreement, be able to assign to thtinsiitui6 rtuoi[r riiuiinL t.;;il;Assembly's own activities.
lo. The regula-r contacts between the Secretary-G-eneral and the President of the Assembly have
cleared the way for the implementation of the supplementary esiimbit da;"i-r- rgaq.
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RECOMMENDATION 475 
'
on Eaflrlnan sacarity and cvents in the Near and Middle East2
The Assembly,
(t) Recalling its Recommendations 349 and 403;
(iil Considering that Article YIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty gives the WEU
Council competence to examine threats to international peace in the Near and Middle East;(iiil Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 472 which reaffrnns its intention to report
on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when this is carried out in a framework other
than WEU, in accordance with Article II of the treaty;(iv) Recalling the action taken by WEU in 1988 to restore freedom of navigation in the Gulf;
(v) Expressing its satisfaction at:
(a) thie continuation of the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq;
(b) the suspension of fighting in Beirut;(vil Aware of the important consequences of the meeting of sixty-two members of the Lebanese Par-
liament on the initiative of the committee formed by Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia to:
(a) work out a political and institutional solution allowing the various communities to cohabit
peacefully;
(b) assert the integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Lebanese state, freed of interference
and foreign military presenoe;
(viil Condemning unreservedly the assassination of President Ren6 Moawad of Lebanon;
(viiil Condemning the taking of hostages, their detention and terrorism in all its forms;(ix) Expressing the strongest concern that no general peace process has yet been started in the Middle
East in spite of the action that the international community has been taking for a long time through:
(a) United Nations resolutions;
(D/ recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe;
(c/ European Community declarations;
(d) diplomatic action by the superpowers;
(e) the good will shown by the Arab countries at their recent summit meeting in Casablanca;(x) Strongly disapproving the new impetus given to the arms race by states in the region, particularly
in regard to long-range aircraft, medium-range missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons:
(a) by frrms, banks and experts from European Community countries;
(b) by agreements with and arms deliveries and military assistance from certain Western
European countries, the Soviet Union, the United States and China,
which are obviously contrary to the search for peaceful solutions to the conflicts causing bloodshed in
the region;
(xi) Gratified that the European Council has taken a major step.to prevent its lnembers contributing
to'the production of chemical weapons by countries in the region but regretting that the Western
Europein countries have taken no cbllective steps to a avoid the proliferation of other types of arma-
ments such as medium- and long-range surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear weapons;
(xit) Endorsing unreservedly the United Nations'decision to convene an international conferenc€ on
peace in the Middle East;
(xiii) Considering that, to ensure peace and stability in the region, it is 
_essential to seek a solution to
ihe israeti-palestiiian conflict that guarantees the seiurity of the state of Israel and the right of the Pal-
estinian people to a homeland and to self-determination in the Gaza Strip and West Bank;
t. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1989 during the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (9th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pieralli on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1202).
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QD. Rccognising the will of the Palestinian pegple who for two years have been demonstrating, withthe intifada movement, their refusal to accept the prolongation oi the Israeli mititary oc""pitidn i[at
started in 1967,
and condemning repression, attacks and any action that violates human rights and international
conventions;
(rv/ Considering that the start ofa general peace process, and hence the convocation ofan interna-
tional conference on peace in the tttidOte_Bast under the aegis of the United Nationi, calts foi;ai;-
logue between the parties involved as a first step,
and assessing positively:
(a) the decisions taken by the Palestinian National Council in Algiers;
(b) the rejection of terrorism by the pLO;
(c) the PLO's explicit recognition of the state of Israel;
(d) the decisions taken at the Arab summit meeting in casablanca;(mt) Considering further that the Israeli Government's plan for elections in the occupied territories, if
*ppry",:9-Iy_lh. lecessary international guarant6es anO negoiiat;a 
-*il;f 
"u 
iil il;i";tnvolved, migbt provide an opportunity to start adialogue which iannot Ue netO-witnori thJpto;
which manifestly has the sympatny and support of the ilopri of tniwiiigaok ard(Ju Sirip, -'
and elpresging.its disappointmelt at the Israeli Government's rejection of the ten points com-pleting the Shamir plan presented by Mr. Hosni Mubarak, piesioeni rii egyptj- -.(-rl Irlhing.constructive.negoti4ions to be started without delay between a representative andcredible Palestinian delegation and tho Israeli Government, -
RrcouurNps rHAT rsr CouNcrr.
I
l. Confirm that it is fully prepared:
(a) to respond toany.request aimed at encouragin_g the consolidation of the military truce, the
resumption of civilian life and normal air ind-sea traffic in 6banonJ-
(b) to support the action taken by Morocco, Algeria and saudi Arabia;
(c/ to support current efforts in kbanon to:
- 
restore peaceful cohabitation among the communities;
- 
reform the institutions;
- 
re-establish state authority;
- 
enable all foreign troops to be withdrawn;
- 
guarantee the integrity and sovereignty of kbanon;
2. ' Take immediate steps to halt the arms race in the Middle East, particularly in regard to chemical
and nuclear weapons, missiles and long-range aircraft and to ttis 6nd:
(a) stop the implementation of contracts for supplies of arms and take various measures,
co-ordinated between governments, to preve-n-t flrrms, banl$ and ieiearch centres from
evading control, as has already been the-case;
(D/ pro-pose Qat 4 states, in-particular the Soviet Union, China, the United States, South Africa
and Brazil, adopt a similar approach;
(c) exeft pressure on the Arab states and Israel to accept afreez.eon and verification of their mil-itary potential and the progressive elimination of dhemica anO nuct""ioriipons *ilh;;i;to the international conference on peace in the Middle East which 
",iU nane to consiOerspecial_negotiations on the reductiron of armaments 
_following the p.titi."t ;Ir;ilil;reachedandasanessentialguaranteeofthesecurityofallstatEsint6Jiigion
I -. Draw up_a list of_prodgcts and technologies which member countries would undertake not todeliver. to 
-any Near or Middle East country ai'o seet the endorsement of the other arms exportingcountries for such a decision;
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4. Ensure in particular that member states do not authorise the export to any oountry in the region of,
(a) chemical products on the list given in the European Council regulation of 2fth February
1989;
(D/ technology necessary for the development of medium- and long-range surface-to-surface mis-
siles;
5. Reaffirm its resolve to preserve freedom of navigation on all seas;
6. Announce here and now that member countries are pr€pared to coordinate the action of their
armed forces:
(a) for humanitarian operations and international police duties at the request of the United
Nations;
(b) wrththe agreement of the parties directly concerned, for guaranteeing the implementation of
bi- or multilateral agreements concluded by the international conference on peace in the
Middle East, or even earlier through direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict;
II
Urge member states to take action in the European Council to ensure acceptance of United
Nations resolutions on Palestine and l.ebanon and:
(a) Intensify diplomatic action to promote peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq based on the
full acceptance of United Nations Resolution 598;
(b) Follow up the Assembly's earlier recommendation to give substantial assistance to Kurdish ref-
ulees and insisi on respect for human rights and recognition of the cultural and administrative inde-
pendence of the Kurdish people in the various states in which they live;(c) Recommend that member states increase, directly or in the framework of the European Com-
niunity, their humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people of the Gaza Strip and West Bank
whose living conditions are deteriorating from day to day;
(d) Persevere with approaches to each state capable of exercising rpfluencg to brin-g about the release
bf at tne hostages takenbn kbanese territory and the international fight against all forms of terrorism;(e) In any event, promote the meeting of the international conference on peace in the Middle East
which only Israel and Iran are now refusing and, to this end:
(i) ask the Soviet Union to renew normal diplomatic relations with Israel;
(ii) ask the United States to raise the level of their contacts with the Palestine Liberation
Organisation;
(iii) ask the United Nations General Assembly to stop equating Zionism with racism as
approved in one of its resolutions;
(iv) askthe United Nations Security Council to adopt a resolution in favour of the Palestinians'
right to self-determination;
A Ask the Israeli Government:(/ to stop its repressive action in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which has already caused
several hundred deaths;
(ii) to abandon all practices that are prejudicial to human rights;
(iii) to respect the property of the population of the occupied territories;
(iv) to allow Palestinian universities to be reopened;
(g) Ask the Israeli Government to agree to a dialogue with-t-he P[-O agd negotiations with a credible
iild repiesentative Palestinian delegation with a view to holding free elections in the occupied terri'
tories;(h) Ask Israel's neig[bouring fuab states and the PLO to exercise their influence and vigilance in
halting infiltrations of armed groups into Israeli territory;
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(t) Together with the Council of Europe and the European Community 
- 
which can place at the
service of peace in the Middle East its great economic potential and vast wealth of supranational expe-
rience 
- 
take the necessary steps to define a truly Western European peace initiative with a view to:
(i) backrng up the diplomatic effort by the United States and the Soviet Union;
(ii) helping to terminate the present dangerous status quo;
(iii) fosteing an international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the
United Nations.
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 475
l. The questions raised by the Assembly in Recommendation 475 are essentially a matter for
European political co-operation.
2. Concerning the problems posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons, more particularly
technologies associated with the development of medium- and long-range missiles, WEU Coun_cil
Working Groups have discussed in depth the potential security implications of this situation for
member states.
Export controls over chemical products that might contribute to the proliferation of thir ty_pe of
weapon are a matter of national responsibility of member states which, within the context of EPC, are
in close consultation on these questibns. Together with their partners in the Twelve, they have also for-
mulated a system of controls relating to eight products identified as presenting a known risk.
As regards missiles, the question has been raised within WEU as to whether member states
which have not yet done so should join the system set up by the Seven in 1987.
3. Co-ordination of the action of armed forces of WEU countries, to which reference is made in
paragraph I.6, can certainly be envisaged under the auspices of WEU. The operatio.ng in the Gulf have
iet an eiample of useful co-operation among member states. Nevertheless, the provision of contingents
for humanitarian or peacekeeping operations is a matter to be decided nationally by these countries. It
is not WEU's responsibility tb announce in advance that member states are prepared to co-ordinate
such action. Any hational decisions to commit forces should be taken with due regard for the overall
political context which is in fact a matter for EPC.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th April 1990 and received at the Oflice of the Clerk on 9th April 1990.
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RECOMMENDATION 476I
on force comlmrisons (NATO and Wanaw Pact military potential) 
-
reply to the annual report of the Council2
The Assembly,
(t) 
. \oqing that the sigqing of the INF treaty in 1987 brought about a change in East-West relations,particularly in regard to the arms limitation process, which encourages the adoption of further disarm-
ament measures;
(ii) 
- 
. 
Welcoming the fact that the INF agreement generally improved the East-West atmosphere, thus
making a decisive contribution to establishing confidence between the great powen;(iil Aware t_hat this agreement provides, in the form of inspections, for the most searching and
extensive verification measures that have ever existed and that experience thus gained might mlke a
valuable contribution to the conclusion of future agreements on other types of-armamenis;
(fv/ 
_ 
Considgri4g that it is essential for the arms limitation and disarmament process to be continued
step by step in Europe and worldwide;
(v) 
. 
Considering that the dynlmism generated by the INF treaty should be exploited with determi-
nation to achieve the control of armaments and further reductiohs;(vil Stressing the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union in the conclusion
of a convention on a globql ban on chemical weapons and of a START agreement providing for a 5096
reduction in strategic nuclear weapons;
(ujil. Welcoming the announcement by Secretary-General Gorbachev in his speech to the United
Nations General Assembly o47th December 1988 that unilateral arms reductions-would be made, sub-
sequent to which the other Warsaw Pact countries (with the exception of Romania) also announced
that they would unilaterally reduce forces and arms in the next two years;
(viii) Endorsing^u-nr-eservedly Pr_e9i{e.nt_push's disarmament initiative at the NATO summit meeting
in Brussels on 29th May 1989 which is likely to lead to decisive progress in the conventional disarml
ament process;
(ix) 
.Su.pporting in particular the inclusion of combat aircralt and helicopters in the first series of
negotiations on conventional disarmament and the West's offer to reduce iroop levels significantly;(x) 
_Considering that the series of proposals made by the NATO member countries in Vienna on
2.2nd Septemter 1989, completin-g,ir,nnortant_aspects of ihe western proposals of l3th July 1989, is par-
ticql?rly likely to foster the establishment of a peaceful order in Europe based on mutrial conhA6nce
and joint security;
(!i) 
__ 
Concerned that the problem of short-range (less than 500 km) missiles, particularly important
for Western Europe because.of.the deploymentfrange and nnmericai superiority of Sovief misiites, is
not yet the subject of negotiations;
ffttl Considgring-that the WEU member_ countrie.s' sgcurity interests can be defended only in the
framework of the North Atlantic Alliance but that in futureihey must be harmonised more'consist-
ently;
(xiii) Welcnming the French Prime Minister's proposal of 7th September 1989 that WEU should start
a specific programme of immediate co-operation with regard to verification and disarmamenfi
(xiv)- Plgased that the. Council in its reply to Recommendation 470 is considering a WEU contributionto the CFE verification system, emphasising 'the exploitation of Europearicapabilities aoO tnJpooling of member states' assets',
I . Adopted by the Assembly on 6th December 1989 during the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session ( I lth sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Steiner on behalf of the political Committee (Document 1204).
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RncouurNps rIIAT rnr Couxcll-
l. Strongly insist on a change in the alliance's priorities as defined by the NATO ministers for
foreign affairs in Reykjavik in June 1987, i.e. in particular:
(a) a 5Wo reduction in strategic nuclear weapons;
(b) a worldwide ban on chemical weapons;
(c) the establishment of a stable global conventional balance through the elimination of inequal-
ities and reductions in troop levels and arms;
(d) significant, verifiable reductions in United States and Soviet shorter-range land-based
nuclear forces;
and to act in this manner whenever possible;
2. Take up the proposal made by the French Prime Minister on 7th September 1989 and prepare a
WEU programme for purposeful verification and disarmament cooperation;
3. Take appropriate initiatives to exert pressure for results to be achieved quickly in the CFE nego-
tiations so as to allow the immediate resumption of the SNF negotiations;
4. Work out here and now the prior conditions necessary in the conceptual field for SNF negotia-
tions to be resumed without delay after the implementation of the first CFE agreement;
5. In the framework of the CFE negotiations, take steps to obtain a verified halt in the production
of new generations of conventional weapons;
6. In view of the favourable progress in the CFE negotiations, endeavour to halt the development
and stationing of new nuclear weapons in Europe;
7. Seek at least a verified ban on chemical weapons in Europe if the agreement proposed by Pres-
ident Bush at the United Nations General Assembly on 25th September 1989 on the conclusion of an
international treaty banning chemical weapons is not concluded by 1990.
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to Recommendation 476
l. Communicated to the Assembly on llth April 1990 and received at the Oflice of the Clerk on lTth April 1990.
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The Council continues to subscribe to the alliance's priorities as defined in the comprehensive
concept of 3fth May 1989.
- . 
A ch.a-neg in these priorities in relation to. t-he negotiations on conventional forces, as proposed by
the Assembly in point 
_f (c,), would not be without problems, for it would amount io changing tnlqpproach adopted in Vienna by all the participating countries. The Soviet Union and couitri6s of
Central and Eastern Europe have subscribed to the priority of eliminating inequalities, as set out in the
Ye-slern proposals. Wit-h thg exception of the level of American and SoviEt staiioned forces, it is essen-tially armaments which will be subject to a ceiling following asymmetric reductions.
Except in the case of aircraft, the positions have come considerably closer.
Any cha-nge-in. approach with a view to making gxeater reductions or taking into account troops
as such would call into question the-prospect of a rapid conclusion now taking shape. Since this
conclusion is highly desirable 
- 
as confirmed by the Assembly in point 3 of the sani'e recbmmendation
- 
the Council is of th-e opinion that no basic change to the western approach in the negotiations is
required and that the line taken in the initial western proposal of 6th M-arch 1989 should'still be fol-
lowed, i.e. that the_allies lle prep?Jed to envisage additional reductions and limitations together with
the restructuring of_armed forces * in the longer term, and in the light of the implementationlf the pro-posed measures ". It is with this prospect in mind that the member states ind their other westernpartners envisage pursuing negotiations as soon as a CFE-I agreement is concluded.
?. 
- 
.Co-operatioqin the verification of a CFE agreement is being examined in depth by the Council'sWorking Groups. Firm proposals will be submitled to Ministers at their meeting on 23rd April.
I All particip^ants in the CFE negotiations were in agreement in noting, in the declaration adoptedin the margins of the open skies meeting in Ottawa on-l3th February, that the main elements of an
agreement were now on the table. At this stage, the need is to give, through constant effort in Vienna,
P[actical expression to these elements of agreement so that a conclusion fray be reached in the course
of the year.
4. The WEU countries concerned are taking an active part, within the various alliance goups(HLG, NPG), in the process of reflection on the r6le and itructure of theatre nuclear forcesl This
reflection will help to define the alliance's objectives in the matter of SNF negotiations with the Soviet
Union.
5. 
.The CFE agreement that the 23 participants hope to conclude this year is conceived in terms ofquantitative limitations..It appears unlikely that, in this phase, the qualitative elements might be made
subject to a control rfume. The con-cept of fr_eezing the production of new generations-of weapons
raises more. particularly a problem.of their definition and distinction from th--e inevitable, legitimate
modernisation of military capabilities. These should be maintained at their present level, evei if they
are adapted to the lowest possible parity level compatible with the security of WEU member states.
6. The question of the deployment of new nuclear weapons in Europe will be considered within the
Atlantic Alliance in due course, having regard to the termi of the comprehensive concept approved at
the alliance summit meeting on 3fth May 1989.
7. On tlq subject of chemical weapons, the agreement now being negotiated at the Geneva Con-ference on Disarmament is for a compl-ete and verifiable worldwide bin. tfrost WfU member states aredirectly participating in.these. negotiations and all of them subscribe to the objective oi a *oiA*iOi
ban. The Council is of the opinion that a ban limited to Europe would not be in tne interest of Euio-peans. In the meanwhile, the United States and the Soviet-Union, the main holders of chemical
weapons, have already agreed to a drastic reduction in their arsenals. It is therefore planned to iefa-
triate all stocks of chemical weapons stored on the territory of the Federal Republic of d;ilt. ilisde-velopmentis an important step towards an agreement on a total ban, which ali wnU countri6s con-
sider should be concluded as sobn as possible.
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'
on the future of tlu Co-ordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) 2
The Assembly,
(t) Aware that the technology gap between the western alliance and the Soviet bloc in sophisticated
weaponry has narrowed in recent years;
(ii) Confirming the continued need-to protect advanced western defence.technology through Coogq
iritit armr contrdl and reduction, confidehce-building and enhanced security over a reasonable period
of time justify that need being reviewed;(iit) Concerned at past violations of Cocom rules which have led to a serious traqsfgr of strategic
iecinnotogy to prosuibed countries, thus enhancing Soviet offensive capability in vital areas at the
expense of western security;(iv) Concerned at variations in methods of enforcing export controls between Cocom member states;
(v) Noting the concern of WEU member states at United States extra-territorial claims which effec-
tively discourage exports of non-sensitive technology;
(vt) Acknowledging the complaints of western high+echnology. co-mpanies that Cocom ryles pr_evelt
in6m from tatciniaO-vantage oi valuable trading opportunities, including joint ventures in the Soviet
bloc;
(vit) Welcoming the improvements in Cocom review procedur-es in recent Yegs-, which have reduced
ine Ust of sensitiie itemsl but fearing that they may still not be keeping up with the pace of progress in
technology;
(viii) Awarcof President Gorbachev's appeal to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
on 6th July 1989 to rescind the Cocom rules;
(ix) Noting requests to grant exceptions to Cocom rules for Hung;ary and Poland and the Soviet
ie6uest for dlosei co-operation withlhe West on the development of new technologies,
RecoMtr,tsNDs rHAT rsn Couxcr
Call for
l. A fundamental reassessment of the current state of Soviet technology;
2. A complete review of the Cocom lists in the light of this reassessment, with a view to encour-
aging maximim opportunities for trade and for worldwide co-operation in preventing the supply of
dunltions and of industrial goods with military applications to terrorist groups;
3. Common export and re+xport controls and common enforcement policies in the Cocom
member countries;
4. Negotiations with proscribed countries for the introduction of on-site verification procedures to
accompany all future salis of western strategic technology where appropriate in return for the further
liberalisation of the Cocom list;
5. The forthcoming conferenoe on economic co-operatioruin Europe, to b9 held in Bonn from l9th
March to l lth lprit t990, to be used for a discussion of high-technology trade between East and West
and the r6le of Cocom in that framework;
6. The estabtshment of a committee of experts within the CSCE framework which should make
recommendations for the sharing of high technology between East and West.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th December I 989 during the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session ( I 2th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee(Document 1207).
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The Council shares the Assemblv's concerns on the sgbject of controls over exports of defencetechnologies; in particular those concehing the need to 
"cfiiiur a 
proper balance teto,ee, two con-flicting approaches: one designed to protJct sensitive-diience tecnnolggo; the other designed topromote trade in order.to take. advantage of the.markets 
.onening ul in ffift;Lfupe, and to con-tribute towards the modernisation of thieconomies on wnicl tire success of the poriticai rlrorm't uiirrgintroduced in the countries of Eastern europe wiu 6 ; ta;-.xtent depenJ.- r----!
The Council is also aware of the need to adjust Cocom's export policy to the changing political
situation in these countries.
The Council has taken note of the Assembly's recommendations on this subject.
At present, however, this question is not being discussed by the WEU Council.
l99O and received at the OIIice of the Clerk on lTth April t990.
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l. Communicated to the Assembly on llth April
DOCUMENT 1233
RECOMMENDATION 478I
on Westem Europoaa secarity: defeace implications of the
People\ Republic of China's cvolving geopolitical situatbn2
The Assembly,
(i) Noting the inalienable right of the Chinese Government and people to conduct their own
internal affairs but nevertheless considerably shocked and saddened by the events in Beijing and other
major cities in May and June 1989, as well as by subsequent violations of human rights and. pointing
ouf that all member states of the United Nations, by their membership of that organisation, have
solemnly committed themselves before the international community to respect in the conduct of their
internal affairs the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
(it) Noting the r6le played by China in maintaining a world balance and contributing to peaceful
international relations;
(iir) Considering that, insofar as the interests of China and of Weste_rn Europe gonv-e{ge io P*Y
irdas, they shodd therefore continue to be developed independently of ideological and institutional
differences, provided human rights are respected;(iv) Considering that the essential aim of the Chinese Government is still the country's economic
and social development;(v) Welcoming the development of the Chinese econo-my an9 q{ exchanges of all kinds between
b'nina and Westein Europe, while regretting the absence of a parallel improvement in the political situ-
ation;
(vt) Welcoming the convergence between diplomatic action by Western European countries and by
Cf,ina to seek a solution to ensure Cambodian independence;
(vir) Noting that events in China have causedoonoern_among the residents of {ong Kong and Macau
ib6ut tneir iuture, and noting also that the Chinese Government has undertaken to guarantee their
rights and safety;
(vilfl Noting that for many yeanl the Chinese have occupied Tibet and denied the Tibetan people their
human rights,
Rscolr{rr,IENps rHAT Tne CouNctI-
l. Request the Chinese Government to accede to the two Human Rights Covenants of the United
Nations, i.e. the International Covenant on Civic and Political Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
2. Ensure that member countries continue firmly to express their disapproval of the measures of
repression and restriction of freedom taken by Chini in 1989, possibly resuming regular consultations
wilU tle Government of the People's Republic of China on matters relating to the maintenance of
world peace;
3. Invite member governments, in time, given the conditions laid down in paragraph.l, toproceed
to develop political, technological, economic, commercial and cultural relations with the People's
Republic of China;
4. Take the necessary initiatives to seek a convergence of views between member countries and the
People's Republic of China on anns control and disarmament, particularly by ensuring tha!.thq negoti-
ations on arins limitations in Europe do not lead to an increase in forces and arms deployed in Asia;
5. Pursue among member governments the possibility of concerting a policy designed to lay the
foundations for lasting peace in Eastern Asia in order to maintain the independence of Cambodia in
accordance with the oUjectives fixed at the time of the Paris conference in August 1989.
I . Adopted by the Assembly on 7th December 1989 during the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session ( I 2th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Cox on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1203).
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1. The questions raised Fy tne Assembly in Recommendation 478 arc essentially a matter forEuropean political co-operation.
2. The Council is of the opinion !h4, as regards arms control and disarmament, it would not be
appropriate to take initiatives vis-i-vis China which were outside the framiwoit ofiirJge"JiU p.iiw
towards this country ryhich has.been agreed by the Twelve, with. more particular reg;ardt-" tn. 
"riqti{tions on conventional.forces in Europe, th6 non-circumventlon measures ennrsagJaloilh;-aFE
agreement should provide complete assuranoe that the agreed measures do not lead-to an increase inthe forces and arms deployed in Asia. It was,_mor-eover, #ith tnis aim in mino tnai tne *este- participants demanded that the reductions provided for by the agreement should take the form ;aa;-truction.
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 478
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th April 1990 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 9th April 1990.
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RECOMMENDATION 479 
'
on the establishment of a just, percelul and secure order in Europe -
prospects stemming from developments in Central and Easten Europez
The Assembly,
I
(i) Welcoming the fact that the developments which started with the pelgstrorka movement in the
tiSSn and contiiued in.many Central and Eastern European countries in 1989 at last make it possible
to consider establishing a new, peaceful order throughout Europe;
(it) Considering, nevertheless, that there is still much uncertainty about the future and stability of
those countries;(iii) Noting with satisfaction the considerable progress made in the CFF: negoti.ations and grati{ed
itrit ttre co[ntries concerned are considering-starting further negotiations, shortly after a first
agreement is signed, to reduce even further the level of forces and armaments in Europe;(iv) Welcoming also the convening of a conference of heads of state or of government in 1990 to give
new scope to the cscE process;
(v) Noting the broad convergence between proposals by Eastern and Western European countries to
live EuropJ as a whole econbmic, juridical and cultural structures designed to organise a new
European order;
(vi) Anxious, however, not Jo precipate the premature disb_andment of organisations which have so
iai ensured peace in Europe since this would make it more diffrcult to establish this new peaceful order
and consideiing that the bases of European security should be maintained for as long an interim period
as necessary;
II
(t) Welcoming the progress made towards reuniting the German people in a single p^o_litical system,
wtrictr is one of the main aims that the WEU member countries set themselves in 1954;
(ii) Considering that the attainment of this aim implies a negotiated qgreqqlegt_ between the two
German states and noting that it calls for an understanding on the status of unified Germany between
the two states and the four responsible powers;(iii) Considering that the countries of Europe as a whole are concerned by the formation of a new
German state at the heart of Europe;(iv) Considering that the pennanency of the present frontiers of Germany must be confirmed by a
prior undertakingly the two German siates, together with one by the other European countries, for the
ireation of a German state not to jeopardise what has been gained in European integration nor to be an
obstacle to the establishment of a new peaceful order in Europe;(v) Noting that many provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty apply, for fifty years at least, to the
Fi:derat nep-ubtic of G-ermany and that they cannot be infringed without a revision of the treaty;
(vi) Recalling that the Council has decided to proceed with such a revision as soon as the accession of
Portugal and Spain becomes effective;
(vii) Considering that the geographical situation and strength of a unified German state make it unde-
sirable to $ant it neutral status;
(virfl Noting also that the integration of the entire German territory in NATO seems unacceptable to
many Central and Eastern European countries;
Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd March 1990 during the extraordinary session (3rd sitting).
Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pontillon on behalf of the Political Committee (Document l2l6).
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Qn Considering, however, that it is essential for the new German state to be integrated in aEuropean collective security system with which the United States and Canada remain ass6ciateO anO
constituting in itself the nucleus of an all-European security system;
m
(r) Noting that in a 
-period of instability it is.hardly des-irable to add to the degree and variety ofuncertainty and hence the maintenance of ihe alliances-is a factor of peace and orde?in Er-p;;ai'dt
as a new security order has not been organised throughout Europe;
(iy' 
. 
Considering.that the reduction of armed forces stationed in Europe makes it necessary to
conduct an immediate review of the deployment of NATO forces;(!itl. Considering that the forces of the WEU countries will have a larger part to play in this newdeployment than heretofore;(iv) Considering that all the western countries have to limit their military expenditure;(v) 
. 
Coasidering, therefore,,that closer co-operation between WEU member countries for their joint
security is becoming essential;(vt) Considering that, for this reason, the European members of the alliance will have to exercisegtreater poJitical responsibilrlies, particularly in legard to arms control, organising tt e coffectiui
security. of Euroae as a whole and defence igainst any threat from outside tfie aiefcovered Ui ttriNorth Atlantic Treaty,
RrcouurNos rHAT rne CouNcrr-
I
l. Draw without delay the first conclusions from the study it is conducting into the consequences of
a CFE agreement for Europe's security and inform the Assembly accordingly;
2. Extend this study subsequently to cover all the consequences ofthe changes in Eastern Europe;
3. Prepare carqfully a joint position for the WEU countries in regard to matters within its purview
that are included in the agenda of the CSCE;
II
l. Inform the AssemPly 
_whether the commitments entered into by the Federal Republic ofGermany under the modified Brussels Treaty are also valid for a unified German state;
?. _ Befo-re anyrevision of the modified Brussels Treaty, analyse the consequences of a devolution ofthe Federal Republic of Germany's cpmmitments to a uirified German state-for the application of the
treaty and the platform adopted in The Hague, paying particular attention to:
(a) ceoperation between WEU and NATO, provided for in Article IV of the treaty;
(b) t\pleryentation of miliQry as_sistance in the conditions laid down in Article V and paragraphIII.4 of the platform of The Hague, specifying on which frontiers member countries arjn6*
obliged to contribute to the defence of Germany;
(c) applicglion to any state that succeeds the German Democratic Republic of Article VII
according to which the high contracting parties will participate in ho coalition directed
against any of them;
(d) implementation of Article VIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, Protocols Nos. II, III and IV and, in par-
ticular, Annex I to Protocol No. tttbn-determining the level of forces, renunciation of-thgproduction of certain armaments and control of the application of 'the relevant under-
takings;
(e) respect for Article XII flrxing the period after which each member country shall have the rightto cease to be a party to the treaty;
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of this analysis;
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4. Ensure that the states participating in the conference that will define the status of Germany are
duly and fully informed of these results so that they may take account of the gnarantees.offered 
_by the
modified Brussels Treaty for the security of both Germany and its neighbouring countries and for the
establishment of a new peaceful and secure order in Europe;
m
l. Explore forthwith the possibilities offered by WEU as a medium for assessilg possible threats to
member iountries and for research into the prospects of an all-European security area for which it
might eventually be an appropriate framework, in particular:
(a) for defining a sufficiency threshold in defence matters;
(b) for analysing the concept of shared security;
(c) for developing means of arbitration, confidence-building measures and disarmament;
2. Use WEU as a lever for a new European security order in which it might:
(a) guarantee the intangibility of its members' frontiers, including those resulting from the unifi-
cation of the two German states;
(D/ ensure respect for the commitments entered into by its members in the context of agreements' 
timiting forces or arrnaments or the non-production of certain weapons;
3. Assess the level of forces that WEU countries should deploy for Europe's security and agree on a
fair sharing of the efforts required;
4. Use the modified Brussels Treaty as the juridical basis for the presence of forces of member
states on the territory of other member states insofar as their presence would help to strengthen a
peaceful order in Europe;
5. Convene regular meetings of chiefs-of-staff of member countries to examine European 4rmq-
ments requiremenls, thus givin-g political impetus to the standardisation and joint production of such
armaments;
6. Draw up a programme for the joint organisation of verif,rcation measures required for the appli-
cation of the CFE agreements;
7. For this purpose, pursue further its study of the possibility of setting up a European observation
satellite agency;
8. Have the WEU Institute for Security Studies organise a pennanent exchange of information with
the Eastern European countries on milit-ary deployment in Europe and the application of the CFE
agreements;
9. Keep the public regularly informed of work carried out by its specialised_gtroups to allow
European bubtic-opinion to beiome aware of co-operation in the framework of WEU.
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No reply has yet been received from the Council.
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